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	NOTA INTRODUTÓRIA 
 
Este trabalho se articula em torno de dois objetivos. O primeiro será reconstruir a 
abordagem de Hannah Arendt sobre o pária. O pária será o eixo temático com o qual 
pretendo reproduzir, criticamente, o percurso do pensamento de Arendt partindo de 1944, 
quando a autora afirmou a “suprema importância” do pária para a reavaliação da 
humanidade (The Jew as a Pariah), passando por 1951, quando a autora reclamou uma 
“nova lei” e um “novo princípio” para garantir a dignidade humana (The Origins of 
Totalitarianism), e chegando, mas não parando, em 1958, momento em que Arendt 
afirmou a pluralidade como condição básica da vida humana (The Human Condition). O 
segundo objetivo será questionar a atualidade do pária tendo em vista problemas de 
política contemporânea. Esta transposição não é simples nem evidente, pois, como Arendt 
lembrava, a história se faz com rupturas, não com repetições. A história não nos ensina 
muito, mas ensina algo - e, nos termos de Arendt, os elementos do passado não deveriam 
servir como corrimão ao pensamento, mas como forças fragmentárias, como exemplos e 
como memórias que podemos representar, fazendo-os presente de novo, na tarefa de 
pensar e julgar a atualidade. 
Ambos os objetivos, a reconstrução dos termos de Arendt e avaliação de sua 
relevância, não estão necessariamente separados nos capítulos a seguir. Há momentos em 
que o texto pende para a descrição de experiências e de conceitos estabelecidos, e 
momentos em que se propõe a julgar o sentido, sobretudo o sentido político, do que está 
apresentado. Mas os dois objetivos se mesclam na pergunta pelo significado do pária. Por 
fim, cabe uma nota sobre a opção pelo texto em inglês: nos últimos dois anos, pela 
possibilidade e depois pela confirmação do estágio no exterior, passei a escrever os 
resultados de minha pesquisa, e projetos auxiliares, em inglês. Mantive a escolha para a 
redação do texto final, que foi lido, discutido e apresentado em contextos em que o inglês 
era a língua mais indicada para uma divulgação mais ampla do trabalho. Com esta 
decisão, eu sabia que restringiria as possibilidades do meu texto pelo uso de uma língua 
que não me é natural, e sabia também que correria o risco de apresentar o texto num inglês 
com expressões ligeiramente aportuguesadas em determinadas passagens (pelo que conto 
com a compreensão dos avaliadores). Ao fim, espero que o risco tenha valido a pena.        
 
      
 
	 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘I didn’t mean to stay’, said K., ‘only to rest a little.  
That I’ve done, and now I’m off.’  
‘You’re no doubt surprised at the lack of hospitality,’ said the 
man, ‘but hospitality is not one of our customs,  
we don’t need visitors.’ 
(Franz Kafka, The Castle)  
 
 
 
The concept Jew was not easy to define.  
Of course, I rejoined.  
No easier than the concept German.”  
(Jakob Wasserman, My path as German and Jew)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESUMO 
 
Esta tese pergunta pelo sentido do pária na obra de Hannah Arendt, buscando 
compreende-lo dentro do sentido mais amplo do pensamento político da autora. A 
pesquisa teve como ponto de partida artigos reunidos na coletânea Escritos Judaicos, em 
que a autora tratou do pária pelo viés de experiências dos judeus europeus, sobretudo 
entre o século 19 e o século 20; passou por Origens do Totalitarismo (1951), texto em 
que Arendt definiu o movimento de exclusão e destruição de párias europeus, em especial 
os judeus, como o “agente catalítico” do colapso da Europa; chegando a textos como A 
Condição Humana (1958), em que Arendt apresentou a pluralidade e a unicidade como 
novos princípios requeridos pela reconstrução da dignidade humana num contexto pós-
totalitário. Articulando-se de forma não-monística, este texto tem, como eixos, temas da 
obra de Arendt como a assimilação, tentativa de absorção de judeus e outros párias pelo 
“social”; a despersonalização, movimento radical de dissolução da personalidade e 
alienação do “eu” em favor de forças históricas; e a unicidade, como condição básica de 
seres humanos plurais e insubstituíveis. O trabalho sustenta, de forma geral, que a 
experiência do pária, levando em conta sua exclusão, desaparecimento e tentativa de 
reaparecimento, é um exemplo fundamental para a ação e o pensamento políticos na 
contemporaneidade. 
Palavras-chave: pária; assimilação; despersonalização; totalitarismo; 
pluralidade.   
 
 
      
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation questions the meaning of the pariah in Hannah Arendt’s work, 
aiming at its comprehension within the broader context of Arendt’s political thought. The 
research departed from articles published in the anthology The Jewish Writings, in which 
Arendt approached the pariah relying on experiences of European Jews, mainly between 
the 19th and the 20th centuries; dealt with The Origins of Totalitarianism, text in which 
she defined the exclusion and destruction of European pariahs, specially Jews, as the 
“catalytic agent” of Europe’s broader collapse; arrived at texts such as The Human 
Condition (1958), in which Arendt presented plurality and uniqueness as new principles 
required by the reestablishment of human dignity in a post-totalitarian world. Developed 
in non-monistic lines, this text deals with topics of Arendt’s work, as assimilation, the 
attempt of absorption of Jews and other pariahs by the “social”; depersonalization, the 
radical movement of dissolution of personality and alienation of the ego towards 
historical forces; and uniqueness, as a basic condition of plural and irreplaceable human 
beings. It holds, in broad terms, that the pariah’s experience, its exclusion, disappearance 
and attempt of reappearance, is a fundamental example for acting and thinking politically 
in the present world.           
Key-words: pariah; assimilation; depersonalization; totalitarianism; plurality.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
PROLOGUE: THE PROBLEM OF POLITICS AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF 
PLURALITY 
 
 
“Doesn’t the care for existence 
clearly precede everything else – 
every virtue and every principle?”  
(Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics) 
 
  
In September 1950, Hannah Arendt wrote in her “thinking-diary”: “Problem der 
Politik: Problem der Gründung”.1 The problem of politics is the problem of foundation. 
To be clear, she did not write that the problem of politics is the lack of foundation. She 
wrote instead: the problem of politics is the problem of foundation. I begin with this 
reference, because in the last period of my research I realized that the question I was 
asking – what does it mean to be pariah? – required addressing another, more general, 
perhaps more difficult one: what is the meaning, or what are the main meanings, of 
Arendt’s work? Are there a discernible intention, a set of thematic and problems, in which 
Arendt’s reader could contextualize her work, interpret her arguments, and understand, 
even if not agreeing with, her unfamiliar2 definitions of familiar concepts?  
These questions, though, form more than a theoretical framework to my inquiry 
on the pariah’s meanings. I do not ask them merely to gain some introductory clarity, but 
to explore the assumption that the political thinking of Hannah Arendt, if needed an 
epitome, could be called a pariah’s thinking. Although any rigid classification of Arendt’s 
work is unfit to her claim that thinking is “out of order”,3 I assume that this poses no 
challenge to the proposed epitome, because the pariah is, precisely, the one who is “out 
of order”. Moreover, the problem of political grounding (“Problem der Gründung”) is 
related, in Arendt’s perspective, to the pariah situation: groundlessness and wordlessness, 
the quest for a common-ground and the loss of a common space, are both imbricated as 
theoretical and political problems. 
Let me start with a few notes on the theoretical problem. The question on the 
theoretical orientation of Arendt could be reframed, to use an academic vocabulary, as 
																																								 																				
1 Arendt, H. Denktagebuch. 1950 bis 1973. Erster Band. München/Berlin: Piper. 2016, p. 36 
2 Young-Bruhel, E. Why Arendt Matters. New Haven: Yale Uni. Press. 2006, p. 79  
3 Arendt, H. ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, Social Research, Vol. 51, No. 1/2, Spring/Summer 1984, 
p. 16 
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follows: is there a normativity, a regulative intention, in her work? If there is, what are its 
content and its relation to the pariah? At a first glance, the answer seems simple. Yes, 
Arendt’s work is filled with what one would call normative prescriptions. The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, for instance, described as an articulation of the questions which her 
“generation had been forced to live…What happened? Why did it happen? How could it 
have happened?”, did not unfold an “objective” description of the past.4 Arendt herself 
declared that she did not work as a traditional historian, who wants to preserve its object, 
but as someone who wanted to destroy it.5 
Arendt dismissed the call for cold objectivism, especially regarding the events she 
was forced to face. While writing the first pages of The Origins, she worked with the 
provisory title The Burden of Our Times. This burden “demonstrated”, in Arendt’s words, 
“that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can be found only in a new political 
principle”.6 Accepting the “organic link”7 between The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951) 
and The Human Condition (1958), I read the latter as a sort of declaration of this “new 
political principle”, this “new law on earth”, which Arendt vindicated in the first text. In 
the process of writing The Human Condition, Arendt’s intellectual mood changed while 
she incorporated new problems into a framework larger than that of Origins.8 
Nevertheless, the accumulation of unparalleled political experiences was in the 
background of a book described by its own author “as a reconsideration of the human 
condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears” 
(emphasis added).9 The reader of the book, in this sense, would hardly find anything 
purely empirical in her account of the activities of labor, work, action and its correlated 
distinctions and meanings. On the contrary, critics of Arendt found it too “idealist”.10    
																																								 																				
4 Arendt, H. The Origins of Totalitarianism. London: Penguin Classics. 2017, p. xxix (Henceforward, OT) 
5 “…my first problem was how to write historically about something – totalitarianism – which I did not 
want to conserve but, on the contrary, felt engaged to destroy”. Arendt, H. ‘A Reply to Eric Voegelin’, In: 
The Portable Hannah Arendt. Edited by Peter Baehr, New York: Penguin, 2003, p. 158. Also: “…the 
confusion in the issue of ‘objectivity’ was to assume that there could be answers without questions…”. 
Arendt, H, ‘The Concept of History’, Between Past and Future: eight exercises in political thought. New 
York: Penguin Books, 2006, p. 49 (Henceforward, BPF) 
6 Arendt, OT, pp. x-xi 
7 See the introduction to the second edition of The Human Condition, by Margaret Canovan. Arendt, H. 
The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998, p. xi (Henceforward, HC) 
8 Young-Bruhel, op. cit., p. 79 
9Arendt, H, HC, p. 5. In The Origins…, in the beginning of the part (2) on imperialism, Arendt assumed 
“looking at this close and yet distant past with the too-wise eyes of those who know the end of the story in 
advance”. Arendt, OT, p. 159  
10 L. Botstein, a favorable reader of Arendt, admits that “There is an inherent idealism in her [Arendt’s] 
writing about the possibilities of politics”. Botstein, L. ‘Liberating the Pariah’, In: Thinking in Dark Times: 
Hannah Arendt on ethics and politics. Berkowitz, R.; Katz, J.; Keenan, T. New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2010, p. 166 
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Yet the topic of normativity in Arendt requires second thoughts. While some see 
too much idealism, even utopianism, in her writings, others point to a “normative lacuna”. 
Others, less sympathetic, even accuse the author of a “permissible” mentality that could 
foster evils she was trying to prevent. Still others delineate a border between moral (thus 
normative) and existential (thus normative-free) elements in Arendt’s theory. In the 
search for a label, to be derived either from descriptive or normative contents, readers and 
researchers suggested Arendt’s foundationalism or anti-foundationalism, her Hellenism, 
modernism or “reluctant” modernism, her republicanism or elitism, her Aristotelian, 
Kantian or Heideggerian roots, not to mention the attempts to solve the enigma of her 
supposed left or right leaning.11 
In a summary about pluralism, for instance, a reader may find sub-classifications 
such as socio-cultural pluralism, liberal pluralism, pluralism of difference, federal 
pluralism, individual pluralism – all terms that, now and then, can point to some facets of 
the work of Hannah Arendt, but never capture its depth and extension.12 Instead of being 
labeled, I think that Arendt’s work is properly understood around a set of questions. These 
questions refer not only to Hitler and Stalin, but to broader processes in which problems 
and paradoxes of the modern ethos were, as she used to say, “crystallized”13 – problems 
and paradoxes such as “a rebellion against human existence”14, an “unnatural growth of 
the natural”, the problem of grounding political authority, all entangled with the 
																																								 																				
11 Here is Seyla Benhabib’s notorious reference to the “normative lacuna” in Arendt’s theory: “Although 
Hannah Arendt’s conception of politics and of the political is quite inconceivable, unintelligible even, 
without a strongly grounded normative position in universalistic human rights, equality, and respect, one 
does not find her engaging in any such exercises of normative justification in her writings.” Benhabib, S. 
The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996, p. 194. For the controversial 
review of Arendt’s work by Martin Jay, in which he detected Arendt’s “existential mentality proclaiming 
the permissibility and possibility of everything”, see: Jay, M. ‘The Political Existentialism of Hannah 
Arendt’. In: Permanent Exiles: essays on the intellectual migration from Germany to America. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985, pp. 237-256. For G. Kateb’s distinction between “existential values” and 
“morality”, according to which Arendt “seems suspicious of morality, as if she had an allergy to it”, see 
Kateb, G. “Existential Values in Arendt’s Treatment of Evil and Morality”. In: Politics in Dark Times: 
Encounters with Hannah Arendt. Edited by Seyla Benhabib. New York: Cambridge Uni. Press, 2010, p. 
343  
12 Vincent, A. The Nature of Political Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, See Chapter 7: 
“Segmented Foundations and Pluralism”  
13 For Arendt’s refusal of “causality” as a historiographical method (“Methode in den 
Geschichtswissenschaften”), and her emphasis on “crystalized elements”, see: Arendt, H. Denktagebuch. 
Erster Band, p. 96. 
14 Arendt, HC, p. 2 
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development of mass societies in conditions previously unknown. In this sense, her 
pariah’s philosophy is also a philosophy of modern crisis.15  
If one places these modern crisis – and the political-philosophical “problem of 
grounding” – at the center of Arendt’s enterprise, the debate between the excess and the 
deficit of normativity turns out to be, I believe, artificial. Those who charge Arendt with 
“idealism” miss the point that she, as a political writer, wrote a response, anchored in 
principles, to this major crisis of the modern ethos. She judged human realities (one of 
her conclusions being precisely the contemporary fear of judgment). Yet her “idealism” 
was not arbitrary: against the naturalization of a-political and anti-political processes, she 
tried to reestablish political “ideas”. She, for instance, did not regard the Greek polis as a 
nostalgic object, but did try to recover some of its lost principles, to recover the principle 
of polis, in order to respond to the modern loss of public spaces. Arendt’s criticism, in 
this sense, was “politically immanent”16, as an attempt to make clear to Western 
civilization how it collapsed, and how it could, if it could, begin anew. 
The charge of lack of normativity misses the point too, but in a different way. This 
point deserves a little more attention. Arendt barely, if ever, used the term norm. Her 
writings rarely display imperative verbs, as ought, must, should. To the reader of The 
Human Condition, she wrote “this book does not offer an answer”.17 Arendt did not, 
moreover, worry with being “effective” or “impacting” – that was a typical masculine 
concern, she noted.18 This was not a matter of modesty. The core of the question lies in 
the concept of norm itself, and its uses. Arendt realized that the crisis of modernity 
coincided with the end of traditional normativity. Grounding-norms proved to be 
ineffective and, in a special sense, even destructive from a political point of view. In what 
follows, I will approach the political problems of what I call, in provisory terms, 
traditional normativity, trying to reproduce Arendt’s main concerns with traditional 
																																								 																				
15 Jerome Kohn emphasizes where (between the “no longer” of a lost tradition and the “not yet” of an 
unpredictable future) and about what (the main crisis of our age) Arendt wrote. Kohn, J. Introduction to 
Between Past and Future, p. xviii   
16 According to C. Volk, Arendt’s analysis of the loss of humanity “is not morally, ethically, or 
anthropologically motivated, but purely politically motivated.” Volk, C. ‘The Decline of Order: Hannah 
Arendt and the Paradoxes of the Nation-State’, In: Politics in Dark Times…, p. 197.  
17 Arendt, HC, p. 5. Although this is a contestable affirmation (Arendt does provide principles and criteria 
to redefine our political models), it registers her hesitation in embracing a strict normative attitude. 
18 In the interview with Günter Gaus, answering if she wanted her work to be “effective” (the original word 
is “Wirkung”: “Wollen Sie mit diesen Arbeiten eine Wirkung auch in der Breite erzielen…?”), Arendt 
replied that she did want to understand, not to be “effective” or influential; that, whenever another person 
understood the same meaning she did, she had a pleasant feeling of being at home [“dann gibt mir das eine 
Befriedigung wie ein Heimatgefühl”]. Arendt, H. “Fernsehgespräch mit Günter Gaus”. Ich Will Verstehen: 
Selbstauskünfte zu Leben und Werk. Piper: München/ Berlin, 2016, pp. 48-49   
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foundations. I will also try to illuminate some aspects of the new foundation proposed by 
Arendt to the political experience. 
 
1.1 The Problem of Traditional Foundations  
Western civilization (meaning a series of political communities built around ideas 
and events in a chronological, geographical and cultural continuum) was assumed to be 
grounded upon firm religious commandments, supported by established metaphysical and 
philosophical truths. It was assumed that human nature, even in its essential possibilities, 
was contained within cognizable forms of behavior. Man was conformed to a defined 
scheme of things, according to which even its deviations towards violence (its sins, 
theologically speaking) were predictable and controllable – as, precisely, marginal 
deviations of the norm. But these norms proved to be ineffective both as descriptions of 
man (what were his possibilities) and as prohibitions for man (what he could do and not 
do). The problem, for Arendt, was not the specific content of norms, nor the quality of 
arguments proving the validity of these norms. The nature of the problem was, at a first 
moment, practical, not philosophical: religious and moral norms were no longer guiding 
disoriented masses. Totalitarianism, and the scale of displacement, manipulation and 
mass killing of superfluous human beings, was a factual proof that “Thou shall not kill”, 
for instance, was no longer valid, and that vast segments of European populations did not 
recognize the old codes.  
Moreover, an immediate attempt of reestablishing the old norms (a restoration of 
religion and morality, for instance), apart from being counter-factual, would be also 
uncritical, for it would leave unexamined the problematic relation between norms, 
compliance and behavior. There was, according to Arendt, a “nonthinking” 
presupposition within established codes and norms, which ended up compromising the 
political sphere and the awareness of individual consciousness. It seemed that masses 
simply wanted codes to conform to: “The faster men held to the old code, the more eager 
will they be to assimilate themselves to the new”.19 Thus, the fact that Arendt did not 
reapply the standards of a failing normative order was explained less as a matter of 
skepticism, and more by the call of “facing up to reality”, of understanding the 
problematic relation between traditional normativity and political perplexities unfolded 
in the twentieth century.  
																																								 																				
19 Arendt, ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, p. 27 
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She did not replace, I argue, one norm for another. She dismissed instead the 
traditional relation between codified commandments and political action. Her search for 
a “new law” was simultaneous to her criticism of the relation between the man who 
prescribes norms and the man who engages in action, in other terms, between philosophy 
and politics. For Arendt, traditional search for a firm political ground presupposed a 
hostility against the dynamics of politics. A well-grounded, orderly politics conformed to 
a compelling truth: that was the model established, as Arendt always reminded, by Plato’s 
ideocracy, which remained dominant in the Western tradition of political theory.20 In this 
regard, traditional fabrication of a ground for politics was established not by political 
beings themselves, but by an isolated man who had just seen his fellow citizens 
condemning his mentor to death. The founding experience of political theory was marked 
by the withdraw of its founder, who was suspicious of public deliberation, and assumed 
that an ideocracy could stabilize public affairs. Politics was imagined through a 
philosophical withdraw of the self towards the self.21  
This did not mean that the “construction of a deity”22, as the foundation of politics, 
was ineffective, in the sense of not producing results. Arendt noted that the substitution 
of political action for the controlled making of a city and its citizens creates forms of 
government whose problem “is not that they are cruel, which often they are not, but rather 
that they work too well.”23 These forms of deity-grounded governments, whose “most 
obvious salvation from the dangers of plurality is mon-archy, or one-man-rule”, normally 
produce the “short-rage advantages of tyranny, the advantages of stability, security, and 
productivity”.24 An absolutely grounded politics seems to solve two problems at once: the 
justification for ruling, and the effects of this ruling in terms of social cohesion and 
productivity.  
																																								 																				
20 Arendt, H. ‘Philosophy and Politics’, Social Research, Vol. 71, No. 3, Fall 2004, p. 431 
21 Jerome Kohn notes: “On the one hand, thinking discloses the self to the self, thecondition of which is 
the thinker’s withdrawal from the world, while on the other, acting displays the self to other selves, the 
condition of which is theactor’s appearance in the world.” Kohn, J. ‘Hannah Arendt’s Jewish Experience’, 
In: Thinking in Dark Times: Hannah Arendt on ethics and politics…, 2010, p. 181  
22 Arendt, HC, p. 11 
23 Arendt, HC, pp. 220-221. See also: “Only if seen in the image of a working activity, could political action 
be trusted to produce lasting results. And such lasting results meant peace, the peace needed for 
contemplation: No change”. Arendt, H. ‘Labor, Work, Action’, In: The Portable…, 2003, p. 169  
24 Arendt, HC, p. 222. The whole sentence reads: “It is the obvious short-range advantages of tyranny, the 
advantages of stability, security, and productivity, that one should beware, if only because they pave the 
way to an inevitable loss of power, even though the actual disaster may occur in a relatively distant future.”  
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But, according to Arendt, an absolute ground has an important side-effect: “the 
banishment of citizens from the public realm”.25 A ground fabricated without public 
participation, and the subsequent establishment of a concentrated ruling-authority, “pave 
the way to an inevitable loss of power”. The problem of grounding, if we agree with 
Arendt, when solved with seemingly productive shortcuts turns out to aggravate, even if 
only gradually, the problem of politics. It reinforces the suspicion towards politics, and 
establishes politically-emptied structures of ruling and dictating. In a very subtle way, 
“facing up to” complex and multi-sided processes which formed what I am calling the 
crisis of modernity, Arendt suggested that the “disappearance of the ancient city-state”26, 
symbolized by the decline of Athens, the trial of Socrates and the Platonic reaction, 
marked the beginning of the gradual disappearance of politics itself, and the emergence 
of fictional stabilizations of the political. 
This is a too general statement, for it ignores important complementary processes 
and divergent tendencies which were rarely abstracted by Arendt in a linear diagnosis. I 
believe, yet, it captures, at least in an introductory tone, some elements of the set of 
questions around Arendt’s thought. For this work, moreover, it signals how the problem 
of grounding, the fabrication of solutions, and the “banishment of citizens from the public 
realm” are related. No less important, the “banishment of citizens” from spheres of power 
was, as we shall see in detail, a kind of prelude to the attempt of expelling pariahs from 
earth. Writing on the “loss of power” created, paradoxically, by absolute foundations, 
Arendt reminded that “the actual disaster may occur in a relatively distant future”.27 In 
the pariah-case, considering the ancient search for a solid foundation, groundlessness 
became, centuries later, as we shall see, a literal reality to millions of people. 
      
1.2 The Problem of Modern Politics 
Pre-modern world was structured upon fabricated norms, dependent on traditional 
metaphysics and introspective truths. These worldless truths were defined in terms of self-
evidence, immediate revelation, and philosophical self-reference – all speechless 
foundations. Civilization changed, and with it sources of political and philosophical 
authority changed as well, but the pattern remained more or less intact; an immediate, 
absolute ground founded a static world-picture, whose fundamental (grounding) myths 
																																								 																				
25 Ibid., p. 221 
26 Ibid., p. 14 
27 Ibid., p. 222 
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were beyond dispute. Politically, the dominant form of those mythological-orders was the 
govern of one-man, with the effect of “banishment” of people from public affairs, that is, 
from the spheres of deliberation and initiative. 
Modern revolutions changed this scenario. Established ground-myths were 
overthrown, not only symbolically: the end of the 18th century and the 19th century 
testified a succession of revolutionaries attempts, directed against monarchs of an ancient 
order. Mythical foundations were de-legitimized, rejected as outdated sources of 
authority. Yet the modern takeover on the old structures, according to Arendt, did not 
solve the problem of foundation. In a way, it only aggravated the problem. I contend that 
it is regarding these questions that Arendt’s supposed nostalgia of antiquity should be 
challenged. What seemed a promising beginning of men’s emancipation, indeed, 
liberated processes that, seen retrospectively, threatened politics even more radically than 
old tyrannies. For Arendt, the crisis of modernity, with its different outcomes in the 20th 
century, was not caused by forces of reaction delaying progress; it was shaped by forces 
generated by modern dynamics themselves.28 
Let me focus this point in detail. There is a phrase of Arendt on Kant’s 
transcendental revolution which is elucidative: “Men never seemed to have risen so high 
and at the same time to have fallen so low”.29 Kant put tradition, that is, traditional 
metaphysical assumptions, on trial, judging it, proving its limitations and condemning its 
fallacies. In our terms, Kant’s revolutionary tribunal overthrew established myth-grounds, 
not out of an iconoclastic passion, but out of a critical, assumedly empowering, enterprise. 
Reason, as the new judge-legislator, was accessible to every-man, endowed now with a 
critical capacity of contesting fabricated myths of public banishment. Relying on reason, 
not on traditional foundations, men could enter a stage of political maturity.30 
But Kant’s “calling of each individual to think for himself”31, more a philosophical 
than a political manifesto, was limited in form and in practice. In form, because Kant 
criticized the possibilities of thinking in terms of knowledge of reality. Kant liberated 
thought only to recognize its own limitations. In practice, because Kant, aware of the gap 
																																								 																				
28 This is how Arendt closed the Part on ‘Imperialism’ in The Origins…: “The danger is that a global, 
universally interrelated civilization may produce barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of 
people into conditions which, despite all appearances, are the conditions of savages.” Arendt, OT, p. 396 
29 Arendt, H. Was Ist Existenz Philosophie? Frankfurt am Main: Hain, 1990, p. 19 
30 Kant, I. “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?”. Practical Philosophy. Translated and 
Edited by Mary J. Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  “Maturity” is the translation of 
Mündigkeit, which relates to “Mündig” (mature) and “Mund” (mouth), meaning the phase when one 
becomes able to think and speak for itself.   
31 Kant, ibid., 8:36, p. 18 
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between rational principles and empirical adherence to these principles, knew very well 
that concrete men would not become suddenly enlightened, and that an “age of 
enlightenment” was not the same as an “enlightened age”.32 Kant, as Arendt stated, 
“robbed men of the ancient security in Being”33, but did not (because he could not) 
reestablish a stable ground to modern theory and practice.  
Kant re-postulated a “transcendence”, but it was then a transcendence which man 
found only within himself, a kind of assumed fabrication. It could tell something of the 
being of man, but not of the being of reality. It were as if Kant, moved by a philosophical 
radical drive for inquiry (but not by a political radicalism), collapsed the old structures, 
including the old identification between thinking and being – and, at the same time, 
regretted this collapse in political and moral terms. Man could destroy the old 
metaphysical castles, but the destruction of actual castles was a different matter. Without 
God and kings, man troubled himself trying to reconcile modern freedom with ancient 
stability. The alternatives seemed not as secure, not as grounded, as the old deities. 
What if men started longing for a firm ground, for the old closure provided by the 
“constructed deities”? God, as a thing-in-itself, could not be known, but as a practical 
idea, as a moral foundation, must be affirmed.34 Not every man was concretely rational 
and mature, so perhaps the old structure of commands and prohibitions should not be put 
on revolutionary trial. The solution could be to postulate that every man carried within 
himself a potential rational ruler, a ruler which coincided with every other man ruler, and 
this all-encompassing-ruler being deduced from a rational, a priori form of ruling.35 
Man’s actions were to be commanded by the logic structure of human mind in general – 
now, a sort of modern “ideocrat”.36 
																																								 																				
32 Kant, ibid., 8:40, p. 21 
33 Arendt, Was ist Existenz Philosophie?, p. 14 
34 On Kant’s defense of the idea of God (compared to which we don’t know any “better” concept) for 
grounding practical morality, see Kant. I. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1988, 
A589  
35 “It is true: without religion morality would have no incentives, all of which must be derived from 
happiness. The moral commands must carry with them a promise or a threat.” Kant, I. Notes and Fragments. 
Edited by Paul Guyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 19:181, p. 441 
36 Kant’s metaphysical state is derived from purely rational norms: “A state (civitas) is a union of a number 
of people under laws of right. To the extent that these are a priori necessary, that is, as long as these follow 
from these concepts of external right per se (i.e., are not statutory), the form of this state is the form of the 
state as such, that is, the state according to the idea of how the state should be according to pure principles 
of right....”. Also, grounding morality on metaphysics, Kant defined freedom as a state in which a subject 
“must be constrained (necessitated) [genötigt] to conform with the rule”. See Kant, ‘The Metaphysics of 
Moral’, In: Practical Philosophy. Introduction - III Preliminary Concepts of The Metaphysics of Morals 
(6:222) and Part II – Public Right; Section I – The Right of a State, § 45. p. 337, p. 456  
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Aware of this problem, Kant alerted that a revolution in principle should not be 
met with a revolution in practice.37 He criticized blind-obedient habits, calling everyone 
to discuss like a “scholar”, to debate publicly the terms of obedience, but without 
recommending actual disobedience. Moreover, free-discussion should be contained 
within the limits of the monarchic vertical structure of command, which was concentrated 
in the hands and the head of the only man who could say “Argue as much as you want 
and about whatever you want, but obey!” (the king).38 The king, in the model of top-down 
ruling, “unites in his will the collective will of the people.”39, while, at the same time, 
living in fear of offending God, whose “most sacred office” he is responsible for.40 The 
political model, even for the king himself, was the model of vertical ruling-and-obeying.  
The central point, for our discussion, is not the impasses of Kant’s philosophy in 
itself, nor his reluctance in embracing political implications that were beyond his 
historical imagination, but the position of Kant, with his antinomies, as the philosopher 
of modern revolutions, in special the French revolution.41 The perplexities of the modern 
condition, and in our particular, the perplexities regarding the “problem of grounding”, 
became explicit in the revolutionaries’ search for a ground to their actions. 
Revolutionaries experienced, in the political field, a similar deadlock experienced by 
Kant in his theoretical attempt to dismiss traditional transcendence with a man-made one. 
Could man become his own absolute ground? What would be the limitation of man’s 
actions in a universe with no higher authority than man himself? Was man ready to 
become an absolute foundation, a kind of ruler-and-ruled in the same being? 
Revolutions, in this sense, displaced traditional kings without dismissing 
traditional frameworks. This was nowhere more clear, according to Arendt, than in the 
revolutionaries vindication of an absolute foundation for their new foundations. Even the 
north-Americans revolutionaries, whom, according to Arendt, created stable structures of 
democratic and participative freedom, did not have the proper vocabulary to imagine 
																																								 																				
37 “A revolution may well bring about a falling off of personal despotism and of avaricious or tyrannical 
oppression, but never a true reform in one’s way of thinking; instead new prejudices will serve just as well 
as old ones to harness the great unthinking masses”. Kant, ‘An Answer...’, 8:37, p. 18 
38 Kant, ibid., 8:41, p. 22 
39 Kant, ibid., 8:40, p. 20. Kant ended the text linking “freedom” with the “principles of government” [die 
Grundsätze der Regierung], p. 22  
40 Kant, I. “Toward Perpetual Peace”. In: Practical Philosophy…, note to 8:353, p. 325. Kant here defended 
the king’s epithet of “administrator of the divine will on earth and its representative” [eines Verwesers des 
göttlichen Willens auf Erden und Stellvertreters desselben]. Kant, I. Zum Ewigen Frieden: ein 
philosophischer Entwurf. Texte zur Rezeption 1796-1800. Leipzig: Philipp Reclam. 1984, p. 18   
41 Arendt, op. cit., p. 17 
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neither to name their new beginning. In declaring their independence with the sentence 
“We hold these truths to be self-evident”, they unconsciously revealed their problem of 
paradigm, for “We hold” referred to a plural, deliberative, opinion-based foundation, 
while the expression “self-evident truths” tried to provide the new foundation a 
compulsory and perpetual character.42 This is also felt in the ambivalent role played by 
the word God, until these days, in north-American political discourse, as if a secular and 
plural republic could not find its own terms and own principles, needing instead to 
preserve a shadow of the old transcendences.43 
 
* 
In the essay What is Authority?, Arendt went back to the original “hostility” 
between Plato and the polis, which remained influential, in distinct forms and arguments 
throughout several theories, until the eclipse of tradition in the end of the 19th century. I 
will now summarize what I consider the main definitions, methods and projections that, 
in Arendt’s regard, de-politicized human relations. These were, in short, rejected by 
Arendt as grounds – “Gründe”, both as fundaments/grounds and reasons/causes – of the 
political:   
 
a) Plato’s search for an authority to the public realm took him into the “household 
and family life”, in which the head of the family ruled as a despot, and family members, 
servant and slaves labored and lived pressured by the necessities of physical endurance.44 
For Arendt, this remained as more than an analogy: the structure of command-obedience 
oriented towards laboring, producing, and feeding the basic needs of bodily life became 
paradigmatic in the Western tradition of political thought. This model gained even more 
influence with the modern “rise of the social”, in which entire political communities were 
regarded as “big families”, and the laboring-social process was organized by one-man (or 
																																								 																				
42 The sentence opens the second paragraph. In the first paragraph, the north-American revolutionaries 
declared that their acts were in accordance to the “Laws of Nature” and the “Nature of God”. ‘Declaration 
of Independence of the United States of America’. In: Hayden, P. The Philosophy of Human Rights. St. 
Paul: Paragon House, 2001, p. 343 
43 “…the men of the French Revolution no less than the founding fathers in America insisted on making 
the fear of an ‘avenging God’ and hence the belief in ‘a future state’ part and parcel of the new body politic.” 
Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’, BPF, p. 133. For Arendt, the problem was not that revolutionaries were 
dogmatic, but that they were caught, again, in the problem of grounding, in the relation between 
theology/philosophy and politics, and that they were suspicious of how men would behave without an 
absolute standard: “…they were clearly spoken not out of any dogmatic faith in the ‘avenging God’ but out 
of mistrust in the nature of man”. Ibid., p. 134  
44 Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’, pp. 104-105 
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by fictions forcing the one-ness of the social-family). In this case, the relative freedom of 
the political sphere was consumed by the unconditional necessities of laboring.  
b) another philosophical “solution” was to imagine the political as a technical 
realm; the “concept of expert”45 was introduced through the image of authoritative 
relations of command justified by a specific knowledge. The shipman sails the boat 
conducing its passengers; the shoemaker works alone, out of his idea (eidos), in the art of 
making the shoe; the physician is obeyed by his patients because he (the physician) has 
the know-how etc. The “making” model also became dominant in Western political 
thought, being, in its extreme form, related to the utopian model of “making” a city, a 
citizen, or even of making History in the exact terms imagined (better said, known) by 
the maker. Politics, in this sense, is regarded as an object to be fabricated by a single-
subject, which controls a “human material” and creates something out of it; 
d) an additional “solution” was the postulation of an immaterial reality, eventually 
formulated in mythical terms, as a kind of supreme realm to reign over, and determine, 
the sensitive and material reality of changing things. In this sense, the sphere of ideas was 
either translated into accessible ludic-tales regarding, for instance, the punishments and 
the rewards of a hereafter, or postulated, axiomatically, as “fundamental” realities that 
could not be verified by sensitive experience, nor relativized by a variety of 
interpretations.46 As in almost every other solution, the political lost its internal dynamics, 
its capacity to affirm something from its own activity, being reduced to a mean of 
achieving the stability (“No change”47) required by assumedly more important activities, 
such as religious worship or philosophical contemplation;     
c) a sort of “tyranny of reason”48 was delineated in the hierarchy in which the 
thinking life was supposed to find the “true being of things”, projecting it into the acting 
life, in the form rational compulsion. The transcendence, whether defined in terms of a 
natural essence, a logical self-evidence or a necessary telos (end), was to be taken as an 
absolute source of the normative-authority. The fact that concrete men and women did 
not act in accordance to such an ideal transcendence was explained in terms of bodily-
emotional misconducts (such as in the Platonic model), in terms of a constitutive gap 
																																								 																				
45 Ibid., p. 111 
46 Arendt referred to ancient mythological tales as a “solution” to the problem that “truth cannot be the 
object of persuasion”. For Plato, the multitude, relying on “appearances”, was not suited to grasp the self-
evident, immaterial truth. Hence, “persuading the citizens of the existence of hell will make them behave 
as though they knew the truth.” Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’, p. 132 
47 Arendt, ‘Labor, Work, Action’, p. 169 
48 Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’, p. 108 
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between the regulative-transcendent and the empirical-natural (in Kant, for instance), or 
as a mere question of a chronology, as in Marx, for whom Man would gradually produce 
himself (that is, produce its real essence) as History progressed. 
 
In these paradigms, we find one or another of the following aspects: a denial of 
speech by an introspective access to an immediate “ground”; a disregard of spatiality and 
temporality by an assumed eternal, a-temporal nature of politics; a block of change by a 
repetitive (or permanent) characterization of political relations. But the main a-political 
aspect of these models is their depiction of human beings as “multiple beings” of a same 
species or a same model, rendering their differences and particularities as inessential to 
political activity. In this sense, these methods wash away plurality by imagining a 
concentration of power in the hands of one or only a few rulers authorized to govern 
others. In my reading, nothing can be more anti-political for Arendt than undermining 
plurality by excluding faces and voices from public spaces.            
 
1.3 Are We Plural or Should We Be Plural?  
Now the question is whether plurality, as the human condition of politics, is an 
ought prescribed by Arendt’s theory, or something different. I remember an academic 
seminar, some years ago in Brazil, when a student challenged the claim that plurality is a 
given reality. According to him, nothing is given outside the space of conceptual 
apprehensions. In these terms, plurality is already a mental demarcation of the world, a 
subjective-conditioning of our perceptual experience, a sort of intellectual-social 
construct imposed by man’s into empirical reality. According to this position, there would 
be no independent external realities, only a given mental-framework to which experience 
must conform – a “space of reasons” upon which the task of philosophy would be only 
analyzing this space in terms of logical and conceptual coherence.49 
																																								 																				
49 It is not in the scope of this work to test Arendt’s anti-subjectivist claims against the background of 
contemporary philosophy of language. Without further elaboration, I can only register that I do not believe 
that the challenge presented, for instance, by W. Sellars against the “myth of given”, or the assumption of 
a non-inferential part of reality which would ground every other portion of perceived or thinkable realities 
(being thus the “ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims”), does contradict Arendt’s perspective. 
Perhaps Sellars’ takeover corroborates Arendt’s critique of foundational metaphysics and totalist 
ideologies. Arendt, I believe, would agree with a “space of reasons” if one understands it as the constant 
process of thinking and speaking about human realities and experiences. The “given” to which Arendt refers 
is not a foundational pack of knowledge. For the “myth of given”, see Sellars, W. Empiricism and The 
Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997,  p. 76     
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Most of Arendt’s project would make no sense if we concede to this subjectivist 
claim. Arendt not only refused the primacy of the conceptual over the real, she affirmed 
instead almost the opposite: that reality is “fortuitous”; that reality withstands outside the 
subject; that reality is unfolded by events, not by ideas; that, whenever a subject tries to 
create a “fiction” or an “image” of reality, “reality takes its revenge”; that the “impact of 
the world’s reality upon human existence is felt and received as a conditioning force”; 
that the impact of reality can be “shocking”; that reality, in its dynamic character, cannot 
be stabilized by fixed concepts, so that we must permanently “reconcile” our thoughts 
with reality, or constantly put reality into stories and narratives that re-actualize its 
meaning for us.50 
On the other hand, in “introspection”, according to Arendt, “nothing is involved 
except what the mind has produced itself”.51 Arendt parted both with the tradition which 
sought “the innermost meaning” of reality and with the “pragmatist” and “utilitarian” 
attempt to “impose upon reality the preconceived meaning and law of man”.52 For Arendt, 
one of the main aspects of the modern crisis was the retreat of man to “the prison of his 
own mind”53, and his search for grounds of truth and authority in the inner patterns of a 
logic or imaginative subjectivity. This man could not “experience the reality of what he 
himself is not”.54 Reality, in Arendt’s regard, is not reducible to an “essential” being, 
neither can it be fabricated by a human subject. Arendt was no metaphysician and no 
constructivist. 
She rejected, moreover, both the idea that men are governed by a super-human 
force and, simultaneously, that men, through an absolute mobilization, could generate in 
themselves an omnipotent force to control and fabricate reality. The main argument in 
Arendt’s rejection is that, when we speak of reality, we speak of human realities, that is, 
of a reality unfolded by the interactions of men and women in plural. Reality is 
“guaranteed by the presence of others”55, and “others” are flesh and bone beings who are 
in themselves unique instantiations of freedom. Peg Birmingham attributed to Arendt’s 
																																								 																				
50 See HC, p. 9, 137, f 2 (in which Arendt emphasized the German term “Gegenstand” to refer to the 
objective character of reality as standing “against” the subject), 252. Also: Arendt, ‘Truth and Politics’, 
BPF, p. 252, 257. ‘What is Authority?’, p. 135  
51 Arendt, HC, p. 280 
52 For Arendt, both traditions and methods had been “refuted by our experiences”. Arendt, ‘The Concept of 
History’, BPF, p. 86 
53 Arendt, HC, p. 288 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid., p. 199 
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plurality an anarchic element.56 I would rather say that plurality is marked not exactly by 
anarchy, but by a “plurarchy”, so that each human being is an arche, a beginning, a 
principle, a movement in itself.57 This human reality, generated and sustained by the 
dynamic “flux of action and speech”, cannot, for Arendt, be “solidify in words”58, 
specially by a philosophical discourse that tries to encapsulate the real in univocal word-
concepts.     
Ignoring this point means ignoring the willingness of Arendt to “see politics with 
eyes unclouded by philosophy”.59 As I am arguing, this is no marginal point to Arendt’s 
project. I believe that even serious and prolific readers of Arendt, mostly those who 
accused her lack of grounds or her deficit of normativity, do not pay the deserved attention 
to this point. Not coincidently, some of these scholars reproduce a traditional 
architectonic of a political philosophy grounded upon certain fundamental ideas or 
propositions. Seyla Benhabib, for instance, refused an “essentialist universalism” (“the 
belief that there is a fundamental human nature or human essence…”), but argued for a 
sort of “justificatory universalism” (“strong beliefs in the normative content of human 
reason…in the validity of procedures of inquiry, evidence, and questioning…”) and a 
“juridical universalism” (the application of universal principles to regulate national 
institutions and decisions), both grounded on a “moral universalism”. This “moral 
universalism” means an axiomatic affirmation of the “equal moral respect” entitled to 
every individual.60  
 Habermas, aware of the “tension between normative approaches, which are 
constantly in danger of losing contact with social reality, and objetivistic approaches, 
which screen out all normative aspects…”61, also refused human nature, historical 
teleology and established traditions as normative sources for political philosophy.62 He 
proposed not a divine transcendence, but a pragmatic transcendence of each citizen 
towards the understanding of the “structural conditions” for a “communicative 
																																								 																				
56 Birmingham, P. Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: the predicament of common responsibility. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006, p. 86 
57 For Arendt’s reflection on the polysemy of the Greek verb “archein”, see HC, p. 177 
58 Arendt, HC, p. 181 
59 “Ich will Politik sehen mit, gewissermaßen, von der Philosophie ungetrübten Augen.” Arendt, H. Ich 
will…, p. 47 
60 Benhabib, S. Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011, pp. 
63-68 
61 Habermas, J. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2015, p. 6-7 
62 Ibid., p. 3 
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rationality”, which enables a diversity of discursive-agents to engage in an “unlimited 
interpretation community”.63 In this community, there are no homogeneous norms of 
behavior, but only self-chosen norms for dialogue, argumentation, and verification-
processes. Homogenous norms (or, in Habermas’ terms, “crystallized complex of 
beliefs”64), could, and probably would, be challenged by skeptical discursive-agents. 
 I think that, despite the similarities between Arendt, Habermas, Benhabib (for 
instance, their refusal of naturalistic accounts and homogeneous norms, and their embrace 
of the binding aspect of speech), there are important differences, especially regarding 
their approach to the problem of political foundation. These differences cannot be 
minimized. To begin with, Benhabib’s “moral universalism”, working in the form of a 
subjective self-imposed maxim, a maxim which is quite similar to the old principle of 
reciprocity and mutual respect, still relies on the model of a transcendent subject that 
prescribes and orients actions out of an ideal morality. It remains a regulative norm, 
detached from specific political conditions and historical configurations.65 Moreover, as 
a presupposed (or self-supposed) norm, it falls prey to the problem of proof, justification 
and validation, which undermines every rationally prescribed norm in a post-
metaphysical universe.66 
 Habermas’ depiction of a communicative community does resemble some aspects 
of Arendt’s emphasis on the role of speech within horizontal spaces of deliberation. But 
I regard the Habermasian project as closer to Kant’s idea of a “scholarly” public debate 
concerning propositions and norms. Debate, and the related processes of “verification”, 
“will-formation”, “decision-making” etc. are, in my interpretation of Arendt, only a 
specific dimension of the political. An “intersubjective communication” is not, I believe, 
a proper frame for Arendt’s view on political realities, which are actual, concrete spaces 
where people share a world, appearing to each other not only in mental and symbolical 
terms. This sharing-a-world, this “being among men”67, is not merely a subjective-
linguistic exercise aimed at confronting and justifying statements (in other words: the 
world is not an intellectual forum).  
																																								 																				
63 Ibid., p. 19 
64 Ibid., p. 24 
65 For this reason, Benhabib introduced a distinction between a “generalized other” and a “concrete other”, 
both as ontological-normative principles prescribing the acceptance of the other in an abstract and an 
individual perspective. Benhabib, op. cit., p. 69  
66 Benhabib recognized an unavoidable question within this model: can a moral universalism subsist without 
an epistemological universalism?, Benhabib, op. cit., p. 63  
67 Arendt, HC, p. 51 
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Arendt, indeed, defended this spatial-experiential dimension of the political, 
defining “spaces” and “locations” of human activities.68 Isolation and loneliness were, 
according Arendt, radical forms of de-politicization, for men losing contact with others 
meant losing public reality itself. This contact, for her, was not merely mental, for, even 
if lonely, an individual man could still rely on the inner machinery of his mind. He could 
not, however, experience reality. Experience, differently from the circularity of self-
evident ideas, requires the possibility of “being affected and affecting the world”.69 In this 
perspective, politics requires more than sharing values or ideas subjectively. It relies on 
a “common sense”, a common way of being present and feeling and speaking about 
reality, a unifying sense “which regulates and controls all other senses and without which 
each of us would be enclosed in his own particularity…”.70 Sense, in my reading, refers 
both to meanings shared by fellow citizens, and to perceptive senses and emotions related 
to factual experiences. Politics, in short, requires more than an idea, a proposition, a 
symbol, a shared norm; it requires the presence of bodies, of faces and voices, of people 
with names, as “[a]ction without a name, a ‘who’ attached to it, is meaningless”.71  
 
1.4 Non-normative Grounds and Conditions  
If Arendt was not primarily interested in discussing priorities of norms nor in 
establishing mentally defined grounds, how can we, after all, understand her approach to 
the problem of political foundation? How can we understand the “new law” claimed by 
her to restore freedom and to guarantee dignity in a post-1945 scenario? If I am right in 
insisting that this new law avoided the frameworks of traditional norms, then what kind 
of “law” is this? In a first attempt of answer, I would like to recall Arendt’s article Was 
ist Existenz Philosophie?, in which she sided with Jaspers to defend a way of escaping 
the traps into which modern philosophy built some of its problems and its so-called 
solutions. Arendt then stated, 
 “Once the concrete world was freed from this specter of Being and from the 
illusion that we are capable of knowing that specter, philosophy was likewise freed from 
the necessity of having to explain everything monistically on the basis of one principle, 
that is, of this omnipresent substance. Instead, we can accept the ‘fragmentation of Being’ 
																																								 																				
68 See for instance the titles of the section 10 – “The Location of Human Activities” (Chapter II) and the 
reference to the “Space of Appearance” in the sections 28 and 29 (Chapter V); “Die Lokalisierung der 
Tätigkeiten” and “Erscheinungsraum” in the German edition. 
69 Assy, B. Hannah Arendt: An Ethics of Personal Responsibility. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. 2008, p. 
36 
70 Arendt, OT, p. 625 
71 Arendt, HC, 180-181.  
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(in which context Being no longer means the Being of the ontologies), and we can 
accommodate the modern sense of alienation in the world and the modern desire to create, 
in a world that is no longer a home to us, a human world that could become our home.”72 
 
For Arendt, it was no longer possible to restore the old identification between 
thought and things, between thinking and being, as there was no ontological ground to 
which men and women would conform in physical or metaphysical terms. Moreover, the 
modern retreat to subjectivity (that is, to the mind’s cognitive content) would not be a 
proper solution after the discovery of a metaphysically-emptied (or metaphysically 
inaccessible) world. It would be instead a form of escape into isolation, into fantasy, into 
arbitrariness, or, at best, into philosophical abstraction. The modern fear of fragmentation 
could be justified, but not “solved” by imagined forms projected by the subject onto the 
object. Moreover, the idea that the subject makes its object would be a shortcut to restore 
the old security of an unitarian Being – for, according to this position, if man can know 
the chair he makes, he could also know the reality he produces.73 
Indeed, it is not that modern man does not acknowledge anything existing outside 
himself. He does not acknowledge that the existent is given to him, because everything is 
created, fabricated, controlled by him. Even God became a function of the human mind, 
or a self-imposition of the human psyche, and even nature, which was not produced by 
man, could be now artificially re-produced by him. So Arendt called us to accept (not to 
postulate) the “fragmentation of Being” [Zerrissenheit des Seins]; to accept that, after 
Kant, we cannot fabricate a Ground to the Being and, at the same time, believe that this 
Ground comes from the Being. She called us to accommodate what moderns called 
“alienation” [Fremdheit] – a belief that we lost our true essence or nature, that we could 
re-discover it, and harmonize ourselves with it once again -, stating that, once we cease 
this impossible search for our true self, we may start building a home-structure in a world 
devoid of the old “security of being”.74 
																																								 																				
72 Arendt, H. Was Ist Existenz Philosophie? , p. 46.  
73 The distinction between “poeisis” and “praxis”, or, in Arendt’s terms, between work and action, was 
already indicated, but not sufficiently developed (according to Arendt), by Aristotle in his Nicomachean 
Ethics, in which “practice” is distinguished both from epistemic (episteme) and technical/productive 
knowledge (techne/poeisis). Men of action are not producers nor scientists. Aristotle, ‘Nicomachean 
Ethics’. Barnes, J. ed., in: The Complete Works of Aristotle. Trad.: Ross, D. Rev.: J. P. Urmson. Vol. 2, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995, Book VI, 1139b14 to 1140a24, pp. 1799-1800. The modern 
framework of a “poetic” view of human reality was established, for instance, with the help of Vico, who 
wrote of “…the first men of the gentile nations, children of nascent mankind, creating things according to 
their own ideas.” Vico, G. The New Science of Giambattista Vico. Translated by Thomas Goddard Bergin 
and Max Harold Fisch. New York: Cornell University Press, 1984, Book II, Section I, [376], p. 117  
74 In the German sentence, Arendt explored the relation between the loss of a “home” in the world [der 
Welt, die Heimat nicht mehr ist] and the vindication of a humanly built world, which could become a new 
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With Jaspers, Arendt reminded this modern man, imprisoned in him-self, of things 
which were not created by him, neither by his hands nor by his mind. These are not minor 
things, but defining conditions, giving aspects of life, or simply, in Jaspers terms, “limit-
situations” [Grenzsituationen] in which humans exist in the most basic (grounding) sense: 
death, chance, guilt, and the uncertainty of the world.75 Death, for instance, is not a 
construct, but an experience that conditions life, defining, limiting and orienting man’s 
existence on earth. These conditions cannot be controlled by man’s hand, nor solved by 
man’s intellect. According to Arendt, human thoughts, in this sense, become a kind of 
“playful metaphysics” [spielenden Metaphysik], “always experimental and never rigidly 
fixed”, always interplaying with changeable experiences.76   
It is not that men must accept, as norms or prescriptions, existential conditions. “I 
must die, I must suffer, I must struggle, I am subject to chance, I am inevitably entangled 
to guilt”.77 This must is not a rational imposition. It is a description, an acceptance, of the 
grounding-conditions of human life. These border-situations are experienced in a unique 
way by everyone. They do not imply a certain model of thought: “That I cannot resolve 
reality into thought becomes the triumph of my potential freedom”.78 They are just 
grounding conditions, limiting and defining conditions to our present, unique sense of 
being. They only shape the situation in which we live. For Jaspers, these situations come 
as given [gegeben] to oneself, limiting oneself in the form of a reality which was not 
expected, much less produced by oneself. This given is, thus, experienced as “failure” 
[Scheitern], a breakdown of the subjective self-assurance. “How man experiences 
failure”, wrote Jaspers, “grounds what he becomes.”79    
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
home [eine Menschenwelt, die Heimat werden können]; that is, facing the loss and the failure of traditional 
communities grounded on the “security of being”, men and women have the challenge of building and 
taking care of, with the demands of action, contingency and responsibility, a world of their own. Arendt, 
op. cit., p. 46 
75 Arendt, H, op. cit., p. 40. Also: Jaspers, K. Einführung in die Philosophie. München: R. Piper & Co. 
1971, p. 18 
76 Arendt, op. cit., p. 41 
77 “…ich muss sterben, ich muss leiden, ich muss kämpfen, ich bin den Zufall unterworfen, ich verstricke 
mich unausweichlich in Schuld.” Japsers, op. cit., p. 18 
78 Arendt, op. cit., p. 42 
79 “Wie er sein Scheitern erfährt, das begründet, wozu der Mensch wird”, p. 20.  
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1.5 Plurality As a Condition of Life 
Arendt opened The Human Condition (Vita Activa, in the German edition) 
mentioning the “basic conditions under which life on earth has been given to man”.80 No 
word in this sentence is superfluous to Arendt’s meaning. She referred to “life’s 
conditions”, on a basic, fundamental sense, as they were given to man, or found by man 
in their existing situations. They are not a rational law prescribing a certain human 
behavior. Neither are they an abstract definition of man in general. Arendt went back to 
Kant (who said that “mere ideas” cannot enrich men’s knowledge)81; but also further than 
Kant. “It is highly unlikely”, she wrote, “that we, who can know, determine, and define 
the natural essences of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever be able 
to do the same for ourselves”.82 Man can project laws and categories into nature and into 
things, but he cannot discover “human nature” – “this would be like jumping over our 
own shadows”.83  
The solution, however, would not be postulating Man from the view-point of a 
transcendental subject, in order to compensate this cognitive deficit concerning the 
knowledge of our nature. The construction of a “superhuman”84 representation of 
ourselves tells us nothing about our giving conditions, in which life in general, and 
political life in special, are experienced. For Arendt, we lose “humanity” not because of 
any deviation from a “natural law”, not because of any misapprehension of the moral 
Good. We lose humanity when we reject some of these “basic conditions of life”, among 
which are our condition as human individuals, constituted by specific bodies and 
emotions, situated in particular life-experiences, and capable of spontaneous acts and 
creative initiative. Our “nature” resides, paradoxically, in our capacity to “denaturalize” 
ourselves, not by suppressing what is natural to us, but by integrating it into human, 
“unnatural” modes of existence.85 
																																								 																				
80 The section I, Chapter I, is precisely called “Vita Activa and the Human Condition”. Arendt, HC, p. 7. In 
the German edition, one reads the reference to “Grundbedingungen” (fundamental/basic/grounding 
conditions) “…unter denen dem Geschlecht der Menschen das Leben auf der Erden gegeben ist”. Arendt, 
H. Vita Activa oder Vom tätigen Leben. München: Piper. 2016, p. 16 
81 Kant compared a man who relied only in mere ideas [bloßen Ideen] with a merchant who, to improve his 
financial conditions, simply adds some zeros to his cash balance [Kassenbestand].  Kant, Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft, A602 
82 Arendt, HC, p. 10 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., p. 11 
85 “…being properly human means being to some degree unnatural: initiating action, setting human limits 
to natural processes; creating lasting structures to house human life; laying down laws and endowing one 
another with rights that are ‘human’ but not ‘natural’.” Canovan, M. Hannah Arendt: a reinterpretation of 
her political thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 25  
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In what follows, we shall see that totalitarianism was the extreme outcome of the 
modern crisis, a crisis which Arendt labeled as a “rebellion against human existence as it 
has been given”.86 The destruction of “humanity”, as Arendt saw it, had not been 
characterized by a rejection of a recognized ontological law through a conscious embrace 
of sinful, deviating ideas and norms that caused human beings to behave in a “wrong” 
way. It was instead a process of factual degradation of human beings into conditions 
analogous to, or even worse than, those of “natural” species.  Nazis did more than destroy 
human conditions historically established in terms of rights, norms and institutions. They 
degraded human beings into things that lacked basic emotions, spontaneous capacity to 
react, and even primitive instincts of self-preservation. Totalitarians self-identified with 
the objective-Being of Nature or History, thus establishing radical new conditions to 
life/death on earth. By equating their will with Nature’s “will”, they tried to abolish 
grounding-conditions of human life – as life itself became a mere “material” to their hands 
and heads.87  
 Among the attacked conditions, plurality was at the center, as totalitarian 
movements not only excluded people from spheres of power, but also attempted to erase 
particular ethnic groups and independent human beings from the earth, so that, in 
totalitarianism, “individuality, anything indeed that distinguishes one man from another, 
is intolerable”.88 The totalitarian attempt of creating a “One Man of gigantic dimensions”89 
was, for Arendt, the major threat to the human condition and to human freedom in its 
most elementary sense. So, the starting point for Arendt’s reflection is not an imaginary 
depiction of humanity into “ideal” conditions, but a reminder of elementary traces of our 
humanity, even of those traces inscribed in our basic organic and emotional constitution, 
and in our original insertion into communities where the reality of others pre-exists ours. 
There is an orientation in Arendt’s work for, more than understanding, accepting ours and 
others existence in an unjustified, gratuitous way, as a basic condition for the 
establishment of politics, that is, of a spatial polis which we build together and where we 
coexist. 
 
																																								 																				
86 Arendt, HC, p. 2 
87 “Totalitarian government can be safe only to the extent that it can mobilize man’s own will power to 
force him into that gigantic movement of History or Nature which supposedly uses mankind as its material 
and knows neither birth nor death.” Arendt, OT, p. 622  
88 Arendt, OT, p. 599 
89 Ibid., p. 611  
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* 
If I am right in emphasizing Arendt’s defense of the primacy of the real over the 
conceptual, and of people over rational and systematic truths, then the “normative” 
problem must be redefined, its vocabulary and method included. Arendt left it clear that 
totalitarian “ideas” were “neither Plato’s eternal essence…nor Kant’s regulative 
principle”.90 Referring to norms in general, I am not distinguishing between the several 
meanings which norms and laws can assume in philosophical discourse, from necessary 
and a priori laws to positive laws open to exception and interpretation.91 Arendt indeed 
stressed that totalitarian “laws”, relying on the “identification of man and law”92, broke 
up spaces of interpretation and discussion over general rules and principles, and with the 
notion of law as a spatial and relational frameworks upon which men move, think, speak. 
Instead, totalitarian law “stabilized” men, neutralized man’s thinking by applying the 
“strait jacket of logic”, and conformed them into a necessary “movement”.93 It abolished 
the “insecurity of philosophical thought” by implementing ideologies of “total 
explanation”.94 In a way, if philosophical tradition started with the dialogues of Socrates, 
totalitarianism abolished philosophy by abolishing conversation.  
But, on the other hand, Arendt gradually approached the similarities between 
traditional philosophical systems and totalizing ideologies (Weltanschauungen).95 She 
refused to be called a philosopher not only because she saw and experienced the 
alignment of German intellectuals with Nazism.96 She realized that the coordination of 
intellectuals, in most cases, was not due to particular opportunism, but to the very matter 
and method of their work. This experience was fundamental to Arendt’s attempt to break 
																																								 																				
90 Arendt, OT, p. 616 
91 In Hegel’s and Kant’s dictionaries, for instance, one fine at least eight meanings of law and its synonyms: 
Recht (“Right” as general law), Bestimmung(en) (“Determinations” as legal provisions), Gesetz (both as 
ethical and natural laws, and even laws of thinking: Naturgesetz, Gesetz des Rechts, Denkgesetz), Regel (as 
theoretical and practical rules), Gesetzgebung (“Legislation”, as the act to give laws). Caygill, H. A Kant 
Dictionary: the blackwell philosopher dictionaries. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1995, p. 275-277.  
Inwood, M. J. A Hegel Dictionary: The Blackwell Philosopher Dictionaries, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, pp. 
160-163     
92 Arendt, OT, p. 607 
93 Ibid., p. 617 
94 Ibid. 
95 It is interesting to dislocate the set of references here to Freud, who refused to translate “Weltanschauung” 
to English: he defined it as a “specifically German concept” whose translation may “raise difficulties”. Still, 
he defined it as “an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence uniformly on 
the basis of one overriding hypothesis, which, accordingly, leaves no question unanswered…” Freud, S. 
Lecuture XXXV – The Question of a Weltanschauung. The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume XXII (1932-36). London: The Hogarth Press, 1973, p. 158 
96 For Arendt’s memories on the “coordination” (Gleichschaltung) of intellectuals with the Nazi movement, 
see: Arendt, Ich will…, pp. 58-59 
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up with the abstract circularity of thought-patterns which are never interrupted by new 
ideas or facts. In his New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1933), S. Freud 
wrote that philosophy, overestimating the “epistemological value [Erkenntniswert] of our 
logic operations”, sustains the illusion of being able to produce “a picture of the universe 
which is without gaps and is coherent”, but then collapses with every new alteration of 
knowledge.97 He recalled a verse of Heine, which I reproduce here in its entirety: 
 
“Life and the world’s too fragmented for me! 
A German professor can give me the key. 
He puts life in order with skill magisterial, 
Builds a rational system for better or worse; 
With a nightcap and dressing-grown scraps as material 
He chinks up the holes in the Universe.”98  
 
This philosophical attempt of filling the holes of the universe (wearing pajamas), 
and this “overestimation” of our logic operations and conclusions, had been a permanent 
source of misunderstanding between the philosophical and the political, a 
misunderstanding which remained more or less unchallenged. In the twentieth century, 
however, when the crisis of the modern ethos reached its peak, the sinister implementation 
of a “natural law”, absolutely valid for humans behaving as animals that had lost their 
capacity to formulate alternative “laws” of thought and action, demanded, in Arendt’s 
view, a critical examination of the similitudes between ideology and theory, or, more 
properly, between the conformation of politics to traditional philosophy. In the process, 
she redefined her whole vocabulary and method, starting with her grounding terms: she 
would talk of human conditions, not of natural or necessary laws. In this context, her Vita 
Activa contrasts not only the Vita Contemplativa of the philosopher, but also the illusion 
of a “Vita Passiva” created by an identification of theory with practice.     
Plurality is, in short, the unwritten law for Arendt. This law, however, is not 
inscribed in the sky, nor deduced by logic-rationality as the fundamental content, or 
measurement, of positive laws. It is experienced through human senses, it is seen, heard 
and felt wherever and whenever men leave their isolation to be in contact with others. It 
																																								 																				
97 In the original, Freud stated that philosophy “…arbeitet zum Teil mit den gleichen Methoden [of 
sciences], entfernt sich aber von ihr, indem sie an der Illusion festhält, ein lückenloses und 
zusammenhängendes Weltbild liefern zu können...” Freud, S. Neue Vorlesungen zur Einführun in die 
Psychoanalyse. Gesammelte Werke. Fünfzehnter Band. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1999, p. 173. Freud, 
S. Lecuture XXXV…, pp. 160-161 
98 Heine, H. ‘The Homecoming’ [Die Heimkehr], LVIII, (Book of Songs). In: The Complete Poems of 
Heinrich Heine. Suhrkamp/Insel, 1982, p. 99 
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is, moreover, according to Arendt, a given fact, presented by her, in The Human 
Condition, in a declarative mode, not in a hypothetical or subjunctive one: plurality is.99 
The “law” of plurality, thus, is not an imposition, but an acceptance of the fundamental 
“fact of plurality of men and people”, of their fundamental “distinction” and “diversity”. 
To affirm this condition, Arendt did not necessarily break with philosophical thought or 
with normative concerns. She only opened spaces for a complex takeover on the political 
experience, reserving to the processes of forming thoughts and making laws, for instance, 
only a complementary (not a dominant) position.100 Because plurality grounds political 
experiences, theoretical ideas and juridical norms can be constantly reformulated, 
criticized, implemented, and amended by active men and women.101 
The argument concerning Arendt’s normative question could be summed up as 
follows: political concepts must be grounded upon plurality, because plural human beings 
are the beginning of political experiences. Empirical polities exclude people from its 
assemblies and its streets, and many historical actors closed the access to power. But, by 
doing this, they only denied a political affirmation for plurality. They did not undo the 
fact of plurality. Even if we consider the radical totalitarian attempt to eradicate the fact 
of plurality, this poses no definitive challenge to Arendt’s stance, since her position is 
grounded on the contingent, fragile, non-necessary appearance of human beings. After 
Auschwitz and Hiroshima, few would doubt men’s capacity to destroy humanity. But, as 
the existence of humanity is not necessarily guaranteed, its destruction is neither 
necessarily predicted. Indeed, writing on the mode of persuasion, trying to “teach a sense 
of politics to a world in danger”102, Arendt did not demonstrate necessary ends (“oughts”), 
but told stories, explained situations and reminded possibilities to a human world in which 
the most realistic doctrines were producing unsustainable political realities.  
																																								 																				
99 “Action…corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth 
and inhabit the world.” (emphasis added) HC, p. 7. Arendt did not recommend “uniqueness”, she declared 
it: “Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way 
that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live.” (emphasis added). Arendt, 
HC, p. 8 
100 C. Volk examined the relation between action, constitution and norms in the work of Hannah Arendt, 
emphasizing the interaction between the experience of political action and the establishment of laws: 
“Arendt is concerned with experiencing and not with inventing or constructing norms and rights”. Volk, C. 
‘Hannah Arendt and the Constitutional Theoremof De-Hierarchization. Origins, Consequences, Meaning’. 
Constellations Volume 22, No 2, 2015, p. 18 
101 In an entry to her thinking book (October 1950), already eight years before publishing The Human 
Condition, Arendt noted that, without the fact of the plurality of men and people [die Tatsache der Pluralität 
der Menschen und Völker] and its fundamental “inequality” [ihre grundsätzliche Ungleichheit] there is no 
politics, and no law is needed. Arendt, Denktagebuch. Erster Band, p. 37   
102 Feldman, R. H. Introduction to Arendt, H. The Jewish Writings. Edited by Jerome Kohn and Ron H. 
Feldman. New York: Schocken Books, 2007, p. lxx (Henceforward, TJW) 
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For Mary McCarthy, The Human Condition had political insights “both amazing 
and obvious”.103 Arendt’s reminder of a basic fact of human reality (that human beings 
share the earth with each other) may sound “idealist” for contemporary ears. But, 
whatever prescriptivism one may find in Arendt’s later conceptual formulations, one can 
hardly deny that her grounding fact, plurality, is a condition experienced and testified by 
ourselves in a basic sense, and it’s a condition without which politics is transformed into 
a mere instrument of exclusion and domination. This may sound “obvious”, but it is 
actually “amazing” if one retells and rethinks the history of Western politics in the last 
century, when the production of pariahs, followed by their persecution and destruction, 
was naturalized and normalized within a process that disintegrated countries, destroyed 
cities and exterminated groups.  
In this context, as we will see, the pariah-situation is related to man’s inability to 
share a world, to accept the grounding-condition of human plurality, the giving condition 
that being human means being-between-humans. The very existence of the pariah, and 
the political and social rebellion against his existence, means both that human conditions 
can be given to men, but also radically rejected by men. Rejecting the pariah, in this sense, 
relates not to the refutation of a norm, but to the refusal of being part in a world where 
the reality of others is given to us. Departing from the pariah limit-situation, I propose, 
with Arendt, hence, 
“…to be confronted anew, without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and 
without the protection of traditional and therefore self-evident standards of behavior, by 
the elementary problems of human living-together.”104    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
103 See the back cover of the aforementioned edition. 
104 Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’, p. 141 
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CHAPER TWO 
A POLITICAL QUESTION 
 
 
I would like to define the guiding question to this work, What does it mean to be 
a pariah?, as a political question. What do I mean by a political question? First of all, it 
is a question which deals with appearances. A political thinking may be exercised in 
solitude, and may rely on representations, images and references to non-present objects. 
But it essentially reminds and recalls what was seen and heard, as “incidents of living 
experiences”105, in public spaces. It also deals with secondary objects, related to these 
experiences, such as written thoughts and analysis, which “appear” to the thinking person 
not as pure objects strictly defined in themselves, but as reified thoughts, memories, 
images, testimonies of people who had seen and spoken about these shared experiences 
from different angles and under different conditions. In this regard, and here I am 
following Arendt’s writings on the thinking process, one may move away from the world 
of appearances to think, but, if one thinks politically, he represents this world of 
appearances, and some specific appearances of it, making it present again to himself.106 
What “appears to me” is not a sing of subjectivism, but, differently, a sign of a 
relation, a relation between myself and the different sort of objects that are given to me 
or selected by me, either as recorded events, as shared memories, as texts, as images. 
What appears, in this line, can only appear to the “eye” of the mind (a metaphoric eye) if 
it has first appeared to sensory, bodily eyes of people who have testified and recorded, 
spoken and written about these appearances before me. Kant, in his Critique of the Power 
of Judgment, a fundamental source for Arendt’s reflection on the nature of political 
thought and speech, had stated that, in the process of judging, “one wants to submit the 
object to his own eyes.”107  
Even if the person who thinks and judges is not a direct testimony to what 
happened, he represents or imagine an experience (or an object of art, in Kant’s original 
proposal), appreciating that experience or that object in all its particularity.108 It is not a 
																																								 																				
105 Arendt, ‘Preface: The Gap Between Past and Future’, BPF, p. 14 
106 See, for instance, Arendt, ‘Thinking and Moral Considerations’, pp. 13-14 
107 Kant, I. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Edited and Translated by Paul Guyer, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000, § 8, p. 101 
108 For Kant, the operation involved in the judgement of taste and pleasure [Geschmackurteil], is not 
cognition (evaluation/classification of an object in accordance to a given rule/category), but imagination, 
or the power to imagine [Einbildungskraft]: “In order to decide whether or not something is beautiful, we 
do not relate the representation by means of understanding to the object for cognition, but rather relate it 
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cognitive operation, an operation of fitting objects into given categories or rules, nor an 
intuitive contact with the empirical: it stands in the middle, as an imaginative movement 
(“perhaps”, as Kant wrote, “combined with the understanding”), a movement 
approximately described as a “searching for a law”.109 So, to begin with, this work does 
not ask for any “hidden essence”, nor for any other mental experience that the self can 
simulate in isolation. Hegel had already stated that if we are to talk about an “essence” of 
something, this essence must make itself present, thus, appearing in the space of concrete, 
effective realities.110 For Arendt, “…thought itself arises out of incidents of living 
experience and must remain bound to them as the only guideposts by which take its 
bearings”.111  
In this sense, among the appearances upon which this work relies, facts occupy a 
special position. For Arendt, facts are “political by nature”. Facts concern “events and 
circumstances in which many are involved”.112 They are not known a priori, nor 
discovered by scientific experiment. They emerge from the interaction between people, 
in “common and commonly recognized reality”113. Facts, as distinguished from rational 
and mathematical truths, are not products of the logic mind. In a way, facts resemble 
Jaspers’ “limit-situations” in their living-force as realities which were not created by 
thought. Facts, indeed, have a compelling character similar to the conditions of death, 
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chance, birth, and the general unpredictability of life, and other grounding conditions for 
Arendt’s non-abstract thinking. In this sense, according to Arendt, “[f]acts are beyond 
agreement and consent”.114  
This does not mean that Arendt revived a sort of “cult of facts”115, typical of a 
historiography that regards facts as given objects to receptive minds. Facts were, in origin, 
experiences in “which many were involved”, either as actors or testimonies, either doing 
something or seeing what was done. They were rather done (deeds) out of freedom, lived 
and experienced by specific men and women in unique circumstances. Moreover, to 
become part of the human world, the world of objects and artifacts, they needed to be 
politically established.116 Thus, they were not “created”, but they were established by a 
joint work of witnesses, testimonies, memory-tellers, and recognized by citizens as a part 
of their common-ground.117 As political objects, facts are performed, seen, and established 
only in between-men. 
In this regard, the idea that a fact is merely “created” by the writer who tells it 
(hence, telling nothing more than his subjective bias) reflects the modern belief that we 
are all imprisoned in ourselves, in our subjective beliefs, in our particular interests. 
According to this idea, no one can witness and memorize an event in its common 
dimension. For Arendt, however, this kind of subjective-historicism, as any other 
subjectivism, is unpolitical. If accepted, it would collapse public speech by denying its 
very “common ground”. Thus, in alluding to the “factual matter itself”, to the “brutally 
elementary data” – for instance, to the fact that Germany invaded Belgium in 1914, that 
Kafka wrote Der Prozess, that a man called Harry Heine was born in Düsseldorf -, Arendt 
reminded that the established ground of facticity, “whose indestructibility has been taken 
for granted even by the most extreme and most sophisticated believers in historicism”118, 
is a condition for any political experience based on acts, and on spoken memorization and 
interpretation of acts.    
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2.1 A Question of Speech 
This brings up the second political dimension of this work. This works speaks 
about objects. Grounding-facts, not being open to opinion and interpretation themselves, 
that is, being “beyond agreement”, inform opinion and interpretation. Arendt stated that 
freedom of opinion is exercised upon facts, not in replacement of facts themselves. As 
logical principles inform mathematical operations, “factual truth” inform opinion and 
interpretation, which are everything but self-evident, since facts are everything but 
necessary. The kind of objectivity established by facts, events and other public appearing-
realities does not stop speech by the force of its “truth”, but, quite differently, allows, by 
its grounding-objectivity, the emergence of opinions. A fact, as a political object, exist 
“only to the extent that it is spoken about”.119  
 Conversely, if something is not spoken about – if not discussed, if its meaning is 
not explored, if its interpretation is not enlarged -, then it is not political. Hobbes called 
memory a “sense in decay”, an image, of an object seen, which “is fading, old, and 
past”.120 In Arendt’s regard, to be political, a memory must not only be memorized, but 
“spoken about”. A monument, for instance, will become a dead object (a past object), if 
it does not entail an active and discursive representation or re-elaboration of its political 
meaning. A memorial, in this sense, favors a special kind of memory (or of thinking, as 
in the German Denkmal): a shared, spoken memory of an “incident” or an actor which is 
represented, being in this case physically present once more, in the common space of 
streets, squares and parks. Not thinking and not speaking about the meaning of the 
objectified fact that is a monument reduces it to a merely architectural thing, a thing 
deprived of its political significance.  
 For Arendt, however, political discussion can bring “comprehension” to factual-
public matters, but it is never a complete comprehension, for factual truths, “though they 
are never obscure, are not transparent either, as it is in their very nature to withstand 
further elucidation”.121 According to Arendt’s depiction of reality (“sameness in utter 
diversity”)122, a fact preserves its object-character precisely because it is seen and spoken 
from different vantage points, which do not contradict but confirm the very existence of 
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the shared object. Speaking about political realities or interpreting facts does not remove 
the matter from its objective-existence, but rather guarantees it, by allowing it to “show 
itself from all sides”123, and allowing a plurality of voices to add their contribution to 
“withstand enlightenment” of the object.124 
But what kind of speaking about appearances do I have in mind here? The 
additional political aspect of this work is its judging character. The evaluation of the 
pariah is a political one, for it is entangled with a judgement of political configurations. 
Modern historiography tried to ground its object on scientific standards, searching for a 
kind of objectivity that would mean the “extinction of the self”, which von Ranke called 
the “pure vision of things”.125 The historian, in this orientation, would abstain “from 
bestowing either praise or blame, together with an attitude of perfect distance”.126 This 
was supposed to resemble a natural science in which no subject would interfere in the 
observed object. Modern physics added the dimension of causality, according to which 
“scientific history” would offer an objective account of human processes as if they were 
mechanically caused. In these terms, explanation would mean justification of 
deterministic and naturally-inspired relations between causes and effects. 
This historiographic perspective is, according to Arendt, also unpolitical, for it 
denies that every act is contingent. Every insertion of men in reality through “deeds and 
words” is grounded upon “other potentialities originally inherent in any give situation”.127 
An act, a recorded fact, and every other appearance ‘might have been otherwise’, and this 
is the “price of freedom”, a price paid by agents, who are entangled within webs of 
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multiple, uncontrollable potentialities, and also paid by the difficult establishment of 
factual truth, which, in its non-necessary, non-logical aspect, can always be denied, 
ignored or forgotten. The price of freedom, in short, is bargained by accounts that present 
human realities as rooted in necessity. Events, for the objective-naturalistic perspective, 
can only be understood in patterns that clean off the contingent-ground of human affairs. 
Isaiah Berlin wrote that “[f]or the omniscient being, who sees why nothing can be 
otherwise than as it is, the notion of responsibility or guilt, of right and wrong, are 
necessarily empty.”128 If subjectivism imposes itself on the object, fabricating an object 
from its own “interest”, pure-vision objectivism extinguishes the humanity of people 
involved as agents, writers, spectators, interpreters of events, by gluing events in a 
necessary scheme of things. For Arendt, contingency (the “might have been otherwise”) 
grounds not only future decisions, but the very interpretation of established facts, the very 
judgement of appearances. By detaching acts, facts and given situations from necessary 
patterns of determination, we are allowed to interpret actions in their conditioned, 
circumstantial, but also free origination. 
Arendt uncoupled understanding and justifying. She dealt with appearances, 
which, as appearances that ‘might have been differently’, could be both comprehended 
(accepted in their facticity) and judged (praised or blamed according to their contingent 
origin). Comprehension and judgment were entangled in Arendt’s retrospective account, 
and their interplay resembled that between facts and opinions: to get a fact right, not only 
describing its “elementary data”, but also contextualizing it, and explaining some of its 
constitutive interactions (as they appear to oneself), does not mean accepting the fact as 
an unavoidable outcome of an irresistible process.   
Politically, judgment is not passed by History, science or God. Men and women, 
relying on their limited knowledge and standing on their unique vantage points, judge 
each other and the realities they unfold. Politics depends on this interaction. Neutralizing 
historical time within a pre-established monolithical process may comfort us with the 
illusion of an objective, non-judgmental knowledge. In these terms, we do not pay the 
“price of freedom”. But an all-encompassing knowledge does not only undermine 
freedom and responsibility. It falsifies human comprehension itself. A “pure vision” - 
																																								 																				
128 Berlin, I. ‘Historical Inevitability’, in: The Proper Study of Mankind: an anthology of essays, New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997, p. 135. Also on the relation between knowledge, responsibility and 
judgement, Berlin noted: “The more we know, the farther the area of human freedom, and consequently of 
responsibility, is narrowed.” (p. 135) 
 - 32 - 
which extinguishes the plurality of people, and abolishes the limited and complementary 
interrelations of on-looks and opinions – would mean, again, an attempt of seeing things 
as a “deity”. 
The political aspect of my question, a question that implies judgement, is thus 
complemented by the political criteria for my judgement. Following Arendt, I will not 
judge in accordance to a transcendental norm. I will not defend an external - moral, 
religious or ethnic - viewpoint. I will try to be, with Arendt, “politically immanent”, and 
this means more than applying general political concepts to the matter. It means 
comprehending and interpreting the processes in which the fate of the pariah and of 
European politics were imbricated, culminating in the destruction of both. With the “too-
wise eyes” of those who judge concluded events, Arendt did not rely on a fixed table of 
right-wrong rules. Understanding the “destruction of humanity”, and the rebellion against 
the pariah, required more than a ready-made, purely reactive moralism. 
 
2.2 “Thinking in my identity where I am not” 
Political thinking is informed by facts, texts, concrete evidences, and, never being 
“self-evident”, it may be “running, as it were, from place to place, from one part of the 
world to another”.129 E. H. Carr stated that historians cannot avoid the “trap” of being 
conditioned by their own circumstances, even if they try to use “obsolete” and 
“unfamiliar” words.130 Arendt would agree with that all thinking is conditioned at some 
extent. But she would never regard this as a “trap”, as if thinkers were limited by a 
determinate vocabulary and set of images. Representative thinking, for Arendt, is 
precisely the thinking that frees itself from traps, from one-sidedness, from the 
asphyxiating atmosphere of a Zeitgeist.131 Thinking, for instance, the problems of 
modernity with the help of Greeks and Romans (thus, re-presenting them), Arendt tried 
to move beyond conceptual clichés and predominant interpretations of her epoch. This 
requires “being and thinking in my own identity where actually I am not”.132 
“Impartiality”, for Arendt, has to do with an “incessant talk” and “an infinite number of 
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different standpoints”. 133 We can even be sons of our time, accepting our conditioning by 
actual circumstances. But, as sons are liberated from repeating the behavior of their 
parents, we, as plural and active beings, are also free to address and act upon our present 
realities from different standpoints and with different attitudes. 
Arendt once wrote that doxa, the Greek word for opinion, also means “splendor 
and fame”. It thus refers to “the public sphere in which everybody can appear and show 
who he himself is”.134 I remember a Professor who once said that “I appear” in my text. 
To be sure, I do not want to bring up my private concerns to this work. But I do want to 
appear “in my own identity” thinking and writing of ideas, memories, facts, places “where 
actually I am not”. In Kant’s analysis, what operates judgement is a “voice” which 
presupposes the possibility of an agreement. It is a voice that aims to speak for others 
(aims to be a “universal voice” [allgemeine Stimme]), and is oriented to the persuasion of 
people, not to demonstration of truth: “it expects confirmation not from concepts but only 
from the consent of others”.135  
In this context, this is also a political work because it avoids a “‘scientific 
detachment better known as indifference” (J. Roth).136 In her reply letter to Eric Voegelin, 
Arendt wrote that an author who describes, for instance, the conditions of poverty among 
the British workers in early industrial England neutralizing its emotions and indignation 
“robs” a part of the object’s nature. Poverty, persecution, extermination are human 
phenomena in which not only ideas and abstract processes are involved, but actual 
emotions and sufferings.137 In this regard, concepts and experiences are integrated, in this 
work, by my unique view, which relates to the pariah experience as more than a sheer 
object of curiosity. This is also a work of self-understanding, not only because my second 
name, Lembert, probably refers to where my Jewish ancestors came from, Lemberg 
(Lviv), a city where pariahs were extinguished in a convulsing period when the region 
went, within years, from Polish to Soviet then to Nazi rule; not only because my last 
name, Kasper, is ethnic-German, what would make me, at some point of the 1930s, a 
Mischling, of whom it was said that there is a “civil war in his blood”; not only because 
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matters of religious, national, ethnic, class, professional identity have always been 
enigmas to me; but because this research allowed me to relate my own story to larger 
stories and experiences, conferring thus a political meaning to it, and a potential 
“universal” reach to my voice. 
 
2.3 A Biographical Question 
 This work also grounds its question on the life experience of Hannah Arendt. I 
shall begin with reality as it was given to Arendt herself, in the first decades of the 20th 
century in Germany. Arendt’s work, starting from her early reflections on assimilation 
and pariahdom, written down in her first non-academic texts, was partly conditioned by 
“the shocking impact of reality”.138 Arendt was forced into politics by world events. She 
did not research modern anti-Semitism, did not align with German Zionists, did not 
develop her critic of assimilation, and, later, did not establish herself as a major political 
thinker out of a self-fashioned plan. Her own Grenzsituationen, the surrounding forces of 
her life-context, determined her intellectual and existential journeys, which were 
permanently entangled. In my view, Arendt can only be understood as a German-Jewish-
American thinker, and not because of any attribute attached to the “what” of these groups, 
but because of who she was, what she experienced – the German language, the Jewish 
fate, the north-American political framework.   
 This is not to say that Arendt’s categories cannot be de-contextualized. She did 
that with others authors, and she recognized that “everybody is free to do with it [a public 
work] what he pleases”.139 Indeed, I believe that Arendt’s work is a fruitful source for 
exploration and recreation of political concepts. But even if there is no rigidly right or 
wrong interpretation of Arendt, I still believe, with Jerome Kohn, her ex-student and her 
literary trustee, that a reader who ignores the Jewish experience that underlines her work 
lets “something precious and vital slip through one’s fingers and disappear from sight.”140 
I also agree with Benhabib’s conclusion that the origins of Arendt’s political thinking 
“owe more to her reflection on the Jewish question, and the rise of European anti-
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Semitism” than to any specific intellectual influence, from Heidegger or any other 
philosopher.141 For Bernstein, Arendt’s “understanding of the Jewish question and anti-
Semitism shaped her more general understanding of both history and politics”.142 Arendt’s 
“Jewishness”, according to Ron H. Feldman, “is not her sole concern nor the sole 
determinant of her work, but our understanding of her work is both diminished and 
seriously distorted if we overlook it.”143  
 When one defends the role of Arendt’s experience as a Jew, an important 
specification must be made: it is, preeminently, an experience of a Jew as a pariah. 
Arendt did more than thinking about the pariah. She thought as a pariah. She was a pariah 
within a pariah-people, experiencing sometimes a double sense of dislocation. Arendt, in 
this particular, was never “polemical”, if one understand it as “an aggressive 
controversialist”144, as she never wrote to attack someone, and her books were never 
designed reactions to other books and texts. She became a pariah out of her own 
comprehension and judgement of the surrounding realities, in specific of Jewish and 
European realities. Judging with a distinct voice, as those who start “an emancipation of 
their own”145, was the only way of resisting group-pressures and other forms of social 
conformism that undermined political judgment and actuation. Even when Arendt left 
personal ambiguity to write in the name of a group, speaking for instance on behalf of a 
Jewish “We”, she did it with the critical coherence of whom regards active men and 
women as always responsible to some extent, even when they occupy the position of 
victims.146  
The pariah’s appearance and disappearance, and the post-1945 quest for its re-
appearance, in this sense, are assumed to coincide, in important aspects, with the similar 
movement of “humanity”, not as an abstract form, but as politically organized structures 
of European civilization, which, in persecuting and annihilating its pariahs, ended up in 
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an unprecedented self-destruction. I agree, in this context, with Peg Birmingham that 
Arendt’s thinking is properly grounded not in a general wonder of “being”, but rather on 
the “speechless horror”147 embodied in the death camps and in the pariah’s general 
disappearance. Another way of saying this is recurring to the German language: the 
“Grund” (ground/foundation/reason) of Arendt’s political thinking is also the “Abgrund” 
(abyss) opened when she and her husband heard the first news about Auschwitz and the 
Nazi project of exterminating human plurality through the systematic killing of Jews and 
other “sub-races”.148  
 
2.4 Beyond the Particular and the Universal  
 As Kohn noted, Arendt wrote about human, not only Jewish conditions.149 She 
also started from the “outrageous fact” according to which a phenomenon historically 
unimportant, anti-Semitism, became the “catalytic” factor for the end of European politics 
in general.150 Jewish, European and human experiences are, thus, imbricated, not in the 
form of an indistinct identity, but as in a web of relations. According to Feldman, there is 
a “Jewish-European dialectic” in Arendt’s work, and, by not being tied to a parochial 
Judaism neither to an abstract enlightened Europeanism, Arendt used “both as platforms 
from which to gain a critical insight into the other”.151 This perspective considers, for 
instance, the genocide of Jews not as a merely Jewish matter (as suggested by the more 
particularistic words Holocaust, with a religious connotation, and Shoah, with a national-
linguistic emphasis), but as a human process of first importance.152 
 This means, however, something different from an easy jump to a general 
universalism. Arendt cultivated that intellectual temper “which clung to concrete details 
with an exaggerated, almost pedantic carefulness”.153 Even if the she related the 
persecution of Jews to a broader “minority problem” in the European interwar period, any 
reader should pay attention to the specific position of Jews as the “minority par 
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excellence”.154 Jews were a historical group with no land and no specific national 
conscience in European terms, the “strangest strangers”155, precisely in an age when 
ethnic and tribal belonging emerged as dominant factors of political identification. Jewish 
modern experience, thus, in its radical particularity, in its lack of communication with 
non-Jewish experiences, only proved the failure of direct, homogenizing universalism.  
Uniqueness, in this sense, was so present in Arendt’s analysis that she rarely 
addressed Jews in general (as if it existed a Jewish permanent “substance”). Similarly, 
she refused to discuss an “eternal” (that is, necessary) anti-Semitism156, detached from the 
historical grounds from which politically-oriented comprehension and mobilization 
arises. She focused on the specific constellation of social and political forces around 
modern European Jews, frequently comprehending them in additional categories 
(German, French, Ostjuden, assimilated, religious, poor, rich, parvenu, pariah etc.). The 
pariah, as our specific work type, is even embodied in concrete men and women, who 
experienced pariahdom in the most real sense, with all the richness and ambivalences of 
unique life-paths. If the pariah becomes a simple universal, he becomes nothing. He or 
she loses all significance. 
I propose, in this line, to avoid simple oppositions (such as particular and 
universal), for Arendt’s own imagination relied sometimes on “threefold”, as if she 
refused to conform analysis and judgement into rigid dichotomies.157 Similarly, by 
presenting the pariah as a representative type in Arendt’s work, a type that can illuminate, 
relate and exemplify even topics in which the Jewish question is not directly invoked, I 
am certainly “historicizing” Arendt’s notions. But this, differently from what is generally 
assumed, does not mean a constriction of meaning to past conditions. Historicized, here, 
means politically grounded in contexts which are, to a great extent, similar to our 
contemporary conditions. Moreover, in discussing the pariah’s meaning with events and 
stories, I follow Arendt’s own recommendation of thinking and “teaching by example”.158  
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PARIAH CONDITION 
 
In 1950, reviewing Selma Stern’s book about the “Court Jew” in Absolutist 
Europe, Arendt acknowledged the writer’s “authority in the field”, her “full command” 
of the historical background, her “lively and pleasant descriptions”, but criticized the 
“attitude” of the author. Stern described and explained Court Jews’ stories, but removed 
their political responsibility. According to Arendt, in the book, Court Jews’ activities 
were justified as deriving from “the political and economic spirit of the time”. This 
theoretical “attitude” regarded, for instance, Ephraim (Frederick the Great’s provider) as 
acting and deciding in accordance “to factors outside his own and outside all Jewish 
responsibilities”.159 Court Jews, in this perspective, had no alternative but behaving the 
way they behaved and doing what they did. 
As I am arguing, Arendt’s analysis combined both historical comprehension and 
political judgement. Hers is not a morally abstract commendation of past events, but a 
politically grounded judgement of tendencies, decisions and mentalities that, in her view, 
contributed to the well-known “end of the story”. Concerning Jewish attitudes, the 
contingent origin of events - what Arendt called the “price of freedom” - has a special 
significance. Even if one must empathize with European Jews, who lived pressed by an 
overwhelming anti-Semitism, and whose options were socially and politically limited, 
one’s justification of their dominant pre-1933 models of behavior implies that resisting, 
changing circumstances, and avoiding later developments was not possible. In other 
terms, means that their destruction was irresistible, what is another way of saying that it 
was necessary. In the case of European Jewish history, denying the contingent “might 
have been otherwise” implies a sinister meaning. 
It is also inaccurate, in terms of historical records. Arendt herself escaped in 1933, 
when the options were even narrower than before. Individuals, groups, movements 
responded in different ways to the “Jewish Question” and to anti-Semitism itself. Jews 
had emigrated or stayed, they had assimilated or turned orthodox, they had been drawn 
into political movements (Zionist, socialist, communist, nationalist), or they had remained 
individually indifferent, opting for discretion. In the “end of the story”, however, millions 
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had died, and the late 1940s was a time for a critical re-evaluation of this story, including 
of the Jewish attitudes, of their actions and inactions. 
It is in this context that Arendt’s following sentence (indeed, a judgement) must 
be read and interpreted:  
“…the misfortune of the Jewish people…has been that the parvenu has been more 
important than the pariah”.160 
 
At great extent, my quest for the pariah’s meaning evolves around this statement: 
the pariah should have been more important, more determinant than the parvenu (in 
broader terms, the “social climber”). To understand it, I shall recall the “beginning of the 
story”. The modern condition of Jews in Europe was the pariah condition. Max Weber 
defined Jews as pariahs, as a sort of caste, for they constituted a “social group lacking 
autonomous political organization” and having “a far-reaching distinctiveness in 
economic functioning”. Moreover, for Weber, the social separation of Jews, 
complemented by their political powerlessness, was compensated by a Jewish faith in 
God and an expectation of a “messianic kingdom”. Jews, lacking a stable ground in 
concrete world, sought a “tie”, in Weber’s terms, to an extra-world. Weber also attributed 
to Jews a “resentment”, a longing for revenge, in consequence of this position.161 
Compared to Arendt’s analysis, Weber’s Jewish archetype mixed sociological 
definitions with religious “essentialization”. In explaining Jews both through their 
economic modern condition and their ancient beliefs, Weber’s archetype resembled a 
stereotype, in the sense of a fixed image/impression, which denies Jews a historically 
conditioned, yet not deterministic position. Arendt told a different story. The beginning, 
as it was delineated in The Origins of Totalitarianism, must be fully quoted: 
“Jewish history offers the extraordinary spectacle of a people, unique in this 
respect, which began its history with a well-defined concept of history and an almost 
conscious resolution to achieve a well-circumscribed plan on earth and then, without 
given up this concept, avoided all political action for two thousand years. The result was 
that the political history of the Jewish people became even more dependent upon 
unforeseen, accidental factors than the history of other nations, so that the Jews stumbled 
from one role to the other and accepted responsibility for none.”162 
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Jews, according to Arendt, were born as a political people. They had a historical 
view and a political purpose. Even if moved by an “almost conscious resolution” 
(“almost-conscious” perhaps due to the theological inspiration to their acts), ancient Jews 
acted, and created a polity organized around certain laws, and limited into a certain 
geography (the “well-circumscribed plan”). But exodus marked a rupture in Jewish 
history. After the traumatic destruction of the temple by the Romans, and after the defeat 
of the Maccabean revolts in ancient Palestine, Jews reinterpreted themselves as a cultural-
spiritual, yet non-political community. “Without giving up” the historical “concept”, and 
so being dependent on a nostalgia of a foundational past and on a hope for a redemptive 
future, Jews avoided action, that is, avoided initiating new circumstances in the present. 
Jewish actors were either dead (the biblical patriarchs and prophets) or unborn (the 
imagined Messiah). 
By living in “diasporic” conditions, “a people without a government, without a 
country, and without a language”, in other words, a people scattered around many 
countries, speaking many languages, consenting to many governments was gradually 
defined by, among other characteristics, a “lack of political ability and judgment”.163 One 
crucial consequence of this Jewish withdraw from politics and from history (which, in 
Arendt’s sense, constitute the “realm of action”) was that Jewish destiny became 
completely dependent on external “accidental factors” – the history of others. Their 
geographical, social and economic positions were limited by the few options available to 
them. Thus they “stumbled from one role to the other”, because these roles were not 
designed, nor willed by them. Political responsibility, an underlying theme of Arendt’s 
thinking, was absent from the modern view of Jews. In general, Jews accommodated to 
circumstances, instead of “responding” to them.  
 
3.1 The Pariah Becomes Usurer and Financier 
Among the roles that Jews “stumbled upon”, the economical one was central. In 
Middle Ages and early modernity, given the Christian taboos concerning the use of 
money and the activity of usury, Jews, forming a caste to which was denied access to 
normal society and economy, found in financial transactions their means of endurance. 
Living in ghettos, whose inner economic activity was “limited to minor craftwork and 
peddling”, “the Jews came into contact with other people only during catastrophes and 
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expulsions.”164 The exception was the usurer, or later the court Jew, who held the 
monopoly of what Arendt called the “ghetto’s foreign commerce”. The court Jew became 
the “representative of his people”, the Jew ascribed to contact Christian princes and rulers, 
and also to sustain his fellow coreligionists, who “depended on his charity”.165 
The relation so established between Jews and non-Jews was economical and 
utilitarian. Wealthy Jews – financial agents, usurers, suppliers of money and products – 
were tolerated as long as they proved to be useful, specially to the court (thus, the 
designation of court Jew or Hofjude) – “they had ascended the throne by the grace of the 
princes and their own money”166. Princes and rulers used Jewish resources to build infra-
structure, to wage wars, to adorn palaces, or simply to enrich themselves. Frederick I from 
Prussia, for instance, accepted the fifty wealthiest Jews who were expelled by Leopold I, 
from Austria. These rich Jews, to settle in Berlin, should invest in industries and pay 
special taxes for travelling, marrying, having children. They could not trade wood, 
tobacco, leather, wine, nor practice specialized arts, and they were also barred from 
guilds, and they were forbidden of building a synagogue.167 Frederick II, in “The Charter 
Decreed for the Jews of Prussia” (1750), conditioned the permanence of Jews to certain 
economic obligations and prohibitions, and defined “the money-business” as the reason 
(the ground) of Jewish permanence in Prussia.168 
In the historical process in which “the Jewish usurer rose first from court Jew to 
creditor of absolutist states”169, the wealthy Jew was caught in the same politically 
unstable relation. Being a pariah, he had access to a specific Jewish trans-national 
economy, which had put him in the privileged position of being the prince’s, and later the 
state’s, financial agent. On the other hand, his international position in economic terms 
coincided with his rootless situation from a political point of view. His existence – the 
“tolerance” of his existence – was dependent on his money. What was valued was not his 
culture, his religion, nor his own individuality, but his resources. He embodied a monetary 
function, so his rights (the right to move, the right to own a house, the right to build a 
synagogue) were conditioned by the fulfillment of this function. Jews literally needed to 
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pay for rights.170 Amos Elon described the “newly emerging middle class of Berlin” as 
being predominantly formed by “well-to-do Jews who lacked citizenship rights or the 
courage to demand them. Their toleration could be abrogated at any moment.”171 
This Jewish condition was further weakened by its relations to different strata of 
non-Jewish society, which, in general, regarded Jews with hostility and resentment 
because of the particularities of the “caste”. Decadent aristocrats, for instance, eventually 
needed to borrow Jewish money (to afford the old way of life), being thus indebted to 
interests and rates administered by Jews. For German Junkers, Jews became the symbol 
of the disintegration of feudal stability. The bourgeoisie and the peasantry, on their turn, 
resented Jewish “special” relation to monarchs, while despising the “unproductive” and 
“parasitical” nature of the Jewish “mobile capital”, not visibly integrated to any form of 
social labor or work. Common natives regarded the title of “privileged Jews” (in Prussia, 
court Jews were officially called Generalpriviligierte Juden) as indicating an actual 
distinction of “special rights” who most people did not have.172 As political protection did 
not mean social acceptance, the unstable status quo of paid tolerance could be suddenly 
destroyed by social revolts and official expulsions, when the resentment of depending on 
Jews (and the eventual debts and competition that resulted from of this dependence) 
surpassed the economic calculus of “toleration”.173             
 
3.2 The Internal Life of the Pariah-caste 
The Jewish ghetto, shtetl or community174 was a small society outside society, or 
a “caste” with a minimal contact with the host society. Prior to emancipation, the Jewish 
community self-organized around laws, rituals and positions which were relatively 
autonomous within the small space of the ghetto. But the ghetto’s inner complexity, 
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divided around the synagogue, the school, the kosher butchery, the household, the artisan 
workshop etc., was unified around the figure of the “representative”, the Jew or the small 
circle of Jews who, by their privileged access to rulers, governed (politically) and 
sustained (economically) the Jewish community.  
In this context, inner “democracy” (arguing and debating were essential to Jewish 
diasporic existence)175 was constrained by the religious opinion of rabbis and, more 
important, by the pragmatic decisions of wealthy Jews, who became the actual leaders. 
Considering the pariah condition, in special the external pressure exercised by host 
societies, the lasting model was that of an oligarchy or plutocracy.176 The decision-making 
was disputed by religious and economic principles – both a-political principles, in 
Arendt’s view. As everything, ultimately, depended on the king’s “tolerance”, the 
dominant criteria was economic: “Our taxes”, said a rabbi in Cologne, “protect us”.177 
Jews were regarded as money-bags, and so started to think of themselves, when it came 
to evaluate their relation to non-Jewish governors, as merely sources of money. They 
incorporated to their worldview the image of an external world which was open only for 
a limited financial-personal interaction. 
Concerning the general population of the ghetto, this created a situation which 
Arendt called, following Bernard Lazare, “double slavery”.178 Their existence depended 
on wealthy Jews, while the existence of wealthy Jews depended on kings and rulers. 
Middle and low-class Jews - artisans, traders, wanderer and beggars - were subject to a 
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leader who, by its turns, was subject to an external ruler. In this vertical structure, the 
factor of utility was weakened as one looked down to the bottom: only Jewish leaders 
were useful. The rest, in contrast, was useless, tolerated insofar the Jewish leader could 
justify his instrumentality.  Being the visible face of Jews, the wealthy leader had behind 
himself an entire population that existed because of his political contact, worked upon his 
economic activities and survived because of his charity. 
To be sure, the “slavery” referred to Arendt had nothing to do with compulsory 
work, nor exploration of the labor force of slaves. Jews were analogous to ancient slaves 
in the sense that they lived an economical existence lacking political rights. Even wealthy 
Jews, living in affluence and comfort, enjoying limited freedom of movement, developed 
a “slave mentality” by internalizing the need to be useful to their Christian or secular 
“masters”. Internally, though, there was no class division in Jewish communities. As 
Arendt reminded, the poor were not explored, and the rich were not integrated into a 
system of production. The ghetto was thus a parallel world also in economic terms.179 
There was a “fateful personal union” around the wealthy Jew and the rest of the Jewish 
community, which helped to sustain a delusion about their “slave-condition”: inside the 
ghetto, there were festivals and marriages, households and small shops, and a 
communitarian life with relatively economical, spiritual, and artistic development. 
Indeed, as we shall see, Arendt regarded pre-emancipation Jewish communities 
as having, despite all of its structural fragilities, an overwhelming “humanity”.180 This is 
one of the first meanings of the pariah condition, according to Arendt: standing outside 
all social connections, a pariah-caste develops a warmth, a sense of solidarity, which was 
a remarkable aspect of Jewish communities prior to the crisis precipitated by 
emancipation and assimilation. By not being tied to society’s conventions, and by being 
free from social prejudices, pariahs kept a sense of proximity which gradually disappeared 
in the process that she called the “rise of the social”. The pariah’s vantage point taught 
Hannah Arendt that, when a society justifies oppression in productive, mythological or 
ideological terms, only those standing outside social codes and rites can retain a sense of 
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solidarity and intimacy; and, if these pariahs are denied a political framework to voice 
their judgments as outsiders, they can still build, in the absence of a polity of rights, a 
small community of affection.     
 
3.3 The Problem of Choosing Life  
Along with the social question and the detachment of the political from the 
economical, Arendt’s distinction between mere life and good life is another notorious 
source of misunderstanding. Interpreters focused on Arendt’s Hellenism tend to discard 
this topic as an unjustified anachronism, unfitted to contemporary politics. Accordingly, 
in democratic mass societies, one would hardly figure out the relevance of an agonistic 
heroism inspired in Greek poetry. I don’t intend to clean Arendt’s political thinking off 
its ancient inspirations. They are an important component of works as The Human 
Condition, and must not be explained away as mere theoretical instruments to the 
presentation of a truer, hidden sense of Arendt’s book. I just want to read the theme of 
courage with a different background, that of the Jewish question, and the specific case of 
the court Jews, to bring further elucidation to it.181 
The principle of life is constitutive of Jewish thought since biblical times: “...I 
have set before you life and death, ...therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed 
may live...”.182 After the dispersion, in the moment that, according to Arendt, Jews 
withdraw from history, this principle received an additional validation. Its lasting 
authority was laid down in the Babylon exile around the idea that “The law of the 
kingdom is law” (Dina de-malkhutah Dina).183 This was a practical application, to a 
dispersed people, of the commandment to choose life: whenever you are, accept the 
existent political conditions. Maimonides, for instance, had argued that religious 
martyrdom (or political self-immolation) was not acceptable in Jewish terms, since it was 
senseless to die for the sake of Jewish principles: these principles could only be exercised 
in life.184 
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 This transformed Jews perhaps in the most peaceful of European peoples. Joseph 
Roth celebrated this by recalling Eastern Jews – “the most antimilitaristic people in the 
world” - who preferred migrating to another continent or even cutting a finger out than 
enlisting to an army.185 Acts of physical violence by Jews, very rare indeed, were as a rule 
reactions to aggressions, and were never sustained in a systematic or institutional way. 
The established Jewish mode of responding to violence was to be more discrete, silent, to 
“choose life”, to keep working, and to avoid contact with gentiles. Reacting with counter-
violence or with protests, in the imagination of most diasporic Jews, would only incite 
anti-Semites. In a similar way, Jews never reclaimed political power, and before the end 
of the 18th and the 19th century, they did not advocate in a significant way any radical 
transformation of societies. The Maccabean martyrs of Masada were long ago dead, and 
their acts did not inspire modern Jews. 
  “The Jewish will to live”, Arendt wrote, “is both famous and infamous”.186 It was 
famous because, as long as civilization worked upon a basic humanism, limiting its 
violence with pragmatic-economic and religious-moral considerations, the “will to live” 
was responsible for the notorious endurance of Jews as a distinctive group in history. Jews 
stood as an exception to the rise and fall of peoples. Yet in the 20th century it became 
“infamous”, for Jews were unprepared to match the radical, unparalleled violence 
unleashed by Nazi anti-Semitism. Jews became famous for having subsisted throughout 
centuries, and infamous for being easily destroyed in no more than five years. If, on the 
one hand, under “normal” conditions, Jewish survival became a sort of historical rule, on 
the other hand, under “abnormal” circumstances, Jewish extermination was practically 
normalized. Historically, and I believe there is no exaggeration in this statement, the 
outcome of the Jewish principle of life was the realization of Jewish death. 
 Arendt formulated it as follows: 
“…now the dreadful time has come when every day proves that death begins his 
reign of terror precisely when life becomes the highest good; that he who prefers to live 
on his knees will die on his knees; that no one is more easily murdered than a slave.”187 
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In other words: if one chooses mere life, if one displays a “will to survive at any 
price”188, one degrades oneself, becoming unprotected and exposing one’s own life to 
further aggressions and humiliations, and even to death. This insight informed Arendt’s 
distinction between life, in a mere natural-physical sense of survival, and what Greeks 
called “good life”, or political life in Arendt’s view, a life under human conditions, in a 
worldly-community supporting a juridical and meaningful existence, in which individuals 
have a stable framework to protect and develop their lives, while acting collectively, 
under relative freedom.189  
 
3.4 The Institution of the Parvenu 
Michael Graetz contested the charge of court Jews’ political inertia. According to 
him, in several episodes, wealthy Jews used their economic influence to advance 
“specifically Jewish political aims”. He offered three examples, from different contexts: 
first, the case of Wolf Wertheimer, creditor of the Habsburg Empire, who mobilized other 
court Jews and the Christian princes of Saxony and Bavaria to pressure the Austrian 
Empress Maria Theresa to revoke an edict that expelled Jews from Prague, Bohemia and 
Moldavia; second, the story of the economic leadership of the Bordeaux Jewish 
community, who aligned with non-Jewish bourgeoisie, in the 18th century, to defy the 
ancient regime in France; third, the request and pressures of Jewish notables in Prussia, 
in the 19th century, for the improvement of the conditions of poor Jewish populations in 
Eastern Europe. In the last case, Gerson Bleichröder, creditor, economic assessor and 
friend of Bismarck, approached the Prussian Chancellor in 1877 in the following terms: 
“For twenty-two years I have served Your Majesty faithfully, without any 
compensation. Now the time has come to request such a compensation. What I ask is 
equality for the Jews of Romania.”190   
              
I think that these counter examples and arguments can help us to refine some 
aspects of Arendt’s perspective. Court Jews may have behaved, eventually, in accordance 
to principles others than self-interest. Albert Ballin, one of the Kaiserjuden, engaged in 
diplomatic efforts (with an English court Jew) to avoid the First World War. Bleichröder 
had “lost a substantial sum of money as a result” of helping German aristocrats and 
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sparing economic scandals involving Bismarck.191 They were not only non-egoistic in 
pressing for social and political improvements to average Jews, but they also behaved 
eventually in accordance to national interests.192 These, however, were either exceptions 
or isolated political initiatives that, in general, were neutralized by the fundamental 
apolitical character of their relations with rulers.  
Even if they used their influence eventually, their basic function was to serve, not 
to change power.193 In sticking obstinately to the principle that “Without money there’s 
no living”194, court Jews ended up in isolation or despair. Bleichröder tried to emulate 
aristocracy and bought for himself the title of “von”: he became Gerson von Bleichröder. 
Albert Ballin tried to dissuade his friend the Kaiser from entering the war. After hearing 
the news of the Kaiser’s abdication as a consequence of the German defeat, Ballin 
committed suicide. Walther Rathenau, the other “Kaiser-Jew”, who “obsessively declared 
himself a Jew” to every new acquaintance, wrote a pamphlet defending inter-marriage as 
a way to “arianize” the “unshapely” physical outlook of German Jews. After the First 
World War, and after secretly working for the reestablishment of the German arms 
industry, Rathenau, who said to Kurt Blumenfeld he would accept the Foreign Affairs 
ministry to “break down the barriers that anti-Semites have erected to isolate us”, and 
who refused to use a bodyguard, was assassinated by right-wing militants in the streets of 
Berlin.195 
 
To be sure, there was a rationality in court Jew’s behavior, if one understands as 
rational a continuous avoidance of open conflict for the sake of preservation. But Arendt 
warned that this line of reasoning is blind to larger processes and broader relations that 
may threat household security and even the mere physical life. Moreover, a rationality 
that establishes lower parameters to itself end up degrading relations. Arendt wrote 
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sarcastically that “…every program that takes the status quo into account also helps to 
realize it.”196 A general mistrust in politics, and a specific Jewish belief that nothing but 
private endurance could be politically achieved, were both symptomatic of an epoch in 
which “anyone who can see farther than the tip of his own nose is said to live in a fantasy 
world”.197 
For Arendt, however, how would have looked like the alternative paths – the 
“might have been otherwise”? In the article Jewish Politics, Arendt listed, negatively, 
notions that, in her view, had been guiding Jewish leaders, and thus characterizing Jewish 
apolitia, until then (1942). I will briefly comment these aspects, to draw initial answers 
to the relation between the pariah situation and politics: 
 
“abhorrence for principles”: as we saw, Jewish leaders may have acted politically, 
eventually. But they lacked vision, and their acts had no consistency. They behaved 
mostly seeking “opportunistic success”, forming thus a view based on their self-
importance and their prestige, something which could not be easily accommodated with 
the principle of acting on behalf of their people and other peoples. Indeed, they were 
typically moderns in the sense of being confused by the “relativity of all values”, by 
assuming that human relations were fundamentally negotiations from one-to-one, and 
everything was based on momentary, personal “valuations”. As Arendt defended, politics 
demands stabilization and equalization: it creates a framework of institutions and spaces 
where men, in their plurality, can be equalized by law, being thus able to discuss and 
decide in horizontal spheres. This was not at stake in the game of paying for protection 
and blackmailing rulers with the idea of exchanging goods for some political concessions.  
 
“fear of betting on the wrong horse”: for wealthy Jews, political calculation meant 
seeking secure alternatives, which could preserve an already fragile status quo. Fear, 
indeed, was a dominant principle of behavior (being, thus, a principle of non-action): they 
did not want to risk their position; they did not imagine risking their careers; they feared 
kings and they feared host societies; they feared admitting, publicly, that Jews had 
specific demands (let us remember that Arendt lived during the 1930s in Paris, when the 
Rothschild opposed Jewish protests intended to pressure the French government to resist 
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Hitler. The Rothschild also lamented the large influx of “visible” Otsjuden into French 
streets, which, in the family’s view, could lead to more anti-Semitism. They did not want 
to compromise their status as “good French”).198 Courage, as we shall see in detail, was a 
prerequisite to politics, not necessarily leading to the ancient warrior’s heroism, but at 
least to the initiative of making oneself vulnerable in the agitation of the public affairs: 
“Whoever entered the political realm had first to be ready to risk his life, and too great a 
love for life obstructed freedom, was a sure sign of slavishness.”199  
 
“admiration of those who hold power on this earth”: Jewish leaders seldom thought in 
terms of direct action. Acting as equals “among peers” was outside their imagination. The 
shortcut to power was to befriend with the ruler. In times of social anti-Semitism, this 
also seemed “rational”. Joseph Süss Oppenheimer, court-factor in Württemberg and 
finance minister of the Duke Karl Alexander, was publicly hanged by “natives” after the 
Duke passed away and Oppenheimer lost his protection. Several Jews in the turbulent 
times between the World Wars suffered from a certain king’s nostalgia, as they feared, 
with good reasons, that the fall of kings would leave them exposed to ethnic-social 
resentments. This was especially true in the regions of the former Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, a multi-ethnic state in which Jews enjoyed juridical protection and even some 
degrees of national autonomy. Joseph Roth, who spent his life around Brody, Lemberg, 
Vienna, Berlin, Paris, said that his “strongest experience was the War and the destruction 
of my fatherland, the only one I ever had, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary”.200 In 
the politico-historical imagination of Jews, security was associated with a benevolent 
monarch. The idea was: better being subject to the personal extravagances of a friendly 
absolute ruler than being exposed to the emotions of hostile societies.  
This “admiration of the powerful” led Jews to interpret politics as a sort of 
diplomacy behind the scenes, negotiated in palace rooms, not in public spaces. For 
conspiracy theorists, this was a proof of a Jewish hidden manipulation. But, for Jews, it 
meant something different: they did not want to provoke anti-Semitic feelings by 
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embracing this or that position in public.201 This tactic of appeasing anti-Semitic masses 
with silence accustomed Jews in a political quietism neighboring cowardice. Spaces 
“behind the scenes” are necessarily private, outside the “light” of the public. Jewish action 
could have been displayed in public, perhaps not as an open defiance to anti-Semitic 
feelings, but as genuine articulations of a people who had been enduring humiliation and 
oppression. The case of Jewish sages who accepted open “debates” with Christian 
theologians, in the middle ages, could be seen as an early display of Jewish courage, later 
matched by the German-Jewish revolutionaries of 1848, who argued not only for an 
abstract idea of a German nation, but also voiced their specific “prison” as Jews in 
Germany.202  
 
“reluctance to mobilize the energies of their own people”203: Inherently tied to the 
former, this topic touches another important theme in Arendt’s political work: the 
politicization of masses. As I am arguing, the modern “eclipse of authority” involved two 
problems of grounding and stabilizing political communities. Foundations started to 
collapse, as kings were no longer legitimate leaders. On the other side, the collapse of 
traditional pillars – of authority, of religious norms, of, in Freudian terms, repressive 
expedients instituted by “civilization” – liberated unprecedented social emotions, 
amplified by a sense of helplessness and disorientation among the masses. For Arendt, 
both extremes – the concentration of authority in one man and the dissolution of any form 
of legitimated authority – were dangerous forms of de-politicization. One of Arendt’s 
main concerns related to the replacement of amorphous masses by politically responsible 
and discernible groups and individuals.  
 This, applied to the Jewish condition, meant that individual Jews, out of their 
different orientations and in their different regions, could have been allowed to 
participate, in some way, in their political process, forming their own opinions and 
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displaying their own views. It could have been a matter of acting “from below”, not being 
led “from above”. In the grounding sense of Arendt, the basic political relation is not 
conducing others, but acting with others. Politics is about creating spaces for plurality, 
not controlling plurality. As we shall see in the next section, Arendt ratified this point 
during the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem. Supported by factual evidences, Arendt argued 
that the vertical organization of Jewish communities, cooperating with external rulers, 
facilitated their own liquidation: in communities with no Jewish institutions, where Jews 
were left to their own improvised decisions, the numbers of killing had not been so high 
as in places with established Judenräte. It was another example for Arendt’s conviction 
that improvisation was better than rigidly organized bureaucracies and verticalized 
institutions with no space for inner democracy and spontaneous initiative.   
 
3.5 The Pariah Between Adaptation and Martyrdom 
The role of the Jewish councils (Judenräte) established by Adolf Eichmann’s 
office emerged during his trial in Jerusalem, which Arendt covered for the magazine The 
New Yorker in 1961. Arendt said that this was a factual matter she could not avoid, since 
it informed part of the discussion during the procedures in the court. The topic, however, 
was not presented as proof to any general thesis in the report, neither was it related to the 
central topic of her analysis, Adolf Eichmann himself. Moreover, Arendt insisted that, by 
presenting the story of the Judenräte, she was not using it as a general illustration of the 
history of Jews in Europe: “My book is a report about the trial, not a representation of 
that history”.204 When asked about the historical adaptation of Jews to “Gentiles” in 
Europe, Arendt also stressed that she did not work, in the report, “deeply into Jewish 
history”, and that this sort of historical paradigm could only apply to “the initial states of 
the Nazi regime”.205 
For didactical purposes, I propose here to mitigate Arendt’s own conscious 
affirmation. I propose to relate her approach to the Jewish councils with her earlier stories 
about Jewish apolitia. There is a line one cannot ignore. Moreover, approaching it, I 
intend to bring more clarity to the articulation of her Jewish writings, her report on 
Eichmann and her general political theory. By doing this, one can avoid the common 
perplexity around Arendt’s statements in the case of the Jewish leaders under Eichmann, 
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for they were not an aleatory commentary, but a part of a consistent discourse on Jewish 
politics. Moreover, one can also question, for instance, the opinion that Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, despite being “Arendt’s most intensely Jewish work”, did not discriminate 
“carefully among the various stages of the ‘silent’ cooperation between the Nazi regime 
and Jewish organizations and committees”, resulting thus in a “confused” judgment, 
which seemed to ignore questions such as, 
“Was it so hard to grasp that they [Jewish leaders] would interpret Nazi 
extermination policy as a more massive form of the traditional anti-Semitism to which 
they had been subjected since time immemorial? Was it so impossible to see that the 
Jewish councils tried to keep a semblance of order and everydayness in running the lives 
of their communities, and somehow still entertained the hope that they could influence 
and maybe even postpone the worst from happening to them?”206 
     
Let me try to clarify these questions. The Eichmann report was published in 1963. 
Arendt had been dealing with Jewish affairs since the 1930s, and had been complaining 
against the dominant form of Jewish leaderships since then. The question of responsibility 
and inaction was already in her horizon. Even accepting that, in Eichmann’s text, Arendt 
dealt with a specific form of Jewish politics, within a radically new context of 
powerlessness, I assume that the topic becomes less controversial if we relate it to the 
longer story of Jewish quietism. This was also the position, for instance, of the greatest 
historian of the Holocaust, Raul Hilberg.207 To deal with this difficult point, we don’t need 
a chronological line of causation, but a historical background, to relate somehow the court 
Jews of the eighteenth century established by Christian kings as “Jewish dictators”208 to 
the Junderäte of the Nazi period, which symbolized the “moral collapse of respectable 
Jewish society”.209 In this regard, the contrasting types of the pariah and the parvenu, and 
the relating oppositions life vs. good life, fear vs. courage, private vs. public are, in my 
reading, indispensable references to understand Arendt’s claims.  
 
Chaim Rumkowski and Adam Czerniakow embody some aspects of these 
oppositions. They form an opposition in itself. Rumkowski was chosen, on the basis of 
his economic activities, by the Nazi officers in the region of Lodz as the governor  of the 
local ghetto, the second largest in Poland. The Jewish leaders, as Arendt reminded, were 
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responsible for formulating lists of Jewish inhabitants, controlling their finances and 
transferring money, goods and propriety to Nazi authorities in order to pay for the 
“expenses” with transport and “relocation”, supplying Jewish “police forces to help seize 
Jews and get them on trains”, distributing “Yellow Star badges” etc.210 Rumkowski 
accepted these tasks with an unmatched determination. His belief in the principle of 
adaptation transformed the ghetto of Lodz in a small factory, whose workers were subject 
to a situation worse than slavery (they were not enough fed to work, and they could not 
be sold to another “master”), and whose politics were analogous to an illusory micro-
monarchy (this small monarchy was anything but a sovereign community). The personal 
extravagances of Rumkowski – in his speeches, he addressed to “my Jews”; he printed 
currency and post stamps with his image; he “rode around in a broken-down horse-drawn 
carriage”211, and was ironically called “Chaim I, the king of Jews” - was only an 
embarrassing outcome of the tradition of vertical govern. The point to be stressed here, 
though, is the practical orientation adopted by him, which was a systematic application 
of the “principle of survival”. 
“Only one thing can save us”, Rumkowski addressed the Lodz Ghetto in 1941, “a 
collective acceptance of a productive life, in an atmosphere of utter calm”. Rumkoswski 
applied the principle of compliance, assuming that the “will to live” would prevail as long 
as Jews could prove their utility. So his authoritarian attitude – “I will attack every 
symptom of corruption with the greatest severity”212 – was directed against those who 
dared to disturb the productivity of his domain: those, for instance, who tried to tell the 
truth about the deportations and who realized that the Nazis were no longer abiding to the 
laws of economic instrumentality. Rumkowski was a perfect leader of a perfected system, 
for he emulated the prevailing terms of larger society: when the deportations were set in, 
he threatened to “put all the parasites on the lists”.213 The irony of this part of the story is 
that the Lodz Ghetto achieved a certain success. It was one of the first to be established 
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and the last to be disabled. Some of its buildings are standing today, for there was no 
revolt in Lodz.214 
When the deportations to extermination camps (called “resettlements”) began, 
Rumkowski choose the strategy of surrendering certain groups to save others. In this 
moment, he was honest with his masses: “I have to perform this bloody operation myself; 
I simply must cut off limbs to save the body!” Or: “I came [today] like a robber to rob 
your dearest ones from your very hearts!” 215 Rumkowski once addressed the parents of 
soon to be deported children in the following terms: “…I never imagined I would be 
forced to deliver this sacrifice to the altar with my own hands. In my old age, I must 
stretch out my hands and beg. Brothers and sisters: Hand them over to me! Fathers and 
mothers: Give me your children!...Offer them up into my hands as a sacrifice, so that I 
can avoid having further victims…”.216 He was later also killed in Auschwitz along with 
the last deported from Lodz.217  
In every aspect, he was a startling contrast to Adam Czerniakow, the leader of the 
largest Polish Ghetto, Warsaw. Czerniakow also assumed that, in the “darkest chapter” 
of Jewish European history, it was better to negotiate “humane” small improvements with 
an inhuman order, so to avoid “unnecessary” pains. But Czerniakow still knew that are 
certain conditions more important than life itself. For Arendt, he, “who was not a rabbi 
but an unbeliever”, a secular Polish Jew, acted in accordance to the rabbinical saying “Let 
them kill you, but don’t cross the line”.218 On late July 1942, after being informed by the 
Nazis about the beginning of deportations to Treblinka, Czerniakow tried to obtain 
exemptions for the ghetto’s orphans. Realizing his failure, he went back to his office, 
wrote a note to his wife (“I can no longer bear all this”), and killed himself with a capsule 
of cyanide. If rebellion, on a political and moral basis, coincides with the pariah’s 
activation, Czerniakow can be regarded as a late pariah, as one who has chosen when 
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choice was no longer relevant, and one whose initiative, the beginning of something new, 
meant for that context no longer natality, but self-inflicted mortality.219 
Hannah Arendt stressed how many Jews had committed one of the gravest 
political mistakes, according to her: they had relied on a sort of wishful thinking, another 
form of imprisonment in the self, sustained by an unshakable optimism which neutralizes 
the force of facts with self-told consolations. They retained the hope that political reality 
would turn into something better, that the external order would reassume its normalcy, 
that European hosts would never “cross the line”. Rumkowski, as no other Jewish leader, 
combined the narrative of necessary adaptation and blind faith on external forces, as he 
reacted to protests of the Lodz ghetto inhabitants against the precarious food conditions:  
“I can’t put any more into the soup than I have. Who is this demonstration against? 
Against me? I’m just a servant of the authorities. I have to bow my head and do as I’m 
told. No strike of yours can force me to make thicker soup, for I have nothing…The 
Jewish authorities are definitely doing all that can be done. I do what I can, wherever 
possible. I hope that the situation will improve in the near future.”220  
 
Going back a little further: on the public shyness of French Jews during the 
Dreyfus Affair, an episode regarded by Arendt as a prelude to Nazism, she had written 
that “Precisely because they had played so small a part in the political  development of 
the lands in which they lived, they had come, during the course of the century, to make a 
fetish of legal equality”. This fetish, this optimistic belief that legal equality was a 
metaphysical given, and not a political reality established and preserved by human action, 
created on these post-emancipation Jews a sense of “eternal security”.221 The belief on the 
order’s necessity could only be sustained with the referred systematic, self-regenerated 
optimism, for any historically conscious Jew knew that historical realities can change. 
The “fetish of legality”, perhaps derived from a subjective-cognitive requirement for 
order, led Jews to fabricate an inner sense of normalcy, even when external reality 
actualized itself around abnormal patterns of anti-Semitic violence. 
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The optimism broke apart when the violence of reality became literally 
inescapable. According to Arendt’s historical analysis of the principle of life, optimism 
abruptly turned into suicide, into a silent martyrdom. When Hitler invaded Austria, in 
1938, Austrian Jews, who had believed in the state’s permanence more than any other 
Jew in the continent, started to invalidate the principle of life without giving up discretion 
and respectability: “…we have seen how quickly eloquent optimism could change to 
speechless pessimism”. Four years before Czerniakow ingested the capsule of cyanide in 
Warsaw, Jews of Vienna commited suicide leaving “conventional, meaningless” letters – 
for, in Arendt’s words, “Nobody cares about motives; they seem to be clear to all of us”. 
Without ever discovering a “higher ideal than life”, that is, without ever launching 
themselves into political initiative, into open protest, organized revolt, or even into public 
martyrdom, these law-abiding, respectable Jews became ready to die unpolitical deaths. 
They opted for a private martyrdom: 
“There are those odd optimists among us who, having made a lot of optimistic 
speeches, go home and turn on the gas or make use of a skyscraper in quite an unexpected 
way.”222 
 
The absence of protest and meaningful letters was due to a combination of blind 
optimism with a sense of abandonment (or Verlassenheit, the term Arendt used in German 
for “loneliness”), of being left by others and by a social-cultural reality of which they 
imagined to be an integral part. To abandon oneself was the last stage of this process. 
They rebelled in private spaces, as in Max Liebermann’s living room in Berlin, whose 
windows, after 1933, the painter kept closed (“I don’t want to see this new world around 
me”223), and in the other private, quite rooms where Kurt Tucholsky (in Sweden), Stefan 
Zweig (in Brazil), Ernst Toller (in New York), Ernst Lissauer (in Vienna), and, even 
decades after the 30s, many others who had suffered that period (as Primo Levi, Paul 
Celan, Bruno Bettelheim), took their life respectably, breaking up with the Jewish 
principle of life’s sanctity without offering any further complaining-reason to a world 
which had ceased to offer reasonable grounds to life.  
Also late, Robert Weltsch, a journalist who had written an article for the Jüdische 
Rundschau called “Wear It with Pride, the Yellow Patch!”, an article that was assumed 
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to have saved many from suicide, soon regretted the article, especially its headline. 
According to him, it should have been entitled instead, “Pack Your Bags and Run!”224  
 
3.6 “Last version of human sacrifice” 
Concerning this part of Arendt’s pariah story, I want to stress that there is no 
empathy (or pathos) missing in her perspective. The pronoun she used in some texts – 
“we”, “our” – are proper: throughout her experience as a Jewess in Europe, Arendt 
considered suicide while being kept as inmate by French officials at the camp of Gurs. 
She also immersed on a melancholic state after finding out about the reality of the 
genocide.225 She identified, in a way, with the speechless Jewish martyrs of dark rooms. 
Regarding the genocide as a whole, most of her statements and ideas evolved around her 
conclusion that “This ought not to have happened”.226 From this conclusion, she 
articulated a political revolt with words, examples and principles, deserving a special 
place in the tradition of self-conscious, critical Jewish thinkers. 
But, concerning the specific case of the Judenräte, things are more difficult. 
Richard Bernstein, for instance, criticized Arendt’s text for an involuntary irony: she 
wrote about personal responsibility, and she herself should be held accountable for “how 
her book was read (or even misread)”.227 I do agree that Arendt could have put more 
emphasis on some distinctions, avoided some ironical remarks, and made certain claims 
more clear, for she approached very difficult matters, raised original interpretations, and 
dealt with facts that were not already established as part of a common discourse on the 
genocide. This is, indeed, a difficulty that, in my view, cannot be ignored neither solved 
in Arendt’s work: her way of judging is not easily grasped by untrained readers, since it 
does not facilitate interpretation with simple conclusions or circular messages. Arendt 
was aware that this problem could be aggravated by the context of her report to The New 
Yorker: “Since I had never written for mass audiences I didn’t know what could 
happen.”228 
But this question also touches Arendt’s general attitude as an intellectual, and as 
political thinker in particular. Is it possible to detach how one writes from what one 
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writes? Walter Laqueur said that the problem was not the content, but the form of her 
writing.229 But, as Arendt insisted, the person is revealed through how one writes. If one 
represses one’s own style, one’s own specific presentation of thoughts, opinions and data 
into a certain written rhetoric, one represses one’s own voice – one’s view into reality is 
constrained to the point of losing originality and personality, thus losing a specific access 
to reality. Arendt insisted that the report was basically about facts, and this is not accurate: 
it was about facts and about interpretations and conclusions raised by these facts as they 
were reflected in her process of describing, thinking, and judging (“once I wrote, I was 
bound to tell the truth as I saw it”230; emphasis added). Arendt could only illuminate, and 
help to establish, a part of that phenomenon precisely because she brought her personal 
view into play. In other words, the complexity of the object could only be unveiled and 
established with the participation of an original subject. 
Replying to one critic, Arendt (with irony) said he “belongs among the happy few 
who are psychologically color blind; they see only black and white”.231 Even if her 
analysis did not provide easy conclusions, readers jumped into implications never 
supported by her data or her claims. Arendt was accused of having asked “why was there 
not more active resistance [during the genocide]”, and of drawing conclusions that would 
point to a bovine-like passivity of Jews in the death camps. However, the question of 
resistance was raised by the Israeli prosecutor, and was defined as “silly and cruel” by 
Arendt herself, since it disregarded the conditions of total domination, and the fact the 
Jews, “[o]nce they were caught and driven to their death, they behaved like all other 
groups in the same circumstances”.232 
Moreover, Arendt was accused of ignoring general circumstances that put Jews 
on a fragile position, while she indeed mentioned these “vulnerabilities – no territory, no 
government, no army, no government in exile, no weapons, no youth with military 
training”.233 She, as I mentioned before, could have made, for instance, a clearer 
distinction between the terms cooperation and collaboration. Non-Jews collaborationists 
were mostly voluntary, trying to help the Nazi regime, and even imitating Nazi methods, 
																																								 																				
229 “Miss Arendt was attacked not so much for what she said, but for how she said it.” Laqueur, W. “A 
Reply to Hannah Arendt”. The New York Review. February 3, 1966. 
230 Arendt, ‘Answers…’, p. 478 
231 Arendt, ‘The Formidable Dr. Robinson’, TJW, p. 500 
232 Arendt, ‘The Destruction of Six Million’, TJW, p. 494 
233 Arendt, ‘The Formidable Dr. Robinson’, p. 496. In the new introduction to Trunk’s Judenrat, Steven T. 
Katz complained that Arendt ignored the “near total Jewish powerlessness”. New Introduction to Trunk, 
op. cit., xvii 
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for ideological, utilitarian, or sadistic motives. Jewish “cooperation” was imposed by 
Nazi authorities, implemented through terror, and constant humiliation (leaders were 
frequently beaten), and normalized as a strategy of prolonging life and preserving what 
could be preserved.234 But Arendt never doubted the fatalistic implications of this 
atmosphere in which absolute domination was reinforced by complete Jewish 
powerlessness. She even left aside the matter of resistance within ghettos, and did not 
explore further the variations of personal attitudes that, even in the most extreme 
conditions, helped to create different outcomes.235 Ignoring these nuances, readers of 
Eichmann in Jerusalem proceeded to many other forms of induction from facts and 
suggestion that were not in her text.236 The most problematic, though, involved precisely 
her stance on the Judenräte, a stance that was taken by some as a proof of Arendt’s lack 
of “soul”, her “self-hatred”, and even of her preference of Eichmann over his victims.237 
Indeed, as I am arguing, Arendt wrote what she wrote as a committed Jew238, who 
admitted that “wrong done by my own people naturally grieves me more than wrong done 
by other peoples”.239                 
Arendt did not say that the Jewish leaders under Eichmann were traitors. She said 
that there was perplexity because they were not traitors, “and still they became the tools 
of Nazis”240, in a process, characteristic of totalitarian domination, according to which 
victims played a role in their own destruction.  
																																								 																				
234 Trunk, op. cit., p. 573 
235 The study of Trunk, based precisely on the impossibility of inducing a single type of leadership, stresses 
the differences according to personal, regional, groups conditions and attitudes. There were leaders who 
committed suicide when the deportations began, leaders that tried to help underground efforts, and leaders 
who became corrupt and despotic. There were also significant movements of political opposition within the 
ghettos, as when Polish-Jews POWs confronted the Jewish police and even German order-policemen, in 
Lodz, demanding (and achieving) momentary better food conditions. (See Chapter 19 – Opposition to the 
Jewish Councils and the Ghetto Police). The study’s emphasis on personal stories and multiple, specific 
facts, proved that a short range of “possibilities” was not discarded even in those terrible conditions. 
Moreover, Trunk concluded his study corroborating one of the points (in which Arendt herself hesitated) 
that I am trying to stress here: “It follows from our study that the phenomenon of the Jewish Councils 
should be discussed in the framework of Jewish history…”. Trunk, op. cit., p. 575   
236 For instance, that Arendt said that the trial in Jerusalem was illegitimate, that Eichmann’s sentence was 
unjust, that she tried to exculpate Eichmann as a normal human being, that she provided material for anti-
Semites etc.  
237 Bernstein summarizes the attacks on Arendt after the report: “She was accused of being anti-Zionist and 
anti-Semitic. She was ‘soulless’, ‘malicious’, ‘arrogant’, and ‘flippant’. She distorted the facts. She 
trivialized the entire Holocaust with her catchword ‘the banality of evil’. There were those who accused 
her of making Eichmann seem much more attractive than the Jews he murdered.” Bernstein, R. op. cit., p. 
158 
238 She famously stated: “To a Jew this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is 
undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story.”. Arendt, Eichmann and The Holocaust, p. 61 
239 Arendt, ‘A Letter to Gershom Scholem’, TJW, p. 467 
240 Arendt, ‘The Formidable…’, TJW, p. 497 
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What Arendt actually did say regarding the leaders of Jewish councils? 
She said that, within a short range of possibilities, they still had some 
responsibility, for they were not totally forced into their position. They were “less helpless 
than the Jewish masses”, since they upheld more information and participated in some 
decisions.241 Their belief that “cooperation” would bring a better outcome was a 
subjective matter: objectively, they became an “important factor in the bureaucracy of 
destruction”, helping to determine the attitudes and the reactions of their communities in 
those decisive times. Applying Arendt’s words, one could say that they governed and 
organized their people in a time when disorganization and improvisation was required. 
Arendt never said they were not “victims”242, but they were victims in a position of 
responsibility. 
Now, for Arendt, what could have the Judenräte done differently? Even favorable 
commentators ask this question, as if Arendt’s analysis demanded the impossible, relying 
on a “counter-factual” claim beyond “confirmation or falsification” on the basis of “hard 
evidence”.243 That is precisely the point: yes, Arendt did not accept every attitude as 
necessary. She asked for other possibilities, and, against those who accused her of being 
utopian and not knowing what she was writing244, she did have evidence to support her 
claim: either positive evidences of people who acted differently within a minimum range 
of possibilities (like in the Rumkowski-Czerniakow contradistinction), or the negative 
evidences according to which “organization” achieved a sinister efficiency, as in the case 
of the Hungarian Jews, who, being the last community to be caught and organized, had 
95% of its members exterminated when Germans were already losing the war. 
What, so, the Judenräte, according to Arendt, could have concretely done: 
“Relinquished” their position; “tell the people all is lost, sauve qui peut”; followed 
their fellows to camps and “suffer the same fate” (as the Polish educator Janusz Korczak 
did, movingly joining his students to Treblinka, in the episode that led to Czerniakow’s 
																																								 																				
241 Steven Katz and Jacob Robinson presented Trunk’s Judenrat as a proof of the “inescapability of Jewish 
‘cooperation’ with the Nazi overlord” (Katz, p. xii), but they, and the study itself, disprove their claim, by 
presenting the “dilemmas”, and the variability of individual attitudes. 
242 “…even the Judenräte were, of course, victims. This doesn’t mean they are a hundred percent 
exonerated, but they obviously stand on the other side [of the perpetrators]. Arendt, Interview by Joachim 
Fest, p. 42 
243 Bernstein, R. op. cit., p. 162 
244 “Her reflections about Jews, Zionism, and the solution of the ‘Arab questions’ were not just farfetched 
or utopian. Much of the time she did not know what she was writing about.” Laquer, W. “The Arendt Cult”, 
In: Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem. Edited by Steven E. Aschheim; University of California Press, 2001, p. 
54 
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suicide); used actively the structure of councils “as a cover for underground work”.245 
Arendt also said that, for her, the line not to be crossed was the preparation of deportation 
lists, in which some leaders behaved as “masters over life and death”. She radically 
opposed to views and justifications which sounded “rational”, as she explained in a letter: 
“It was common enough to think a) If some of us have to die, it is better that we 
decide than the Nazis. I disagree. It would have been infinitely better to let the Nazis do 
their own murderous business. b) With a hundred victims we shall save a thousand. This 
sound to me like the last version of human sacrifice: pick seven virgins, sacrifice them to 
placate the wrath of the gods. Well, this is not my religious belief, and most certainly it 
is not the faith of Judaism. Finally, the theory of the lesser evil: Let us serve in order to 
prevent worse men from taking these positions; let us do bad things in order to prevent 
the worst.”246 
 
The topic of the Judenräte is certainly painful. Arendt knew it, and referred to it 
as part of a general collapse of European society. Even if Arendt tried to isolate it from 
the broader scope of Jewish history, the themes of courage and dignity, which trespassed 
her articles in the 30s and 40s, reappeared in her blaming of the Jewish leaders. It was not 
an easy condemnation. But, given the “end of the story”, it was required by the task of 
rethinking politics after 1945. Jews were among the people who needed an urgent revision 
of their political stories and principles, so to finally stop suffering history. To ask for 
rebellion in their weakest moment was outrageous, and Arendt not only did not ask it as 
she also helped to analyze how rebellion was meaningless in the darkest conditions.247 
Elsewhere, Arendt had written that, under total domination, after the depletion of every 
moral, political and physical resource, no revolt was possible. The question of rebellion, 
indeed, served as a “smoke screen for the question that was not asked” – and this was the 
question regarding the cooperation of Jewish leaders, policemen and other individuals 
who, outside the extermination camps, served as tools of self-domination: “Why did you 
cooperate in the destruction of your own people and, eventually, in our own ruin?”248 This 
was not a moralistic rhetorical question with no plausible answer. It was a question 
oriented to the re-politicization of the Jewish people.  
            
 
																																								 																				
245 Arendt, ‘The Destruction of Six Million’, p. 494. As I mentioned before, there were examples of leaders 
who took these paths.  
246 Arendt, ‘Answers to Questions…’, p. 481 
247 This is not to say that Arendt did not praise the dignity of rebellion. For her, though, organizing Jews 
outside the Third Reich around a visible army was a political question of first order. 
248 Arendt, Eichmann…, p. 70 
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3.7 Which Rationality?  
Here, without losing sight of this specific episode, we can move to a more general 
discussion regarding what I am presenting as Arendt’s attempt to comprehend and judge. 
Arendt was accused of not comprehending political actors and their circumstances, and 
yet daring to judge their behavior. As I am arguing, comprehending, for Arendt, did not 
mean searching for reasons to justify, via definite causal explanations, empirical-political 
configurations. It was not a matter of finding the “rationality” of the empirical reality. 
Indeed, Arendt even admitted that “coming to terms” with that reality was not exactly 
possible: “Something happened there to which we cannot reconcile ourselves.”249 If one 
is Hegelian, one would say: there is no possibility of aufheben this moment of world 
history. There is no positive principle to incorporate into the historical march of reason.250 
Arendt judged precisely because comprehension did not mean exposing events as 
necessary. Her judgment, in my reading, is powerful because of this impossibility of 
“coming to terms”, of normalizing, within any pattern of probability and necessity, a 
process so radically inhuman and destructive.  
Now, the political basis of Arendt’s judgment can be made more explicit, 
especially considering the following attempts of invalidating her point with the claim that: 
a) as anyone who is not in the active situation (anyone “who was not there”), Arendt 
could not have judged; b) Arendt ignored the rationality of obedience and adaptation; c) 
Arendt disregarded objective conditions which made impossible the political integration 
of European Jews decades before the episode of the Judenräte. The first claim can be 
easily dismissed, I assume, for if it were valid, it would collapse the basis of judgement, 
of judging and being judged. If only the involved actors were allowed to judge their own 
acts, then judgement would be replaced by self-justification, and by a piori immunization 
of every actor. Politically speaking, one cannot judge oneself.251  
The two other topics – b) that adaptation, historically speaking, was rational and 
c) that integration was impossible - relate to Arendt’s general depiction of political action. 
																																								 																				
249 Arendt, Interview…, p. 23. The German verb used by Arendt in the interview is not precisely “to 
reconcile”, but “fertig werden”, to “come to terms”, to “handle”. Arendt, Ich will…, p. 62 
250 The very impossibility of “reconciliation” confirms Arendt fragmentary approach to political events. In 
other words, any presupposition of necessary progress or regress is broken by the primacy of contingency: 
“There is no Hegelian dialectic between continuity and discontinuity in Arendt’s work because the 
contradiction is not sublated. And Arendt tells us why she rejects philosophical sublation. She says that one 
could sublate this contradiction between continuity and discontinuity only if one told a single story about 
history.” Heller, A. ‘On Tradition and New Beginnings’. In: Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, p. 20  
251 In the Eichmann report, Arendt qualified as “fantastic” the discussion on “whether anyone who was not 
present is entitled ‘to sit in judgement’ over the past.” Arendt, Eichmann and The Holocaust, p. 111 
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Both deserve to be discussed more thoughtfully, for here the question goes beyond the 
specific case of European Jews. This point requires calling into question the definition of 
rationality. From a Hobbesian point of view, preserving corporeal identity, that is, 
securing one’s body from external accidents is a physical law that no reasoning-process 
could disregard. Indeed, Hobbes understood reason not as a faculty through which man 
could discover metaphysical ends, but rather as an instrument of ratiocination, of adding 
and subtracting, or multiplying and dividing things and its bodily perceived proprieties. 
Grounding the reasoning process and the definition of things on a mathematical model, 
Hobbes depicted the rational man as capable of syllogistically extracting conclusions 
from premises, or simply calculating effects from causes (“Science is the knowledge of 
consequences”), within a physical space in which any body’s rational movement is 
oriented to its own preservation.252 
In this model, the strategy of survival can be accepted as rational, also in its 
conclusion of trusting an absolute ruler entitled to preserve the order and avoid any 
physical treat to individual bodies. But Arendt refused this model either on the basis of 
its theoretical flaws (its attempt of grounding a political world on physical laws, logical 
syllogisms and subjective ratiocination) and of its historical failure (nowhere more 
evident than in the history of European Jews, to whom the politics of fear, self-
preservation and alienation from power led to a catastrophic end). Indeed, in the model 
of calculation of consequences from causes (or premises), there is no historical evaluation 
in Arendt’s sense, for history is a collection of unexpected stories and of facts that cannot 
be anticipated via subjective reasoning. Moreover, if one could politicize and historicize 
the calculus of fearful bodies, Jews should logically reinforce their desire for protection 
in environments “naturally” hostile (assuming anti-Semitism as a “natural” element of 
social relations). But, even if one could abstract a fixed premise from the stories of 
European Jews, soon the twentieth century would prove that men could produce a “state” 
much more violent than any hypothetical state of nature. 
Arendt proposed a different political rationality: she recovered the Greek sense of 
a “speaking animal” (zoon logon ekhon), or a being capable of speech.253 Hobbes himself 
																																								 																				
252 For Hobbes’ definition of reason and science: Hobbes, op. cit., Chapter 5, Of Reason and Science, pp. 
29-38. Also: “Reasoning is a step-by-step process in which each stage logically depends on the previous 
one.” Newey, G. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Hobbes and Leviathan. London: Routledge. 2008, p. 
56 
253 Interpreting Aristotle, Arendt added that “according to this [Greek] opinion, everybody outside the polis 
– slaves and barbarians – was aneu logou, deprived, of course, not of the faculty of speech, but of a way of 
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had noted that “The Greeks have but one word, logos, for both speech and reason; not 
that they thought there was no speech without reason, but not reasoning without 
speech.”254 This is what Arendt tried to recover, after the modern imprisonment on the 
self: an interdependence between reason and speech, or, in other terms, between thinking 
and talking. The exchange of words and opinions is intended to do more than feeding 
one’s cognitive appetite for knowledge; to speak is concomitant to see and be seen in a 
public reality formed by interactions and by a “web of relations”, where one appears to 
others.255 In this line, where there is silence, there is no politics.256     
So, what is at stake is something more than a diplomatic dialogue (Jews, as we 
saw, dialogued with representatives of societies and governments). It is rather a “venture” 
into a reality larger than one’s own ghetto, a venture experienced through the reorientation 
of one’s attitudes and thoughts with principles others than those governing private 
deliberation andsocial preservation. The first emotion aroused by this public venture may 
be fear – of exposing vulnerabilities, of risking economic security, of being criticized or 
even attacked by others -, but, politically speaking, fear can evolve into courage, and 
courage can turn into what Arendt called public happiness, that sense of good life 
achieved by one’s insertion into mediated and relational spaces where freedom is 
experienced and rights are secured. 
For example, instead of being led by plutocrats that could only “reason” in private 
spaces, extracting consequences from the premises fear and utility, Jews could have 
organized for the sake of speaking, of telling their stories, their suffering and their 
demands in visible spaces, thus enacting a different political configuration. Their 
appearance to others would also mean the appearance of others to them. For Arendt, this 
would not have necessarily implied a harmonic moment of recognition, but it could have 
at least taught Jews how to see political configurations, and its re-configurations, without 
relying on the fixed wishful thinking of adaptation. Inability to judge was connected to 
inability in capturing the unpredictable shape of political relations. As Jews seldom 
appeared in public, political constellations and events were mostly invisible to them.  
 
																																								 																				
life in which speech and only speech made sense and where the central concern of all citizens was to talk 
with each other.” Arendt, HC, p. 27 
254 Hobbes, op. cit., Chapter IV, Of Speech, p. 25 
255 Arendt opened her chapter on action stating that plurality is the condition “of both action and speech” 
(section 24 – The Disclosure of the Agent in Speech and Action, which is precisely followed by the section 
on the “web” of interactions (section 25 – The Web of Relationships and the Enacted Stories) 
256 Hull, M. B. The Hidden Philosophy of Hannah Arendt. London: RoutledgeCurzon. 2002, p. 153 
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Rousseau once wrote, 
“I will never believe that I have understood the reasons of Jews until they have a 
free state, schools, universities, where they could speak and debate without risk. Only 
then will we be able to know what they have to say.”257 
 
This is an important passage for it condenses much of  what I am trying to argue: 
public appearance could have politicized and also humanized Jews, for becoming human, 
in Arendt’s sense, is becoming able to spontaneously appear and speak with others, while 
others listen to our reasons and our stories, seeing us as more than images, types or 
abstractions, that is, seeing us as living persons capable of articulating our humanity. The 
passage is also important, for in it Rousseau mentioned “free spaces” where Jews could 
have spoken “without risk”. His argument suggested a sort of ethnic autonomy, a sense 
that Jews could only be free, and freely speaking beings, within spaces administered by 
themselves. Rousseau seemed to accept the conclusion that public spaces are unavoidably 
dominated by certain political cultures.258 
So the question remains: what were the possibilities of Jews in a space full of 
“risks”, dominated by a pervasive political culture (that of Christianity or of ethnic-
nationalities)? Was a Jewish revolution or a Jewish politicization ever possible? A first 
answer is: denying the very possibility of alternative configurations, for Arendt, means 
denying politics itself. For Jews, this denial of possibilities, and of politics in Arendt’s 
sense, could only mean the necessity of suffering (and, thus, the necessity of protection 
from suffering). As a principle, though, Arendt affirmed that freedom is “not a prize for 
suffering endured”259, or, in other terms, that freedom is based on acting, not suffering. 
That was a political lesson to be learned: even in the best political moment of Jews in 
Europe – when they gained political emancipation -, passivity (so “suffering”) was 
predominant, since rights were conceded (and soon removed) by monarchs and rulers out 
of instrumental considerations. 
On a factual basis, the argument follows like this: if even in the darkest hour some 
Jews, against gigantic forces, showed some form of dignity or even resistance, then during 
																																								 																				
257 The original reads: “Je ne croirai jamais avoir bien entendu les raisons des Juifs qu’ils n’aient un Etat 
libre, des écoles, des universités, où ils puissant parler et disputer sans risque. Alors seulement nous 
pourrons savoir ce qu’ils ont à dire.” Rousseau, J. J. Émile ou de L’Éducation, Livre IV. In: Œuvres 
Completes IV, Gallimard, 1990, p. 621. I discovered this passage during the reading of Rousinesco’s Retour 
sur la Question Juive (2009). Roudinesco, op. cit., p. 30  
258 The sequence of his argument reinforces this perception: “In Constantinople, the Turks say their reasons, 
but we do not dare [nous n’osons] saying ours; there, it is our turn to grovel [ramper].” Rousseau, Ibid. 
259 Ibid.  
 - 67 - 
the ups and downs of emancipation, during times when anti-Semitism was still traditional, 
more could have been done. Actually, it had been done. Arendt’s answer to the collapse 
of tradition relied also on fragments of the past, mostly fragments which had been 
“hidden” behind the dominance of certain traditions. Without the “burden” of dominant 
forms of thinking and behaving (of dominant “traditions”), some of these past experiences 
and principles could be now recovered with an original force. The Jewish pariah is a such 
a case: its tradition had been hidden, but it was not non-existent.  
There were even political pariahs who escaped to Arendt’s sight, such as Johann 
Jacoby. Jacoby, a doctor and a revolutionary, a conscious German-and-Jew, was elected 
to the parliament in Frankfurt during the political revolution of 1848. He had already been 
called “an insolent Jew” by Fredrick Wilhelm, the king, for having written a pamphlet 
vindicating democratic reforms. On the end of that year, Jacoby and twenty others 
German deputies went to the king’s palace in Potsdam, to protest against his reactionaries 
measures. The king turned his back and dismissed the deputies. Jacoby then replied with 
a sentence later established as part of the history of German democracy: “This is the 
tragedy of kings, that they refuse to hear the truth!”. Jacoby was then sued, for the second 
time, by the king. Until the end of his life, he was regarded by monarchist and nationalist 
as a traitor, whose pacifism was seen as pro-French and anti-Prussian.260 
Jacoby’s is more than a story of courage. He was an embodiment of a possibility, 
a factual proof of contingency and alternative, and a reminder that even in authoritarian 
contexts some margin of action is possible. Indeed, it is only from this margin that 
political actualization can spring. In a way, these were political possibilities in Arendt’s 
sense, since they were oriented to begin, to constitute a democratic space. The clash 
between democratic and un-democratic possibilities is a political, contingent clash in 
itself, which can end up in oppressive configurations of power. But, as long someone or 
some group acts and speaks, appearing as an example of previously unseen possibilities, 
and so enlarging the political imagination of its context, power (with its possibilities, its 
potencies) is momentary actualized. 
From the point of view of the actor (and even from that of the judge)261, it is 
irrelevant and, according to Arendt, impossible to know the outcome of certain political 
																																								 																				
260 Elon, op. cit., p. 173.   
261 I do not agree with the view that Arendt formulated two distinct theories of judgment, as claimed, for 
instance, by Benhabib (p. 175) and Maurizio P. D’Entrèves; they argue, in broad terms, that Arendt depicted 
two models of judgement, one based on Kant’s reflection (and the search for universals from particulars) 
and other based of Aristotle’s view on the prudent, who tries to orient himself in particular circumstances; 
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initiatives. Interpreting Arendt’s meaning, a political appearance can be said a form of 
resistance, a Widerstand, a standing in contrast to seemingly erosive forces pressuring 
and disintegrating a given organism. But the natural accent is only metaphorical: no 
political process of disintegration is necessary; so “resisting”, that is, counter-acting what 
seems an overwhelming force is a political attitude per excellence. This contra-standing 
overwhelming forces does not require a physical force, as Arendt’s distinction between 
power and force indicated, but a readiness to actualize power, which can mean a readiness 
to do something or to say a few words, “because one deed, and sometimes one word, 
suffices to change every constellation.”262 
Jacoby’s words did not change the German constellation (indeed, the other 
deputies apologized, “assuring the king’s courtiers that he had spoken only for himself”), 
but inspired a multitude who marched in solidarity to him in the streets of Berlin, hence 
actualizing and demonstrating the possibilities of democratic power in Germany, even if 
just for one day.263 That the possibility of 1848 (of a democratic, politically egalitarian, 
federalist, secular, and horizontal state) was surpassed by the possibility of 1871 (of a 
militaristic, religiously conservative, monarchic and vertical state), and that both 
possibilities were smashed by the possibility of 1933 do not invalidate Arendt’s theory of 
initiative-beginnings. Indeed, it confirms her depiction of political-human processes, 
which, for being contingent, depend on a renovated awareness, and on one’s willingness 
to appear in contradistinction to seemingly necessary forces. To ask for “objective” 
possibilities and “objective” anticipations of action means, for Arendt, disregard that the 
“unexpected can be expected” from active men.264 
 
3.8 “Breaking the Spell of the Status Quo” 
Delineating lessons from 20th century authoritarianism, fascism and 
totalitarianism, the historian Timothy Synder warned against the dangers of  “anticipatory 
obedience”. He argued that “adapting instinctively, without reflecting, to a new situation” 
																																								 																				
the first one would relate to the spectator, and the second, to the actor. D’Entrèves himself recognized that 
“the contradiction is more apparent than real…Both are concerned with the judgment of particulars qua 
particulars”. D’Entrèves, M. P. “Arendt’s Theory of Judgment”, in: The Cambridge Companion to Hannah 
Arendt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000 p. 253. Arendt’s emphasis on “particulars” is due to 
a pervasive cognitive deficit of action, which is experienced and judged on the basis of not having definite, 
transparent reasons (that is, universals) to act, to anticipate consequences of action, and to ascribe necessary 
meanings to action.  
262 Arendt, HC, p. 191 
263 Elon, op. cit., p. 173 
264 Arendt, HC., p. 178 
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is a form of surrender which dispenses actual intimidation and concrete regulations. It 
does not necessarily imply a desire to profit with this new situation, but simply a tendency 
to adjust, to avoid friction, to be one and the same with the new political landscape. What 
psychologists call “suggestibility”, Arendt called “conformism”, a process that is not 
necessarily imposed by outside forces, but is formed through a circular social dynamic 
that counts with the adherence of a weakened individual who reinforces the process. Here, 
it is only important to bear in mind this almost unconscious adaptation to visible or 
imagined new situations, a dynamics that form a “spell” which tends to reinforce the cycle 
of adherence and suggestion. 
Snyder also argued that the last century invalidated the assumed opposition 
security versus freedom (according to which the increase of one implies the decrease of 
the other), for totalitarian experiences, as distinct from traditional tyrannies, demanded 
more than the surrender of civil liberties. Totalitarian domination did not stop until 
destroying private sphere, including the innermost sphere of intimacy and subjectivity. 
The modern history of European Jews corroborates this insight. Synder’s 
recommendation is: do not believe in the permanence of institutions, and do not wait for 
representation. Don’t expect others or seemingly better ideas to prove themselves, but 
simply “stand out”. “The moment you set an example, the spell of the status quo is 
broken.”265 In Arendt’s term, initiative-action “appears in the guise of a miracle”,266 for it 
defeats a sense of fatalism with a new face and new voice who becomes visible. 
This also requires an additional observation on the necessities and the possibilities 
of the political. Some scholars point to two political models on Arendt’s work: one model 
based on the agonistic, individually grounded, depiction of action in The Human 
Condition; the other, based on the defense of republican institutions delineated in On 
Revolution.267 I do agree that the two books provide different emphasis on the political 
experience, but I do not think that from this we can extract two models from Arendt. As 
I am defending, she thought around a set of questions, that may not always develop in a 
rectilinear way, but always evolve in terms of coherence and cross-relations. The 
interdependence, for instance, between agents and institutions, between action and work, 
																																								 																				
265 Synder, T.  On Tyranny: twenty lessons from the twentieth century. London: Bodley Head. 2017, chapter 
1 (Do Not Obey in Advance) p. 17, chapter 8 (Stand Out), p. 49 
266 Arendt, HC, p. 178 
267 For an indication of the diversity of receptions of Arendt’s work, covering from the “agonistic” reading 
to the “republican” interpretation, from the emphasis on “exclusion” until the elaborations on “human 
rights”, see Arendt Handbuch: Lebel-Werk-Wrikung. Wolfgang Heuer, Bernd Heiter und Stefanie 
Rosenmüller (Hrsg.). Stuttgart: Verlag J. B. Metzler. 2011, pp. 314-382   
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or, in other terms, between the agitation of political experiences and the stable framework 
of law and institutions, is everywhere in Arendt’s texts, starting with The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, in which she described both the disregard for institutions (the 
“lawlessness” movement) and the disregard for people (the “One-man” ideology) of 
totalitarianism. An actualization of power requires both an organized framework and the 
appearance of active – talkative, thinking, moving – people within this framework: 
“Political institutions, no matter how well or how badly designed, depend for 
continued existence upon acting men.”268 
 
Considering this interaction between institutions and citizens, the former 
discussion on the possibilities of Jewish politics needs to be complemented with the 
observation that Jews lacked theoretical and practical frameworks for activation. 
Individually, some Jews may have stood out in public, but they did not have nor did create 
a proper platform to act. The pariah and the rebel were never politically instituted as valid 
examples. The pariah tradition remained mostly “unconscious” to itself.269  
 
 3.9 Responsibility and Interaction  
I contend, thus, that the whole discussion on the Jewish question, and even 
Arendt’s reproach of the Jewish leaders under Eichmann, must be read in terms of 
political responsibility,  and not in terms of guilt for the genocide. Arendt distinguished, 
indeed, between individual guilt (a moral-juridical notion) and shared responsibility (a 
political one).270 From a juridical point of view, guilt is ascribed to individuals whose 
individual acts configured certain crimes. In this sense, juridical culpability requires an 
indication of specific individuals, whose deeds are measured against types of crime. 
Responsibility, from a political perspective, also depends on the concept of person as a 
center of moral integrity and juridical accountability, but it expands it to a broader sense 
of co-potentiality and co-responsibility.271 Political responsibility cannot be fragmented 
																																								 																				
268 Arendt, ‘What is Freedom?’, BPF, p. 153 
269 Referring to the Jewish-European context, Arendt wrote: “The ‘conscious pariah’ (Bernard Lazare) was 
the only tradition of rebellion which established itself, although those who belonged to it were hardly aware 
of its existence.” Arendt, OT, p. 84, f 26. 
270 For the former: “There is no such a thing as collective guilt or collective innocence; guilt and innocence 
make sense only if applied to individuals” (p. 29). For the latter: “…no man, however strong, can ever 
accomplish anything, good or bad, without the help of others.” (p. 47). Arendt, ‘Personal Responsibility 
Under Dictatorship’, Responsibility and Judgement. 
271 According to Bethania Assy, one can talk, following Arendt’s own formulation in the 1960s, of a 
“political morality” (an expression that Arendt only formulated after the Eichmann trial), which breaks with 
the morality of universal norms, conventional commands, or subjective autonomy, and relies on a “personal 
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into isolated pieces, for, as we have been discussing, public experiences always involve 
a plurality of actors. Thinking in terms of political agency, any removal of an agent from 
its relational context implies an artificial (un-real) account of his position. Political agents 
are permanently within “mutual determinations”, within a “world of universal 
interdependence”.272 
Kant, in his “Third Analogy of Experience” in the Critique of Pure Reason, had 
established that experience [Erfahrung] is characterized by a simultaneous “reciprocity” 
or “interaction” [Wechselwrikung] between substances which coexist in the same space. 
From this notion, a principle of community, indeed a “dynamic community”, in which 
shared appearances form a “composite real”, could be derived as referring to a living 
reality of co-participants.273 In a similar way, Hegel, in his Doctrine of the Essence 
(Science of Logic), worked on the transformative logic of active relations: a one-sided 
relation of action-and-reaction [Wirkung und Gegenwirkung], in which one substance is 
passively determined by the violence of an external power, is “sublated” [aufgehoben] to 
a relation of “reciprocity” [Wechselwirkung], of identical capacities to act and react, to 
determine and be determined. This new situation “vanishes” an absolute sense of 
necessary causation, of one being a necessary effect of external causes.274   
Politically speaking, this helps us to understand Arendt’s refusal to reduce 
freedom to the private reality of the subjective-self – be it the self of subjective intentions, 
desires, or simple choices between objects (the “free-will”). These are “private” 
characterizations of freedom, and as such, they are incomplete, for they ignore the always-
relational position of human beings within webs of interactions. In a Hegelian vocabulary, 
these are only “abstract” depictions of freedom, because they detach the agent from its 
global context. Levels of “abstraction” (or separation) are necessary to preserve other 
degrees of freedom or other realms of existence (private, familiar, social etc.), but these 
other non-political spaces are determined and, in last analysis, guaranteed (or threatened)  
by political configurations. For a Hegelian, thus, freedom could not result from retreat to 
																																								 																				
responsibility” that is always situational, and dependent on the insertion of the “person” in the “ethical 
(inter)action”, and its orientation to world’s publicity, visibility and durability. Assy, B. op. cit., p. 158, 163 
272 Arendt, ‘Truth and Politics’, p. 237 
273 The Third Analogy reads: “All substances, so far as they can be perceived in space as simultaneous, are 
in thoroughgoing reciprocal action.” Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason: concise text. Scientia Verlag Aalen, 
1982, p. 85 
274 “In reciprocity, therefore, necessity and causality have vanished”. Hegel, Hegel’s Science of Logic, p. 
570 
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privacy nor from a “resignation” in the face of political events. It results from the 
acquisition of a “communitarian consciousness”.275   
Arendt’s defense of a positive (external co-participation) over a negative (private 
un-disturbance) depiction of freedom is not arbitrary. In saying that “to be free and to act 
are the same”276, she is not falling back into a nostalgic imagination unsuited to modern 
times. She is grasping a constitutive, for her unavoidable, dynamic of public realities. 
From a political point of view, hence, the notion of “responsibility” – or amor mundi  – 
requires leaving the “protective security of our four walls”.277 In this line, Arendt took on 
the accepted meaning of “interest” (something that belongs to a self-oriented 
particularity), replacing it by “inter-est”, something “which lies between people and 
therefore can relate and bind them together”,278 that is, something that concerns the 
existence of many, not of one.  
 
3.10 From Interaction to Solidarity  
If political experiences are indeed interactive, the political failure of Jews can only 
be comprehended along with the political failure of non-Jews in Europe. Still discussing 
the Dreyfus Affair, Arendt said that the inaction of assimilated French Jews was met by 
a mob hysteria. Detached from the mob, only a few individuals understood the political 
significance of the episode. Clemenceau, a journalist at the time, and one of the few 
politicians admired by Arendt, grasped the republican meaning of the campaign contra 
Dreyfus: “by infringing on the rights of one you infringe on the rights of all”. For Arendt, 
solidarity is the “political basis” of any republic.279 To be precise, it is “civic solidarity”, 
not to the moral duty of loving one’s neighbor or feeling compassion towards others. It is 
a matter of concerted initiative, of defending or reclaiming rights with other citizens, of 
grasping the interconnectedness of political configurations based on citizenship. Breaking 
with simplistic analysis that remove political responsibility (by ascribing it to exterior 
																																								 																				
275 “…a liberdade resulta não de uma resignação diante dos acontecimentos mas da consciência adquirida 
de uma comunidade.” Rosenfield, D. Política e Liberdade em Hegel. São Paulo: Ática, 1995, p. 24 
276 Arendt, ‘What is Freedom?’, p. 151 
277 Ibid., p. 155 
278 Arendt, HC, p. 182 
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Question of German Guilt [Die Schuldfrage], referred to the matter of solidarity and Clemenceau: 
“Solidarität, die (in den Worten Clemenceaus “L’Affaire d’un seul est l’affaire de tous”) die politische 
Grundlage der Republik ist”. Arendt, Wahrheit Gibt Es Nur Zu Zweien: Briefe an die Freunde. 
München/Berlin: Piper, 2015, p. 66 
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causes), Arendt illuminated different sides of the phenomenon of irresponsibility, which 
shaped certain conditions to the decline of political humanism in Europe.    
Though the Jews had their specific history of inaction, Arendt noted that Germans, 
in addition to being “coordinated” (gleichgeschaltet) from 1933, did not offer, even at the 
end of the war, any significant form of political resistance to Hitler: desertions were 
mostly opportunistic, conceived when military defeat was eminent, and when private 
suffering affected also citizens of the Reich.280 No significant movement, neither secret 
conspiracy, claimed a conscious restoration of rights, no principle of solidarity was 
vindicated, and the destruction of institutions and of other groups was never seriously 
alluded as a sufficient reason to rebuild, or constitute, a polity of “interaction” and 
“reciprocity”. This, as Arendt elaborated, was not caused by a specific German 
character.281 Totalitarianism provoked an unbounded moral and political collapse, 
simultaneous to the widespread cooperation and generalized bystander neutrality of 
national groups, social classes, and individuals throughout Europe. Shockingly, it also 
provoked the disintegration, and some degrees of cooperation, among its own victims. In 
this line, the case of the Judenräte, according to Arendt, 
“…offers the most striking insight into the totality of the moral collapse the Nazis 
caused in respectable European society – not only in Germany but in almost all countries, 
not only among the persecutors but also among the victims.”282         
 
Regarding this general collapse, Arendt asked what led a few individuals and 
groups to resist disintegration, and remain just when definitions and uses of just and right 
were confounded and even inverted. This question, as most questions raised by 
totalitarianism, could not be answered in traditional terms. Since Aristotle, a practice of 
virtues had been dependent on an ethical community that recognized these same virtues. 
Centuries later, Hegel indicated that individual definitions of what is virtue [Tugend] can 
																																								 																				
280 “…such defections were never serious enough to throw the machinery out of gear; they consisted of 
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only take place during extraordinary [außerordentlichen] ethical collisions.283 But ethical 
collisions, in his sense, referred to a conflict between equally valid principles of freedom 
(such as in the tragic clash between the demands of particular affection and public law). 
How could one be virtuous if an overwhelming mass of men mobilizes around inverted 
notions of virtue and duty? How can one act and judge if a multitude of indistinct 
individuals shouts the same refrains, and marches in the same direction? Indeed, there 
was no “ethical collision”, no need to dispute how to act and judge, since the absolute 
laws and imperatives of movement were pre-judgements and pre-indications of what to 
do and what to say. In conditions of uniformity, there is no collision whatsoever. 
Arendt asked this question until her last texts and works. It informed her 
reflections on the conditions for responsible action, and for the kind of consciousness 
required by political responsibility. She offered several tentative answers, one being the 
capacity of thinking, understood not as a special method of cognition, but as a free, 
perpetual process of imagining different perspectives, positioning itself in the “place of 
others”, and relativizing its own assumptions. She referred to a basic stop and think. This 
thinking process does not produce rigid commands, but it at least is expected to prevent 
an engagement in systematic harmful routines. No immediate object of cognition (no 
norm or command), as no immediate inner feeling (no “voice of conscience”, no “moral 
emotions”) could prevent the mass crimes of the 20th century. Thus, a possible answer 
would be blowing a constant “wind of thought”, a wind that does not build convictions 
up, but perhaps is prone to destroy “creeds”.284 
But the question of resistance, and its conditions, remained a perplexity for 
Arendt. She referred to a paradoxical capacity to tell “right from wrong” precisely in the 
absence of definitions of right and wrong. Scholars complained against its 
inconsistency285, perhaps not recognizing that Arendt could not solve any of these 
perplexities. The political-philosophical problem is that those who did something, even 
under the most extreme conditions, did not fall into a single category. Arendt did not find 
a single explanation, for instance, for the cases of Denmark, Italy, and Bulgaria, countries 
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285 “But if we agree with her that this is a reflective judgment wherein we judge particulars directly, without 
subsuming them under some universal or general rule, we can still ask – and this is the second issue – what 
we mean by ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, and how these predicates are to be distinguished from ‘beautiful’ and 
‘ugly’.” Bernstein, R. op. cit., p. 175 
 - 75 - 
in which the implementation of the Final Solution did not succeed. People who helped 
victims in the cities and forests of Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, did not have a common 
background: they were religious, atheist, educated, vulgar, thieves, all of them probably 
upholding fragments of a no longer valid humanism.286 What they did share perhaps was 
not a set of beliefs, nor a special instinct or intuition, but an willingness to act even when 
action, in Arendt’s sense, was no longer possible, for their acts must be hidden.  
From the point of view of political action, though, the new beginning was only 
possible with a performative virtue, courage. As a mode of active appearance, courage is 
more than the sum of inner beliefs, norms, feelings, that may have propelled one to do 
something. Arendt mentioned Churchill (“the greatest statesman thus far of our century”) 
both in a lecture about thinking after Eichmann, and in a passage about the relation 
between freedom and courage. Pressed by totalitarianism, Churchill “stood in 
conspicuous contrast to whatever we may think the Zeitgeist of this age to be”, and 
remaining “beyond the fashions of the times”, he was regarded, in accordance to the 
fluctuation of popular feelings, an outcast rejected as warmonger, and then a leader 
acclaimed as a savior. Yet he had remained consistent in his courage to judge things as 
he saw it. Courage was the “first quality” because it guarantees all others, according to 
him.287 Courage also guarantees the capacity to judge, to keep personal integrity and to 
display a civic orientation, even in the darkest hour, as members of Danish society, Italian 
soldiers, Polish insurgents and the members of Zegota, the Wehrmacht sergeant Anton 
Schmid, Zivia Lubetkin and the Jewish underground in Warsaw, who had stood out, and 
done something more than only trying to save their skins.  
Here, readers who ignore the historical background of Arendt’s writings may fail 
to appreciate her defense of courage, excellence and personality. They are not nostalgic 
ideals. Arendt’s citizens are not “little boys clamoring for attention” and “her appeal to 
heroism and glory” does not presuppose any “machismo”288 (Where is the machismo in 
the stories of Rosa Luxemburg and Zivia Lubetkin?). Arendt tried to teach courage to a 
world in which political structures crumbled because of a disseminated lethargy and a 
preponderant concern with private life. The conceptual poetic of The Human Condition 
may mislead the reader with Greek examples; but they are mostly this, examples to a 
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world who had failed politically and humanly. In the sinister end, courage meant risking 
one’s life. But, before, as Arendt herself wrote, courage may have signified simply 
leaving one’s house. (If the reader needs a contemporary example: courage perhaps means 
offering a political opinion before one’s boss without fearing losing the job.)  
In a similar line, Arendt’s emphasis on the uniqueness and integrity of personality 
- “this concept of action is highly individualistic”289 – does not relate to “romantic” 
feelings.290 She did not propose an abstract existentialism, neither did she create a cult of 
the authentic inner-self. Personal heroism, in the conditions of the 20th and 21st century, 
is related to responsibility towards public matters, and one’s initiative within the larger 
political interactions. An example of contemporary courage is the jumbled Capitan 
Mandrake (played by Peter Sellers in Stanley Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove, 1964), who 
tries, very carefully and inconsistently, to dissuade his jingoistic commandant from 
starting a nuclear war out of pre-given commands. This heroism may lead to 
“immortality”, another of Arendt’s controversial terms, insofar one becomes a memory 
to be talked upon in his community. Finally, Arendt’s call for alternative possibilities for 
a Jewish politics, and her call for civic solidarity as a political basis for Europe, far from 
being utopian and un-real, point out to a much needed political renovation in her, and also 
our, time. In this sense, one could even talk of Hannah Arendt’s ideal realism.        
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PARIAH AND PARASITE 
 
4.1 Wealth and Powerlessness 
Hannah Arendt’s reading of Karl Marx, as her reading of any classic thinker, 
combined strong statements with nuanced observations. She did not repeat established 
interpretations. Not coincidentally, Arendt dedicated to Marx an attention similar to 
which she dedicated to Plato. Both authors stood, for her, at the beginning and the end of 
Western tradition of thought. She criticized both, and apologized for having criticized 
both. In Marx’s case, she excused the author from “Marxism”, an ideology which granted 
to Marx appraisal and blame “for many things of which he was entirely innocent.”291 
Arendt embraced and rejected Marx, as her post-traditional interpretation and 
appropriation recommended: an author is not a doctrine which must be wholly accepted 
or discarded.  
In this first section, I will compare Marx and Arendt limiting myself, in a first 
moment, to the discussion of the emancipation of European Jews, and the relation 
between economics and politics in this case. Marx’s On the Jewish Question (1844) was 
not dealt with systematically by Arendt, as she focused her reading on the late Marx and 
his general thesis. She only called the text “historically false and in many points unjust”, 
and restricted its relevance to the context of the rebellion of intellectual Jews against rich 
Jews.292 Yet I think that Marx’s text is relevant for three reasons: one, as a document of 
epoch, it points to the common approach of 19th century’s authors to the Judenfrage, with 
its typical predication of Jews in general, its dramatic-grandiose definitions, and its 
defense of secular-ideological “solutions” to the “Jewish problem”; two, as a way of 
contrasting Arendt and Marx approaches; three, in order to present their important 
convergence.  
 
Marx favored the political emancipation of Jews, as long as Jews were approached 
from a religious perspective. Civil emancipation was in accordance to the secularization 
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 - 78 - 
of the state, that is, with the “emancipation of the State from Judaism, Christianity, and 
religion in general”.293 An universal state would make no distinction between its citizens. 
Political emancipation, however, was not enough. Preserving the contradiction between 
civil society and the state, political emancipation was satisfied with the form of a 
constitutional democracy constrained by private propriety and particularistic needs. 
Marx’s defense of a “human emancipation” required the dissolution of propriety, that is, 
required the reorientation of man from “a self-sufficient monad” to his socialization as a 
“species-being”.294 
Marx elaborated, thus, the terms of the Jewish emancipation combining the 
general approach of the enlightenment with his specific vocabulary and perspective. As 
we shall see, most of enlightenment authors accepted Jewish emancipation under the 
condition that it would be followed by Jews’ actualization of their “human essence”, 
which meant leaving their presupposed “Jewish essence”. In Marx’s specific argument, 
Jewish particularity was identified with the egoistic forces of civil society. The prevalence 
of Jews as distinct members of society was a signal that “man” was still divided into an 
“abstract citizen”, protected by political equality, and an empirical “egoistic man”, 
concerned only with himself, and not with the “species-man”.295 The perseverance of 
Judaism only testified that political emancipation did not overcome social fragmentation. 
But, for Marx, Judaism, indeed “practical Judaism”, was more than a sign of 
fragmentation. It was its very agent. Jews, whose God was, according to Marx, “money”, 
or “practical need and self-interest”, embodied the egoistic forces of civil society. 
Moreover, civil-society was Jewish. So, if private propriety and economic fragmentation 
were institutionalized in Christian Europe, this meant that “Christianity…has now been 
reabsorbed into Judaism”.296 Both were under the influence of the “monotheism of the 
Jews”, which was in fact a “polytheism” dissolved into money and the diversity of objects 
which money could buy.297 According to Marx’s human emancipation, thus, the abolition 
of need and egoism, or simply of “huckstering”, would mean abolishing the “empirical 
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essence” of Judaism. In the newer conditions, “the Jew becomes impossible”, because 
society no longer works on the basis of self-interest.298 
I will not enter here in the heated debate whether Marx, or his On The Jewish 
Question, was anti-Semitic or not. What interests me is, first, to emphasize Marx 
reification of Jews into an idea with a specific meaning and a specific destiny in his 
conceptualization of history. Bernard Lazare wrote that Marx analyzed not Jews, but 
“bourgeoisie Jews”, ignoring the “truly strong characteristic mass of the [Jewish] nation”, 
its proletariat.299 Marx was aware that rich Jews were an empirical minority among “Jews 
in general”, and we may even concede, for the purpose of our discussion, that the one-
sidedness of most of Marx’s assertions were justified for an analytical representation of 
the court Jew (even tough Marx referred to “the real Jew” and the “everyday Jew”). Let 
us not assume that the biographical problem of self-rejection of his Jewish roots led Marx 
to a passionate commendation of Jews.300 Let us suppose, instead, that he is only 
discussing, as Arendt did, a specific archetypical activity of Jews in a specific moment of 
history.301  
What would remain as important differences between Arendt and Marx 
approaches? Arendt, in accordance to her fragmentary302, factually-based political 
analysis, stressed that the historical position of Jews contradicted most of ideological 
projections on Jews. The particular pariah-position, moreover, could not be absorbed by 
a general scheme of class conflict, as wealthy Jews were not exactly members of 
bourgeoisie, and poor Jews were not proletarians. Jewish emancipation involved 
circumstances too specific for being abstracted into a larger process of economy’s 
socialization. The Jewish cause, as Lazare later concluded, could not be simply 
“assimilated” to a socialist cause. 
A series of facts and historical conditions supported these claims. For instance, 
after political emancipation, when Jews gradually ceased to form a “fateful union” around 
the ghetto, and individually assimilated to different social classes, ideological anti-
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Semitism increased. Jews left Jewishness to assume their “function” in the social process, 
a move in which a significant part of them sided with workers and embraced variants of 
Socialism and Communism. They “abolished” their own connection with religion and 
with “egoism”, assimilating to the general historical developments of European societies. 
Still, the persistence of anti-Semitism and its metamorphosis into ideology indicated that 
the Jewish question was not merely a social question. In some ways, the Jewish question, 
as we will see in the next chapter, assumed even more complex circumstances in its 
contact to society. This was recognized by some socialist and communist writers and 
leaders who proposed specific “solutions” to the Jewish question, such as the creation of 
autonomous Jewish regions in Soviet Union.303 
In fact, as Arendt reminded, Jews were accused of being “parasites” who exploited 
social forces and controlled politics precisely when they “lost public functions and their 
influence”, and when most of them became productive, as emancipated middle and lower 
class juridical persons.304 What was strikingly contradictory to Marx’s view, and what 
was crucial to Arendt’s refusal of fixed premises in reading history, was the flagrant 
dissymmetry between the economic wealth and the political power of Jews. Contradicting 
established assumptions, wealthy Jews did not accumulate wealth for the sake of 
accumulation, much less did they control politics as a consequence of their accumulation. 
As Arendt recalled, and this could be verified in the transition between generations in 
innumerous Jewish families (such as in the families Zweig, Benjamin, Warburg, and also 
in the family Arendt itself), wealth was pursued not for its own sake, but for the sake of 
intellectual and political activities. Sons and granddaughters of merchants and bankers 
became writers, students, artists, activists.305  
Jewish “egoism”, in these terms, was not “an end in itself”, nor a particularistic 
force behind politics. As soon as Jews seemed to achieve financial “surplus”, the only 
																																								 																				
303 In a general perspective, Otto Bauer broke up with the dogmatic view, established within Marxism, that 
national differences were merely a by-product of economic divisions, producing thus a socio-historical 
analysis (and defense) of nationalities as authentic “subjects” in the European context. Bauer, O. The 
Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000   
304 “Antisemitism reached its climax when Jews had similarly lost their public functions and their influence, 
and were left with nothing but their wealth.” Arendt maintained that this pattern was valid for Western and 
Central European countries. Austrian anti-Semitism, for instance, “became violent” precisely when Jews 
lost the historical protection of the Habsburg monarchy, turning out to be the most vulnerable of Austrian 
ethnic minorities. Arendt, OT, p. 5 
305 “The Jewish bourgeoisie, in sharp contrast to its German and Austrian equivalents, was uninterested in 
positions of power, even of the economic kind. It was content with its accumulated wealth, happy in the 
security and peace that its wealth seemed to guarantee. An increasing number of sons from well-to-do 
homes deserted commercial life, since the empty accumulation of wealth was senseless.” Arendt, ‘Stefan 
Zweig: Jews in the world of yesterday’, TJW, p. 321 
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thing that most of them demanded was to preserve their juridical security. Indeed, in the 
most radical development of modern economy – imperialism -, Jews did not play, 
according to Arendt, a special role in “the expansion for the sake of expansion”.306 The 
bourgeoisie was the original force behind the imperialist drive, and the un-Marxist, 
improbable alliance, in imperialistic countries, between the economic elite and the mob 
proved to Arendt that economic relations were less predictable, less schematic than Marx 
assumed.307 Moreover, it contributed to Arendt’s everlasting comprehension that the 
political is not the superstructure of the economical, a mere configuration determined by 
social-economic developments. In this sense, identifying political equality (political 
emancipation) with capitalistic civil-society was, for Arendt, one of Marx’s great 
problems. 
In fact, anyone reading modern Jewish history cannot easily dismiss political 
stability as a mere expediency of an egoistic civil society. In Arendt’s sense, political 
freedom is not established because of an economic process, but despite of it. Politics is 
not a mere surface of a deep laboring process. Political relations only spring when men 
and women decide to step out, momentarily, their laboring and working activities. By 
becoming political, men add a new dimension, embedded in different categories and 
relations, to their life in common, thus creating an “island of freedom” surrounded by a 
“sea of necessities”. One of the aspects of the Jewish problem, in this sense, was not that 
Jews were too particularistic, but perhaps that they were too Marxists in believing that 
they could achieve emancipation only by assimilating to social forces and social 
activities. 
It was not abolition of property that would emancipate Jews. It was rather finding 
a stable ground, securing a proper place in the world, in a political sense, and not in an 
“economic world”, in which “everything is functional by definition”.308 This world of 
stability was supposed to guarantee both civil-social and political rights: having a place 
and having a voice would mean an effective Jewish emancipation. This is one of the 
																																								 																				
306 Discussing the limited role of Jewish financiers in the imperialist process in South Africa, Arendt defined 
them as “representatives, not the owners, of the superfluous capital”; they were déclassé, “mob element 
among the Jewish people”, and even in their limited participation, they introduced an anti-imperialist 
“factor of normalcy and productivity” to the economic relations. Here also anti-Semites repeated “fantastic 
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disappearance of the Jewish financiers as well”. Arendt, OT, pp. 261-268 
307 In this line, Arendt noted that pan-nationalistic parties and movements, breaking with class and national 
interests, attempted to act “above” classes and parties, “to act as whole”. Masses became an important 
source of support to the economic forces of imperialism. Arendt, OT, p. 327 
308 Arendt, OT, p. 246 
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reasons why Arendt worked upon a triple distinction of wealth, property, power. Power 
refers to a political co-existence and co-initiative among men in a public spaces. Property 
is a “privately owned place in the common world, something stable, marked off from the 
property of others”309. Wealth “is something insubstantial, not tied to any particular 
location, and its most characteristic form is capital, the function of which is to generate 
more wealth in an endless process”.310 Some European Jews were wealthy but not 
powerful. Their wealth did not even secured their property in some cases. Court Jews 
accumulated wealth, but they and their communities were constantly threatened with 
expulsion. They could end up economically wealthy, but physically displaced and 
politically powerless.311 
This situation, according to Arendt, led to one of the most revolting facts of the 
destruction of Jews in the 20th century. Nazis accused Jews of controlling world political-
power, while they revoked Jews’ basic rights, robbed their property and stripped their 
place in the world. It is in this context that Arendt’s bitterness against court Jews should 
be read: their tactics contributed to the absurd, defenseless position in which “our 
Rothschilds have a better chance of becoming beggars or peddlers than our beggars and 
peddlers of becoming Rothschilds”.312 Poor and wealthy Jews alike ended up in collective 
ditches and extermination camps. Jewish wealth proved to be ridiculously powerless in 
the face of the destruction. Prominent Jews failed in convincing world powers to react 
against anti-Semitic measures, as they unsuccessfully begged for larger immigration 
quotas to powers which were mostly unworried with re-locating masses of Jews in the 
world. 
 
Regarding this point, there is a partial agreement between Arendt and Marx. 
Arendt dismissed Marx’s general political prescription, and pointed to fundamental 
problems in the architectonic of his theory. But, while disagreeing with his prognosis, she 
accepted an extent of his diagnosis.313 Marx had noted that, in itself, economic orientation 
is not sufficient to create a stable world. Marx may have not followed his intuition towards 
the specificities of the political, but his comprehension of the instability generated by 
economic processes, his central idea that nothing stands when money emerges as the 
																																								 																				
309 Canovan, M. Hannah Arendt: a reinterpretation…, p. 82 
310 Ibid. 
311 “The Jews were pariahs as long as they remained politically powerless.” Arendt, ‘Antisemitism’, p. 74 
312 Arendt, ‘Jewish Politics’, p. 241 
313 For Arendt’s qualification of Marx as the “greatest of modern labor theorists”, see Arendt, HC, p. 93 
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“common denominator” between men, was very important for Arendt’s own analysis of 
modern “world alienation”.314 Arendt, however, declared that a stable world will not arise 
from economy – however organized “social forces” are. It will only arise outside 
economy, as a “freely chosen form of political organization”.315 
Arendt concluded that the threat to politics did not come from “capitalist” 
economy, but from economy itself. The problem was grounding politics in an activity 
related to natural forces, to needs and impulses. The problem was shaping political man 
in the image of the laboring animal, that specimen absorbed into the silent, repetitive, 
compulsory process of laboring and producing. No matter how connected (in the 
communist view) or disconnected (in the liberal view) to the rest of society is this laboring 
man: he is equally a mere productive body, not a political agent, when absorbed by his 
daily economical task.316 Labor does not free men. Men’s decision to establish, preserve 
or improve their political conditions coincides with the suspension of the “slave 
mentality” according to which there is nothing more important than busying oneself with 
the processual and recurrent impositions of “necessity”.  
I do not propose an exact symmetry between the court Jews’ case and the analysis 
of labor as delineated by Arendt. I just want to point out that court Jews, in orienting their 
behavior by an economic mentality, were unconscious that the struggle for freedom 
required a different vocabulary and a different attitude, thus a model different from the 
parvenu. Court Jews seemed blind to realize that financial transactions form an “unreal 
world”317, since related to private spaces and to subjective variations. They relied on “the 
permanence of a process rather than the permanence of a stable structure”.318 Wealthy 
Jews, in general, remained “uninterested in positions of power, even of the economic 
kind”319 not by a fixed egoism, but by their fundamental lack of political experience, and 
by their general unwillingness to risk themselves in the political space. At the end, in 
wordless isolation, most of them longed for the lost warmth of the small ghetto, which 
they imagined to have guarded and protected better than no one else. 
																																								 																				
314 “The much deplored devaluation of all things, that is, the loss of all intrinsic worth, begins with their 
transformation into values and commodities…”, HC, p. 165  
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4.2 Defining the social 
In the last chapter, I explored the pariah-condition in its economical dimension, 
tracing specific elements of the stories of modern Jews, and relating these elements to 
concepts of Arendt’s larger thought. The tension between life, understood as physical 
endurance, and good life, understood as a political life under a structure of rights and 
within spaces of action, was related to correspondent themes such as fear and courage, 
adaptation and initiative, and also to the specific contradistinction parvenu and pariah. 
Now I want to focus the tension between economics and politics approaching a different 
aspect: what Arendt called the rise of the social. I will try to relate this controversial 
analysis to another implication of the pariah problem. What Arendt wrote about the rise 
of a mass society, I assume, can be better understood with the background of the 
experiences in which pariahs played an important role. 
Arendt referred to the modern rise of the social as a major force threatening the 
autonomy of the political. The social is characterized by a gradual merging between the 
private and the public. The result is a loss of both private and public spaces as relatively 
separated from the other: there is no longer a clear demarcation between these two 
different modes of existence. Another striking aspect of this process is the ascension of 
economic affairs (which belonged to the household, as “laws of the house”, oikos-nomia) 
to a dominant place in political discussions: promising more jobs, growing GDP, better 
economy, “professional politicians” need to prove their utility for private security and 
protection. The very term political economy would indicate the conceptual loss of 
distinction effected by the emergence of the social.  
Arendt’s critique of the social, with her re-distinction between private/economic 
and public/political spaces, generated protest from readers. Maurizio D’Entrèves defined 
Arendt’s terms as too “fixed”.320 Hanna Pitkin complained against Arendt’s lack of 
sensibility concerning questions of material justice. Pitkin voiced a common criticism, 
according to which Arendt proposed an asepsis that would devoid the public of concrete 
matters for discussions: “what does she imagine as the content of political speech and 
action”?321 In this sense, by cleaning her message off economic demands, and by 
grounding this message on ancient examples, Arendt would have nothing to teach for a 
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sphere”. Pitkin, H. op. cit., p. 337. A similar critique is presented by Feldman: “In her [Arendt’s] political 
theory she aestheticizes and sanitizes politics to such an extent that one often wonders what the exact 
content of ‘political action’ really is. Feldman, R. H. ‘Introduction…’, p. lxxvi, fn 104 
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contemporary world that, both in its mentality and practices, has incorporated economic 
goals to the political. 
For now, I just want to make some statements of clarification. Arendt’s social is 
not an all-encompassing tool of empirical analysis. With the social, she is not proposing, 
on the one hand, a general description of every modern society, neither, on the other, a 
rigid normative demarcation. The social is not the same as society, as Arendt alluded to 
French good society of the 18th century, to European class-societies of the 19th century, 
and to north-American civil-society of the 1960s.322 The social is better understood 
against the background of correlated historical phenomena and political problems: the 
advent of mass societies in the 20th century, the emergence of totalitarian movements, and 
the general loss of political mediation. In this sense, it is a “Gegenbegriff”, a sort of 
contrasting concept to rethink and criticize the possibilities of political freedom in our 
time.323 
As a contrasting concept, it is oriented to recover, or un-cover, a visible space for 
public activities. In other terms, it is, in Arendt’s peculiar way of thinking, a criteria for 
comprehending the loss of politics and imagining new possibilities of demarcation 
between the private and the public. Arendt’s terms cannot be said “too fixed”, for her 
analysis departs from the historical fluctuation of activities, from the momentary 
dominance, let us say, of work over action, and then of the animal laborans over the homo 
faber. A reader doesn’t need to agree with each of her stories of world alienation to accept 
the importance of some sense of distinction between private and public. It’s not that her 
terms are too fixed, but that our processes became too fluid. The social problem could be 
exemplified with this very indisposition of scholars to think outside dominant social 
discourses. This indisposition would prove Arendt’s very point that the social emerges 
imposing irresistible, unnegotiable terms.  
In this respect, I agree with Dana Villa on the problem of reading Arendt with the 
presupposition of a specific conceptual/social agenda.324 The presupposition of 
undebatable ends contradicts Arendt’s proposal of freedom as the meaning of politics. 
For Arendt, meaning cannot be understood in terms of means-end categories. Something 
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Reluctant…, p. 23.  
323 Arendt Handbuch, op. cit., p. 282  
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or some experience is meaningful insofar it is not degraded as a mean to a “higher” thing 
or experience. In this sense, the exercise of freedom within politics is an “end in itself”. 
In fact, Arendt regarded end-in-itself as a paradox, for instrumentalism denies in principle 
anything which falls outside the variable relations of use. If politics should be regarded 
only in its usefulness for a “higher” activity, it would mean that institutions and rights 
could be always substituted by more efficient and rapid means to that end. Referring to 
freedom as meaning of and within politics, a meaning independent from successes or 
failures of specific political-projects, Arendt also avoided the language of “values”, 
which, in their anthropocentric-subjectivistic resonance, presuppose that man, as the 
creator and user of values, disposes of the earth and of the world at his will, using them 
in accordance to his momentary “evaluation” and “ends”.325 
I also think that Villa is right in observing that there is an anxiety among 
“rationalistic” readers of Arendt. Projects pre-oriented to an intersubjective consensus or 
to specific ends of justice try to reestablish what Arendt called the old unity of being, an 
attempt which Villa interpreted as a new call for dis-alienation. In the first chapter, I 
argued that alienation and fragmentation (Zerrissenheit) of being are given to Arendt. In 
this line, ends are not to be imposed, but to be formulated throughout the exercise of 
action and judgement among plural citizens; for the possibility of free action and 
independent judgement, it is required a certain distance between citizens, and a distance 
of citizens from “rational” standards.326 Active participation within the political-world 
requires degrees of non-identity and estrangement, for, according to Villa,  
“…it is not alienation per se that she [Arendt] combats, but world alienation. One 
could go even further and say that to be worldly in Arendt’s sense is to inscribe a certain 
modality of alienation at the heart of one’s existence, and to give this alienation an 
extremely positive valorization.”327  
 
So, it is not that Arendt’s action and judgement are “empty”, but that they can only 
be free and spontaneous insofar they are liberated from the pressures of absolute-external 
oughts and ends. Again, this is not a purely theoretical discussion, as it is informed by 
experiences in which goals presented as necessary and absolute – as the question of 
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poverty in the French Revolution, the survival of the race in Nazism, the production of 
equality in Soviet Union – served as tools of domination and violence. It is not that Arendt 
was insensible to pre-political experiences. She was just perhaps too “sensible” to the 
immanent dignity and freedom of the political, as she was aware of the modern problem 
of trying to solve social questions, departing from seemingly humane justifications, with 
abusive instruments.  
Still, for Arendt, the identification politics-society would create a “total citizen”, 
who have no place to hide from the public light.328 Without the right for a private space 
of his own, where he can stay with his friends, his familiars, and his private thoughts, 
where he can eat, love, laugh and talk in peace, a citizen loses an important basis for his 
integrity and personality. If every sphere of life is subject to regulations and norms, the 
citizen may also lose his capacity for spontaneous thoughts, opinions, and initiative.329 It 
can be indeed said that Arendt emphasized more distinctions between activities, and its 
correlated spaces, than “dialectical transformations” or “mutual determinations”.330 This 
theoretical attitude can be explained by her non-monistic approach. She refused positions 
according to which “everything becomes everything”, and she was skeptical towards the 
manipulative discourse in which the positive becomes negative, destruction becomes 
production, labor produces freedom etc. This attitude may have prevented her of 
establishing some interesting connection between different fields, but her priority in 
recovering the political, both in conceptual and practical terms, led her to a coherent 
phenomenology of political action. For her, political appearances are not an illusory effect 
of a deeper determination.  
With this, we can reconsider the accusation of “emptiness” in Arendt’s political 
speech. Indeed, she wrote that emotions inherently tied to intimacy, such as love, would 
be perverted if transformed into factors of political identification.331 “Pain”, for instance, 
being uncommunicable through words, could only be “experienced” in the inner space of 
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Arendt, The Promise of Politics, p. 108  
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the body.332 She also indicated that there can be no freedom when political discussions 
are dominated by economical necessities. But here the argument can take a different side. 
Arendt wrote that, in the public realm – which “constitutes reality” -, “…even the greatest 
forces of intimate life – the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, the delight of 
the senses -…are transformed, deprivatized and deinvidualized, as it were, into a shape 
to fit them for public appearance” (emphasis added).333 So the whole controversy could 
be reframed by saying that Arendt is not cleaning the political, but demanding the 
transformation of experiences into political terms, so they become adequate to appear as 
communicated opinions and reflective judgments to others. According to Arendt, rational 
truth becomes mere opinion in the public sphere. In the same line, subjective feelings are 
transformed into public propositions when someone “deprivitizes” and communicates 
them: he or she must put his or her feelings into words to relate it to others in a politically 
relevant way. Finally, economic necessities, when become objects of public discussion, 
are transformed into matters of possibility, of possible agreements, goals and legislation. 
What is absolutely necessary dismisses political appreciation.  
     
4.3 Life-process: Administration  
Arendt’s writings of the late 1950s and early 1960s – among which The Human 
Condition, On Revolution and Between Past and Future – evolved from a project in which 
she proposed to study and criticize Karl Marx. It would be an attempt to cover a gap for 
which she was criticized after the publication of The Origins of Totalitarianism. Critics 
indicated that the book lacked a more systematic approach to Stalinism and its grounding 
theory/ideology, Marxism. Despite pointing to totalitarian elements in Marxism, Arendt 
never affirmed a direct causality between Marx and Stalin. Soviet totalitarianism was 
product of contingent experiences and historical circumstances which were more than a 
certain effect of certain ideas.334 Still, keeping this cautious theoretical attitude, Arendt 
proceeded to study structural elements in Marx and, according to her conclusion that 
“whoever touches Marx touches the tradition of Western thought”335, also in the classic 
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and modern tradition of political theory. The result was a series of lectures, conferences 
and texts that originated her main works of political thought, in whose pages readers find 
her “law” of human plurality. 
In The Human Condition, her most declarative book, Arendt disentangled 
activities that, according to her, had been mixed throughout theoretical definitions, 
historical experiences and social shifts. Arendt delineated three basic activities: labor, 
work, and action. Labor can be generally identified with the natural life and the cyclical 
processes of nature, including the “biological process of the human body” and the related 
activities that sustain life in an organic sense. Work, on its turn, creates artificial things 
(including things so different as books, machines, houses, and laws and institutions) 
which are properly added as parts of a human world, to be distinguished from a natural 
environment. Action, finally, refers to activities between-men, and to all stories enacted 
in meaningful interactions between plural, speaking human beings. Arendt called it the 
political activity, because, although the other activities relate to the political (citizens 
need, for instance, to be fed and housed), politics per se is action, that is, interactions 
between unique human beings through speech and deeds.336 
Assuming that Arendt’s main storyline is the “rebellion against human existence 
as it has been given”, I propose to focus now on one of the many events interpreted by 
Arendt’s in The Human Condition: the “factual transformation of the whole society into 
a laboring society”.337 For this, I shall deal again with some aspects of Arendt’s reading 
of Karl Marx, the “greatest theorist of labor”, in her opinion. I discussed before their 
perspectives on the Jewish economy in modern Europe. Now I want to expand the 
discussion to deal with a structural relation between economy and politics in modernity. 
In broader terms, in the previous sections, I discussed the economical from a private 
perspective, showing how private self-orientation is incompatible with political activation 
and creation of institutions. Now I want to focus on the social perspective, on the 
problems of a socialized economy – or what Arendt called a laboring society -, trying to 
present how labor, in its modern expansion, threatens both the human capacity to act and 
the human creation of durable institutions (in other words, how labor undermines the 
activities of work and action).  
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One of Arendt’s main point is that Marx projected the activity of labor (Arbeit) 
over other activities, defining Man itself as a creature of labor. Commentators protested, 
saying that Marx also spoke of a specific activity of work.338 But Arendt’s point is that, 
even when he spoke of other categories, he was thinking in terms of laboring, as it was 
denoted by his re-definition of Man as a species-being (Gattungswesen).339 The problem 
lies perhaps on the language of dialectical productions and movements from categories 
to categories. If work is produced by labor, and political freedom is produced by both, 
and if the whole process is understood in terms of a teleology of historical periods, then 
it is difficult to avoid certain conclusions: that labor, for instance, is the definitive force 
in a teleological process whose freedom can only be experienced in its end (telos), that 
is, in a society which is still to come (so, there can be no real freedom today); and so 
freedom must be understood as a collective project, measured in centuries, of a 
“socialized mankind” (gesellschafltliche Menscheit). Since life is understood as a) 
organic-physical life of needs and b) as life of humanity taken as a whole-species, then 
individual human beings and individual world artifacts become alienated or estranged if 
they are not integrated into the life process of human society in this century-measured 
creation of freedom. Thus, everyone and everything is valuated in its contribution to the 
life-process of society. 
Moreover, Arendt’s criticism is not that individuals will become, according to 
Marx’s vision, the “same”, but that, by as referring to them as “integral part of the whole”, 
one may risk denying this part a real integrity, that is, an existence partially independent 
from the whole.340 Arendt is less concerned with sameness, as if individuals would 
resemble each other as animals from a same species, and more with functionalization, 
that is, with reducing individuals to social roles and parts adjusted to the life-process of 
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the whole. In the same line, the question is not if Marx felt pray to a sort of fatalism, but 
that he told a meta-story of labor-necessity whose main characters are classes, groups and 
a species living within long durations, in chronological units that no flesh-and-bone 
individual can ever experience. By the way, this is also a problem with Hegel. The 
incorporation of historical and collective social-dimensions – peoples, classes, nation-
states, cultures etc. – into philosophical discourse can enrich one’s consciousness to 
processes larger than one’s own limited circle of direct experiences. But, on the other 
hand, this kind of discourse can lead to depersonalized interpretations, according to which 
classes, nationalities, movements are truly autonomous subjects, in contrast to individuals 
that only suffer the consequences of the interaction between these gigantic agents. These 
accounts may reinforce a sense of irresponsibility or, in other words, of an externalization 
of responsibility towards abstract entities.  
There is, nevertheless, the “essential difference” between Hegel and Marx, one, 
according to Arendt, of “catastrophic importance”.341 Hegel limited his interpretation of 
the world-spirit to the past, and its relations to present configurations. Philosophy can 
only grasp the meaning of social and spiritual forms which are real/effective (wirklich). 
Marx’s deduction of a future state of things, of a simple solution to a complex series of 
determinations, is not only an inversion of Hegel, but a very rejection of Hegel’s 
fundamental “political instinct”: that neither philosophers nor men of action can foretell 
future configurations, for history is made up of unpredictable actions.342 While Hegel’s 
scheme implied that any “progress” would contain in itself configurations of the past (a 
tribute to historical authority), Marx’s conscious realization of the absolute in a future 
“classless society” implied a rejection of traditional sources of authorities, which, by 
being unable to grasp the telos of the process, were  defined as partial or false 
consciences.343  
																																								 																				
341 Arendt, “From Hegel to Marx”, In: The Promise of Politics, p. 70 
342 Weisman, while rejecting necessitarism in Marx’s original formulation, does concede the point when 
she admits that Marx removed the experience of “wonder” (thaumazein) from his system. “Marx stands 
with Plato. He belongs to the circle of philosophers.” Weisman, op. cit., p. 158.  
343 In a letter to Joseph Bloch (1890), Engels tried to dismiss the accusations of an economic determinism 
and material “absolutism” in Marx’s theory, mentioning that elements others than the economical also play 
a role in historical development. The statements of Engels himself discredited his purpose: “economic 
[assumptions and conditions] are ultimately decisive. But the political ones, etc., and indeed even the 
traditions which haunt human minds also play a part, although not the decisive one.” In this line, “state 
power” (political power) can either “run in the same direction [of economic development], and then 
development is more rapid” or can oppose it, “in which case nowadays state power in every great people 
will go to pieces in the long run”. Concerning the autonomy of juridical reasoning: “the jurist imagines he 
is operating with a priori propositions, whereas they are really only economic reflexes;”. The same is true 
of “the realms of ideology which soar still higher in the air, religion, philosophy, etc.” – they “have a 
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As processual truth is not only found via the contemplation of established social-
political forms, but it is also anticipated in accordance to the logic laws of the process, 
Marx introduced, according to Arendt, “deadly antipolitical” premises to his theory. 
Absolute realization of Man through labor, meaning Man’s re-creation and dis-alienation 
through “a single gigantic developmental process”344, intends to solve political 
contradictions by undoing the contradictions of labor. It identified, so to speak, freedom 
with the end of necessity, and dismissed partial forms of freedom as “prejudices” or 
“ideologies”,345 as it was any representation of freedom that did not coincide with the 
socialization of labor and the social control over human activities in general. For Arendt, 
this scheme is not simply wrong. It is indeed a right translation of a social epoch, in which 
the animal laborans or the “species-being” became the dominant model for human values 
and relations. In this context, the pariah is threatened of becoming a parasite, and, on the 
other hand, anyone perceived as a social parasite is threatened of being ostracized as a 
pariah. For Arendt, the parasite-problem is fundamentally inscribed in Marx’s 
interpretation of modernity:   
“What Marx understood was that labor itself had undergone a decisive change in 
the modern world; that it had not only become the source of all wealth, and consequently 
the origin of all social values, but that all men, independent of class origin, were sooner 
or later destined to become laborers, and that those who could not be adjusted into this 
process of labor would be seen and judged by society as mere parasites. To put it another 
way: while others were concerned with this or that right of the laboring class, Marx 
already foresaw the time when, not this class, but the consciousness that corresponds to 
it, and to its importance for society as a whole, would decree that no one would have any 
rights, not the even the right to stay alive, who was not a laborer. The result of this process 
of course has not been the elimination of all other occupations, but the reinterpretation of 
all human activities as laboring activities.” (emphasis added)346  
     
Let me adjust the focus of this discussion. For Arendt, the “most fateful error” of 
Marx and Lenin (and, I would add, of Engels) was to imagine this process as ending in 
“mere administration”.347 The abolition of labor, the activity that defined Man throughout 
																																								 																				
prehistoric stock”; some of these “false conceptions of nature” could be explained by the “low economic 
development of the prehistoric period”. These false conceptions will be cleaned off with economic 
developments: “And even though economic necessity was the main driving force of the progressive 
knowledge of nature and becomes ever more so, it would surely be pedantic to try to find economic causes 
for all this primitive nonsense. The history of science is the history of the gradual clearing away of this 
nonsense…”. Engels, F. Letters on Historical Materialism. In: The Marx-Engels Reader. Edited by Robert 
C. Tucker. New York; London W. W. Norton & Co. 1978, pp. 760-65       
344 Arendt, ‘From Hegel to Marx’, p. 74 
345 Ibid., p. 77 
346 Arendt, ‘Marx and Western Political Thought’, pp. 278-279 
347 Arendt, ‘From Hegel to Marx’, p. 77. According to Engels, “All Socialists are agreed that the political 
state, and with it political authority, will disappear as a result of the coming social revolution, that is, that 
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history, and the sublation of political disputes, would create a passive society of pure 
leisure, since needs, disputes, differences, estrangement etc. would be solved and, and the 
productive relations would be technically administered, “freeing” men to pursue multiple 
distractions. For Arendt, this ideal combined an image of Greek leisure with modern 
bureaucracy, the latter being the “deadly antipolitical” element. For organizing the life 
process – the rhythmical production and consumption of goods needed by a socialized 
mankind -, a structure of control, functionalization and coordination replaces the public, 
as a former place for deliberation, contestation, and participation of citizens. What rules 
now is a Büro, a gigantic office in “which nobody occupies the empty chair of the ruler”.  
So, according to Arendt, Marxism-Leninism does not imply totalitarianism as a 
whole, but one of its elements: bureaucracy.348 Bureaucracy, or mere administration, is 
the proper form of organization of men living under conditions of “radical and universal 
equality”,349 that is, as beings equalized by the social process of labor-production. This 
form of government is, according to Arendt, even more dangerous, for is creates a radical 
form of powerlessness, in which “nobody takes responsibility”.350 Its domination is more 
oppressive than ancient tyrannies, for, in the latter, the tyrant, a concrete person, could 
still be held accountable as the source of rules and decrees. A “socialized mankind”, 
differently, is represented by no-one other than the process itself, and its organization 
assumes the form of “universal procedures” (periodical and cyclical regulations, 
applications, measurements etc.), which are independent of personal motivations and 
resolutions.351 To use Arendt’s categories-activities: the labor process is artificialized by 
social work (by mechanical and impersonal normative-institutions oriented to 
“administer” the life-process). This is another heterodox conclusion of Arendt: Marx 
assumed that the modern liberal state was inherently violent, for it was based on the 
control of one class over other. Arendt replied that social bureaucracies, organizing 
society in order to fulfill a necessary end, could be even more despotic and violent, for 
they closed political spaces to contestation and discussion, restricting the life of the 
“species-being” to labor, and to regulated leisure after labor. 
																																								 																				
public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative 
functions of watching over the true interests of society.” Engels, F. ‘On Authority’. In: The Marx-Engels 
Reader, p. 732 
348 “If the October Revolution had been permitted to follow the lines prescribed by Marx and Lenin, which 
was not the case, it would probably have resulted in bureaucratic rule”. Arendt, ibid., p. 78 
349 Ibid., p. 77 
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid., p. 78 
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4.4 Life-process: Struggle  
Let us now remember that Arendt related the “rise of the social” to two modern 
phenomena: the disintegration of societies into mass societies and the consolidation of 
national societies. The historical basis of the rise of the social is the process of absorption 
of families into classes, and then the disintegration of classes and communitarian spaces 
into lonely individuals. Rapid urbanization, loss of communal forms of life, and abrupt 
economic transformations shaped what Arendt called the “mass phenomenon of 
loneliness”.352 In a way, this can be seen as a breakdown of the inner complexity of 
Hegel’s Bürguerliche Gesellschaft – not as a simple regression to the abstract individual 
with his propriety. It meant instead the emergence of an unprecedented situation of 
uprootedness and superfluity, since the lonely individual belonged to nothing and nothing 
belonged to him. He or she was left behind, with a sense of abandonment, by social and 
historical realities.353 
Arendt noted that Marx did not understand “that the germs of a communistic 
society were present in the reality of a national household”.354 This is another heterodox 
affirmation of Arendt: national communities could socially organize the life (labor) 
process, thus creating a national or ethnic form of communism. Specific traditions could 
be seen as obstacles to the coordination of social forces. They would be held as 
“backwards” or “reactionaries” forces preventing a total reintegration of individual, 
groups, and associations into the socialized process of production-consumption of the 
nation. This nation-society (as distinct from a nation-state) rescues the individual from 
his isolation, thus recreating a sense of communion through a “big family”.355 It 
substitutes his intolerable loneliness by a demand of equality, not the artificial equality of 
citizenship, but the equality of conformity and coordination of social beings:  
																																								 																				
352 Arendt, HC, p. 59 
353 I will explore this process with more detail in the next chapters. For now, it is interesting to note that, 
for Arendt, “atomized society” was “prepared for the Nazis in Germany by historical circumstances”, while 
created “artificially” by Stalin in Russia. Arendt, OT, p. 417  
354 Arendt, HC, p. 44 
355 “The organic theories of nationalism, especially in its Central European versions, all rest on an 
identification of the nation and the relationships between its members with the family and family 
relationships”. Arendt, HC, p. 256. Peter Gay recalled youth, right- and left-wing movements’ aspirations 
to build (or re-build, in some imaginations) a “whole”, non-fragmentary society, during the Republic of 
Weimar: “The result was a peculiarly undoctrinaire, unanalytical, in fact unpolitical socialism – it was a ‘a 
self-evident proposition’, one observer noted, for all people in the youth movement to be Socialists. Young 
men and women, seeking purity and renewal, were Socialists by instinct; the völkisch, right-wing groups 
demanded the ‘reawakening of a genuine Germanness – deutsches Volkstum – in German lands’,  while the 
left-wing groups called for ‘the restoration of a societas, a communally constructed society.’” Gay, P. op. 
cit., p. 79 
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“Whether a nation consists of equals or non-equals is of no great importance in 
this respect, for society always demand that its members act as though they were members 
of one enormous family which has only one opinion and one interest.”356 
 
This is an interesting takeover of Arendt, as she did not focus solely on the racial 
discourse of ethnic identification. Both are correlated phenomena and, combined, became 
stronger elements of domination during totalitarian experiences. Yet here society, an 
amorphous mass society, relying on some abstract factors of identification, creates a 
principle of coordination which resembles to that of a family. This social-family, 
grounded on the imperatives of “life”, emerges as a form of self-government, for the 
governors of these socialized nations are not arbitrary leaders: they simply administer the 
“needs” of this enlarged family. Life, here, is no longer the chaotic sum of private lives 
of the liberal model, but the abstract life of the species or of the national society, which 
assumes the status of a truer reality over the fragmentation and disintegration of particular 
concrete families and individuals. The social family creates a paradox which pervades 
Arendt’s reflections: it is a fictional factor of unification, which nevertheless creates 
adherence and adjustment, thus generating real consequences. 
In the last chapter of The Human Condition – The Vita Activa and the Modern 
Age, Arendt wrote about processes that accentuated world-alienation and also earth-
alienation. According to these processes, men and women started to trust “realities” that 
were not directly related to their daily perceptual life (Arendt called this process an 
“absolute renunciation of the senses”)357, like the formalistic “reality” of mathematical 
and logical reasoning, the deeper “reality” of chemical and atomic processes, the 
“universal reality” of a beyond-earth galaxy, the social reality of laboring nations or 
species. Being was no longer appearing to concrete individual men and women.358 Arendt 
called this a loss of “common sense”,359 meaning not the loss of commonly established 
ideas and behaviors, but the loss of a basic rootedness in communities of experience, 
along with visible interactive citizens. This process of world alienation, as I am arguing, 
does not lead necessarily to self-preoccupation: it may inaugurate “gigantic” forms of 
actuation, typical of an hubristic modernity, according to which “Man” disposes of 
himself, of his species, or of “the earth from the outside”.360 Considering our case of 
																																								 																				
356 Arendt, HC, p. 39 
357 Ibid., p. 287 
358 Ibid., p. 276 
359 Ibid., p. 280 
360 Villa, op. cit., p. 192 
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discussion: Man disposes of his own society, thus instituting an impersonal reality in 
which everyone is adjusted to the rhythms of everybody. Indeed, it institutes, through this 
fictional identification, a laboring no-body.  
To grasp this process, we can think of the culture of labor that permeates socialized 
economies. One can look to capitalist and socialist examples. Decades before 
McDonald’s had started praising the employees (or functionaries) of the month, Soviet 
Union and aligned countries implemented a culture of labor, according to which the 
continuation of the revolution would demand, instead of political participation and 
deliberation, total commitment to a laboring-life. The Stakhanovite movement in USSR, 
founded upon the example of a mine-worker who had established a record of productivity, 
created a cult of heroic dedication to work, discipline and productivity.361 In the DDR, the 
soviet aligned East Germany, ruled by a bureaucratic organization under the dictatorship 
of a single-party (SED), State-Owned factories (Volkseigenen Betriebe – VEB) followed 
planning targets issued by the party in order to coordinate and control every aspect of 
laborers’ life.  
Laborers were organized under collectives, designed to enhance competition and 
productivity. These collectives, on their turn, were awarded medals in accordance to their 
efficiency, and were encouraged to form “combat groups of the laboring class” 
(Kampfgruppen der Arbeiterklasse). Laboring for life also meant “struggling” for life, 
and so confirming the “rule of the labor”362: after protests in 1953, the regime created 
units of “strugglers”, working as informants, and preventing agitation and political unrest. 
In a socialized country, rigidly organized according to the principle that today’s labor 
creates tomorrow’s freedom, bureaucratic administration of life was compatible with the 
struggle for sustaining life and, by necessity, producing the freedom to come. As one 
VEB activist said, “The way we labor today becomes the way we live tomorrow”.363 
Bureaucratic mechanization, on one side, and struggle for collective life, on the other, 
created the sense of irresistibility, which, for Arendt, characterizes the modern “unnatural 
																																								 																				
361 D. Priestland noted how Stalin’s work-cult created around Alexei Stakhanov was simultaneous to the 
purges of the Great Terror and a larger campaign of persecution, denunciation and execution of “anybody 
who showed signs of ‘bourgeois’ corruption”. Priestland, D. The Red Flag: a history of Communism. New 
York: Grove Press. 2009, p. 177 For Arendt, the “Stakhanov system…broke up all solidarity and class 
consciousness among the workers, first by ferocious competition and second by the temporary solidification 
of a Stakhanovite aristocracy…” OT, p. 420 
362 “…it is force to which we must someday appeal in order to erect the rule of the labor.” Marx, K. ‘The 
Possibility of Non-Violent Revolution’. In: The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 523 
363 I first read the slogan (“So wie wir heute arbeiten werden wir morgen leben”) in the exhibition Alltag in 
der DDR, in the Museum in the Kulturbrauerei, in Berlin. 
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growth of the natural”. The impersonality of administrative and mechanic processes is 
reinforced by the ever growing demands of the abstract needs of the social organism.364  
In a process ruled by nobody, there can be no responsibility and there can be no 
resistance. Anyone who, consciously or not, resists to the life-process is automatically 
rendered as social parasite. For Arendt, when the norms of production and coordination 
equalize the labor of every-body, “those who did not keep the rules could be considered 
to be asocial or abnormal”.365 After the replacement of people by roles and functions, 
those who do not fit are considered ab-normal, a-social, work-shy, or, given the emphasis 
on the social-organism, mere parasites. In biology, parasitism is a matter of microscopic 
objectivity: there is a verifiable organism which takes a vital energy from another 
organism. In a social perspective, parasitism, although metaphorical and abstractly 
defined by the dominant discourse of production, turns out to be a matter of social 
engineering and violence.366 
 
Arendt noted that the “socialized man” was “even less an acting being” than the 
individual of liberal economics.367 The latter, even though oriented to his privacy, is still 
an identifiable agent. The social is not identifiable, does not act, cannot be held 
accountable by specific decisions. There is another irony at this point. Marx and other 
theoreticians of modern economy thought that, via the material developments of modern 
society, old regulations of religious, magical, and mythical orders would fall as false 
conceptualizations of nature. Progress, in special economic and scientific progress, would 
imply more autonomy, as men would free themselves from old superstitions. Arendt 
claimed something very different: mass societies, relying on gigantic-impersonal 
representations of itself, tend to create new, more dangerous myths of powerlessness. 
With the language of future goals and statistical indexes, the social relies on terms that 
																																								 																				
364 D’Entrèves complains against an “ambiguity” in Arendt’s analysis of modernity, according to which she 
pointed to the advance of “working”, artificial mechanisms through technology and specialization, and, on 
the other side, she referred to an intrusion of the “natural”. Accordingly, Arendt never “solved” this 
ambiguity. D’Entrèves, op. cit., p. 53. I argue that it cannot be solved because it is not an ambiguity, but an 
interaction between the two activities (labor and work), or, if one may, a fusion of both. The victory of the 
animal laborans over the homo faber does not mean the suppression of work-techniques (and of machines, 
technologies, artifices etc.), but an incorporation of work-techniques by the laboring process. This duality 
is precisely expressed in the formula “unnatural growth of the natural”. I agree with Villa once more:  
“Nature’s automatism is enhanced by the machine.” Villa, op. cit., p. 199  
365 Arendt, HC, p. 42 
366 Arendt used Soviet Union “new law against social parasites” (who “were supposed to be selected by the 
people themselves in mass meetings”), introduced in 1957, to show that the country could “relapse into 
totalitarianism between one day and another”. Arendt, OT, p. xlv 
367 Arendt, HC, p. 42, f 35 
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are not experienced nor understandable through common speech by common citizens. In 
order to save a race, to create equality, to undo poverty, the social process may confiscate 
food, ostracize discontents, purge classes, expel group-populations, as the process is only 
governed by “needs”, but not checked by concrete citizens.  
The language of life, enhanced by the totalitarian refusal of liberal instrumentality,  
justified the invasion of the “vital space” (Lebensraum) on the East, justified the 
euthanasia and “mercy-killings” of “disabled” persons in the Aktion T4, justified the 
exclusion and extermination of degenerate, perverted, sub-human (Untermenschen) 
races, as justified the death of thousands of laborers (many of them political prisoners and 
“class enemies”) charged, for instance, with building Stalin’s White Sea-Baltic Sea 
channel. It also justified the creation of efficient instruments to implement “painful” 
measures (chemical weapons, atomic bombs, gas chambers) to achieve “necessary” ends. 
According to Arendt, the greatest paradox, and also the greatest proof of the failure of 
modern forms of politics, is that the promotion of life to the highest value helped to create 
a politics of destruction, which only aggravated helplessness in the 20th century:     
“If it is true that politics is nothing more than a necessary evil for sustaining the 
life of humanity, then politics has indeed begun to banish itself from the world and 
transform its meaning into meaninglessness.”368      
 
4.5 Keeping the Process Under Control 
I have explored so far some aspects of the tension between pariah and society, in 
special mass society. Max Weber defined the pariah as a caste with economic function but 
without political rights. Arendt took over this historical situation, and told subsequent 
stories in which the pariah did not, or could not, improve his instrumental situation 
towards a political condition with rights to act and speak. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, the pariah-situation was weakened not so much because of his exclusion by 
malevolent rulers. The pariah’s major tension emerged in contrast to society. This became 
especially true when a disintegrated society turned into a mass society, re-identified in 
terms of a socialized single-subject (a nation, a race, a species).  
Arendt affirmed that the pariah enters the political realm as a rebel. This is not a 
gratuitous rebellion. The pariah rebels, in this case, against society, or against the “social 
process”, which forced upon him a degrading situation. There can be, in fact, a circular 
tension between the pariah and society: either society precludes the integration of a group 
																																								 																				
368 Arendt, The Promise of Politics, p. 110 
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or an individual; or someone, by acting, that is, by not conforming to society, puts himself 
in contrast to the social-standards. So far, the pariah’s clash with society has been 
examined in economic terms. I have explored this tension, firstly, through the acceptance 
of given economic roles by Jews in Europe, with their embrace of an un-political 
functionality. Now, I’ve presented how the problem of economic functionality becomes 
politically more dangerous with the emergence of totalistic societies, which engulf every 
sphere and everybody, as if it were a great factory or a great family.  
If I am right in characterizing the pariah as someone who refuses to be 
disintegrated by the economic process of society, we shall discuss also the position of 
workers. Indeed, according to Arendt’s terms, we shall call them “laborers”, for workers 
still have a control over their material and a degree of freedom in ascribing meaning to 
their works. Modern laborers are absorbed by the necessary and cyclical process of 
society, thus lacking any degree of independence, any space of autonomy within this 
process. Moreover, given the functionalization of society around economic goals, the 
laborer becomes a paradigmatic model to society: everyone and everything is understood 
and evaluated in terms of coordinated social labor. Independent art, political protest and 
sheer laziness are incongruent to the “social”, as they delay the process of production-
consumption. 
Discussing the relation between individuals and a still stratified society, Arendt 
recalled the position of marginal groups “which society had never quite absorbed”, as 
Jews, homosexuals, workers and proletarians.369 These groups, as we saw in the case of 
Jews, still could find an alternative home, with “certain traits of humanity which had 
become extinct in society”370, among their communities still standing outside or in the 
margins of society: ghettos, revolutionary parties, unions, social clubs. The protective 
boundaries of small communities were soon to be dismantled with the rise of the social, 
which, as we saw, coincided with the massification of society into disconnected 
individuals. In conditions of uprootedness and atomization, there is no escape to 
alternative societies: 
“A good part of the despair of individuals under the conditions of mass society is 
due to the fact that these avenues of escape are now closed because society has 
incorporated all strata of the population.”371 
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370 Ibid.  
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For Arendt, the incorporation of laborers by society was concomitant to their 
expropriation from the “world”. Indeed, expropriation and socialization were different 
aspects of the same process. First, laborers were “deprived of the twofold protection of 
family and propriety” (in the beginning of the industrial revolution). Then, “society 
became the subject of the new life process”, absorbing the laborer as a mere body (or a 
mere “force”, in Marx’s terms) into his new abstract “family”, society, within his new 
“propriety”, the nation, or the race, or the species.372 It is not coincident that one of the 
events marking the modern loss of the world is the literal expropriation of people, with 
their removal of a concrete location in the world, and their subsequent incorporation into 
the intangible process of “social production”. Historically, for Arendt, this phenomenon 
was aggravated by imperialism. In the transition of the 19th to the 20th century, unbounded 
economic processes generated superfluous men and superfluous capital. According to the 
nature of the wealth-process, superfluous men and wealth were sent beyond the 
institutional and geographical limits of the nation-state, to continue the process of 
accumulation of wealth in “uncivilized” territories. The inner logic of accumulation 
created an “expansion for the sake of expansion”, which uprooted more people, and 
undermined political institutions and controls. By creating new forms of domination 
through bureaucracy and decrees, imperialistic politics facilitated the movement in which 
“wealth became a never-ending process of getting wealthier.”373 
 
In 1970, in one of her last interviews, Arendt spoke about the relation between 
economy and politics. Adelbert Reif, the interviewer, insisted to know Arendt’s opinion 
on the “alternatives for the future”: capitalism, socialism or another possibility?374 Arendt 
refused to answer a question in such terms, for it assumed two presuppositions that she 
did not share: that thinkers could work with models of predictability (“let us hope it will 
come as a surprise to us”), and that social processes are, fundamentally, of an economic 
nature. Arendt refused to frame the question as a struggle between capitalism and 
socialism. These two models were very similar in her perspective (“we have here twins, 
each wearing a different hat”). The solution, for her, was certainly not “to expropriate the 
																																								 																				
372 Arendt, HC, p. 256 
373 Arendt, OT, p. 188. 
374 Arendt, The Last Interview, p. 80. Reif formulated the question from the perspective of “this stage of 
the historical development of makind”, to which Arendt replied: “I see no such alternative in history; nor 
do I know what is in store there. Let’s not talk about such grand matters as ‘the historical development of 
mankind’…”  
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expropriators”, neither to institute a collective ownership (“a contradiction in terms”).375 
Capitalism initiated a process of expropriation continued through “mild forms of 
expropriation” as inflation, recession, overtaxation, devaluation of currency.  
On its turn, practical forms of socialism, mainly those of Eastern Europe, had only 
carried the process ahead. In Russia, indeed, by that period, there was “total 
expropriation”, in Arendt’s words: “all political and legal safeguards of private ownership 
have disappeared”. Moreover, as propriety was also related, for Arendt, to a community-
rooted place in the world, socialism expropriated its laborers also by destroying their 
“class”, their unions and parties, and their rights – “collective bargaining, strikes, 
unemployment insurance” etc.376 Decentralized forms of agency and multiple centers of 
power (promised by the formula “all the power to the councils”) had been destroyed 
(“precisely by the Communist Party and by Lenin himself”) with the consolidation of an 
one-party ruling according to a single ideology. “In essence”, Arendt concluded, 
“socialism has simply continued, and driven to its extreme, what capitalism began. Why 
should it be the remedy?”377 
Arendt’s moving away from both capitalistic and socialist interpretations of 
politics meant, fundamentally, a rejection of the idea that politics would be solved through 
the choice of the best economic model. Arendt’s project is a consideration of human 
beings not as laborers who will become free in the future, but as laborers or workers who 
can also be free citizens now. Marx had complained against the “decomposition 
[Zersetzung] of man into Jew and citizen, Protestant and citizen, religious man and 
citizen”378, and also against man’s alienation from his labor, the products of his labor, and 
from man himself and his natural essence.379 Marx claimed then a “re-composition” of 
man into a “species being”, a man no longer estranged from other men and from his labor-
work. Arendt’s rejection of this abstract model reestablished political power in 
concreteness: politically, human beings appear to others, and experience otherness, in a 
“decomposed” way, that is, as Jews, Protestants, artists, workers, woman etc. There is no 
access to an immediate source of “recomposition”. A political freedom experienced in 
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377 Ibid. 
378 Marx, K. ‘On The Jewish Question’, pp. 35-36 
379 Marx summed up “estrangement” of “Man’s species being” (the estrangement of man’s body from 
himself, the estrangement from the “product of his labour”, the estrangement from other’s) as follows: 
“…the proposition that man’s species nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from 
the other, as each of them is from man’s essential nature”. Marx, K. ‘Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844’. In: The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 77  
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Arendt’s terms means an artificial equalization of workers, laborers, businessmen, 
atheists, Catholics etc. as citizens entitled to participate, to have a say, on the 
configuration of their social landscape. In Arendt’s sense, a laborer becomes free not by 
abstractly “owning” the laboring processes of society, but by becoming a citizen with a 
rightful location in the world, with entitlement to act and speak on its own behalf.    
Here, it is also important to see Arendt’s defense of political work (creation, 
preservation or recreation of institutions) and political action (speaking and manifesting 
spontaneously) against the demands of a silent, repetitive, conformed labor – or of a 
politics designed as an administered “struggle for life”. In other words, here one may see 
her emphasis on world-institutions as the locus for a politics of plural beings against the 
impersonal process of economy. For Arendt, what protects laborers and people in general 
in the “so-called capitalist countries of the West is not capitalism, but a legal system…”, 
for “the question is what we can do to get and keep this [economic] process under control 
so that it does not degenerate, under one name or another, into the monstrosities in which 
it has fallen in the East.”380 Arendt pointed to the fact that what was unbearable for the 
communist dictatorship in Russia was not economic concessions to private consume and 
comfort, nor even some minor degrees of technical and administrative autonomy to 
factories and business. Political reforms and political demands were actually 
unacceptable – public agitation was a sufficient condition for intervention in satellite 
countries.381 
Breaking with the dichotomy right-left, Arendt suggested that both sides insisted 
that an economic system produced certain political institutions, while, for her, it is 
“action” that arises spontaneously, inserting the discussion of principles and creation of 
institutions over the processes of production, accumulation, distribution. That “economic 
power” could still not control “political power” disproved Marx: “the state and its 
constitutions are not superstructures”. So the core difference for Arendt was not the 
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381 Arendt compared soviet repression in Czechoslovakia (“The Soviet Union marched into Czechoslovakia 
not because of the new ‘economic model’ but because of the political reforms connected with it.”) with the 
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concessions”. Ibid., pp. 86-86. As an example, one could also think of the “closed cities” from Soviet Union 
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plant in Mayak; inhabitants, nuclear workers and their families, have access to better products and goods, 
and enjoy private comforts which inhabitants from surrounding cities do not enjoy. Still, during Stalin’s 
period, a worker who refused to keep his job on the plant was killed; even today, the city is closed, and no 
citizen is entitled to the right of speaking or complaining (part of the population suffers from diseases 
provoked by nuclear accidents). See the documentary ‘City 40’ (2016). Directed by Samira Goetschel 
(1h20min).  
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arbitrary classification of countries in accordance to their economic tendencies, but the 
quality of political institutions, with which citizens could have a certain deliberative 
control over their economic process – as Canovan put it, the difference between “serving 
a [economic] process, and subordinating it to human goals”.382 Politically, the world was 
not divided between socialist and capitalist, but between countries with political rights 
(as “Sweden on one side, the United States on the other”) and countries with no rights for 
participation and actuation (“Franco’s Spain on one side, Soviet Russia on the other)”.383 
In Arendt’s categories, the decisive difference was between countries where frame-
worked action was possible and countries where an unbounded laboring-productive 
process remained unchecked: 
“…only legal and political institutions that are independent of the economic forces 
and their automatism can control and check the inherently monstrous potentialities of this 
process.”384 
 
4.6 Final remarks 
In Arendt’s perspective, any govern grounded on economic forces – either the 
govern of particularistic corporations which invade the public sphere, or the self-oriented 
govern of private agents towards their own satisfactions, or, finally, the gigantic govern 
of socialist bureaucracies that take society as if it is owned by them – is not political. 
Politics is not about private life, nor about the life of the race, or the nation, or the species 
(mankind, until the creation of nuclear weapons, was assumed to be immortal; even if 
millions were destroyed in the 20th century, mankind kept on living). Politics is instead 
about what Arendt called the world, an institutional and civilizational structure in which 
men and women confirm their status as unique citizens, being entitled to a place, to a 
meaningful life of relations and productive work, with the possibility of intervention on 
their economic and political affairs. It’s a freely chosen and freely experienced form of 
human organization. 
Now, in my view, Arendt can be criticized for stressing more the oppositions 
between the economic and the political than their eventual complementation. Economic 
prosperity and political freedom can go hand in hand. The economical and the political 
do not form a necessary opposition. Economic prosperity can enlarge our political 
experience by providing material conditions for the fulfilment of natural and social 
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demands without which contemporary freedom would be inconceivable. If Arendt 
thought, as I am arguing, in terms of re-concretization of life around direct experiences 
(as opposed to the “fictional realities” of global ideologies and abstract systems), then she 
could have stressed how private, social and economic spheres relate to the political in a 
more positive way. As one of her former students noted, “the socioeconomic and political 
domains cannot be distinguished as strictly as Arendt had distinguished them, for they 
are, in daily life, too intertwined.”385 
But I believe that the question, again, is more a matter of how and why Arendt 
wrote than of the actual content of her ideas. As Villa observed, “Everything Arendt has 
to say about action and the public realm is framed in terms of analysis of the de-worldling 
of the public world in the modern age.”386 As I am defending, her critique of society and 
economy do not fit into a sociological account of empirical-historical forms. Her reading 
is not simply a collection of historical lessons, but a conceptual, factually-based, analysis 
of the modern crisis of politics, followed by a judgement oriented to the recovery or the 
recreation of certain political conditions and principles. Based on the analysis of what is 
“new”, or still unarticulated, it’s a “creative response”387, which is meant to confront 
established political and social beliefs. Moreover, she also defended the a-political 
autonomy of the private and of privacy. By not politicizing private and economic life, 
Arendt precisely preserved these forms in their relative independence, thus recognizing 
their importance. Totalitarian and pre-totalitarian dominations caused the “destruction of 
bonds”388 (family, marriage, friendship, privacy), and Arendt certainly knew the political 
importance of preserving pre-political and extra-political forms of life.  
Moreover, Arendt ascribed social tasks of first importance to the technical-
economical, such as the reduction of poverty.389 She also stressed that one social factor 
for the political success of the north-American revolution was the satisfactory economic 
conditions of the former colonies.390 Yet Arendt’s effort was oriented to persuade 
contemporary readers of a difference which sounded obvious on a nominal basis, but 
which had been lost in predominant practices, the difference between economy and 
politics. Her emphasis on differences, on a clear demarcation, was meant to recover what 
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388 Ibid., p. 54 
389 Arendt, H. On Revolution. New York: Penguin Books. 2006, p. 104 (Henceforward, OR) 
390 Arendt, OR, p. 58 
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was for her exclusive grounding terms and experiences of the political. As Pitkin noted, 
every major political theorist was “concerned with this transition from private to 
public”,391 and perhaps no other historical period matched the events of end of the 19th 
century and the 20th century in terms of devastating consequences emerging from the 
tension between the processes of life and the institutions of the good life. Arendt could 
not simply accept as “natural” the “steady transformation of the citoyen of the French 
Revolution into the bourgeois of the prewar period”.392 
Still on this difficult topic, one cannot go further by saying that economic 
processes of mass societies are totalitarians in essence – an affirmation which, I assume, 
would strike Arendt in an analytical and moral level. An expression such as 
“totalitarianism of the market” is, to say the least, “hyperbolic and misleading”.393 
Democratic mass societies, with all its pathological and a-political tendencies, are still 
based on (even if limited) options of life, on (even if weakened) freedom of movement, 
speech, press, on (threatened, but still valid) reserves of privacy and private spheres, on a 
limited, state-controlled, criticizable, use of violence, and on a general possibility of 
differentiation on political, social and personal levels. A critique of mass-economy may 
benefit from several elements of Arendt’s work, as I am trying to show, but not from an 
indistinct identification with the totalitarian phenomenon – if for no other reason, at least 
for the fact that totalitarianism rejected economic rationality. Arendt’s work definitely 
does not suggest that, at night, all prisoners are grey. 
Still, the political critique of economy articulated by Hannah Arendt deserves to 
be considered not only in its alternative to the right-left divide, but also in its complex 
account of several modes of economic de-politicization. From the political apathy of 
private oriented individuals to the behavioristic and conformist processes of a “socialized 
economy”, Arendt brought up different arguments and different experiences to remind 
that a random collection of private aims does not form a public matter. Moreover, she 
insisted that an abstract recreation of economic identity around a “social” which forces 
on to the public an impersonal, seemingly natural impetus (“the rule of labor”, in Marx’s 
formulation) may aggravate the phenomenon of powerlessness.  Economic systems are 
real, but not in “pure forms”, as they coexist with political configurations. The political 
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question, thus, is how to prevent economic processes of robbing freedom, something that 
happens, according to Arendt, 
“…when a dissenter or opponent becomes ‘unemployable’ or when consumer 
goods are so scarce and life so uncomfortable that it is easy for the government to ‘buy’ 
whole sections of the population. What people in the [European] East do care about are 
freedom, civil rights, legal guarantees. For these are the conditions for being free to say, 
to write, and to print whatever one likes.”394    
 
Just short of Arendt’s death, ironically, if one considers the accusations of 
Arendt’s “utopianism”, a series of democratic revolutions rejected the authoritarian 
model of modern revolutions.395 While the latter was based on single parties and single 
leaders acting on behalf of laws “made” by history, and forcing necessary means to pursue 
necessary social ends, those new democratic revolutions reclaimed an institutional space 
for plural deliberation and shared determination by a coalition of different individuals and 
social groups. These acts of re-politicization, from the overthrow of autocracies in 
Portugal, Spain and Greece in the 1970s to the re-democratization in Brazil and 
Argentina, and the fall of dictators in the Philippines and in South Korea, in the 1980s, 
were “Arendtian revolutions”, in the words of Jonathan Schell.396 “Caring about 
freedom”, as Arendt indicated, people on the East also joined these “arendtian 
revolutions” in their rejection of governments which promised to solve the “social 
question”. Bureaucratic-dictatorship, ruling as representatives of the no-body process of 
social laboring, were overthrown in Ukraine, Georgia, in the Balkans, and years before in 
Poland, where a movement with a suggestive “arendtian” name (Solidarity) mobilized, 
nonviolently, for the sake of establishing political and civil rights, diverse groups and 
individuals, from workers, students, intellectuals, religious leaders and many others who 
would be pointed out, under the perspective of social adjustment, as agitators, parasites, 
and a-social elements.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
BECOMING PARVENU: THE PARIAH ASSIMILATES 
 
“Our identity is changed so frequently that 
nobody can find out who we actually are.” 
(Hannah Arendt, We Refugees) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Why did Arendt criticize the phenomenon of assimilation of European Jews? In 
broad terms, the story of assimilation told by Hannah Arendt rested on the conclusion that 
Jews were never politically emancipated – even if some edicts, conceding eventually civil 
rights in the 19th century, were nominally regarded as edicts of emancipation.397 Instead, 
one of Arendt’s main claims was that assimilation undermined emancipation. Indeed, she 
held that both processes, seemingly related and mutually implicated at that time, stand in 
opposition. One cannot be emancipated through assimilation. More than this, assimilation 
poses a threat to political freedom. To understand this and others of Arendt’s (strong) 
claims, I will attempt to define the controversial term assimilation. 
Assimilate designates the incorporation of something, and the comprehension of 
something. “I assimilated that idea”. “He assimilated the blows that life has brought”. In 
a sense, to comprehend is to incorporate: an idea, an experience, a situation, as long as it 
is assimilated, becomes part of what something is. It creates an identity between what 
assimilates and what is assimilated. On a different angle, as a process relating human 
beings, assimilation announces its limits, and perhaps its failure in its own terms. The 
person who assimilates can only become similar, never equal to others. If the goal is 
equality, assimilation contradicts its objective by proposing a relation in which one tries 
to become only similar to another. As similarity is not equality, both stand in unequal 
conditions in the beginning and in the end of the process. 
Arendt begun one of her discussions on the assimilation of Jews mentioning 
equality, the “most uncertain venture of modern mankind”. “Equality of condition” was, 
for her, an important cornerstone of justice and, at the same time, an ideal politically 
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dangerous.398 Accordingly, the extrapolation of equality from certain limited spheres – 
political, juridical, formal – to broader realms originated some of the gravest political 
problems of modern times. Arendt, in fact, related the emergence of racial movements to 
this longing for equality. Ethnic and racial tribalism did not embrace inequality as an 
ontological principle. They rejected inequality, thus aiming to build a society of equals. 
This is another important part of Arendt’s story: the expansion of equality, from a political 
to a social principle, destroys political freedom. By becoming a social principle, equality 
loses its limited status as a term of orientation and stabilization of relations between 
citizens. As equality becomes an all-encompassing goal, society starts a radical 
discrimination to abolish discrimination. It behaves impatiently towards any social and 
natural differences among group and individuals. It can no longer tolerate inequality.399 
In this line, society is a key term to understand Arendt’s critique of assimilation. 
She referred to assimilation as “adjustment to and reception by society”.400 Jewish 
assimilation meant “acceptance by non-Jewish society”.401 Assimilation was so a social, 
not a political process. It did not mean granting rights, neither enlarging the scope of 
citizenship nor creating new political structures. It meant adaptation to certain social 
standards and adoption of certain social roles. When Arendt referred to assimilation as 
the “disappearance of the Jews’ separate existence”402, she meant the disappearance of 
Jews as a socially distinct entity. It was the first moment of Jewish disintegration in 
Europe. Arendt’s first claims – that assimilation was un-political and that it implied the 
social disappearance of Jews – was complemented by a stronger conclusion: that 
assimilation prepared the way to 1933 and to Hitler.403 To understand these statements, 
one needs to bear in mind specific historical features of “rise of the social” in that context. 
First, society demanded equalization. Then, social assimilation, proving ultimately its 
impossibility (becoming similar, as I mentioned before, does not men becoming equal), 
spread over into something much more problematic: totalitarian politics legalized 
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discrimination in order to abolish discrimination and differentiation, actualizing the 
meaning of the “disappearance of Jews”.  
From a historical point of view, before 1933, the conditions of assimilation – its 
background, its models and its first tendencies – were defined in a highly complex period. 
It was complex; yet it was also a short period. Chronologically, Arendt traced the 
beginning of assimilation, of its defining ideas and events, to Moses Mendelssohn’s life 
in Berlin, C. W. Dohm’s  publication of On the Civil Improvement of the Jews [Über die 
bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden], and the opening of Henriette Herz salon, all events 
around the 1770s and 1780s.404 Arendt referred to the end of assimilation – better said, 
the end of its illusions – around the first decades of the 1800s, with the repeal of civil 
rights, and the reaction to the spirit of tolerance and reform in Prussia, during the first 
years of that century. The closing of illusions was marked by events such as the 
publication of Grattenauer’s Against the Jews [Wider die Juden] (1803), the anti-
Napoleonic movements, the substitution of salons by masculine fraternities (where tea 
and conversations were replaced by beer and chauvinistic songs), and the general climate 
of reaction symbolized by the Congress of Vienna. No more than 50 years, in Arendt’s 
account, were needed to establish movements that would define the process of 
assimilation and, later, contribute to the collapse of European peoples. 
The historical complexity of assimilation was matched by its theoretical and 
conceptual intricacy. Arendt mentioned thinkers and authors as diverse as Lessing, 
Goethe, Mirabeau, W. Humboldt, Herder, and also Mendelssohn, as having settled the 
terms and the models for the paths taken, and for those not taken, during the epoch of 
assimilation. Many among them, even though being more or less friendly to the “civil 
improvement” of Jews, could not, according to Arendt, grasp the political significance of 
the Jewish question. Friends of Jews helped to frame the model of social assimilation, 
while anti-Semites increasingly redefined the Jewish question/problem (Judenfrage) as a 
political matter, a matter that would require political measures as disfranchisement, 
alteration of rights, legal segregation and even expulsion.405 The proponents of 
“tolerance” still preached social adjustment. As we shall see, Enlightened theories of 
tolerance preached social and individual adaptation, presupposing equalization as a 
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condition for political integration. Political integration would be a “natural” effect in an 
equalized society. For Arendt, this confusion of political integration with social 
adjustment was one of Enlightenment’s gravest mistake.   
To understand what kind – or kinds – of social adjustment Arendt referred, we 
must explore a little more the polysemy of the social in her approach. Some readers 
analyzed Arendt’s social in three phenomena: economic exchange-market, mass society, 
and sociability. Accordingly, assimilation meant social adaptation only in the last sense, 
an adjustment to manners, clothes, vocabulary, and to certain social-style in order to gain 
acceptance.406 I disagree with such a reduction of the social and of social assimilation. To 
start with, as we saw in the previous chapters, the circumstances of European Jews were 
shaped by the acceptance of limited economic roles. Jews not only conformed to norms 
of behavior, but to the few instrumental functions that were opened to them. Moreover, 
considering the deformation of society into a mass-society, the Jewish question was, in 
Arendt’s terms, a “catalytic agent”. The disintegration of Jewish communities, and the 
aggravation of their powerlessness, coincided with larger processes of social 
massification, to which Jews, being one of the weakest groups in that context, became 
exemplary in the worst sense.  
Still, in the perspective of sociability, of adoption of certain manners, languages, 
styles, the process of assimilation, “of adjustment to and absorption by society”, of 
changing names and buying aristocratic titles, originated events and figures that cannot 
be reduced to a story of pure conformation. Indeed, as we will see, one of main 
protagonists of assimilation according to Arendt was the exceptional Jew. Certainly, he 
was not simply a silent and erased individual. Trying to escape the mass of Jews 
stereotypically reduced by anti-Semitism into an agglomeration of bad qualities and evil 
images, exceptional Jews performed a double effort of differentiation: from average Jews, 
but also from society in general, which wanted to be entertained by some individual 
specialty of these ex-Jews. These exceptions became “Jews and yet presumably not like 
Jews”.407 In the German editions, Arendt referred to the Ausnahmejuden, a term for those 
Jews who, as exceptions, were taken from, and taken out, the mass of Jews.408 Society, to 
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prove its tolerance, picked up some individual Jews out of the more visible masses and 
communities (out of the Judentum). These superposed efforts of differentiation – from 
average Jews and from average non-Jews – made ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit) one of the 
main conditions of assimilation. 
The complexity of assimilation, moreover, was reflected also in Arendt’s political 
methodology. As I have been emphasizing, Arendt replaced objective causality by a 
phenomenology of interactions. Grounded on possibilities and contingent tendencies, 
these interactions formed configurations determined by choices and behaviors, words and 
acts, of agents who, knowingly or not, were responsible. Broadly speaking, the 
background and the outcome of assimilation was formed by interactions of Jews and non-
Jews. To be sure, interactions are not symmetrical relations of mutual determination. In 
this sense, the possibilities of European Jews, as I insist, were undeniably limited. But, as 
Arendt also emphasized, politics is not necessarily about physical force, about the amount 
of bodies standing for or against something. Minority groups, when politically articulated 
for the sake of justice or freedom, can initiate transformative events, regardless the 
physical and social forces against them.  
In this line, Arendt, speaking as a Jew and for Jews in 1943, held that 
“Lacking the courage to fight for a change of our social and legal status, we have 
decided instead, so many of us, to try a change of identity. And this curious behavior 
makes matters much worse. The confusion in which we live is partly our own work.”409 
 
Rather than acting politically (“to fight for a change”), many Jews decided to 
socially assimilate (“try a change of identity”), a process that resulted in a political 
deterioration (“matters [are] much worse”) for which Jews themselves were co-
responsible (“partly our own work”). Arendt concluded that insisting in pure suffering 
was a narrative-bias that could only reinforce a sense of powerlessness among Jews. On 
the other hand, Arendt also stressed the conditions shaped by external, non-Jewish forces, 
which established overwhelming obstacles to politicization and liberation. Arendt 
recalled Heine’s statement that he would not have converted “if the law permitted one to 
steal silver spoons”.410 The law in Heine’s epoch incorporated the dominant social values, 
thus inflating the conditions for citizenship and general rights with certain social criteria 
– for instance, with the necessity of being Christian in order to become a professor. 
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“Jewish intellectuals had to abandon Judaism so as not to starve”.411 In general, European 
law in the 19th century, identifying citizenship and sociability, fostered assimilation and 
discouraged rebellion. It “…put a premium on lack of character and punished simple 
human dignity with starvation.”412 The few, either visible or invisible, possibilities open 
to Jews were mostly undermined by the perceived necessity of assimilation.  
In the same line, as Arendt tried to illuminate the political failures of both Jews 
and non-Jews, in their multiple groups and individuals, and in their different regional and 
historical contexts, she also combined what I have been calling aspects of comprehension 
and judgement. Max Weber defined “empathic or appreciative accuracy”, in social 
analysis, as the search for evidences and elements of the “emotional context” in which 
certain actions occurred. To “understand” the meaning of pattern of behaviors, in this 
sense, requires taking into account subjective orientations, “emotional reactions”, and 
other “irrational” forces which inform empirical “social-actions” [‘Soziales Handeln’]. 
For Weber, most empirical “social-actions” fall in the border of meaningful and 
meaningless behaviors, between behaviors in which discernible levels of meaning coexist 
with “not fully understandable” experiences.413  
Still, Weber’s methodological foundations presupposed a certain passivity to the 
multiplicity of empirical forms. The diverse categories, and sub-categories, of sociology 
would approach (“understand” and “clarify”) causes414 of certain social intercourses and 
consequences. One may say that Arendt pursued a sort of “empathic accuracy” while 
rejecting the passivity of causal explanations, which tended to emphasize the necessity of 
certain social effects, taking thus as simply “understandable” processes that aggravated 
the oppression of Jews in Europe. Arendt’s analysis was political, not sociological. So, 
instead of presupposing a fixed, abstract proposition such as “Assimilation is wrong”, she 
worked on origins and on visible tendencies and examples of assimilation as they could 
be comprehended in the formation of a-political, un-democratic, and unjust historical 
configurations.  
More than this, Arendt tried to “destroy” what had been political destructible. In 
less extreme terms, she tried to un-hide possibilities and models undermined by the 
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generalized assimilation of Jews. In this line, Arendt stressed the predominance of 
patterns that led to assimilation, but she did it complaining - that the parvenu became 
more influent than the pariah, that rebellion came too late, that Zionism became only 
relevant in the aftermath of the destruction of European Jews, that some Jews opted to 
become revolutionaries as non-Jews etc. One could say that this late historical conscience 
is in accordance with a political thought that only contemplates and judges events when 
they are fully developed. Only when was too dark, a post-1945 owl could fly over the 
dust to grasp the meaning of that destruction. Arendt admitted this chronological vantage 
point. But the interesting point here is that some of Arendt’s critical remarks on 
assimilation were written down even before von Hindenburg’s indication of Hitler to the 
chancellery.415 So here the accusation of an easy judgement, and the questioning of 
someone “who was not there” and who knew the end of the story, miss the point, for 
Arendt, besides being there (she left Berlin in 1933), could intuit some of the destructive 
mechanisms of assimilation even before the final stages of Nazi extermination. That is 
why some readers spoke of Arendt, an author who obstinately refused theoretical 
predictability, as being sometimes strangely “prophetic”.416 
 
5.2 Enlightenment: the theoretical basis 
“What”, asked Peter Gay, “does Hume, who was a conservative, have in common 
with Condorcet, who was a democrat? Holbach, who ridiculed all religion, with Lessing, 
who practically tried to invent one? Diderot, who envied and despised antiquaries, with 
Gibbon, who admired and emulated them? Rousseau, who worshiped Plato, with 
Jefferson, who could not bring himself to finish the Republic?”417 When one speaks of 
Enlightenment, one may refer to a variety of ideas, authors, events that can be hardly 
reduced to a single significance. In order to avoid ambiguity, I will restrain myself to what 
Arendt said and wrote on this topic. This is basically the same orientation for authors with 
whom Arendt engaged. She normally avoided self-generated hypothesis, and almost all 
of her terms and ideas relied on her interpretation, and appropriation, of others authors 
and experiences. I will try to interpret Arendt’s points by comparing them to external 
sources, but my general concern here will be with reconstructing her arguments on the 
																																								 																				
415 For instances, two texts that I analyze in this section were written before 1933: ‘The Enlightenment and 
the Jewish Question’ [Aufklärung und Judenfrage] (1932) and ‘Rahel Varnhagen’ (mostly written in the 
period between 1930-33).  
416 Bernstein, R. ‘Hannah Arendt’s Zionism?’, in: Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, p. 195  
417 Gay, P. op. cit., p. x  
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topic of assimilation. I won’t discuss how accurate were Arendt’s Lessing, Herder, 
Mendelssohn etc., as I will try to understand what she, interpreting these authors, had to 
say about the topic of assimilation. 
What Arendt had to say, to being with: “The classic form in which the Jewish 
question was posed in the Enlightenment provides classic antisemitism its theoretical 
basis.”418 Arendt did not tell a story of a millenary anti-Judaism, neither did she emphasize 
a continuity of Jewish-hatred, as if hostility against Jews were an unchangeable 
metaphysical given. The Jewish question was precisely formulated during the 
Enlightenment, mostly by anti-religious authors, and in a period when the Church lost a 
considerable part of its political and spiritual dominance. Indeed, for someone seeing 
retrospectively, the destructiveness of modern anti-Semitism, and the complex attempts 
of “solving” the Jewish Question, from assimilation to extermination, could only be 
developed in a post-religious context. Arendt was schooled enough to know that modern 
anti-Semitism did not develop out of nothing. Religious Jewish-hatred had been an 
important element in Christian discourses and practices along centuries. But any 
reduction of the Judenfrage and of ideological anti-Semitism to middle ages myths would 
be misleading, both in terms of historical comprehension and political orientation.419 
Indeed, as I just mentioned, equality was one of the main elements in the debates 
of emancipation and assimilation, and equality was a product of the Enlightenment. Until 
the revolutionary affirmation of the rights of men, Europe had been organized within 
nonegalitarian frameworks, in which aristocratic lineages, religious orders, guilds and 
corporations, incipient classes, and a multiplicity of regional groups were regulated and 
governed by a complex monarchical-feudal system. Jews could be protected and tolerated 
as an economic caste, preserving an internal sense of being a world apart. In the new 
configuration of modern societies and modern states, the idea of equality could not 
tolerate parallel worlds: equalization, and social adaptation, replaced the role of external 
instrumentality as a condition for tolerance. Tolerance, grounded on the idea that all 
humans are equals, demanded a concrete actualization of equality. Tolerance, in this 
context, could only mean toleration between equals.  
In this new scenario, Jews were no longer tolerated on the basis of their inequality 
(as a specific caste), neither in accordance to old prejudices and discriminations (for 
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419 For a comparison between Jewish hatred and ideological antisemitism, see for instance Arendt, 
‘Antisemitism’, p. 70 
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instance, the Christian idea that Jews could be tolerated as second class citizens, being 
living “proofs” of the error of not accepting Christ). Jews were to be tolerated as equal 
human beings. This orientation took many theoretical and practical forms. According to 
Arendt, G. E. Lessing was one of the main articulators of the concept of tolerance in the 
Enlightenment. In his notorious play Nathan the Wise, Lessing established his terms for 
tolerance. Asked by the Sultan Saladin to explain which religion was true, Nathan (a “rich 
Jew”) told the fable of the rings. In the fable, a man of the east had received a ring “from 
a valued hand”. The ring had a “hidden virtue” of making someone beloved “of God and 
man”. The man kept the ring, and later promised to give it to each one of his three sons. 
In secret, he sent the ring to a jeweler, asking two exact copies of the original. The jeweler 
brought back three rings, so “the father’s eye could not distinguish which had been the 
model”. 
The father then gathered his sons, gave each one a ring and a blessing, and died. 
Each son had a ring, but “the true ring could no more be distinguished / Than now can – 
the true faith”. Although the father had shown and distributed equal respect to each son, 
without favoring one with the original ring, now each son “claims to be the lord o’ th’ 
house”. The three sons went to a judge, in order to decide which was the original ring, 
but the judge settled the impossibility of solving the question (“Am I to guess enigmas?”). 
The judge recommended forgetting truth (“None of your rings is true. The real ring / 
Perhaps is gone”), and embracing belief (“Let each believe his own the real ring”). By 
believing they held the real ring, the sons could love and beloved “With gentleness, 
benevolence, forbearance”.420 
Lessing’s fable of tolerance had several implications. First of all, he established 
the priority of people over cognitive truth and systematic dogmas. In Arendt’s words, 
“Man becomes more important than the truth”.421 The goal of human history is not to 
prove the validity of one religion over the others, but to spread the conscience that “all 
religious faiths are in the end merely different names for the same man.”422 Coexistence 
and tolerance depends on the abolishment of truth, so no son can claim dominance over 
the other. In Lessing’s words, “…the father choose no longer / To tolerate the one ring’s 
tyranny”.423 Religion becomes a subjective belief, not an objective, moral-political truth, 
																																								 																				
420 Lessing, G. E. Nathan the Wise. Mineola: Dover. 2015, pp. 50-59 
421 Arendt, ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question’, p. 4 
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and this implied a liberation from tyrannies built upon dogmas. It also meant the 
suppression of religious Jew-hatred for the sake of human equality. In essence, humanity 
was a single unity, so any religious development, instead of claiming exclusive 
conceptual validity, should point to moral perfection, and thus to tolerance and respect 
between the sons of a moralized, virtuous humanity. 
The argument that men are essentially equal could be also read in a different way, 
through the abolition of specific religious truths and the restoration of universal truths. 
As we will see soon, this was the framework adopted by Moses Mendelssohn. Jews, too, 
are human beings became a motto of Enlightenment’s equalization. The question was 
how this ideal was to be understood, and how would this equality be brought from idea 
to practice. In terms of historical contingence, Jews were visibly unequal, they had 
specific ceremonial laws, a different calendar, different historical and philosophical 
references, different economic occupations and social norms. How could they become 
“men”? Did it mean becoming “human” like their hosts? This paradox was reflected in 
the texts of many Enlightened philosophers, who could affirm in general a common 
ground for humanity, while at the same time despising the particular aspect that humanity 
took in the form of Jews – as in Kant’s anti-Jewish remarks, and in Voltaire’s defense of 
universal tolerance along his specific attack on Judaism and Jews.424 Abstractly, Jews 
																																								 																				
424 This is Judaism, according to Kant: a faith with no “essential connection” to Christianism, which only 
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Jews may have formed historically is explained by the participation of Jews in the human nature, and not 
as “an integral part of the legislation of Judaism.” Hostility towards Jews, according to Kant, is due to the 
essential anti-universality of Judaism: Jews are “hostile to all other people and hence treated with hostility 
by all of them.” Judaism resembles a “mechanical cult”; Christianism could only implement its revolution 
with a “total abandonment [völlige Verlassung] of the Judaism in which it originated”; the resemblance of 
early Christianism with Judaism was purely strategical (as “means of introducing a pure moral religion 
[reine moralische Religion] in place of an old cult [alten Kultus] which the people were much too well 
habituated”), and helped by external ethical theories, such as Greek ones; as a possible cause of the 
historical endurance of Jews as a distinct, non-assimilated, people, Kant offered the “stiffneckedness” 
[hartnäckigerweise] of a people who want to make its messiah a political, not a moral concept; Jewish 
books would be preserved “though not for the sake of religion, yet for scholarship”, as the history of the 
Jewish people falls back “to epochs of prehistory”; the Jews “refuse to recognize as a law anything that 
differs from theirs”. Kant compared Jewish assimilation and conversion to Christianity with an “euthanasia 
of Judaism”, from which would result only “pure moral religion”. Kant. I. ‘Religion within the Boundaries 
of Mere Reason’(pp. 154-187); ‘The conflict of the faculties’ (p. 273; 276). In: Religion and Rational 
Theology. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001. Kant, I. Die Religion Innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. Leipzig: Verlag Von Felix 
Meiner. 1950, pp. 139-153. According to Herder’s notes of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, Kant stated the 
following in a discussion of lying: “Every coward is a liar; Jews, for example, not only in business, but also 
in common life. It is hardest of all to judge Jews; they are cowards.” ‘Notes Taken by J. G. Herder’ In: 
Lectures on Ethics. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 2001, p. 27. Also, for an analysis of Kant’s definition of Judaism (as “universal hatred”, 
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could be equal, but they were not effectively equals. In this line, the Judentum was 
regarded, by most Enlightened men, as a collection of despicable practices and beliefs, 
and of debased individuals in the need for regeneration. 
Theoretical tolerance, hence, meant practical intolerance against the concrete 
forms of Judaism of that period. So the common saying – to the Jews as individuals, 
everything; to the Jews as a people, nothing – was derived from this paradoxical intolerant 
tolerance. Jews could actualize their “human” essence through an individual effort of 
personal formation and moralization. They could leave, as individuals, the particularity 
of the Judentum. So this movement towards their humanization would imply, 
simultaneously, the disintegration of a separate, distinct Jewish sociability. To be sure, 
there was no ethnic essentialism in this perspective. Jews could be regenerated, exactly 
because they were not fixed by biological or cultural predeterminations. But they could 
only be regenerated – that is, rescued to humanity - as individual human beings, not as a 
distinct group unadjusted to prevalent social standards and norms. 
According to Arendt, emancipation became not a political issue, but a project of 
social-education. With the presupposition of historical progress, humanity would be 
expected to dismantle its atavistic traditions, its oppressive institutions, and its backwards 
superstitions. Judaism, as a religion, was either source of anachronistic ideas and rituals, 
as it was the target of prejudices of other religious and traditional groups. Tolerance, as a 
social aim, was to be pursued by the means of personal education, or formation (Bildung). 
Human beings should be educated, and this was true specially for individual Jews, coming 
from a people haunted by ancient laws and dressing anachronistic clothes, also involved 
in degrading economic activities. So, especially for writers sympathetic to Jews, the 
Jewish question would be solved with education - of Jews into new virtues, manners, 
ideas, attitudes, and of non-Jews into new forms of tolerance.  
In Arendt’s regard, what must have been a political question – a question of 
struggling for rights and extending rights to an European people – became a matter of 
moral and educational preparation for rights. Jews should regenerate, through education, 
into moral individual beings as a condition for emancipation. The Jewish question, in this 
sense, was mostly reduced to the question if Jews could be educated or not, and under 
																																								 																				
opposed to the “universal love” of Christianism), see Rosenstock, B. Philosophy and The Jewish Question: 
Mendelssohn, Rosenzweig, and Beyond. New York: Fordham University Press, 2010, p. 191 
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which circumstances.425 A sort of “tutelary politics” (Erzihungspolitik) was conceived in 
accordance to this “contract of regeneration for rights”.426 Jews, in order to become full 
citizens, were expected to become – before or, in more “tolerant” proposals, after 
receiving rights – virtuous, rational, educated men, ready to enter respectable society. In 
this context, appears the exceptional Jew, the Jew of exceptional education who proves, 
by his own means, that, despite being born a Jew, he could behave as a cultivated man.  
To be sure, the exceptional-Jew is not exactly the non-Jewish-Jew of Isaac 
Deutscher, for the later transcends the boundaries of a Jewish community carrying an 
universal message to a larger public.427 Repressing his Jewishness within private spaces, 
or even within his mere subjectivity, Arendt’s exceptional Jew tried to prove to society 
that he could excel in liberal arts, professions and intellectual matters valued by that 
society. In this process, his potential rebellion was neutralized. The exceptional Jew could 
occupy private, economic and social spaces, but he had nothing to bring to political 
discussions. As Arendt indicated, this man who was and was not Jew wanted to prove to 
society that he could become a normal human being. He rarely thought of a political 
struggle to become a citizen.428 The fact that many Prussian Jews converted to 
Christianism after the edicts of emancipation in the beginning of the 19th century, and the 
fact that they were mostly wealthy Jews, proved to Arendt that there was an attempt to 
“escape from emancipation” via baptism and assimilation in general.429 Assimilation, in 
this sense, implied depoliticization. This tendency was only aggravated when a romantic 
cult of self-made personalities was added to the framework of individual education and 
Bildung. The individual path implied an escape from communal life – mostly centered in 
the Jewish family – into a self-oriented project of personal cultivation: “…individual Jews 
became pre-occupied only with the development of their personality and their ‘education 
sentimentale’”.430 
This unpolitical feature of assimilation was reinforced by its de-historicizing 
orientation. Jews were expected to detach themselves from their specific historic 
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conditions, their distinct traditions, their collective memories and cultural milieus, 
jumping from there into the abstract model of the prevalent Bildung.  Besides 
presupposing an immediate obliteration of Jewish identities, this movement would 
deplete the particular circumstances in which the Jewish question could be politically 
approached. In this context, the endurance of anti-Semitism could be explained by the 
failure of Jews in educating themselves, but it could not be tackled by political means like 
the admission of public Jewish voices and the grant of stable rights to the Jewish 
community. Jews needed to be educated in order to efface anti-Semitism (so anti-Semites 
were exculpated from their prejudices as long as Jews were still “degenerated”). The 
phenomenon of anti-Semitism, instead of being imputed to anti-Semites, was so ascribed 
to the backwards, non-educated Jews. 
According to Arendt, Herder was one of the few thinkers who avoided the abstract 
model of equality, with its reduction of difference into private beliefs, and its 
presupposition of a common model for the “formation” of humanity. Defending the 
uniqueness of groups and individuals, Herder defended that no project of tolerance could 
rely on a complete identification between men. Proposing that the “real differentiation 
among men is more important than their ‘virtual’ sameness”, the German thinker 
appreciated the historical dimension of the Jewish question, recommending thus, 
according to Arendt, the political task “to incorporate another nation within Germany”.431 
The Judenfrage, in this sense, turned into a political demand for recognizing a historical 
people. Political comprehension would arise within the public sphere, through the 
exercise of rights, suffrage, and political mediation, in which German-speaking-Jews 
could share a space with other German peoples and groups. This demand, in these terms, 
was never seriously appreciated.         
  
5.3 Assimilation as Ambivalence: the case of Moses Mendelssohn 
 The year of 1743 changed the paradigm for Jewish integration in Europe. In that 
year, Moses Mendelssohn walked during five or six days the distance of one hundred 
miles from Dessau, his former town, to Berlin. He was 14 years old, “frail and sickly”, 
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 - 120 - 
and extremely poor. The boy was interrogated in the Rosenthaler Tor, the gate through 
which cattle and Jews could enter Berlin. At that time, only a few Jewish families lived 
in the city. They were mostly useful-protected Jews [Schutzjuden], wealthy family 
members paying special taxes and fulfilling specific economic functions. Mendelssohn 
was accepted within the walls of Berlin, because his former teacher was then the chief 
rabbi of the local Jewish community.432 As he was protected by exceptionally useful Jews, 
Mendelssohn could enter the city to become the paradigmatic exceptionally educated Jew. 
In Arendt’s terms, the “privilege” of being tolerated was enlarged to receive a “new type 
of excepted Jew”: not the Jew of money, but that of “culture and education”.433 
 The ascension of Mendelssohn was impressive. While living in the rabbinic 
seminar, he studied – hidden, since no secular books were allowed – German, Latin, 
Greek, French, and science, logic, mathematics, philosophy. With the help of a few 
learned Jewish and Huguenot friends, Mendelssohn came to discover Leibniz and 
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, reading both works in Latin. As soon 
as he was accepted as a tutor of a wealthy Jewish family, he could buy his first books, 
and from then he extended his range of readings to Spinoza, Plato, Cicero, Montesquieu, 
Rousseau, and also to English and Italian literature. Self-taught, since he never attended 
an academic seminar and never received formal secular instruction, Mendelssohn would 
start to publish articles, essays (he won a competition on the topic of metaphysics, leaving 
Kant only with a mention of honor), until he achieved intellectual fame with the 
publication Phaidon (1767). Becoming the “German Socrates” or the “Socrates of 
Berlin”, Mendelssohn was nominated to the Prussian Academy of Science. As the 
nomination was refused by Fredrick II (likely because of his Jewish origin), Mendelssohn 
said he preferred “to be honored by an academy and vetoed by a kind than the other way 
around”.434 Mendelssohn’s prestige kept growing. 
 The first significance of Mendelssohn’s story is that he was taken as a proof, a 
living proof, that Jews could be “educated” and “formed”. They could learn to think as 
philosophers, to write as German literates, and to behave as virtuous, rational men. 
Mendelssohn proved that mobility, formation, and transformation were indeed possible – 
they weren’t empty ideals. A Jew, or someone coming from a Jewish background, could 
display human Tugenden. He became admired not only as an exceptional philosopher and 
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thinker, but as a Jew who managed to become a philosopher, and a prudent man, a sort of 
modern Aristotelian phronimos who could write in Hebrew and speak with leading 
German intellectuals in equal terms (friend of Lessing, he was the inspiration for the 
character of Nathan the Wise). The framework of the Enlightenment had found its figure 
and its story: coming from the country side of Germany, being born as a Jew years before 
the proclamation of the rights of men, having spent days after days eating only a piece of 
bread, Mendelssohn, relying mostly on his capacities and his intellect, had reshaped his 
destiny as an unparalleled self-made man, as we would call it today. 
 Moreover, Mendelssohn was not only taken as an exemplary success of the 
Aufklärung. He embraced and developed the project theoretically. In broad terms, he did 
not abolish truth in favor of men, as Lessing did, but he unified men under the eternity 
and universality of rational truths. Relying on a classic philosophical model, Mendelssohn 
argued for the natural rights of men, which could be rationally grasped by every human 
being. In the same line, practical rationality was accessible to every individual, who could 
shape his own nature in order to become a virtuous and wise man. Human perfection was 
not a historical project, but an individual task. According to Arendt, Mendelssohn 
detached reason from history, thus prescribing subjective introspection as a way of 
grasping intellectual truths and practical virtuous.435 Self-perfection, not political struggle, 
was the key to solve the Jewish question. The concrete differences between Jews and 
Christians, as the specific ceremonies, dialects, clothes, and superstitions which 
differentiated Jews, even internally, were to be explained as contingent, historical 
manifestations of human diversity. Some of these contingent practices and traditions 
could delay, and even undermine, human formation. But, in principle, no man was 
condemned to remain uncultured. 
 Individually, Jews and Christians could be equally debased, as one could find 
individual Jews and Christians equally virtuous. This difference was due to contingent, 
individual choices and circumstances. In essence, there was no difference between men. 
The same was true for the essential similarity of Judaism and Christianism as systems of 
belief: in essence, they could be reduced to the rational principles of “natural religion”. 
Jewish rituals and symbols were simply historical phenomena related to chronological 
circumstances and empirical representations, which remained in the field of accidents. 
Jewish law, differently, was eternal, and compatible with human reason. This dualism 
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was not restrained to Mendelssohn’s theory. He lived in two, perhaps three different but 
simultaneous worlds: the “universal” world of German philosophy and literature, the 
“particular” world of Jewish law, studies, and interpretation, and the “practical” world of 
business (he became a bookkeeper) and family tasks. Even though Mendelssohn could 
integrate these different worlds in an honorable way, achieving respectability in every 
field, the paradoxes of Jewish emancipation were reflected in his life, his work, and his 
legacy. 
 In this sense, he can be said truly exemplary of the years of emancipation-
assimilation, as Arendt attributed ambiguity as a characteristic of this process.436 Through 
his exceptional intellect and gifts, Mendelssohn tried to prove his and other Jews’ 
normalcy. Admitting the historical specificity of the oppressive conditions under which 
Jews were kept - “They bind our hands and rebuke us that we do not use them”437 -, he 
nevertheless abstracted the plea for rights to a matter of reason (as every man was 
“naturally” entitled to universal rights). His unsolvable dualism soon turned against him 
as a challenge, an insulting challenge made by his friend Lavater: why did he insist in 
keeping Jewish tradition, that is, Jewish particularity, if human rationality prescribed an 
universal set of virtues equal to all? Why did he not become a man like most of normal 
European men, that is, why did he not become Christian? When Lavater provoked him to 
either refute Christianism, or to immediately convert (as Socrates would do if he 
recognized the truth)438, Mendelssohn despised being involved in a situation typical of 
medieval disputes.439 He did not want to be forced into an open religious fight in the time 
of toleration. His only struggle was to, orderly and respectably, perfect himself and help 
to reform his people (he preferred that a non-Jew defended Jewish emancipation, and 
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celebrated the fact that no one could defend the rights of man without defending 
simultaneously the rights of Jews).440 
 Mendelssohn was no rebel, but he was neither a coward. When he experienced 
social insult, even if a veiled insult, he reacted. The controversy with Lavater initiated a 
gradual, theoretical answer to the problem of dualism. As when Mendelssohn did not 
want to beg to Fredrick II for the right of “protected” (he did not want to beg for “natural 
rights”), he did not want to propose an open critique of Christianism, for specific religious 
dogmas were to be finally protected as beliefs of subjective freedom.441 But his dignity 
impelled him to answer to Lavater – “I declare myself a Jew. I shall always remain a 
Jew”442 -, formulating a series of arguments that would culminate in his Jerusalem, or on 
Religious Power and Judaism (Jerusalem, oder über religiöse Mahct und Judentum, 
1783).443 Mendelssohn recognized the need for Jewish regeneration, as contemporary 
Judaism had decayed into meaningless, particularistic rituals and symbols, which had but 
little in common with the original rationality of Mosaic legislation.  
However, this historical decay of Judaism would not prove the superiority of 
Christianity. And, here, Mendelssohn’s counter-argument was fueled with a – restrained 
and educated – pariah’s indignation. Inverting the logic of arguments formulated by 
several German thinkers from Kant to Hegel, which had been ascribing to Judaism a 
deficit of rationality (if not sheer irrationality), Mendelssohn stated the opposite: Judaism, 
taken in its essential formulations, is much closer to pure rationality than it is 
Christianism. Jewish legislation does not depend on dogmas (such as the Trinity), and 
does not contradict fundaments of monotheism (as the eternity and infinity of God, and 
the forbiddance of idolatry), which Christians explicitly do with the theory of the divinity 
of a finite human being, who never reclaimed himself to be God. Jesus, for Mendelssohn, 
was a moral example, but in no way a divinity.444 Moreover, if Judaism was to fall, this 
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would imply the destruction of the basis upon which the house of Christianity had been 
built. Both religions would collapse together.445 
This was the closer Mendelssohn got to a rebellion – it was, in fact, an impressive 
theoretical rebellion, given the conditions of his time. But, as it could not succeed 
philosophically, it could be neither translated into a specific program for political 
mobilization. Mendelssohn tried to solve the problem of dualism (the universality of 
reason and the particularity of religions) affirming the dignity of Judaism (closer to 
universality than no other religion), but his political contract prescribed a secular state in 
which either Jewish and Christian beliefs were to be contained only in the conscience, 
while Jews and Christians would behave as virtuous men in the public sphere. Be a man 
in the streets, and a Jew at home, the assimilationist motto, was interpreted as a call for 
Jews to become citizens of “Mosaic persuasion”, “Israelites”, Germans of “Jewish 
belief”, that is, to conceal their Jewish identity as mere private experiences. 
 Mendelssohn, who Arendt described as “an extraordinary and unique individual”, 
who did not break his connection with the Jewish masses, and “did not consider himself 
an exception”, formulated a powerful program of social reform and education. According 
to Arendt, he knew that “the extraordinary esteem given to his person only corresponded 
to the extraordinary contempt in which his people were held.”446 Conscious of this, he 
worked to bridge distant worlds: he translated the Torah to German (whose editions were 
burnt by zealot, orthodox rabbis), he defended the study of Jewish law and secular 
disciplines, the learning of Hebrew and German, and the renunciation of certain 
ceremonies, rituals and dresses, in favor of a modern, regenerated Jewish identity. But 
“Mendelssohn himself never took any interest in the political battles of his time, not even 
in the fight for Jewish emancipation”.447 Involuntarily, Mendelssohn provided arguments 
for that typical Prussian “alliance of the Aufklärung and state absolutism”.448 Jews would 
not enter politics. Instead, politics (that is, State’s tutelage) would enter the Jewish world, 
in order to educate, cultivate, domesticate Jews until their normalization.  
The argument of regeneration prescribed at least two difficult, if not impossible 
tasks: the repression of Jewish identity into a private or subjective data; and the 
“acculturation” of millions of individuals coming from distinct regions, traditions, social 
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446 Arendt, ‘Privileged Jews’, p. 16 
447 Ibid., p. 17 
448 Sorkin, op. cit., p. 25 
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groups. Taken to its extreme consequences, it implicitly recommended, as Arendt recalled 
ironically, do as Mendelssohn did, become a genius!449 This model of acculturation had 
its consequences: it neutralized the political energy of an oppressed people (“This new 
freedom of reason, of formation, of thinking for oneself, does not change the world at 
all.”)450; it removed this people from its historical grounds (as would any other people 
subjected to an universalistic receipt of Bildung); it associated distinct Jewish identities 
with in-human/a-social qualities, so denying, for the sake of human tolerance, the specific 
human shapes of the Judentum. Jews could not be emancipated as Jews.  
To be sure, Mendelssohn was not responsible for the whole extension and 
implications of this model. He provided an honorable example of someone trying to solve 
the paradoxes of the Jewish question as it was formulated by the Enlightenment. He 
founded the tradition of reformation, which intended to preserve essential attributes of 
Judaism while discarding elements unfitted to new epochs. Mendelssohn was what is 
called today an hybrid figure, who could cross communitarian borders, learning from 
different traditions, and opening himself through dialogue to different arguments, views 
and different forms of human communication.451 But, by becoming a respected member 
of a society that disrespected Jewish history; by becoming “protected” by a king who had 
ignored him, and who had kept his wife and children as unprotected (with no rights) until 
his death; by educating himself and discussing openly and politely with a few companion 
in private circles, while avoiding political controversies; and by trying to solve the 
particular unfavorable conditions of European Jews with universal philosophy and 
abstract morality, Mendelssohn, through his brilliant biography, left an ambiguous legacy 
for the process of assimilation-emancipation.452 
																																								 																				
449 Also, commenting the induction from Mendelssohn’s exceptional path to a general model of 
emancipation: “Thus Moses Mendelssohn had been able to assimilate to his alien surroundings without 
abandoning his Judaism. He needed only to lay aside old ‘prejudices’ in a highly deceptive present, and 
learn thinking. It was still possible for him to believe that his course should serve as a model, that it was 
not the accidental destiny of an individual.” Arendt, RV, p. 104 
450 Arendt, ‘The Enlightenment…’, p. 8 
451 In his biography, Salomon Maimon recalled how Mendelssohn practiced a spontaneous tolerance and 
openness in relation to his interlocutors: “Jews newly arrived from Poland, whose thoughts are for the most 
part confused, and whose language is an unintelligible jargon, Mendelssohn could understand perfectly. In 
his conversations with them he adopted their expressions and forms of speech, sought to bring down his 
mode of thinking to theirs, and thus to raise theirs to his own”; and: “He understood also the art of finding 
out the good side of every man and every event”. Maimon, S. An Autobiography. Montreal: Dawson 
Brothers. 1888, p. 224  
452 For Sorkin, “[b]ecause Mendelssohn used radical means to achieve the conservative end of sustaining 
his dualism, he left an ambiguous legacy.” Sorkin, op. cit., 72 
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“A radical reformer in the guise of a conservative”453, Mendelssohn answered to 
the paradoxes of his epoch in a truly unique way – so his example could not be established 
as an effective, general model. His most famous disciple, David Friedländer, soon 
abandoned the argument of natural rights, moving back to the argument of utility, as he 
presented in his third petition for rights to the Prussian king, in 1790:  
“Not with empty declamations, not with appeals to the rights of man, have we 
importuned our beloved sovereign, but with the humble plea that through the amelioration 
of our civil relations, new potential can be imparted to the unused energies of true, 
industrious subjects who, obligated by gratitude, might assist in the prosperity and well-
being of the state.”(emphasis added)454  
 
In Arendt’s words, Friedländer “openly contradicted” Mendelssohn’s 
recommendation of adaptation to external law and preservation of Jewish law (“Bear both 
burdens as best you can”), when he proposed the infamous baptism of Jews for “public 
integration into society”.455 The proposal was rejected by the Protestant provost of Berlin, 
as it had been taken as a humiliation by most local Jews. A Jewish historian called 
Friedländer an “ape”, and Heine later joked that Friedländer tried to “cure a ‘skin abscess’ 
by a ‘bloodletting’”.456 Notwithstanding the embarrassment caused by Friedländer’s “dry 
baptism” proposal (it asked for the exemption of the necessity of recognizing the divinity 
of Jesus), the path of discretion, of concealment of Jewish identity, of gradual imitation 
of prevalent norms set the tone of assimilation. The ceremonies of Reform Synagogues, 
animated by organs, avoiding any mention to specific Jewish words, became gradually 
more “universal”, that is, more similar to Christian ceremonies. The sons of Mendelssohn 
became quasi-secular, assimilated Jews, and her daughters converted to Christianity. His 
grandson, born Jakob Mendelssohn, would later become the composer Felix Mendelssohn 
Bartholdy, author of one version of Ave Maria.    
 
5.4 Salomon Maimon: the skeptical pariah 
A different pariah-path was taken by Salomon Maimon. Born in a Lithuanian 
small village from an impoverished Jewish family, Maimon, due to an arrangement of his 
father, married at the age of 13, and became father at 14. His intellectual power, and his 
acute drive for knowledge, inquiry, and his unconstrained imagination, led him to stood 
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out in centers of rabbinic studies in Poland. He soon mastered principles of the Kabballah, 
gaining notoriety in the emerging centers of Hassidism, and learning to think and argue 
in accordance to the Talmudic tradition. Maimon rapidly reached the limits of religious 
wisdom, and so he described as being in a “dark” atmosphere from where he needed to 
escape in his drive for truth and light. He left his family, and tried to be accepted in Berlin, 
the center of Jewish Enlightenment and European culture. He only managed to enter 
Berlin in his second attempt. In the first one, he was expelled by a Jewish guard for 
carrying Maimonides’ The Guide for the Perplexed, a dangerous book according to the 
local Jewish authorities. 
Maimon impressed the acculturated Jews of Berlin, but remained a strange pariah 
among educated-pariahs, an Ostjude speaking an irregular German, with unconventional 
gestures and a disconcerting frankness. Mendelssohn initially embraced him, even, as 
Maimon himself recalled, unimpressed by the fact that an Eastern Jew could read books 
of mathematics and immediately solve intricate problems. In that context, Maimon could 
be another striking example of a self-made exceptional Jew. He was exceptional, but he 
was too much of a pariah as well. Soon the bourgeois followers of Mendelssohn started 
to complain against Maimon’s iconoclastic reasoning. As his “skeptic rationalism” 
developed, and he did not conform to respectable living standards, Maimon, “the dark 
twin of Mendelssohn”457, was charged with “trying to spread dangerous opinions and 
systems”, not settling “any plan of life”, and being “addicted to sensual pleasures”.458 
Mendelssohn gave him a letter of reference, and asked him to leave Berlin. 
Maimon had appreciated Mendelssohn’s welcome, and admired his intellectual 
acuteness, his range of wisdom and knowledge, and his conciliatory humanity. (He did 
not admire Mendelssohn’s followers). But if Mendelssohn accepted the conditions for a 
Bildung, and avoided clashes with the dominant standards (and with the political 
configuration) of his time, Maimon could not do it – because of his restless temperament, 
his unbounded quest for knowledge and experience, his absolute independence from 
group connections, material objectives, social relations. Maimon indeed suggested that 
Mendelssohn’s difficult conciliation of different worlds – with his philosophical dualism 
– came for the sake of social peace, but with the price of intellectual accommodation: 
“…how far a man may be inconsistent for the sake of human welfare”.459 Specific 
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religious traditions, for Maimon, could not be rationally sustained, not by an 
uncompromised philosopher. After leaving Berlin, Maimon was hosted in a Jewish house 
in Hamburg, where he refused “to say prayers which [he] regarded as a result of an 
anthropomorphic system of theology”.460 Some of the guests asked the house owner to 
expel Maimon immediately.  
In his wandering through Poland, Prussia (he went four times to Berlin), 
Netherlands, Maimon never broke with his bohemian, erratic lifestyle – he engaged in 
intellectual debates, taught in secular seminaries, contemplated suicide, and never 
established a permanent address. Having criticized Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 
regarded him as one of his best critics), he embraced a strange combination of Spinozism 
with Hume, a sort of dogmatic rational substantialism with empirical skepticism, finding 
no compromise between the two levels, and leading, practically, a life that he consciously 
assumed as Epicurean. Concerning the Jewish question, Maimon also held, 
simultaneously, radical Enlightened presuppositions – as the substitution of religious 
particularism by a rational, universal morality as a way of improving human relations – 
with a stubborn pariah-pride of his uniqueness.  
He finally decided to be baptized, so not to starve (“I had learnt no particular 
profession, I had not distinguished myself in any special science, I was not even master 
of any language in which I could make myself perfectly intelligible.”).461 But his request 
was written in his own terms. It was not plea for integration, no justification of utility, no 
reverence to a “most merciful” king (as Mendelssohn had to address Fredrick II) – it was, 
in fact, almost a request to not be accepted. Maimon started his letter to a priest of 
Hamburg declaring that, “The Jewish religion, it is true, comes, in its article of faith, 
nearer to reason than Christianity.” But, as he conceded that Christianism was more 
effective in practical terms, and he accepted moral perfection as a human objective, he 
would agree with the “practical use” of the new religion – not, however, without affirming 
that, for him, the “mysteries of the Christian religion” were nothing more than “allegorical 
representations of the truths that are most important for man”. The priest replied that 
Maimon’s soul did not seem to truly embrace Christ, as he was “too much of a 
philosopher…to be able to become a Christian.” Apparently satisfied with the outcome 
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(the story was told by Maimon himself), he declared: “I must therefore remain what I am 
– a stiffnecked Jew”.462   
For Arendt, the paradoxes of the Jewish question were lived by Maimon through 
his exceptional fame and his exceptional misery. Maimon could only have lived that 
existential and intellectual adventure as a Jew. But also his miserable death, perishing, 
finally divorced, as a 46 years old, alcoholic man, hosted in a noble’s castle, could only 
be explained by his pariah condition. “If a Polish non-Jew could have succeeded at all in 
becoming a well-known commentator of Kant he would have died, not in the castle of a 
count but probably as a full professor with bourgeois status and leaving a small 
fortune.”463 Also ambiguously, Maimon established his unique conditions for life, and for 
his own destruction, avoiding any permanent engagement with social structures and 
cultural norms464; but he simultaneously seemed to have nurtured the dearest of 
Enlightenment’s expectations: that the abolition of religion and tradition would put an 
end to oppression.  
Remaining a “stiffnecked Jew”, he nevertheless celebrated the threat that 
Enlightened philosophies would put to the “rabbinical despotism”. He believed that, with 
a sharp criticism of the Jewish “theocracy”, with the “spread of light and truth”, the 
“national existence” of Jews would be abolished.465 He was wrong. Jewish existence was 
not merely a matter of “religious law”, and the Jewish question would outlast the decline 
of theological beliefs. Self-declared a skeptic, Maimon was also a believer – in his very 
own way - in the Enlightenment’s promise of regeneration, of acculturation, and 
liberation. But, having experiencing social dissimulation, having understood that 
acculturation also implied adaptation and conformity, Salomon Maimon collapsed his 
own traditions, and dared to know his individual truth, performing an erratic search for 
authenticity, a search to be recalled as a fascinating biography, but still a painful, 
politically inactive, and self-destructive biography. Since Arendt hardly expected the 
pariah to be a model of perfection, a model purely designed to specific political effects, 
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Salomon Maimon, even though rarely discussed by her at length, was undeniably a pariah 
in the outset of the age of assimilation. 
 
5.5 Rahel Levin-Varnhagen: between self-creation and fate 
Along with the article The Jew as a Pariah: a hidden tradition, and other essays 
on Jewish affairs, Arendt’s biography on Rahel Levin-Varnhagen is one of the main 
documents of her search for the meaning of the pariah, the parvenu, and assimilation. 
There, one also hears an echo of Arendt’s late topics – as the force of given life-
conditions, the tension between uniqueness and society, and the problems of 
introspection. The ambivalences of assimilation, and of Arendt’s thoughts on 
assimilation, also appear in the text in full colors. Arendt identified with Rahel Varnhagen 
(actually, she insisted that her biographed was more justly designated by her first, pre-
marriage name, Rahel Levin).466 Arendt even famously stated that she would tell Rahel’s 
story “as she herself might have told it”.467 To be sure, this was not exactly a 
historiographic arrogance: Arendt tried not to over-explain her subject imposing it 
speculations from outside. She wanted to let Rahel speaks though her letters, through her 
own words, thoughts and memories.  
Moreover, Arendt tried to de-assimilate Rahel, as she accused Rahel’s husband, 
the diplomat Karl August Varnhagen, of having tried, by his editions of her letters, “to 
make Rahel’s associations and circle of friends appear less Jewish and more aristocratic, 
and to show Rahel herself in a more conventional light, one more in keeping with the 
taste of the times.”468 Arendt wanted to reestablish a defining life-conditon of Rahel, her 
Jewishness, meaning both her complex relation with a existent Jewish community 
(Judentum) and with her own being-Jew (Judesein).469 Rahel had suffered what, according 
to Arendt, several Jewish pariahs had suffered in the hands of non-Jewish interpreters and 
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historians: an assimilation of their own stories, and an depletion of existential conditions 
which had defined their external and inner paths. Rahel had defined herself as a “fugitive 
from Egypt and Palestine” lying in a deathbed in Berlin, when she famously declared that 
the condition she refused for years had been the center of her experience: “having been 
born a Jewess [eine Jüdin geboren zu sein] – this I should on no account now wish to 
have missed.”470 It was Rahel Levin herself, Arendt told us, who asked to be de-
assimilated. 
But the Jewish condition did not come as an easy data of life. Indeed, in Rahel’s 
portrait, Arendt stressed the fluctuant ambivalence of assimilation, as Rahel went from a 
shlemihl (unlucky person, “who has anticipated nothing”)471 to a parvenu, and by trying 
to sustain her identity as a parvenu, she finally realized that the pariah condition was 
inextricable. So, the ambiguity of assimilation relativized the borders between social-
escalation and individual rebellion: Arendt did not propose a fixed social or 
anthropological typology. She described, and conceptualized, personal attitudes, indeed 
very contrasting attitudes, never losing sight of the non-deterministic potentialities 
inherent to the situation of oppressed peoples and misfit individuals. In fact, Hannah 
Arendt affirmed that pariah-parvenu are not even exclusively Jewish types (although she 
mostly wrote of Jewish examples), being models of adaptation and rebellion verifiable 
among excluded groups elsewhere.472  
Arendt was also ambivalent in defining the reach of Rahel’s story: she did not 
want to lose her particularity as a mere allegory of a larger European-Jewish history, but 
she emphasized that Rahel’s story, though chronologically starting in Berlin in 1771, had 
“already begun seventeen hundred years earlier in Jerusalem.”473 So, by not managing to 
escape her Jewish condition, and by living the pains and troubles of what this condition 
meant in German states in early 19th century, her “whole life had become a segment of 
Jewish history in Germany”.474  Only as “a Jew and a pariah”, Rahel had found “a place 
in the history of European humanity”.475 To this, Arendt added: also as a woman, for she 
experienced the “Woman Problem” (“the discrepancy between what men expected of 
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women ‘in general’ and what women could give or wanted in their turn”)476 before it 
became a primary topic of political and social debates. Living a life of adaptation to roles 
or living it in her own terms, that was a lasting question in Rahel’s trajectory. 
As a symbol of Rahel’s question, stood her salon in Berlin. Salons organized by 
Jewish women became spaces of “mixed society” when Prussia seemed to originate new 
forms of social intercourse. Brendel Mendelssohn (Moses Mendelssohn’s daughter), later 
married to Schlegel (becoming then Dorothea Schlegel), hosted one of these salons. 
Rahel’s salon, however, stood out as an association “outside society and its 
conventions”.477 There, one was judged solely on the merits of his or her personality. 
Rank, money, fame played no role in the evaluation of its members (although princes as 
Louis Ferdinand, rich bankers as Abraham Mendelssohn, famous writers and poets as 
Gentz and Schlegel, and notorious politicians as W. von Humboldt shared that space). 
Rahel’s salon was “naively undenominational”. Jews and non-Jews had tee and discussed 
literature, philosophy, spirituality, and also intimacy – the combination of mixed social, 
professional and ethnic backgrounds only counted if integrated into unique personalities, 
cultivated in the different strands of what European culture had to offer at that historical 
point.478  
A “society outside society”, Rahel salon’s political significance was discussed by 
Arendt’s readers. Benhabib took it as feminine political alternative to the masculine 
model of the Athenian assembly, as “a space of sociability in which the individual desire 
for difference and distinctness could assume an intersubjective reality.”479 For admitting 
members regardless their social position, and for being a reflexive and intimate space 
organized by women, it could be counted as an alternative both to social exclusion, and 
to the masculine, war-oriented elitism of ancient Greek politics. Villa rejected this 
proposal, since the salons “were nearly as exclusionary as the Athenian assembly”; one 
could only enter the salon if he or she shared “the intellectual, social, and romantic 
temperament of the group”.480 In my view, Rahel’s salon stood as a pre-political social 
space – not as a simple association of “like attracting like”, and not as a political space (it 
really lacked openness and equality, as Villa noted, and it also demanded a shared 
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examination and exploration of private life). Still, it was a subversive experience, in 
which individuals could experience freedom from social-norms and freedom for 
interaction with peers. It was nonetheless a social experience, as it “represented a short 
period of flowering German-Jewish social relations”, coincident with a growing number 
of mixed marriages.481 
This social dimension is important to understand what accompanies Arendt’s 
appreciation of Rahel: her criticism of Rahel. Arendt held that Rahel was unsuited to 
political action: “she could neither choose nor act”, only let “life rain upon” her, showing 
no appreciation of public and historical conditions, and no real engagement with these 
political realities (“Facts mean nothing at all to me”)482. When she decided, she decided 
to “live life as if it were a work of art”483, relying on what Arendt regarded as a romantic 
illusion (“the great error” of romanticism, to be precise): the possibility of creating one’s 
own personality, of reinventing oneself in accordance to a supposed authentic inwardness, 
or, worst, in accordance to social standards. “Like all parvenus, she never dreamed of a 
radical alteration of bad conditions”, so she decided to change only herself.484 Here Rahel 
begun a “violent mania for social-climbing”.485 
Rahel’s assimilation, in Arendt’s exposition, touched the main aspects of the 
Jewish story of adaptation in Europe. Rahel believed that “only understanding despots 
can help us [Jews]”, and celebrated that a people who had been only robbed could be at 
least used as instruments and source of money – a tribute to court and financier Jews.486 
She also accepted the illusion of self-cultivation as a way of reversing prejudices, and 
showing to a society dominated by the values of nobility that ex-Jews could achieved 
privileged positions, not by birth-lineage, but “for themselves by their own powers”.487 
Assimilating to dominant religious and class German traditions, to which historical anti-
Semitism had been mixed, she also assimilated to established prejudices, coming to play 
for a while that “sport of good society, the ‘modern hatred of Jews’” (she referred once 
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to the Jews as “this…deservedly despised nation”).488 She became, as a parvenu, ready to 
adapt tastes, desires, life489, believing that the easiest escape from political oppression and 
social insult was through a whole redesign of one’s identity. This parvenu drive for 
assimilation can be perceived by the parvenu himself as a voluntarist performance of self-
creation and self-imagination. However, for Arendt, the process only reveals the parvenu 
(the ex-pariah) state of domination, for her self-creation is nothing but a self-
domestication, a conformation to the prevalent social forms:   
“Those who are resolutely determined to rise, to ‘arrive’, must early accustom 
themselves to anticipating the stage they hope to attain by simulating voluntary 
appreciation; must early set their sights higher than the blind obedience, which is all that 
is demanded of them; must always act as if they were performing freely, and as their own 
masters, the things that are in any case expected of hirelings and subordinates. This fraud 
seldom has any direct influence upon their careers, but it is of the greatest value for social 
successes and for positions in society. By this fraud the pariah prepares society to accept 
his career as a parvenu.”490 
 
Rahel’s career into “social fraud”, into wearing a “social dress”, and abandoning 
her “truth”, resulted in an escalation towards “rank, marriage, change of name…the 
illusion of a native place.”491 In a completely artificial move, she had risen to a position 
in the “natural” society of her environment, as a baptized, respectable woman, now with 
access to the “understanding despots”, for she was married to a diplomat – who, in 
Arendt’s analysis, came as a political coward, a man whose diplomatic missions were 
conceived to achieve nothing but a compliment or a decoration from his superiors. For 
Karl Varnhagen, literature and politics were only “instruments for social 
advancement”.492 He also demanded his wife’s adaptation to social respectability, which 
implied, most significantly, Rahel’s abandonment of old friendships, specially of those 
“disrespectful” women, as Pauline Wiesel.  
But here came the turning point in Rahel’s social escalation. “I cannot”, Rahel 
wrote, “sin and lie along with it [society]”. A sudden reverse-transformation occurred 
when Rahel had finished her transformation into a respectable woman. One cannot escape 
Jewishness [Judentum] was the final chapter of Rahel’s biography, the chapter in which 
Arendt analyzed a typical pariah-backlash. When Rahel reached her social “goal”, she 
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rebelled.493 She became a parvenu, but could not avoid thinking, feeling, expressing as a 
pariah. She rebelled against the woman-function: “…now I have to behave toward people 
as if I were nothing more than my husband; in the past I was nothing, and that is a great 
deal.”494 It is better to be nothing than fulfilling a role. It is better to go unnoticed, to 
remain invisible to society, than to fake reactions, to behave respectably, to suppress 
emotions and opinions so not to defy conventions. Rahel compared her assimilated life to 
that of “a poor worker who loses himself in the operations of life all week long and 
perhaps on Sunday can come close to its real essence.”495 
Rahel’s Sunday came late. She was married, socialized, baptized, and she was also 
becoming older, and her origins, her youthful years, her time of spontaneous and free 
thoughts, affairs, friendships had past. So her return to pariahdom was firstly an imagined 
return to a lost condition. As an act of rebellion, she resumed her friendship with the 
“disrespectful” Pauline (which had remained unmarried, outside society). She recovered 
the disinterested contemplation of those “true realities”, of those objects, experiences, and 
faces outside social connections and orientations: “a tree, a ride, a smell, a smile”. This 
rediscovery of humanity, or this longing for a humanity never found in social artificialism, 
was due to the pariah’s spontaneous lack of prejudice, of her almost unaware playful-
morality, which takes “too much consideration for a human face”, and lives by a 
“…gratitude, excessive attachment, [which] is the typical vice of the pariah, who feels 
obligated even by a casual word”. This pariah, by her experience, and by a combination 
of feelings, memories, and unforced principles, settles her own terms of relations with 
others, as Arendt noted with a bit of irony (towards those unending discussions on moral 
issues): 
“This sensitivity is an emotionally exaggerated understanding of the dignity of 
every human being, a passionate comprehension unknown to the privileged. In a society 
based upon privilege, pride of birth and arrogance of title, the pariah instinctively 
discovers human dignity in general long before Reason has made it the foundation of 
morality.”496 
 
The more Rahel tried to transform, the more she felt impelled back to her pariah 
condition. This movement was conditioned by external circumstances: the parvenu 
experiences social insult, for she is merely an arrivist, a recently-arrived, who is trying to 
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hide her non-noble origins. Becoming Varnhagen, Rahel was addressed by her former 
friend, Karoline Humboldt, as Sie, a formal reference that barely concealed the contempt 
for Rahel’s arrival (W. von Humboldt himself observed in a letter: ‘There is nothing the 
Jews cannot achieve’).497 The creation of a social character outside her “truth” turned out 
to be much more shameful than the “greatest shame” of being born a poor schlemihl and 
Jewess. Also, her pariah-backlash was determined by the external circumstances of facing 
other Jews, especially non-assimilated, non-Berliner Jews, to whom the parvenu felt, in 
contrast, like a “Grand Sultan”.498 A deluded parvenu would conclude that she is an 
instance of progress, that she is the first of a new generation of regenerated. A conscious 
pariah, as Rahel became, would acknowledge that there was more honor in those who 
stayed behind, who did not betray her people just for becoming the last-comer to society.  
This was another of the lost illusions of assimilation: that “Jewishness” (Judesein) 
could be regarded as a mere defect, as a personal bad trait to be extirpated through 
acculturation and education. Being-Jew became a personal question, depending on one’s 
ability to overcome or hide that “misery of birth”, like the “lame man’s too-short leg”.499 
But, as physical defects are hardly invisible, the existence of a differentiated people could 
not simply undone by the constructive-destructive mentality of assimilation. Rahel started 
then to fight for her “stolen” existence. One way of doing this was embracing her 
condition as a Jewess, thus accepting that she could not belong to a society which did not 
accept herself neither her “backwards” coreligionists. She came back by replacing the 
parvenu’s introjected anti-Semitism with a renewed philosemitic admiration, a renewed 
concern for that “…great, gifted nation that went far in the knowledge of God.”500 
Here, we can see how some elements of Arendt’s late political thought were 
explored, still in an non-categorical way, in Rahel’s biography. Rahel did not act 
politically – she did not “chose”, she did not care about facts, she wrote only letters 
(private documents), and she never thought of changing “bad conditions”. But she did 
change herself, she did produce a new identity, she became, in short, her own author. The 
first movement (politicization) would mean public appearance, and interaction with 
others. The second one (self-recreation) implies an exclusive concern with oneself, and 
placing oneself as a “work of art” in accordance to pre-established social forms/models. 
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Rahel thought it would be easier to change herself than to participate in a change of 
politics. For Arendt, the latter is indeed difficult: politics requires persuading others, 
beginning events that no one can control. But changing oneself, for Arendt, was actually 
more problematic – if not impossible. Firstly, because it entailed a deep moral-
psychological process of disintegration and depersonalization, in order to become the 
new, imagined person. This imagining and self-designing an identity that would fit to 
social expectations implies, per force, the loss of one’s unique existence (the loss of the 
condition “…of living as a distinct and unique being…”501). 
The conclusion seems quite simple: you only assimilate to be accepted. But this 
means that society does not accept your former self and, probably, won’t accept the 
falsification of your former self into the new one. Why would you want to be accepted by 
a society that does not accept you? In Rahel’s and Heine’s cases, as we saw, to not 
“starve”, to undo a “defect” that blocked social integration, to work and live in peace. But 
Arendt alerted that peace won’t come if one accedes to a an exclusionary society. This 
society will only grew stronger in its prejudices, in its longing for “equality”, in its 
intolerance to unequal and abnormal elements. By changing yourself in order to 
assimilate to a certain society, Arendt warned, you may nurture the social flaws of that 
society, which can turn later into political regulations. It’s not even that you don’t change 
society: you reinforce its prejudices, thus leaving unchecked and uncontested early forms 
of exclusion and dehumanization which can grow even stronger.     
Rahel tried to be the author of her new identity, but, as “nobody is the author or 
producer of his own life story”502, she felt trapped in a sort of social tragedy, in which the 
Jewish fate haunted her. This destiny was not only a matter of some Gods of Accident 
reappearing during the execution of her plans. It was a matter of a historical and social 
“destiny”, or, to interpret Arendt’s terms, of historical and social grounding-conditions of 
Rahel’s existence. Here, we must consider important distinctions and points in Arendt’s 
approach. Answering to Jaspers, whom had found Arendt’s characterization of Rahel’s 
Jewishness as too “fundamentalist” (Jaspers rather saw the Judesein as an “accidental” 
feature), Arendt introduced the distinction of “fatefulness”, as different from a 
“fundament” (or, one could say, an “essence”). She added that this “fatefulness arises 
from the very fact of ‘foundationlessness”, only occurring outside the idea of a fixed-
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deterministic Judaism.503 To understand this provisory distinction (Arendt herself 
admitted she was not wholly “conscious” of it while working in Rahel’s text), I propose 
to rely on Arendt’s “grounding-conditions”, which were precisely formulated, as I 
presented before, with the influence of Jasper’s limit-situations (Ch. 1). 
As I am arguing in this work, humans can deny limit-situations, as humans can try 
to undo grounding-conditions of life. Political organizations can, and normally do, deny 
the fact of plurality. Through intricate psychological mechanisms, people deny limit-
situations as, for instance, death and guilt. And some people can successfully assimilate 
to external social or ethnic identities, as they can even reshape their individual identities 
out of self-conceived images. There is no legal, moral, nor even an ontological barrier to 
assimilation or self-creation. But there are consequences. Arendt indicated personal-
psychological, socio-historical and political consequences of this early denial of plurality 
and uniqueness through assimilation.  
In this sense, embracing the “fatefulness” of certain individual-historical 
conditions is a matter of possibility; as, on the other hand, is it possible to deny 
systematically given-conditions by assimilation, suppression of memory, self-denial, 
reality-denial, rationalizations and conscious or unconscious forms of lie. Here we can 
appreciate this matter from a different angle. It is quite surprising that Arendt used 
seemingly cognitive and legal concepts to refer to Rahel’s career as a parvenu – 
“fraudulent self-identification”, “true realities”, “real essence”, “lie along with [society]”. 
These rigid terms, indeed, indicate a solution less complex than Arendt’s own view. She 
did not think of human beings as determined by “real essences”, which they must discover 
in order to fulfill their “real possibilities”. But the cognitivist-epistemological analogy 
can be further explored in its unexpectedness. A classic definition of truth is the 
correspondence between a worldly state-of-things and the intellect (or related subjective 
propositional/symbolic representations of this state-of-things). In this line, a 
psychological-subjective sense of falsehood could be felt or perceived by the detachment 
of the subjectivity from its external reality (Rahel’s conclusion that she could not “sin or 
lie” with society). This a romantic-subjective-inward criteria, which is nevertheless 
relevant, for Rahel adopted this standpoint. Moreover, a person can lie, in this sense. In 
Arendt’s political interpretation, lying is different from holding a rationally false 
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statement, for the latter can be refuted in logical terms. Saying that 2 + 2 = 5 or that a 
square is round, or that black is white is plainly false and ineffective. Its falsehood can 
be verified by self-evident criteria, so no one can be persuaded of its illogicality. A lie, 
differently, explore alternative possibilities of human existence; it denies portions of 
visible, living realities, whose truthfulness is not logical or self-evident, but dependent on 
human recognition and political establishment (“Poor reality, dependent upon human 
beings…”).504  
Rahel did not explicitly lie (or made a fraud) by using fake documents and living 
parallel lives. She, however, denied a series of life-conditions, or facts of life, trying to 
suppress them, in order to become a “new” person. She succeeded in creating a new 
persona: one of the capacities of lying, according to Arendt, is to generate real 
consequences. But the problem is how long one – person, social group, political 
community – can sustain its scheme of deceptions:  
“A person probably can defy a single fact by denying it, but not that totality of 
facts which we call the world.”505 
 
The “totality of facts” is incompatible with the parvenu belief that she can 
fabricate her world by reshaping her identity. Here, Arendt indicated the limitations of 
introspection: the sensation of untruthfulness – of a robbed existence – could only arise 
within the interaction with an external reality, that reappeared to Rahel as a “fateful” 
remembrance of who she was – that is, of the life-conditions denied by her. Reality, as 
Arendt point out, is established and experienced with others, within external conditions. 
The constructivist assumption can only work if a whole human reality is controlled and 
involved in a web of “deceptions”, so as to satisfy the designs of its “author”. Rahel’s 
illusion of a free self-creation thus collided with the “conditioning force” of external 
reality: with social insults that remembered her origin; with the encounter with non-
assimilated Jews, who still appeared as a social and historical group; with the need to 
associate with “enemies” of her former people, thus experiencing social humiliation. The 
parvenu needed to dress a costume, but “through every hole in his costume his old pariah 
existence could be detected.”506  
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When Arendt wrote, thinking of Rahel, that “there was no escape, unless it were 
to the moon”507, she meant: there is no escape for the parvenu. Whenever the parvenu 
goes, she is haunted by the shadows of the pariah (affective memories, origins, 
spontaneous relations). The parvenu role works only for a while. But here a true liberation 
starts, so one doesn’t need, for the sake of liberation, to go to the moon (let’s remember 
that, decades later, Arendt would write that a literal form of world alienation is aiming to 
escape to the sidereal space). What seems to be an irresistible destiny haunting the 
parvenu becomes a fateful-condition for the pariah’s liberation – even if, in Rahel’s life, 
it only meant liberation from social prejudices, and not an effective political 
emancipation. Rahel’s rebellion coincided with an acceptance of her difference, and so 
with a transformation of “difference from being a source of weakness and marginality 
into one of strength and defiance.”508  
Hence, Arendt, the author of the ‘new beginnings’, did not say that a person is 
imprisoned by his or her living-conditions (the community in which is born, the physical 
skills, the color of skin, the way of talking and thinking, the historical context etc.), but 
that one can only be free by acting upon and from these conditions. Arendt wrote that 
men “disclose” their unique selves by showing to the world “who they are”, so that 
revealing “actively their unique personal identities”.509 Assimilation is the opposite of 
active disclosure, since it means closing oneself in a fabricated identity, an identity 
produced in accordance to a reified social-image. It is made from an illusion of repetition, 
since it pre-supposes an accepted model of social behavior. Through action, though, in 
Arendt’s terms, one appears confirming its uniqueness, bringing up a new face and a new 
dimension of humanity. If we think on the background of Rahel’s story, we can 
understand how Jews tried to disappear as Jews, how they tried to un-make their 
Jewishness, instead of appearing as themselves, and actively confirming their uniqueness. 
This, as Arendt insisted, was not only a matter of cultural pride, but of appreciation of a 
political reality, and acceptance of the fact that being-Jew was a reality under political 
attack.    
For Rahel, the moment of rebellion, the moment of fortification of the person and 
of its appearance in its own terms, came when she began, anew, to write letters with 
																																								 																				
507 Ibid.  
508 Benhabib, S. ‘The Pariah and Her Shadow: Hannah Arendt’s biography of Rahel Varnhagen.’ Political 
Theory, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 1995), p. 11 
509 Arendt, HC, p. 179 
 - 141 - 
Hebrew characters (as she did when a child), when she self-declared as a “fugitive of 
Egypt and Palestine”, and understood that the “misery of her life” had been the source of 
meaning, and the conditioning force of everything that happen to her (including of what 
she did by trying to deny it). And, as Arendt significantly ended her biography, she could 
only die, reconciled as a pariah, “with peaceful heart”, when she found another pariah 
who could be her heir, a pariah who had promised, in that “bad times”, that “the Germanic 
rabble will hear my voice ring resoundingly in German beer halls and palaces.” Heine, a 
pariah who Arendt would analyze a decade later, and who we will discuss soon, was the 
inheritor of a pariah-Jewess who had asked (“No philanthropic list, no cheers…no mixed 
society, no new hymn book, no bourgeois star…”) only for someone, as Heine and Arendt 
did, to “say it very soon. But as you do, the text from my old, offended heart will still 
have to remain yours.”510 Disclosing the pariah tradition was part of Rahel’s testament.  
 
5.6 Exceptionalization and atomization 
Let us shift, for a while, to the politico-historical background of assimilation in 
Europe. Arendt did not say that Jews assimilated because the state demanded. In fact, she 
pointed that the most traumatic episodes of anti-Semitism and assimilation in the 19th 
century (the “century of the parvenu”)511 related to revolts of several social groups against 
the state. Since Jews were seen as protected by the state, with which them supposedly had 
a privileged relation, attacks on the state sometimes were commuted into attacks on 
Jews.512 The perception that the state was separated from society related to the perceived 
estrangement between social groups and Jews. While society complained that the state 
did not answer to its demands, Jews were regarded as “a state within the state”. In this 
context, the decline of European Jews, for Arendt, coincided with the “complete 
breakdown of state worship”.513 
So, although Arendt elsewhere identified forms of autocracy (as, for instance, 
government by decrees, complemented by the use of bureaucratic apparats) as one of the 
historical origins of totalitarianism514, she stressed the interaction between Jews and 
society as the main source of Jewish assimilation and depoliticization in the 19th century. 
Other authors, differently, stressed the role, specially in Prussia, of a certain monarchic 
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authoritarianism combined with a rigid bureaucratic apparatus designed to enforce orders 
and to control public discussion, while liberalizing socio-economical life. In this context, 
political sphere would be closed, but private and economic spaces were freed from 
traditional regulations. Jewish emancipation, in this line, could be understood as 
socialization, that is, as occupation of private and economic positions, but with no 
political participation whatsoever.515 If we accept Arendt’s claim, this explanation may 
capture some important historical trends – reduction of Jews to private spaces, Prussian 
traditional authoritarianism, bureaucratism, cult of obedience etc.-, without pointing to 
two decisive phenomena: the decline of the state and the rise of the social. 
A further comparison can be done between Arendt’s perspective and Otto Bauer’s 
The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy [Die Nationalitätenfrage und die 
Sozialdemokratie, 1907]. Bauer was one of the leading figures of Austrian-Marxism, a 
writer and politician involved in the complex questions of the multi-ethnic Austrian state 
in the beginning of the 20th century. In The Question of Nationalities, his first important 
treatise, he presented an economic-historical analysis of emerging national claims in the 
geographical and the jurisdictional limits of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. He did so 
breaking with some of Marx’s views on the question of nationalities. Bauer 
fundamentally defended the legitimacy of nationalities, and its irreducibility to atavistic 
forms of identifications solvable within the scheme of economic developments.  
Indeed, confronted by the national problem in the multi-national, pluri-ethnic 
Austrian state, Bauer defended a relative national autonomy within the state. This 
autonomy – nationalities would become “legal entities” – would grant to nationalities – 
to Poles, German, Slovaks, Czechs, Magyars etc. – a relative political, juridical and 
economic power over their jurisdiction. This jurisdiction, moreover, would not be defined 
in territorial terms (there would be no geographical division); rather it would work as a 
“personality principle”, as an association of individuals identified with a certain 
nationality wherever region they lived within the state. This jurisdiction would have 
autonomy over matters of education and culture (for instance, establishment and 
administration of schools, museums, academies, theaters etc.), so as to preserve and 
promote the uniqueness of national cultures. The nation, as a legal entity, would also have 
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the right to appeal to state-justice over questions such as national defamation and 
persecution.516     
Bauer’s articulation of the “attempt of the Austrian nations to find a legal code for 
their existence”517 was, among other questions, due to what he called the centralist-
atomist configuration of the 19th century liberal state. According to this conception, the 
modern state, grounded on liberalism, had turned into the “…only one free independent 
power, the sovereign state”, complemented only by a “mass of unorganized 
individuals”.518 State’s sovereignty could not be checked by any other source of political 
power, since lonely and disarticulated individuals could only enjoy limited civil rights – 
which, by the way, were founded and protected by state’s tutelage. For Bauer, this specific 
process was explained by an economic continuity between the absolute monarchical state 
and the liberal state. The overthrown of kings by bourgeois revolutions and constitutions 
did not change the process of atomization, that is, of concentration of politics into the 
single hands of the state.  
According to Bauer, this dynamic was conceived to facilitate and simplify the 
capitalistic process of production into a unified social functioning: “the large capitalist 
enterprise united the isolated workers as its workers in the work of the society”.519 This 
sentence and Bauer’s general analysis are strikingly close to Arendt’s interpretation. 
Bauer defined Hobbes and Rousseau, with their defense of a sovereign ruler or a 
undivided will, and their suspicion of civil partial-associations, as the theorists of the 
centralist-atomist model.520 According to him, this model instituted a relation absent in 
the medieval feudal state, which “recognize a wide range of associations of individuals”, 
and allowed alternative centers of power – as seigniorial and cooperative associations – 
to celebrate laws that were “not derived from the state”.521 In replacement of these several 
sources of power and legality, the modern state centralized the political and juridical 
process, leaving to individuals limited economic rights, and civil liberties that were 
almost ineffective in contrast to state absolute power. 
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To be true, the medieval system was no democratic model for the 20th century. But 
it had a complex configuration of power, and an estimation of regional, specific traditions 
and specific economic relations, in a centrifugal operation, later undermined by the 
centralization of power and atomization of individuals characteristic of modern states. 
The problem of nationalities [Nationalitätfrage] emerged within this central-atomist 
context. According to Bauer, as the state was the single source of power, nationalities 
started to compete for influence over the state. As they were not juridical entities, with no 
specific rights, the quest of nationalities was organized via the individual, civil right to 
form political parties. National parties competed among each other to “conquer the state”, 
to use Arendt’s terms. Because they had no national power for themselves, nationalities 
organized in parties (and later in movements) struggled over seats in the Austrian 
parliament, and over general state-command. In this scenario, the victory of one nation 
implied necessarily the defeat of others nations, as it occurred with the control of German 
bourgeoisie over the state’s structure in West Austria, and the control of other 
nationalities (over defeated nationalities) in other regions: “The struggle of the nations 
for influence over the state now necessarily becomes a struggle of the nations against one 
another.”522  
Bauer defended, so, the recognition of nationalities as intermediary entities, as 
alternative centers of power between the sovereign state and the atomized individual. In 
his view, granting powers to nationalities would demobilize their competition for the 
state-power – and so their mutual hatred. There would be no subjugation of one 
nationality by other through the use of the state structure. Now, Bauer comes very close 
to Arendt’s concern, considering both her analysis of ethnic rivalry in pre-1933 Europe, 
and her critique of Jewish assimilation. Indeed, one of the implications of Arendt’s 
defense of the emancipation of Jews as Jews was this, a political-juridical recognition of 
Jews as a distinct, legal entity within a federal system.523 Jewish politicization could imply 
the entrance of Jews, as a distinct political people, in a structure of mediation and 
negotiation with other European peoples, on the basis that Jews were not necessarily 
alienated from others, neither necessarily identical to other peoples. 
I have been discussing, in the previous sections, the specific relation between Jews 
and non-Jewish society in the assimilation process. How does society – or the social – fit 
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to this question between nationalities and the state? Well, Arendt’s anti-socialism referred 
precisely to this emergence of national-societies, or socialized ethnicities. As I mentioned 
before, the emergence of large-scale, national societies coincided with the decline of 
specific class, religious, regional associations. The competition between nationalities in 
Austria only proved that these ethnic groups were the main factors of identification in that 
scenario (which only became more explosive with the emergence of what Bauer called 
“nonhistorical” nations, also claiming state power). So, now we can understand that the 
decline of the state, for Arendt, did not imply the decline of centralization. Indeed, the 
emergence of the “organic nation”, with its hostility towards the state as a space of rights, 
discussions, procedures, safeguards etc., created a more radical threat to groups and 
individuals falling outside that organic nation. (It is not simple coincidence that the 
Austrian branch of the pan-Germanic movement was one the most important sources of 
Nazism).524 
The failure of assimilation, thus, can be examined with this background. Within 
it, Jewish assimilation could never succeed: Jews had become individuals – journalists, 
philosophers, lawyers, physicians -, but these were solely liberal-professional 
designations with a weak sense of social belonging. By becoming individual journalists 
or doctors, they were not becoming Germans, or French, or Poles. They tried to break 
with their national-association precisely when European peoples were redesigning 
themselves as national-associations (or “organic nations”). The path of conversion, name-
changing, intermarriage, social escalation etc. would be soon reverted into suspicion, 
insult, contempt, or whatever accusation that brought up the concealed Jewish origin of 
the assimilated.    
Assimilation’s demand – “to conform through differentiation and distinction”525 – 
led the individual ex-Jew to a solitary position. The way of exceptionalization would have 
catastrophic consequences. The framework of assimilation had divided Jews into several 
classifications of exceptionality: useful vs. useless; protected vs. unprotected; educated 
vs. backward; Western vs. Eastern; local vs. foreigner; secular vs. religious etc. The 
presupposition of exceptionalism was in no way a gradual, spontaneous, unforced 
fluctuation of identity. It presupposed the rule of a despicable, anachronistic Judentum. 
The exception confirmed the rule: Jews, as a distinct people, were incompatible with 
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modern national societies. The assimilated Jew described by Joseph Roth, who wraps the 
Torah in a newspaper to go to the synagogue, or who runs away when his religious cousin 
arrives in Paris from Poznan, tried to prove his exceptionality by hiding from the rule – 
and, so, helping to hide any form of visible Jewish existence, either social or individual. 
He so blamed the Jews that instantiated the ‘rule’ – his cousin from Poznan - for not 
having yet being transformed into an exception.526 
In this process, the Judentum – families, clubs, schools, synagogues, newspapers 
– were emptied by the escape of these exceptions, or turned into exceptional associations 
which tacitly contributed to the process of invisibility (Gabriel Riesser is one pariah’s 
exception to the “exceptional”: when Western Jews began to self-designate as  israelitisch 
or mosaisch, to conceal the pejorative term Jew, he founded a newspaper called Der Jude, 
asking “Should we deny this ancient and honorable name in order to please those who 
hate it?”)527. The exceptions, though, as we saw, arrived to nowhere – to no new class, no 
new nationality, no new family. Even if they arrived, they could not undo the marks of 
their escalation, the fact that they were converted, or inter-married, or that they still 
carried a “Mosaic belief” within their heads. Their option was, as Karl Kraus formulated, 
between hiding their origins and hiding their people (“betray with the secret of his origin 
the secret of his people”).528 Struggling between differentiation and acceptance, between 
individualization and association, between eating as parvenus and starving as pariahs, 
between arriving and staying, “the way of the pariah and the parvenu were equally ways 
of extreme solitude”.529  
These “free-floating individuals”530, who tried the path of assimilation, lost their 
old bondages, and helped to dissolve the already weakened institutional position of 
Jewish associations and groups. By becoming atomized individuals, Jews lost the few 
political potentialities that they had of “disclosing” who they were and who they could be 
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unworthy but understandable attitude of an insecure middle class just scaling the steep ladder into the 
echelons of the upper middle class, with fresh air and scenic views. At the sight of a cousin from Lodz, one 
may easily lose one’s balance and fall”. Roth, op. cit., p. 122 
527 “[Riesser] acknowledged the hatred that was bound up with the use of the name, but it was the anti-
Semite, not the Jew, who needed to change. ‘Is it not the responsibility of those who hate’, he asked, ‘to 
fight against the hatred and cast it off, if it is ever to end?” Gay, R. op. cit., pp. 149-150 
528 Quoted by Arendt, OT, p. 85 
529 Ibid.  
530 Feldman, ‘Introduction…’, p. lxvi 
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in their own terms. Jews were not absorbed by historical or nonhistorical social-
nationalities, as they would not have a nationality of their own to protect themselves 
during the national struggles to come. The backlash of particularism after the illusion of 
Enlightened assimilation (before they were “human too”, now they were “artificially” 
assimilated) inclines one to accept the apologetic argument of “no way out”: before, the 
problem was that we, Jews, were different; now, the problem is that we, Jews, are trying 
to become equals. But there was alternative to assimilation. The alternative, for Arendt, 
was to embrace the “fatefulness” of the Jewish condition, making from it a clear statement 
for Jews as an European entity along with other groups, cultures, and nations. Contrary 
to what is claimed by fatalist accounts of Jewish accommodation, this political acceptance 
of the Jewish condition was possible, for the Zionists themselves, and also some Jewish 
socialist and other cultural groups, provided examples of it.531 
There is, finally, what one could call a paradox in this debate. Assimilation is 
broadly understood as adjustment or conformation to a certain group. But Arendt stressed 
the “solitary ways” of the exceptional ex-Jewish Jew. How can one assimilate (be 
incorporated to a group or a community), and remain a solitary individual? This is 
precisely one of Arendt’s claims concerning the failures of assimilation. Jews were not 
assimilated. They only tried to assimilate, and, by trying, they helped to dissolved their 
own community. We could think of different levels and models of assimilation. One thing 
was an attempt of assimilation to a Western nationality (a sort of assimilation to 
particular-particularism); another, an attempt to assimilate, for instance, to a Bolshevik 
identity, to the idea of the Bolshevik Russian as a “Universal Human Being” (an 
assimilation to particular-universalism) – as one ex-Jewish poet celebrated “Now I am 
tall - and the rabbi is small”.532 Bolshevik Jews (from a point only Bolsheviks), for 
instance, denying their parents’ religiosity or their petit bourgeois mentality, could find a 
new family and a new community with the comrades of the Komsomol, within the group-
orientation of committees, party-sectors, branches of police, propaganda departments etc. 
They were not isolated.       
But, in accordance to Arendt’s political critique, the main problem of assimilation 
was the gradual destruction of Jewish communities (long before the physical destruction 
of its individual members in the genocide). Politically, individuals with no roots, with no 
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communitarian basis, with no basis for organized actuation, are defenseless atoms. From 
a different angle, the inhumanity of assimilation was implicit in its conceptual denial of 
plurality. As Arendt stressed, plurality is not a simple multiplicity of indistinct 
individuals. Human beings are unique, and this also means that they exist, relate, establish 
meaning and build their lives in unique communitarian and group formations. Moreover, 
as the process of assimilation was lived in specific ways by each Jew, these models and 
mechanisms were superposed to the point of ambiguity and confusion in concrete lives. 
One individual could run through different layers of assimilation, as the attempt to cover 
Jewish “nakedness with the fig leaf of a different nationality”533, convert to another 
religion, focus on an individual-liberal career (assimilation to universal-particularism), 
aggravating his sense of confusion and isolation. Solitude and atomization could be 
experienced in different ways. Even in the closed model of assimilation to the “universal 
revolutionary” of Bolshevism, which offered a more rigid structure of integration, an ex-
Jew needed to undergo a complex repression and concealment of his origins, being in no 
way immune to denunciations of the pariah-skin which appeared through the holes of his 
assimilation’s dress.534 
 
5.7 Jewishness as a Vice 
Grounded on the premise that Jews are human, Enlightened assimilation validated 
hidden premises and practical consequences: that Jewish and human identities were not 
coincident; that humanization of Jews required an abandonment of Jewishness; that this 
process of “humanization” was in no way immediate or easily achieved, as some Jews 
were condemned to remain as Jews by their inability to be educated or transformed; that 
Jewishness, being reduced to the mere belief in norms of Judaism, could be experienced 
only subjectively and privately, having no political significance; that Jews should arrive 
as pure individuals or as individuals integrated to non-Jewish identities; that the normal 
assimilation-path became the escape from Jewish normality (that is, exceptionalization 
via double differentiation); that exceptional, assimilated Jews tacitly accepted the vision 
of a debased Judentum; and, finally, that exceptional Jews were mostly not absorbed, but 
isolated in the end of the process. 
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One consequence was that the assimilated became an actor. The term actor may 
led to some conceptual confusion, given the positive meaning Arendt ascribed to the term 
itself, and to politics as a “space of appearance”.535 Traditional philosophical frameworks 
established the distinction between appearance/inauthenticity/error/falsehood x 
essence/authenticity/right/truth, leading to a general dismissal of all phenomena in favor 
of “hidden”, introspective authentic-truths. As it is known, Arendt refused this 
framework, and recovered the specific dignity and freedom of a phenomenal, apparent 
sense of being. Opposed to an important part of the philosophical tradition, Arendt wrote 
that appearing and being, actually, coincide: in a most vivid and concrete sense, reality is 
what appears to human beings. In these terms, appearing-beings can be said actors of a 
human drama, disclosing their selves within the world of senses, sounds, faces, and 
interactions.536 Now, one could ask why did Arendt criticize assimilation as a sort of 
theatrical actuation, coming to state that,  
“Jews are human beings, not professional actors who constantly have to change 
identities in order to be happy. And only under inhuman conditions do human beings 
attempt to change the color of their skin or the shape of their noses or the number of letters 
in their names.”537  
 
So, we could have here two senses of being an actor.538 In order to distinguish 
both, and to grasp Arendt’s critique of assimilation without redefining her own terms, we 
can indeed rely on the very concept of appearance. Assimilation was a phenomenon, and 
so it displayed an “appearance” of certain social and historical relations. But, as we’ve 
been discussing, it could be criticized by Arendt for being a controlled, restrictive mode 
of appearance, leading ultimately to the disappearance of Jews as distinct individuals and 
of the Judentum as a distinct community. Assimilated Jews tried to appear as non-Jews, 
thus removing from visibility an important aspect of their condition. They were still 
living, human beings within certain social interactions, but their humanity and vitality 
had been undermined and repressed, for they needed to control and restrain their own 
mode of appearance. They did not reveal, but concealed themselves. Their appearance 
																																								 																				
535 “…the actor, the doer of deeds…” Arendt, HC, p. 178. For the section on Power and the Space of 
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537 Arendt, ‘The Return of Russian Jewry’, TJW, p. 173 
538 In On Revolution, Arendt elaborated a triple distinction between the dramatic persona of Greek culture, 
the modern “persona” with its “legal personality” and simply the “hypocritical” actor, who enacted any role 
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was literally theatrical, for it was determined by given roles and functions, within a certain 
social script, which presupposed an authorship of a determinate social scheme. There was 
no room for alternative scripts, not even for improvisation. Their stories, in short, were 
written by others (even by impersonal others), and, as actors can “be” several characters 
in a single life, as they can play different roles to which they are trained, assimilated men 
and women nurtured a belief in a theatrical acceptance of externally designed roles. As 
an actor makes his “real” self to disappear in order to become his “role” or “character”, 
assimilated men concealed their Jewishness in order to behave in accordance to socially 
defined identities. 
Now, in a positive sense, human beings are also “actors” revealing their unique 
identities, their unique sense of being in the world and appearing to others. This 
interactive appearance of human beings enacts an indeterminate web of stories. But, in 
this picture, there are people and persons, and not only roles and social characters. Indeed, 
in the German text of Vita Activa, Arendt used Person instead of agent/actor.539 Here we 
could differentiate between being a Person and being a social-persona, the latter 
understood as an adaptation of individuality to a social “mask”. In a world of people and 
persons, and not only of roles, there is a plurality of spontaneously, historically formed 
groups, and a plurality of individuals revealing their distinctive way of belonging to these 
groups, cultures, associations. No story is previously written, for stories emerge from 
these living, infinite interactions. In a similar way, there are no single author imposing 
anticipated roles, characters and ends to these stories, since men and women are active-
actors capable of beginning new courses of actuation and embracing unexpected life-
circumstances. Human beings, in this depiction, appear to others by sustaining their 
unique living conditions; they do not adulterate these conditions to disappear into 
fictional, theatrical roles imposed by dominant social standards.  
 The assimilated-actor accepts a character that is imputed to him. He so regulates 
his own life and choices and words in accordance to this – explicit or imagined – 
attributed identity. In other words, he is subjected to live his life in accordance to an idea. 
He must fabricate himself in accordance to that idea. The agent-actor (the Person), 
differently, accepts the conditions that life has given to him, and starts his own, open, 
unpredictable story by embracing his unique sense of existing among others. His life is a 
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biography, not a fiction written by others. Now, as actors are required to live in the 
imprecise borders of different identities, or even in the dissonant accumulation of 
characters by the same person, exceptional-assimilated Jews needed to develop a specific 
form of ambivalence, which can be, in broad terms, presented as a contrast between 
external adjustment and inner disintegration. Privatization of Jewishness led, according 
to Arendt, to an actual transportation of the Jewish problem from the streets to home, to 
privacy and also to the individual psyche. As the Judenfrage lost its “political 
significance”, as it was repressed from a public matter to the obscurity of private spheres, 
it started to “haunt” the private lives of assimilated Jews.540 
 This emotionalization turned the Jewish “problem” into something even more 
unsolvable, for a matter supposedly of rights and political stabilization had now to be 
psychologically approached, repressed, concealed, or even integrated by an weakened 
ego which feared giving public appearance to an unaccepted dimension of his existence. 
This innermost attempt of being a Jew “at home”, besides confounding the psyche, also 
intoxicated private relations (friendships, love-affairs, marriages) with the residues of an 
unsolved political issue. Bringing Jewishness to privacy, assimilated men and women 
could not eliminate the “Jewish problem” from their minds, their thoughts, and certainly 
not from their private-selves accessible to their intimate relations. Jews actually became 
actors, needing to control their moves and words, to behave in a certain way to please 
society, to entertain those who did not want to meet a common Jew nor a common man. 
To the inner, psychological confusion, assimilated Jews added a confused evaluation of 
social approval, for, as actors, they could be fascinating and repulsive at the same time, 
they could be admired only because they were strange: 
“Concentration on an artificially complicated inner life helped Jews to respond to 
the unreasonable demands of society, to be strange and exciting, to develop a certain 
immediacy of self-expression and presentation which were originally the attributes of the 
actor and the virtuoso, people whom society has always half denied and half admired. 
Assimilated Jews, half proud and half ashamed of their Jewishness, clearly were in this 
category.”541 
 
The “complexity of inner life” was aggravated (“artificially complicated”) by an 
oppressive social system demanding ex-Jews to behave as exotic strangers, 
simultaneously accepting and rejecting their strangeness. It was, as we saw, no demand 
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for full depersonalization, but for an ambivalent double-differentiation, for a subtle 
redesigning of Jewish strangeness into an individual, exotic strangeness, on the basis of 
an attraction-repulsion dynamic. Lacking a clear directive of adaptation, these non-Jewish 
Jews testified how destructive social forces can be. The “authority” of the social was not 
concentrated in one man or one clear group, but diluted into a combination of visible and 
imperceptible mechanisms of adjustment. Psycho-historians and sociologists of modern 
masses pointed to this compliance to norms which are not necessarily declared, nor 
forcibly imposed by a central authority, but voluntarily and unconsciously promoted by 
group values and social self-regulations. This is another perplexity of the process of 
Enlightenment, for, having declared man’s capacity to speak and act for himself, it 
actually inaugurated forms of submission, and destruction of individual independence, 
which tended to be imperceptible, thus more dangerous. 
David Riesman, in The Lonely Crowd, a book that Arendt studied for her 
conceptualization of mass societies, distinguished three types of personalities in 
accordance to the willingness to adapt or not to certain social contexts. The adjusted is 
the one who is directed by surrounding traditions, by norms presented by family and 
smaller groups, by regulations introjected to his conscience, or even by more general, 
universal “other-directions”. Among those who do not adjust, there are the autonomous 
and the anomic. The autonomous is a not a pure self-referent individual, but someone 
capable of accepting social norms, and conforming to it, on the basis of his choice and 
evaluation. Autonomous men and women guard a critical distance to their social 
environment, being capable of “transcending their culture”, and even refusing it. The 
anomic is the one who breaks down, socially or psychologically, in his attempt (and 
failure) to conform. He experiences non-adjustment by refusing social regulations, or by 
over-respecting it and becoming internally deregulated.542 
As a general image of the contemporary man’s search for conformity and 
acceptance, Woody Allen’s Zelig provides an extreme and caricatured case of someone 
who, willing to conform (it all started with Leonard Zelig’s fear of admitting to colleagues 
that he had never read Moby Dick), loses even his physical identity when he encounter 
others to whom he adapts immediately. In a more complex way, assimilated Jews in 
Europe had their ethnic-national origin added as a particular factor to the general 
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mechanism of pure social psychology. They developed specific Jewish psychological 
“qualities”, and a typical mental complexity, as a result of the psychologization of a 
condition which had been defining their visibly strange identities. This internalization of 
Jewishness to the “unpredictable laws”543 of passions and emotions could foster a 
productive “identity confusion”, which Erik Erikson defined as an important factor for 
the creativity of writers and artists from minority groups.544 It could also lead, as it did 
with “average Jews”, according to Arendt, to “an empty sense of ‘being different’, which 
later was interpreted in many psychological variations as innate strangeness.”545 Or it 
could simple infuse a sense of disorientation. Kafka, perhaps a combination of all these 
private experiences, famously expressed his “sense of nothingness”, in the letter to his 
father, in which he also complained to him: “I could not understand how, with the nothing 
of Judaism you yourself possessed, you could reproach me for not making an effort (for 
the sake of piety at least, as you put it) to cling to similar nothing.”546 
Like actors and other marginal figures, “half denied and half admired” by society, 
Jews “became people with whom one hoped to while away some time.” They felt in the 
center of an almost complete reversal of the principles and aims that animated bourgeois 
revolutions n the 18th and 19th century: defense of equality was replaced by fascination 
for strangeness, as “boredom to economic saturation and general indifference to political 
questions” became marks of a decaying society: 
“Bourgeois society, in its search for entertainment and its passionate interest in 
the individual, insofar as he differed from the norm that is man, discovered the attraction 
of everything that could be supposed to be mysteriously wicked or secretly vicious”.547             
 
This was a presage to the doom, according to Arendt. As a “culturally approved 
fantasy”548, this temporary contact with Jews was analogous to limited permissions for 
vicious experiences, for small escapes from social norms and conventions. The 
exceptional Jew, in this context, became the “exotic” Jew, when Jewishness was 
“perverted into a vice”, and the “Enlightenment’s genuine tolerance and curiosity for 
everything human was being replaced by a morbid lust for the exotic, abnormal, and 
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different as such.”549 It was the outcome of a process which had started with the rejection 
of the anachronistic Judentum (and the religious, long-bearded Eastern Jew) as 
incompatible with educated and emancipated societies: now a decadent, bored and quasi-
nihilistic society, playing in the edge of its major crisis, had developed a little and 
temporary fascination, combined with rejection, for that individual, mysterious man who 
carried the innate defect of Jewishness (“a cheerful little anomaly”, as Primo Levi put 
it)550. It marked a complete deterioration of the Jewish condition. It went from a separated 
community to atomized, weakened individuals, trying to elaborate psychologically the 
conflict about who they were and who they should be.  The lack of a political-social 
structure had transmuted into a loss of psychological and inner structure, into confusion 
and, in some cases, into a “sense of nothingness”. Instead of having produced proud and 
active citizens, the Judenfrage generated neurotic individuals.  
 
5.8 ‘Bloodless destruction before bloody extermination’ 
How can we understand Arendt’s claim that “1933 is simply the natural outcome 
of 100 percent Jewish conformity with the German people”?551 How can we comprehend 
the relation between assimilation, held by many as a necessary condition for integration, 
and exclusion, isolation and, finally, genocide? One can accept the claim that assimilation 
resulted from a naïve drive for integration; but how could it be that it paved the way for 
total disintegration? In what follows, I will try to answer these questions, exploring 
Arendt’s assertion that “The terrible and bloody annihilation of individual Jews was 
preceded by the bloodless destruction of the Jewish people”.552 I will try to make more 
explicit the claim that assimilation was, indeed, one of the origins of totalitarianism.  
Arendt proposed a stronger mutual influence between modern events, such as, on 
the one hand, the Enlightenment, the emancipation and the plea for equalization, and, on 
the other, the destruction of humanity by an unprecedented scale of social violence in the 
20th century. In this, Arendt did not share the view of authors such as Elisabeth 
Roudinesco, who, even though assumedly influenced by Arendt, criticized the idea of a 
continuity between Voltaire, Robespierre, Hitler and the Gulag, that is, the idea that the 
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evils of the 20th century were somehow a product of Enlightened modernity. Roudinesco, 
in particular, saw more similarity between Nazism and medieval Jew hatred, both 
proposing persecution and exclusion on the basis of innate qualities. In Roudinesco’s 
view, the modern theory of “regeneration”, based on the universal rights of man, may 
have its “inner contradictions”, but any claim of justice and democratization should 
recognize its belonging to the tradition inaugurated by the French Revolution and 
Enlightened thinkers.553    
Arendt suspected any theory of “continuism”. Nazi anti-Semitism was other than 
religious Jew-hatred, and also other than anti-Semitism of early nationalists. One aimed 
to conversion in an universe ruled by God. The other aimed to expulsion in an universe 
ruled by nations. Finally, the totalitarian one aimed to extermination in a universe ruled 
by racial-biological laws. Arendt avoided, moreover, reducing the question to a mere 
dispute of dualistic forces – the darkness of middle ages versus the lights of modernity; 
the backwardness of religion versus the progressivism of Enlightenment -, which would 
be a simplistic version of a theoretical politics of for or against certain tendency. These 
models of anti-Semitism could be compared, but not identified. Indeed, as we saw, 20th 
century genocide, for Arendt, could only develop within these “inner contradictions” of 
modern humanity reaching its point of exhaustion. This did not lead Arendt to reject the 
modern idea of a common humanity. Neither did she try to recover religious tradition, for 
its end, or at least the end of its political and moral dominance, was a consumed fact. 
Arendt was simply aware of the unexpectedness of historical processes, of how an epoch 
which started discussing equality and tolerance could end up promoting exclusion and 
extermination. 
So her own terms were exaggerated in the assertion that 1933 was a natural 
outcome of assimilation. To be sure, Hitler was not a natural effect of Mendelssohn, 
neither Stalin was simple product of Marx, nor Nazism was a simple development of the 
universal rights of man etc. But 1933 was neither a simple return to obscurity, a simple 
decay to medieval times (a popular description of any tendency assumed as “irrational”), 
as Nazism was not a simple deviation of a flawless emancipatory movement, a sudden 
incarnation of demoniac forces in Enlightened Europe. To begin with, assimilation, as an 
answer to the modern idea of equality, was an early form of dehumanization. As Arendt 
stated, only “under inhuman conditions” human beings try to alter their bodies, their skin, 
																																								 																				
553 Roudinesco, E. op. cit. 
 - 156 - 
their names, their personal and group appearance in order to be accepted. In this line, 
Arendt indeed ascribed a “continuity” between leftist (or progressive) and rightist (or 
conservative) arguments, for instance, in modern France, where writers such as Fourier 
and Giraudoux fused medieval libels with modern images to depict Jews as “barbarians” 
delaying progress or promoting degeneration.554 
The framework of adaptation to modernity – via education, exceptionalization, 
regeneration – established a narrow definition of what meant being human. It discarded 
the compatibility of humanity and Jewishness. Instead of a plurality of human groups and 
a plurality of unique individuals, modern society demanded functionalization and 
adjustment to convergent economic, social, and cultural forces that dominated European 
societies. The one-sidedness of modern equality neutralized inequality and difference, 
reducing it to private, invisible spaces, or simply accepting it as momentary sources of 
usefulness or entertainment. Jews, divided in several groups, embodying conflicting 
images – piety and greed, spirituality and materiality, cosmopolitanism and parochialism 
etc.-, remaining as a transnational group in an age of ethnic-national closure, represented 
an overwhelming obstacle to some of the aims of Enlightened modernity: equalization, 
secularization, nationalization, individualization. They hardly fit into simplistic schemes 
of modernity. 
Jews were thus transformed “from a people into a problem”555, to be solved by a 
society now governed not by God, but by human efforts. The existence of Jews became 
a “question” of social regulation, a matter of public policy, an issue demanding a 
“solution”, as if the tension around the existence of a distinct group could be simply 
exhausted by a decisive – “final” – approach to that problem. Originally, hence, the 
Judentum was marked by Enlightened thinkers as an anachronistic association, thus 
assimilation to the framework of Enlightenment meant, per force, assimilation to anti-
Semitism. Like Rahel Varnhagen, who “assimilated to her enemies without being 
accepted by them”556, most ex-Jews tacitly accepted or consciously embraced 
predominant prejudices against their former people. In the past, Jews converted to 
Christianism normally needed to embrace anti-Judaic articles of their new dogma. In 
modern assimilation to classes, nationalities and social norms, individual Jews needed to 
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reject the Judentum, by distancing themselves from ostensible forms of Jewish-
difference. 
This attitude strengthened enemies and weakened Jews. It not only left national 
and social forms of anti-Semitism unchecked. It reinforced the conviction that the 
problem of Jews was the very existence of visible, backwards, barbarian Jews resisting 
the forces of modernity. The fact that some Jews became exceptionally educated – 
following Mendelssohn’s exceptional example – did not serve to “educate” their host 
society, neither to persuade anti-Semites to leave their prejudicial views. Indeed, in the 
context of education and acculturation, anti-Semitism would undergo a lethal 
transformation because of the realities created by assimilation. Many Jews changed, 
proving that they could be normal. Anti-Semitism also changed, assuming new premises 
on Jewish abnormality. The program of education was so one-sided: it were Jews who 
needed to be reformed, not society. Indeed, Jewish reformation meant nothing else but 
meeting the standards of a prejudicial society. 
Meanwhile, Jews only exacerbated their political inability. Moved by a “fear of 
admitting that there are and always have been divergent interests between Jews and 
segments of the people among whom they live”557, average assimilated tried to prove their 
complete equivalence with other peoples. They expected to realize the principle of 
equality, not through the equal right to speak and participate as unique beings, but through 
the social opportunity of becoming “normal”. They started to fall upon “the nakedness of 
an entire class of people who no longer believed in defending themselves”558, who 
responded to every attack not with political organization, but with discretion, order, with 
more education, more individual escapes, and more self-disapproval of “anachronistic” 
Jews. The political and social consequences could be chronologically felt until final 
destruction: first, de-association from an ethnic and national association (from the 
Judentum); then, practical dissolution of communities, followed by the weakening of 
inner bonds of solidarity; next, the atomization of assimilated Western Jews, and the 
exposure of un-assimilated, Eastern or religious Jews, who were left without their leaders 
and without the old closure of ghetto institutions. (By the way, Arendt refused the 
argument that the destruction of Jews was shocking because it aimed to exterminate a 
higher culture and individuals as Albert Einstein. Hers was an anti-utilitarian position: 
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the attempt to destroy the “little”, the non-exceptional, useless Jews was equally or even 
more revolting).559 
Finally, assimilation caused multiple backlashes. First, the backlash of 
“dissimilation”. Assimilated Jews, having failed in completely detaching themselves 
from Jewish origins and Jewish relations, founding no easy arrival to non-Jewish society, 
facing the persistence, through new forms, of modern anti-Semitism, created a new 
identity – liberal, urban, individual, modern, secular, but still Jewish. Shaved, elegantly 
dressed ex-Jews embarked on trams in Berlin and joined cafes in Vienna with the 
company of other men, citizens, friends – also ex-Jews. As Richard Wolin put it, the 
German-Jewish dialogue was in practice a monologue.560 Jews were no longer a religion 
in the vicinity of Christianity. They were no longer a state inside the state. They were now 
individuals taking over modern society, spreading everywhere as journalists, as bankers, 
physicians, scientists, and husbands to non-Jewish wives, and as artists and writers, and 
as degenerate painters. Their rapid “integration” to society, or their sudden arrival to 
different social ranks created new problems, and new forms of denunciation – something 
that opened Arendt’s eyes to the contemporary illusions of social integration.561 Jews were 
too close from non-Jews – and still strange. They became familiar strangers. Sometimes 
they entered, or infiltrated the social “body” by inter-marrying, converting, changing 
names, thus, “falsifying” a belonging to a social-body now threatened by their advance, 
and by the resulting identities and forms of life created by this advance.562 
In this context, the idea of racial anti-Semitism found a fertile soil. As Jews were 
no longer a visible, separated entity, now anti-Semites had the trouble of finding Jews 
everywhere, of suspecting those half-Jews, ex-Jews, assimilated, who artificially 
concealed their mysterious origin. The effort of exceptional Jews in denying the 
background of a debased Judentum helped to create the belief on a communal entity fixed 
in metaphysical terms (later the Jewish spirit or the Jewish race). Jews gradually became 
a “principle”, a “communal entity”, a collective thing (the Jews), as expressed by 
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562 Developing further this topic, Slezkine argued that Jews did more than to assimilate: they created a 
specific modern identity. Slezkine, op. cit. 
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Grattenauer’s reference to “the Jew everywhere and nowhere”. Hence, being Jewish 
became “an inescapable fact”563 even for the assimilated, for the one who tried an 
individual escape. The later hysteria around examination of family ancestry (the need to 
prove that one had no grandparent with Jewish “blood”), the attempt to undo the problem 
of the Mischling (half- or quarter-Jew) by confining him into the German people or the 
Jewish people, were radicalized developments of the extrapolation of anti-Semitism from 
a religious feeling or a limited political view to a generalized social attitude.564 
The later identification between society and politics promoted political 
discrimination as a form to undo the traumas of social assimilation (and also of 
dissimilation): in 1933, Jews were removed from the state, and also from the “soil” of the 
country; in 1935, Jews were removed from society, as society entered private spheres to 
prevent mixture of “blood and race”, to forbid racial intercourse and intermarriage; 
finally, between 1939 and 1945, Jews were gradually removed from streets, buildings, 
cities, until the final attempt of removing them from the face of the earth. Now not on the 
pretext of their difference, but of their threatening equalization, not by the fact that they 
were mysterious strangers, but because they were normalizing their strangeness (or 
infusing their “foreign spirit” into normal society), the Jewish question was approached 
by a radically new solution. Assimilation, understood as the “disappearance of the Jews’ 
separate existence”, as the bloodless dissolution of Jewishness, would be finally replaced 
by the drive to destroy Jewishness through the physical killing of its individual members 
– pariahs, parvenus, and average Jews alike. 
 
5.9 Conclusion: Assimilation, why not?  
Arendt’s critique of assimilation arises several perplexities. Are not alteration, 
self-creation and even disappearance of certain forms of life unavoidable consequences 
of freedom? Did Arendt defend a Jewish identity on the basis of a stubborn cultural pride? 
Moreover, what’s the difference, if there is a difference, between her view and a 
multicultural defense of “cultures” against the threatening forces of a liberal, 
homogenizing, atomizing modernity? On a positive way, isn’t assimilation indispensable 
to the creation of a common life, a common language and a common political ground? 
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How could Ostjuden, dressing black, speaking Yiddish, with no civic education and no 
secular knowledge, become European citizens?  
Again, I do not intend to present Arendt’s perspective in a frame with no 
ambivalences. In fact, in a letter to Erich Cohn-Bendit, Arendt used assimilation with two 
senses: one, a positive sense, as the “process of making Europeans out of the masses of 
Eastern Jews”; another, a negative sense, which grounded her critique, as “Assimilation 
in the old style”, which “leads irreversibly to baptism and to its own absurdity”.565 In the 
first sense, the process had no “moral ambiguity and dishonor”. But what is precisely the 
difference, and how does it work in Arendt’s political thought? Outside Arendt’s terms, 
where does it stand the line between an understandable process of acculturation, which 
Hegel, discussing the emancipation of Jews, called Ausgleichung, an adjustment of ideas, 
attitudes, dispositions566, and the infamous Gleichschaltung, that “same-fication” 
(insufficiently translated as “coordination”), which Nazis promoted from 1933, invading 
every sphere of life under its domains? 
In the difference between “political assimilation” and “assimilation in the old 
style”, and perhaps between Ausgleichung and Gleichschaltung, lies the core of Arendt’s 
perspective on political – and also human – identity. First, this identity arises as a 
capacity, as a possibility of action. Human identification is not an immediate given. 
Arendt explained the “twofold character” of plurality – “equality and distinction” 
[Gleichheit and Verschiedenheit] – exemplifying it with the conditional purpose and 
functioning of speech: as men are equal, they can achieve mutual understanding by 
speaking to each other; as men are different, they need an ongoing exercise of speech, 
they need to talk constantly to each other, in order to explain their reasons, needs, plans, 
views, in a process also open to misunderstanding. It is an identity conditioned by active 
speech, and so by limited, contingent comprehension, thus also establishing a limited and 
contingent identity.567 Arendt, in this line, replaced a common nature (either rational, 
biological, national etc.), by a common speech (Sprache), conditioned both by the activity 
of speaking, and by the specific linguistic-worlds created by historical languages.  
As an example of her own perspective, Arendt was German as long as she spoke 
German, and thought German words, concepts, expressions. In short, she was German as 
long as she experienced the German language. Arendt and Jaspers constantly discussed 
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group-identity and people-essence in their letters, often in disputed terms. Arendt 
manifested her skepticism concerning Jaspers’ use of the expression “German essence” 
[Deutsches Wesen] in his book about Max Weber (the German essence being “rationality 
and humanity” [Vernünftigkeit und Menschlichkeit]). For Arendt, Jaspers seemed to relate 
world-building tasks (as establishing culture, making public use of words, creating spaces 
of freedom) with a national-essence. That was unacceptable for Arendt (“…Freiheit nicht 
mit Deutschheit identifiziert darf…”), for, by offering a definition of what Germaneness 
is, Jaspers may have attached exclusive attributes to a certain people (could ‘humanity 
and rationality’ be specific national qualities?), preventing other people and other 
attributes of participating in this German essence. Arendt meant clearly that, if there was 
such a thing as a German essence and a German destiny [Schiksal], she could not be 
invoked as an instance, as a participant of it, for she was an un-typical German, she was 
Jewish.568 
By politically and publicly assuming her Jewishness (“…ich als Jüdin…”)569, 
Arendt did not mean that her whole identity was defined by that belonging. She also 
experienced a certain Germanness by her participation in a linguistic community of 
German speakers:  “For me, Germany is the mother-tongue, the philosophy and the 
poetry.”570 Stating this in 1933, Arendt seemed to subscribe to a culturalist view: 
speaking, thinking, reading in a certain language makes one member of a linguistic 
community. But, even in this early definition, Arendt held a pluralistic definition of 
culture: a dialogical use of a certain historical language (Sprache) as a means of 
communication, creation, signification. The producers of culture are individuals and 
specific groups who establish, by linguistic and symbolic description, expression and 
representation, what they feel, think, and imagine. The anti-migrant cliché which 
recommends “respect to culture” distorts the phenomenon of culture as if it were a noise-
code enforcing silence after 22pm. In Arendt’s vocabulary, the world can be seen through 
plural angles – so culture can be, and normally is, established by diverse voices and views. 
Indeed, the point is not that culture is established regardless the background of its 
producers, but that the richness and diversity of their backgrounds – the fact that German-
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Jews, protestant Germans, atheist Germans, Germans from Bavaria and from Saxony, 
male and female Germans – made of culture a phenomenon of co-participation. 
Moreover, this participation in a certain culture is not a fixed “destiny”. Arendt’s 
early culturalist view on Sprache was later complemented by a political comprehension 
of speech. She became north-American by understanding and accepting a new 
constitution, a new set of laws, and also by learning English. As she was not wholly 
determined by a specific national-belonging, she could embrace a new political 
fatefulness, in a different world-organization. This “new beginning” was even more 
plausible in the United States, a geopolitical space “independent of a homogeneous 
population and of a common past”571, a country where, as Michael Walzer put it, the term 
“American” designates a political adjective for citizenship, not for “nativity or 
nationality”. In this structure, citizens are “allowed to remember who they are and to 
insist, also, on what else they are.”572 There, Hannah Arendt could be a unique intellectual 
woman of German-Jewish origin with north-American address and passport. She did not 
need to forge a new identity in order to become American: the adjective “American” 
accepted complementary identification nouns – Jewish-American, African-American, 
Irish-American etc. To be precise, these were matters beyond words and identity-
definitions, they were matters of experience: as an American Jewess born in Germany, 
Arendt could preserve her a linguistic-mental world, insisting, decades later, that she 
“came”, in a way, from “the tradition of German philosophy” and that the German 
language had remained with her.573 
In this context, Arendt’s experience in a non-national (or multi-national) state – 
in fact, an union of states – led her to point to the structure established by north-American 
revolutionaries as an exemplary one. Political pacts among groups with different 
religious, cultural, ethnic backgrounds had established an “artificial” identity between 
these “naturally” different associations. By saying that “American society is artificial ‘by 
nature’”574, Arendt meant to praise, not to despise it, for politics requires an artificial effort 
of stabilization and equalization of groups and individuals which can be regarded as 
different “by nature”. Speaking, in this sense, is an activity indispensable to this 
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“artificial” identification. Arendt realized that the more a community imagined itself in 
natural, biological terms – relying for that on invisible-immediate attributes as blood, 
soul, spirit etc. -, the less it resorted to speech for mediating interests, discussing aims, 
and establishing meaning collectively.575 That was not the case of the United States, 
whose political identity was a product of action, of words and deeds, and not a 
deterministic given. 
Now, how could Arendt’s Jewish identity – or, more properly, the experience of 
her Jewishness – enter this debate? As I have been presenting, Arendt criticized European 
Jews for not assuming politically their Jewish-condition, for not appearing as Jews. But 
Arendt herself, in important passages of her work, identified Jewishness with “those 
qualities which usually can become articulate only in the sphere of private life and must 
remain unqualified, mere existence in all matters of public concern”. When displaced 
persons of Jewish origin lost every legal status, they were left only with the “mere 
existence” of their Jewishness, almost as natural as the “shape of our bodies”. In these 
passages, Arendt defined “difference as such” and “individuality as such” as private 
givens, being elements of “those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act…”.576 
A similar point was made by Arendt in her famous letter to Gershom Scholem. 
Addressing her “Dear Gerhard” (Gershom Scholem’s German, pre-Zionist name, the 
name given to him by his parents), Arendt insisted that belonging to the Jewish people 
was not a matter of decision for her. Her Jewishness was one of those “indisputable facts 
of my life” (“unbezweifelbaren Gegebenheiten meines Lebens…”), which “has been 
given and not made”. For that, “for what is ‘physei’ and not ‘nomo’”, for what is physical 
and not a rational construct, Arendt had a “basic gratitude”, and no will of changing or 
disclaiming it, and others of these kind of “facts”.577 
Now, a reader will surely ask if there is an inconsistency in Arendt’s approach. 
Wasn’t Jewishness one of the main elements of the public experience of Jews in Europe? 
Wasn’t it, in other terms, the main source or their political identities – or at least of their 
political troubles? How come Arendt simply stated that it was a private data, a quasi-
natural given? From a different angle, how could a physically-given attribute become an 
object of political concern, if politics, also in Arendt’s definition, is a space of alteration 
and negotiation? I think that this perplexity illustrates how Arendt’s approach was less 
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schematic than critics believed. It also shows that her distinctions did not work as rigid 
categories. In the same letter to Scholem, Arendt referred to this “basic gratitude” for 
these physical givens of life as a “prepolitical” attitude, which only “in exceptional 
circumstances” has “political consequences”. One of these exceptional circumstances 
were precisely “the circumstances of Jewish politics”.578 Twentieth century politics 
indeed had been defined by “exceptional circumstances”. So, for Arendt, individuals are 
not necessarily defined by certain features of their identities, having to behave in 
accordance to it. Her argument is not that Jews are only Jews, and blacks are wholly 
defined as blacks, and women must behave as women, and individuals fall under strict 
defining categories. Her point was a conditional one: under certain circumstances, a part 
of one’s identity, an aspect of what one is (as opposed to what one does), may become a 
political target. In such a case, a basic-life-condition is under attack. 
We can discuss her perspective by contrasting it to that of an orthodox Hassidic-
Jew. It is not a random comparison, for Hassidism is also deeply marked by the traumas 
of assimilation and genocide. Its mindset is defined as reactive answer to the 
Enlightenment and the Holocaust. Ultra-orthodox Judaism is a radical denial of the offers 
of modernity: orthodox adopted the dark clothes of Eastern Europe when most secular 
Jews ran into the fashions, ideologies, professions of liberal modernity. Orthodox refused 
secular studies, clinging obstinately to the sources of Jewish teachings and norms – or of 
what they assumed as its sources -, establishing a strict communitarian-closure in order 
to avoid the risks of assimilation. Later, the experience of genocide only reinforced the 
fervor and piety of ultra-orthodox: they should live a separate existence, a sort of 
restoration of the distinct Jewish ghettos and shtetls, where a pure relation to God could 
be preserved. So they live in New York, Paris, Sydney as if they were in the old 
communities of Galicia and Bessarabia, speaking a particular language, following 
different codes, and having a limited, only necessary, contact with non-Jewish forms of 
life. 
Arendt’s perspective, as I have been presenting, is also an answer to assimilation 
and to genocide. But it is strikingly different from that of ultra-orthodox. In broad terms, 
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we can compare both answers relying on the private/public distinction. Accepting 
Arendt’s claim that the Jewish condition – as the Black-condition, or the Woman 
condition – is natural or quasi-natural, I argue that Arendt worked on the “political 
consequences” of the Jewish question, proposing a public approach to it, while ultra-
orthodox defended a re-privatization of the Jewish condition. As Jews were reduced to 
nothing more than their Jewishness, as this given-condition became the sole factor of 
identification, specially for anti-Semites, Arendt observed that truly political reactions 
required externalization, the public appearance of Jews as Jews. Any other reaction would 
be worldless, that is, unpolitical, for it would try to conceal the problem at stake, that of 
coexistence and acceptance of Jews as a part of human plurality. Ultra-orthodox, on the 
other hand, reacted inwardly, defending a protective shrinkage to clearly defined limits 
of separation between Jews (rigidly defined according to orthodox dogmas) and “Goyim”. 
As non-political citizens, they rely on the state and on public law only as means to 
preserve their separate existence and their particular norms. They reinforce the particular 
“private-difference” of Jews by making it even more private, more detached from the 
public, while Arendt argued for the transformation of Jews into world-citizens, along with 
others. 
The conditional argument of Arendt was defined by Benhabib as political, not 
ontological.579 In these terms, to be Jewish did not mean a substantial predefinition of 
one’s attributes, and one’s functioning in accordance to these attributes, neither a 
“privilege” of “a specific form of historical identity” demanding permanent recognition 
or protection. Assuming Jewishness meant a political answer only in a realm where being-
Jew was under attack. Arendt reminded that a society attacking a condition that 
constitutes one’s basic sense of existing among others could not be appeased by 
assimilationist strategies. Politically speaking, that society was wrong, and not Jews 
themselves. M. Hull defined this conditional attachment to certain conditions attacked or 
oppressed by others as the transformation of a given private issue into a political personal 
question. The person, as a source of political power and public affirmation, can only be 
effective if it upholds his or her appearance, his or her basic life-condition, especially if 
it is under attack in a specific political conjuncture. If Jewish communities are persecuted, 
Jews need to speak out as Jews. If the right to vote is denied to a woman, her public 
answer as a woman becomes a political act. If blacks are disproportionally targeted by a 
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form of social violence, then blacks lives, and not merely human lives, should be 
discussed. The “political climate”, thus, conditions concrete actions, especially when 
certain aspects of identity are fundamentally assaulted. Assimilation is no political 
answer, for it relies on “abstract and anonymous identifiers [that] encourage the 
suppression of difference.”580 
Arendt avoided to be rigidly identified under a fixed what-attribute, as if her whole 
biography, and all of her acts and thoughts, were a direct product of this identification. 
She even shunned away from excessive publicization of certain features of her being: she 
almost declined a position in Princeton, when that university worked with the press to 
publicize the fact that she became the first woman to teach there. She did not want to be 
depicted as an “exceptional woman”.581 Speaking of the Jews who supported her 
Eichmann report, Arendt defined them as Jews “like me – Jew with no strong connections 
to the Jewish community, for whom, however, the fact of their Jewishness is not a matter 
of indifference.”582 Arendt wrote so much about Jewish affairs not because of a static 
cultural pride, neither because of a subjective need to elaborate her identity. She did it 
because the Jewish question, the matter of Jews’ existence and location in the world, 
became a central issue of world politics. The Jewish condition, in her work, was not 
conceptualized in itself, but in its relation to the political developments of the crisis of 
modernity and the decline of humanity.  
In this line, Arendt could be regarded as a precursor of a “politics of identity” only 
of this term does not presuppose a closure of one’s norms, ideas and attitudes within a 
single group-determinant. If identity is “the background against which our tastes and 
desires and opinions and aspirations make sense”583, Arendt’s actor is not encapsulated 
into a single source of identity, from which he would accordingly develop a particular 
ideology, and a permanent mode of behavior. In fact, as I am arguing, Jewishness – 
Judesein – was for Arendt more than a predicate, a general quality of a group of individual 
objects. It was a life-condition experienced in plural ways within the historical drama of 
modern Europe. It was not a matter of conceptual definition (politically speaking, the 
unending religious discussion of what defines being a Jew did not matter), but a fact of 
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experience which conditioned Jewish and non-Jewish families, groups, associations and 
political communities.  
In this line, it is possible to argue that R. Bernstein, in his important Hannah 
Arendt and the Jewish Question, insists in a topic which Arendt could not, and did not 
want, to address. Bernstein complained that Arendt was satisfied with the fact of 
Jewishness, but never seriously discussed its meaning. In his own words,   
“Sometimes it seems as if Arendt simply takes the existence of the Jewish people 
as a historical fact and then concerns herself with the social and political questions about 
the history, responsibility, and destiny of that people. But this is to avoid the question of 
Jewish identity, not to answer it. It is not satisfactory to fall back upon the “factual” 
existence of the Jewish people. For, to use her own, later terminology, this does not 
illuminate the meaning of being a Jew.”584 
 
It is true that Arendt never proposed a definition of the meaning of Jewishness, 
neither did she ascribe a strict significance to Judaism. Sometimes, she suggested that the 
pariah was her model for Jewish existence. Then, she declared that pariah and parvenu 
qualities are found in every oppressed people. She did recognize particular features 
(historical and conceptual) of the Jewish people – the idea of being chosen by God for a 
moral mission, the historical-political condition of a de-politicized diaspora, the position 
of a “minority per excellence” in the European context etc. She offered so several 
meanings, several interpretations of what meant to be a Jew, that is, to be Jew of this or 
that kind (German or Polish, rich or poor, assimilated or Zionist etc.) in determinate 
historical conditions. Yet she never engaged in a dogmatic discussion of what is the 
correct form of being Jew. As she distrusted the idea of a German essence, of a 
classificatory distinction between American and “un-American” behaviors, she also 
refused the idea of a un-historical, abstract Jewish normative-essence. Arendt’s non-
essentialist (perhaps not exactly “anti-essentialist”) perspective was grounded on her very 
attempt to discuss the vita activa with the “eyes unclouded” also by approaches of strict 
intellectual definitions. She was interested in the actions and inactions of Jews, and not 
in what is the idea of “Jew” in general. Jews are historically conditioned beings, capable 
of “beginning”, of “affecting and being affected”, interpreting and discussing their 
tradition, of doing things and saying words, establishing unique ways and plural 
possibilities of disclosing who they are concretely. 
																																								 																				
584 Bernstein, R. op. cit., p. 27 
 - 168 - 
We saw that Arendt regarded the modern priority of truth over people as an early 
form of dehumanization. Europe spent centuries discussing the truth or the falsehood of 
this religion over that religion, and then it stated the falsehood of religion in general, and 
in all these theoretical disputes truth and dogma had achieved a priority over people and 
existent forms of life. Arendt could not incur in the same method regarding Judaism. Her 
criteria to judge Jews was political – she was interested on how Jews acted, or did not act, 
when the Jewish condition entered the political stage. Even her clear political 
condemnation of parvenus and assimilated would never reach the absurd conclusion that 
they were not Jews. Her problem was not that they did not follow some religious norm, 
that they were not born to completely Jewish mothers, that they dressed in this or that 
way, that they knew or not knew enough Jewish books. Her problem was that they “no 
longer believed in defending themselves”. In her view, they were political “traitors”585, 
not religious apostates. 
Still relying on the distinction private/public, a normative discussion on the 
essence of Judaism can be taken as a private matter. It is a matter for Jewish theologians, 
to be presented in the private spaces of synagogues, and Jewish clubs and houses. The 
specific debates on the meaning of festivals, of sacred texts, of habits, concern primarily 
the internal relations of Jews among Jews. In this line, Judaism (as an –ism) can be 
regarded as a private, inner-oriented, system of beliefs, norms and traditions, differently 
from Jewishness, as a visible life-condition, appearing distinctly to others, within external 
historical and political circumstances. One could argue that what Jews constitute 
internally will be reflected in their external relations – in the line that the private and the 
public (or the internal and the external) are not isolated, but in mutual influence. As I am 
arguing, Arendt tried to establish possible realms of differentiation, in order to avoid 
totalistic interpretations of reality. She complained against the “growing incapacity for 
making distinctions”, whose “result is a generalization in which the words themselves 
lose all meaning”.586 But this, I also argue, did not led her to a dogmatic fragmentation of 
reality into isolated, incommunicable pieces. Private and public are related, but not 
identical. Historical definitions of Judaism may shape the way that one discloses its being-
Jew. But, for the sake of preserving difference also in a conceptual level, I defend that the 
inner space of Judaism (the cultural rituals, the familiar relations, the spiritual 
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elaborations) is distinct from Jewishness as a political, active way of being-Jew among 
others. 
In specific Jewish terms, Arendt’s position was, again, not without ambivalence. 
She criticized official orthodox Judaism for their inactive belief on the protective “barrier 
of the Law” and the omnipotent power of the “vengeful God of Israel”.587 She also 
criticized Reform Judaism for helping to establish “a religion that no one believed in any 
longer”, for having “destroyed the legends of its founding”. The result of this kind of 
Reform was an emptied people with no pride of its heroes. While “Christian humanity 
has appropriated our [Jewish] history for itself…, there is paradoxically a growing 
number of those who believe they must replace Moses and David with Washington and 
Napoleon”.588 Elsewhere she described the “curiously mixed tendencies” of Reform 
Judaism: “toward liquidating Judaism and yet preserving it”.589 This seemingly indecision 
between strict conservatism and loose reformism mirrored Arendt’s attempt to avoid the 
extremes of complete separation and complete identification, of, in other terms, alienation 
and assimilation. Jewish politicization, in this sense, could only occur with the active 
embrace of Jewish past and Jewish heroes as unique stories and examples of a plural 
humanity (“because Washington’s and Napoleon’s heroes were named Moses and 
David.”).590  
Arendt aimed at a politicized Jewishness, conscious of its difference, and also of 
its interrelatedness with other people. So she claimed a “Passover story” capable of 
teaching the “difference between freedom and slavery”591, and a Jewish school, which, 
avoiding the “principle of racial purity” (“prepared to accept half- or quarter-Jews…and 
everyone who has been forced to its arms by the political situation”), would work on an 
inclusive, not purely religious platform (“…built upon the very broadest basis”). In that 
school, established upon the historical condition according to which “[o]ur children will 
not be able to grow up either in the ghetto or among the German public”, the history of 
assimilation and of antisemitism would be taught, in order to help the “coming 
generation” to “judge their environment and themselves”. The students of this school 
would form a “self-consciousness” independent from “ethical command”.592  
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In the short commentary Creating a Cultural Atmosphere, Arendt, adapting Elliot 
Cohen’s terms, proposed a “culture for Jews”, as opposed to a strict “Jewish culture”. 
Assuming that “culture is by definition secular”, she tried to respond to the conditions in 
which culture-oriented Jews needed to abandon Judaism in favor of a non-Jewish, non-
religious, purely secular culture. The task of creating an “atmosphere” in which Jews 
could creatively appropriate the content and symbols of Jewish concepts and stories 
would imply a breakaway from the “monopoly of rabbis” and also from the sterility of 
formal Jewish scholarship. Jewish tradition would be so “discovered and dealt” in a fresh 
way, “in our own terms”,  by a people to whom tradition “no longer constitutes a holy 
past or an untouchable heritage”. Along with pious orthodoxy and formalistic scholarship, 
folklore was also criticized by Arendt for its particularistic self-reference: “The cultural 
value of every author or artist really begins to make itself felt when he transcends the 
boundaries of his own nationality”. This “transcendence” would not mean a purely 
universalistic notion of culture: Arendt exemplified her claim by defending the “rescue 
of Yiddish writers”, that is, of writers produced by a specific regional milieu, who should 
not “remain lost to culture generally”. In this “culture for Jews”, secular and religious 
writings could be equally appropriated by active thinkers, writers, and artists, in their 
“own terms”, that is, reflecting their own personal voices, regional nuances, and specific 
situations. Arendt, in this defense, mentioned the Yiddish writers of East Europe, the pre-
Israel renascence of “Hebrew literature”, and the political freedom of American Jews, 
who could work without the pressure for assimilation. This pluralistic view of a “culture 
for Jews” would be sustained not by “circumstances beyond the control of the Jewish 
people, but upon their own will” (she wrote that in 1947).593 
So Jewishness was not a fashionable term coined by Arendt to refuse the past and 
the content of Judaism in favor of a simply factual recognition of Jews. Instead of a radical 
reform, or even a radical denial of Jewish tradition, Arendt worked with the aim of an 
active endurance of tradition, or of the plural traditions, established by the Jewish people 
in history. Again, avoiding the extremes of, on one side, a deterministic, static folkloric 
or religious heritage and, on the other, an abstract escapism of assimilated towards an 
“universal” culture, Arendt proposed that being-Jew was a condition not to be imitated, 
not to be denied, but to be consciously appropriated – or acted upon. Here, the distinction 
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between the burden of tradition and the force of the past has a specific relevance, for that 
was a people trying to restore not only its culture, but its individual dignity and its capacity 
to act and to participate within a pluralistic framework of humanity. In this inclusive view, 
the normative aspects of Judaism are less important than the performative deeds and 
words of Jews who are conscious citizens, and actors grounded on possibilities for 
recreating the force of their past into an open present.  
 
In this perspective, the figure of the pariah is exemplary. The pariah reclaims his 
tradition, or redefines his relation to group identities, thus allowing the world – or specific 
aspects of the world – to be seen from a different angle. Regarding this debate, Nikolas 
Kompridis protested against Benhabib’s presentation of the “claims of culture” for 
providing a fragile basis for the preservation of cultures. Accordingly, Benhabib had 
provided three normative criteria for a free and just organization of cultures: “(1) 
egalitarian reciprocity, 2) voluntary self-ascription, and (3) freedom of association and 
exit”. In special, Kompridis held that the last item – the possibility of “exiting” a culture 
– made no sense, and provided no normative basis for defending cultures: “Isn’t obvious 
by now that the identity that we are is not something we can change overnight, not a 
‘construction’ we can take apart and put back together at will?”594 In her defense, 
Benhabib resorted to the figure of the pariah:  
“I certainly did not mean to suggest that you can stop being an African American 
or a Jew or an Indian simply by exiting your community of birth; obviously you cannot 
leave your skin behind, but you can take leave of your religion and your ethnicity and try 
to pass as white, assimilate, dissimulate, or, more positively, a ‘self-conscious pariah’, in 
Hannah Arendt’s words.”595 
 
Had Benhabib relied more on Arendt’s terms, she could have declared that the 
pariah is not exactly a mere “positive” choice along with other options of “exit”. It is an 
authentic performance of a person who refuses to be a mere instance of the what – 
attributes or norms – that defines his group, class, tradition. This means rebellion only in 
situations of oppression. Otherwise, it means disclosure of who someone is through a 
unique mode of embodying given-life-conditions, of appearing, actively and 
linguistically, in a certain tradition and within certain political context. Benhabib 
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reminded the “possibility of narrative resignification and reapropriation”.596 The pariah 
does that not out of a normative prescription, but because he or she cannot accept 
depersonalization, assimilation, and deformation, that is, he can only act, and be free, by 
assuming his body, understanding his situation, and embracing the limited – though not 
restricted – range of possibilities offered by his unique sense of existing among others.     
** 
Arendt reaction’s to assimilation could open a larger chapter considering social 
engineering, artificial reproduction of nature, scientific intervention on human biology 
and chemistry and so on. Indeed, in his Against Perfection, Michael Sandel reminded 
Arendt’s natality (and “the contingency of a life’s beginning that is not at our disposal” 
and the “mystery of birth”), while discussing phenomena as diverse as actual fabrication 
of super-athletes, and the new generation of parents who, through medical control, intend 
to fabricate children in accordance to imagined models.597 In popular mass culture, 
identity fabrication can be exemplified with the extreme, and jocose, case of Michael 
Jackson’s alteration of his skin-color. Now, there are several nuances and different 
implications between the discussion of voluntary plastic surgery, social assimilation and 
the forced medical experiments on concentration camps. But the background is similar, 
as in these cases human conditions are equally disposed by the subjective will to fabricate 
new life conditions. 
Peg Birmingham, discussing this tension between the givenness of birth-
conditions and the possibilities open by natality, stressed the un-fixedness of Arendt’s 
person. She suggested that Arendt’s reference to her Jewishness as a ‘physis’ must not be 
understood as a substantial nature, as if the “self is given as a fixed or unchangeable 
datum”. Emphasizing the “mysterious gratitude” which arises from the ‘givennes’ of life-
conditions, Birmingham proposed to take this ‘physis’, this constitutive givennes, not as 
nature, but as the “origin of human existence”.598 Birgmingham recalled Augustine as the 
source for Arendt’s thoughts on the condition of natality. If we go back to Arendt’s 
dissertation on Augustine, we can read her interpretation of the role of memory as the 
center of the self. “The search for the origin”, Arendt interpreted, “begins with 
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recollection from dispersion”.599 Differently from the desire, which is directed towards an 
absent object, located only in the future, memory and remembrance trace man – “man 
who was created and did not make himself”600 – back to his own ‘whence’, to the location 
from where his existence evolves towards an indeterminate future. The original given 
rescues the self from “dispersion”, thus giving to it a center from which he can exist and 
act with others, within the world. Instead of the will’s fragmentation between its self-
desires, self-projections, and images created by it-self, which are all necessarily absent, 
Arendt’s given-conditions, the conditions of birth, of early experiences and formative 
memories stand as the original natality from which an unique biography can be 
experienced and performed. In other words, the self does not make it-self. It is formed by 
realities given to him-self, starting with the reality of a given body. 
We can shift this analysis to the etymology of power in Arendt’s reflections. 
Arendt related power to potentiality and possibility. This could be verified by the 
etymological correspondence of the verbs indicating possibility and the noun indicating 
the experience of power – in Latin languages, with the verb Poder (eu posso, tu podes 
etc.) and the noun Poder, in Portuguese (Poder also in Spanish; Pouvoir in French); and 
in German as well, for, according to Arendt, Macht “derives from mögen and möglich, 
not from machen…”.601 Moreover, Arendt detached freedom from the traditional 
connotations of free-will and right behavior. Freedom, as an external experience, could 
not be placed on the self-referent will, neither in the cognitive space. I will and I know 
were not verbal indications of the performance and experience of freedom. That could 
only be referred by the I can, which launches the I to the possibilities of concrete, living 
interactions. As Arendt avoided a repressive interpretation of political power, this “I can” 
is not strictly limited to the do and not do of positive legislation. It is limited by given 
conditions, from which the I can, nevertheless, actualizes hidden possibilities through its 
externalization in reality. I can only do (I can only explore the possibilities of power), 
when I am grounded on given life and world conditions:  
“The necessity which prevents me from doing what I know and will may arise 
from the world, of from my own body, or from an insufficiency of talents, gifts, and 
qualities which are bestowed upon man by birth and over which he has hardly more power 
than he has over other circumstances; all these factors, the psychological ones not 
excluded, condition the person from the outside as far as the I-will and the I-know, that 
is, the ego itself, are concerned; the power that meets there circumstances, that liberates, 
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as it were, willing and knowing from their bondage to necessity is the I-can. Only where 
the I-will and the I-can coincide does freedom come to pass.”602 
 
I truly can do something, if I embrace what is given (body, talents, gifts, qualities, 
and historical, social, political circumstances as well). Jews could, and can, be free, along 
with non-Jews, only if they embrace their Jewishness. This, as I am arguing, does not 
mean a necessary destiny (Hitler, for instance, affirmed that a Negro or a Chinese will 
never become a German, not even if he learns the German language).603 Jewishness, along 
with other given-conditions, is rather an origin whence one can disclose a life-story. By 
centering her politics on the human conditions of plurality, natality, the givennes of the 
body and its qualities, Arendt made us think about the political and human consequences 
of rejecting life-conditions for the sake of life-survival and life-adaptation. Wolfgang 
Heuer rightly pointed that, after the stories of the 20th century, Arendt established as 
political criteria not the opposition between life and death, but that between humanity and 
inhumanity.604 Recalling the Jewish “will to live”, we have seen that Jews, from the early 
efforts of assimilation to their horrific end in ghettos, cattle-trains and camps, experienced 
things worse than death. In this context, the terms political and human, in Arendt’s 
thought, became mostly interchangeable, and assimilation became an early example not 
only of depoliticization, but also of dehumanization.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
NOBODY RULES, NOBODY SUFFERS: DEPERSONALIZATION 
 
61. Becoming nobody 
Another of Arendt’s strong claims was that most events – and specially evil events 
– of the 20th century could not be understood in terms of individual psychologies, personal 
decisions or particular acts. Indeed, the unprecedentedness of such social and historical 
crimes, and of the means used in pursuing and normalizing these crimes, derived from 
the de-individualization suffered by the supporters – one would say ‘vehicles’ – of these 
processes. Though Arendt ascribed to the principle of leadership [Führerprinzip] an 
essential role in shaping totalitarianism, she did not reduce those phenomena to Hitler or 
Stalin, as if, by their mendacity, their ability to cheat or manipulate, they were the single 
causes of the destruction of humanity. Indeed, one of Arendt’s criteria to distinguish 
totalitarianism from mere tyranny was that, while tyrants dominate ruled-subjects from 
“outside”, imposing orders and forcing compliance through explicit violence or coercion, 
“totalitarianism has discovered a means of dominating and terrorizing human beings from 
within.”605  
For Arendt, a radical aspect of totalitarianism was that it abolished the distinction 
between ruler and ruled, between commanding and being commanded, through an 
unprecedented identification between the masses and the leaders: “the totalitarian leader 
is nothing more nor less than the functionary of the masses he leads”.606 In totalitarianism, 
we no longer have an individual who, keeping a relative distance to the social context, 
resists, despises, ignores, or even complies to dominant forms of behavior out of fear and 
external pressure. We have instead a circularity between masses and leaders, between 
groups and those who personify the group’s will. Both, leader and masses, can only create 
a sense of existence through their mutual reinforcement: “Without him [the leader] they 
[the masses] would lack external representation and remain an amorphous horde; without 
the masses the leader is a nonentity”.607 This situation created a new social atmosphere in 
which behaviors could no longer be understood in terms of particular and individual inner 
psychology and subjective intentions.  
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In this context, depersonalization becomes a central topic to grasp Arendt’s 
placement of the person – who acts – at the originative center of human action. Arendt 
understood that, in the 20th century, de-individualization and depersonalization enacted 
not apathy and paralysis, but violence, cruelty and destruction in unparalleled scales. That 
this de-individualization led to an active voluntarism was “only seemingly contradictory”, 
for, as Bakunin “confessed”, it started with a decision: the decision to abandon individual 
decision: ‘I do not want to be I, I want to be We’.608 The voluntary decision to leave the 
individual self, thus doing or suffering things that the individual self would not do or 
suffer in non-totalitarian contexts, became one of the sources of the shocking inhumanity 
created by totalitarianism. To be sure, to speak of a “nobody” is misleading, because the 
body was there, but not the person. Indeed, the body was still there as a source of force, 
of support, and sometimes even of specific decision-making. But the body had lost its 
separateness as a distinct, irreducible, responsible person. This sort of depersonalization 
is a condition for the “fungus” of totalitarianism to spread on the “surface” of society, 
regardless any strong root in evil individual psychologies. 
The phenomenon of depersonalization can be regarded from different angles, as it 
reached different social and historical groups. According to the sociological classification 
of Raul Hilberg, victims, bystanders, perpetrators (and its subcategories: the old 
functionaries, the newcomers, the bearers of burdens, the zealots, the Jewish leaders, the 
refugees etc.)609 suffered different degrees of this uncoupling of the person from its 
political, social and personal basis. At the beginning, one found diverse events, and social 
and psychological mechanisms, as the elements which contributed to this self-loss: the 
traumas of First World War and the bloody experience in the front; unemployment and 
general economic crisis; the confusion generated by assimilation to and exclusion from 
ethnic societies; the dissolution of moral standards and the decline of ‘respectable’ 
bourgeois values; the breakdown of class society into a mass of atomized individuals, 
longing for a redemptive re-orientation in life.  
If we move back to the stories of assimilation of We Refugees, we find Arendt’s 
description of the displaced-condition, specially of Jews as refugees, who, still insisting 
in the appeasing tactics of assimilation, and pressured even more by the surrounding 
political hostilities, refused their conditions as Jews, thus, as refugees. As we saw, still 
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insisting in compliance to standards of respectable national societies, they (Arendt 
addressed her reader as “We”) tried “to put up a front, to hide the facts, and to play 
roles”.610 Arendt described “that Mr. Cohn from Berlin, who had always been a 150 
percent German”, but in 1933 had to find refuge in Prague, becoming then “convinced 
Czech patriot”. When in 1937, the Czech government, under Nazi pressure, expelled its 
Jewish refugees (“disregarding the fact that they felt so strongly as prospective Czech 
citizens”), Mr. Cohn went to Austria, and “to adjust oneself there a definite Austrian 
patriotism was required”. After the annexation of Austria, he went to Paris. “Having 
already acquired a great skill in wishful thinking”, Mr. Cohn believed that “he would 
spend his future life in France”, and thus attached himself to an imagined belonging to a 
certain French tradition. Yet the unrecognized fact of his existence was the determinant 
factor of his fate: “As long as Mr. Cohn can’t make up his mind to be what he actually is, 
a Jew, nobody can foretell all the mad changes he will still have to go through”.611 
Kafkaesque became a synonymy of a bizarre, absurd situation, which does not 
restore to ultimate reasonable explanations, either legitimate or understandable within 
humane motives. Not coincidently, Kafka, as we shall see soon, became, through his 
characters and his own experience, an exemplary pariah, who elaborated the sense of 
displacement in a meaningless, human-less order, where one cannot even live a normal 
existence. Mr. Cohn could be simply a K. trying to adapt to the prevalent order: 
“He is that ideal immigrant who always, and in every country into which a terrible 
fate has driven him, promptly sees and loves the native mountains.”612 
 
But he – even though he was an ordered and respectful individual – was rejected 
by the political order, by any political order, due to the absurd character of the social and 
political system, which disregarded every level of Mr. Cohn’s existence. Arendt, in this 
line, identified the beginning of the end of humanity with a creation of a disordered 
political order, marked by the “decline of the Nation-State” system. The end of the First 
World War had “exploded the European comity of nations”, showing the destructive 
consequences of national competition, and also dismantling political structures and 
spreading an unemployment that “seized…whole nations”. The disintegration of states, 
the political vacuum created by massive war, the atmosphere of “everybody against 
everybody else, and most of all against his closest neighbors – the Slovaks against the 
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Czechs, the Croats against the Serbs, the Ukrainians against the Poles…”, generalized the 
pariah-condition through the generation of what Arendt called the “scum of the earth”. 
Groups who “were welcomed nowhere and could be assimilated nowhere” formed 
contingent of superfluous people with no social belonging, no political location and no 
juridical protection – shortly, homeless, stateless, rightless. Arendt stressed how these 
people, being innocent from a criminal point of view, harmless from a political one, and 
peaceful from a social perspective, were expelled and forced by events which had the 
“expression of some unredeemably stupid fatality.”613  
Instead of reshaping the political system of Europe in order to include the diversity 
of people living in its geographical limits, political actors only aggravated the problem of 
ethnic animosity by introducing the “nation-state principle” everywhere, in replacement 
to old multi-ethnic empires, in some cases in regions highly mixed from an ethnic-
national point of view. The new political order created “state people” that would control 
politically the destiny of “minorities”, or “nationally frustrated people”, which in some 
cases amounted to almost 50% of the state population (mostly in East European states). 
National minorities had only two choices: “assimilation” or “liquidation”.614 
Assimilation, given the emergence of ethnical-racial determinism, and considering, in 
some cases, the “numerical and cultural weakness of the so-called state peoples”, became 
an ineffective path. So the established order produced a problem it could not, by its very 
nature, solve: the lack of political representation, and later the lack of a juridical-structure 
to masses of minorities. The international mechanisms created to protect these minorities 
– the League of Nations and the Minority Treaties – were mostly controlled by agents 
thinking and acting in terms of “national interests” – and not of “common interests of 
minorities”, much less in terms of human rights -, so they became gradually ineffective. 
Mobilization around human rights was virtually absent.615  
In a nationalized Europe (fragmented along with lines not representing the 
diversity of the “interregional character of the minorities”), one could only be a citizen if 
one belonged to a recognized, state-owner nationality. National right and national 
interests became exclusively valid over abstract human rights, and even also over civil, 
individual rights. This created an absurd situation in which an individual could be only 
counted as a person or a “human being” if he belonged to a recognized nationality. From 
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this conquest of the state, as a space of rights and citizenship, by the nation, as a group of 
ethnic belonging, a series of Kafkaesque situations followed. Mass denationalizations 
created within a few days millions of people (“…millions of Russians, hundreds of 
thousands of Armenians, thousands of Hungarians…”), who, by living outside a state 
controlled by its nationality, could suddenly lose propriety, jobs, rights, and documents. 
Jews, the “minority per excellence”, felt under the category of “undeportable”, for “there 
was no country on earth in which they enjoyed the right to residence”.616 
Joseph Roth described this new nomadic wandering of Jews through a senseless 
bureaucratic system as follows: 
“It’s almost a metaphysical affliction: You’re transient and you’re stuck; a refugee 
and a detainee; condemned to rootlessness and unable to budge.”  
(…) And they also wander from one branch of officialdom to the next, from the 
local police station to the central police headquarters, from the tax inspectorate to the 
National Socialist Party offices, from the concentration camp back to the police, and from 
there to the law court, from the law court to prison, from prison to the house of 
correction.”617  
 
From a different angle, Jewish refugees became finally “pure human beings”: they 
were left only with a naked existence, without the qualifications of a job, a class, a 
recognized name, a passport, a political right etc. In this context, Arendt reminded that 
the worst thing was to remain an “innocent”. Unlike the refugee and the rightless, a 
criminal still had a juridical existence, and an obvious home in the world (the prison). He 
still had rights, and he was still part of a certain juridical system, as he was integrated to 
a political structure which recognized him as a legal person. The “rightless” had nothing 
but its mere body. And being a body with no rights could be worse than being nothing, 
for one becomes vulnerable to manipulative and abusive acts outside a legal and political 
system. That was the case of refugees who could only find a “home” in internment camps, 
and, while in their wandering transit, were handled by policemen of others’ states, being 
thus susceptible to abuses and mistreatment that could not be legally contested neither 
politically controlled. 
What is left from “humanity” – or, legally, from the “Rights of Man” – in a 
nationalized order that created millions of de-naturalized, de-nationalized, superfluous 
men and women? Nothing besides the mere body, the crudeness of a purely natural 
existence. Today, the claim of Human Rights is established. Sometimes it is even 
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manipulated for multiple aims, being predicated of a variety of politically sensible 
demands. But, originally, Arendt related it to a specific condition of superfluity, of total 
powerlessness. Under conditions in which the individual is determined by circumstances 
way beyond his participation, circumstances which he cannot grasp, he even transcends 
the condition of a mere body into a no-body, for the last resort of his dignity, the control 
over his body-needs and body-processes, is lost with the loss of a private space. He 
becomes an object determined by the occasional passions of solidarity, or rather 
determined by the bureaucratic and “legal” forces of border policemen and functionaries 
of internment camps.  
Arendt stressed this gradual production of worldlessness as a historical-political 
origin of totalitarianism. The political order of Europe, redesigned after First World War, 
pre-conditioned its own destruction. The creation of masses of deprived, uprooted men 
provided to totalitarianism, and to the specific totalitarian social-engineering, those 
millions of lawless bodies that would undergo measures of dehumanization. In this line, 
the formulation of human rights proved, simultaneously, the limits of philosophical 
abstraction and the primacy of political action. Assuming that basic rights were 
ontologically attributed to every individual, the philosophy of human rights became 
nothing more than an emptied ideal, which, moreover, ceased to speak even as a 
regulatory principle to that epoch. If “the Declaration meant that he [the individual] could 
carry his dignity within himself”618, it fostered illusion and isolation, as the individual 
believed in the permanence of his status, regardless the contingencies of political action.  
Historically, though, individuals lost their “humanity” when they lost their polity. 
They lost their rights when they lost their belonging to a nationality. And they lost their 
dignity when their people (their “nation”) was transformed into a mass of unorganized 
bodies. Jews, being culturally and politically destroyed by the contradictions of 
emancipation and assimilation, became then a mere collection of disoriented individuals, 
in some cases incapable of articulating their Jewishness, the same condition that had put 
them into displacement. The 20th century showed to Arendt that losing politics may 
signify the loss of a home, meaning the “loss of the entire social texture”, the loss of an 
address, of social relations, of a space of privacy, of a “distinct place in the world”, a loss 
even more shocking as “it was a problem not of space but of political organization”; and 
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also the “second loss”, that of “government protection”, or the loss of a polity, now even 
more disturbing because there was no right of asylum, no effort of assimilation or 
acculturation, no effort of “naturalization” that could ever absorb millions of innocent 
people, who had been displaced because their group-condition did not fit into the new 
order.  
Arendt stressed that what was taken as absolute human rights were indeed “rights 
of citizen”, which, despite being historically and politically defined (as the rights to life, 
liberty, propriety, happiness etc.), were dependent on the attachment of an individual to 
a concrete community. These rights made no sense, they became completely ineffective, 
outside a polity. Moreover, certain circumstances could remove some rights of an 
individual without making him a rightless body, as Arendt exemplified in contrast: 
“The soldier during the war is deprived of his right to life, the criminal of his right 
to freedom, all citizens during an emergency of their right to the pursuit of happiness, but 
nobody would ever claim that in any of these instances a loss of human rights has taken 
place”.619 
 
The rightless who Arendt had in mind suffered, differently, a complete loss of 
humanity. He experienced “absolute rightlessness”.620 Even a slave still had a social role, 
and so “a place in society” and a residue of humanity.621 That was not the case of the 
rightless. So, Arendt worked on a “phenomenological rehabilitation of the common 
world”622, for the sake of relocating individuals within webs of historical and political 
interactions, in which rights are to be translated into concrete conditions, not empty ideals. 
Human rights are ineffective, and politically misleading, if postulated as ontological 
qualities of isolated individuals. That is why Arendt reframed “human rights” as an object 
of politics, not of moral philosophy. Indeed, the loss of humanity chronicled by Arendt 
reached a point that no “natural law” had before predicted in its positive items, and that 
no tyrant tried to “take away”623: a “loss of the relevance of speech”, “the loss of all human 
relationship”, and “of some of the most essential characteristic of human life”. Perishing 
in camps and “holes of oblivion”, they were lost to the world in a literal sense, that is, lost 
as bodies with visible faces and audible voices.624  
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For Arendt, this very sense of existing among others is more fundamental than 
any discussion on any positive value. Becoming a “scum” did not mean losing a specific 
cause of justice, but losing all qualifications to a dignified human existence. An individual 
or a group transformed into an absolute pariah, meaning absolute exclusion of a human 
community, does not lose one or two positive rights, but the very the possibility of 
reclaiming any right. In this context, the basic human right, for Arendt, was the right to 
action, the right to exist within a human community, to be counted as some-one. The right 
to have rights, the right to have “a place in the world which makes opinions significant 
and actions effective”625, precedes every positive rights as the beginning of one’s political 
life. It means, in other words, the right “to belong to some kind of organized community”. 
As Arendt concluded that mere body-survival is not equal to a human existence, the right 
to have rights can be read as the right to exist within a humanly created structure of power 
– in short, the right to exist politically. 
 
For Seyla Benhabib, Arendt answered to the perplexities of the Rights of Man 
with a “frustratingly ambiguous” formula: 
“…if we have a right to have rights, who could have removed it from us? If we do 
not already all have such a right, how can we acquire it? Furthermore, what is meant by 
‘a right’ in this formula: a legally recognized and guaranteed claim by the lawgiver? Or 
a moral claim that we, qua members of a human group, address to our fellow human 
beings, to be recognized as their equals? Clearly, it is the second, moral, meaning of the 
term rights that Arendt has in mind.”626  
 
Once more, I think that Benhabib misses an important element of Arendt’s 
reformulation. Arendt stressed the exhaustion of the “very language” and the theoretical 
framework of the Declaration of Rights: its assumption of rights “inalienable”, “given by 
birth”, based on “self-evident truths” was no longer valid from a political point of view. 
Indeed, it implied “the belief in a kind of human ‘nature’” from which stable laws could 
be deduced. But the modern process of worldlessness, of alienation from the world and 
also from the earth, turned the framework of “human nature” into a highly questionable 
one, to say the least. “Man-made instruments”, following from man-made philosophies 
of domination, placed man as the master of nature, in a context in which unpredictable 
technological processes could end up destroying nature itself (Man “has been alienated 
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from nature”).627 Moreover, the lawless experiments of totalitarianism, disposing of 
human “nature” as if it were a plastic material to be re-fabricated, has put a question mark 
in the capacity of law, whether natural or artificial, in limiting human domination and 
self-inflicted degradation. The language of natural law thus became highly problematic: 
“How should one be able to deduce laws and rights from a universe which 
apparently knows either the one nor the other category?”628 
 
Benhabib seemed to demand what Arendt could not offer, a purely rational 
prescritptivism. One could ask back to Benhabib: how would one persuade contemporary 
masses regarding the logical or epistemological quality of this or that norm? Why would 
any foundational moral theory prevent a similar political destruction? Did not European 
humanity have plenty of well-grounded systems of morals, ethics, laws etc.? Benhabib 
seems to struggle to get rid of the Platonic model in which a rational ontology is grasped 
by the philosopher, who then orients a multitude of citizens in accordance to rigidly-
grounded laws.  
This is not to say that Arendt’s formula is not “ambiguous”. But it is certainly not 
“frustrating”, for it is grounded on the experience of political power as synonymous of 
possibility. We can think of this formula once more with the stories of European Jews in 
mind. The catastrophic period for European Jewry began after the proclamation of 
universal rights. Jews could even enjoy some assumedly “human” rights – of property, 
movement, and even of opinion -, in determinate periods, but mostly as the result of 
concessions by monarchs interested in economic favors. There was no action, no political 
mobilization, no popular legitimation for the inclusion of Jews as citizens. When Jews 
became stateless and rightless, removed from their respective polities, they could even 
rely on some fragmented rights – they still had a limited right to preserve life, to think 
whatever they pleased –, but these isolated rights made no sense, for Jews were now mere 
“human beings” living in camps or in transit-roads, detached from spheres of justice and 
public deliberation. Despite their bodily endurance, they became, politically, nobodies.  
The right to have rights is thus a right to begin, for, differently from a regulative 
end, it allows human plurality to constitute itself openly, within the contingent, imperfect, 
always troubled conditions in which political communities find themselves historically. 
From the point of view of the pariah, with its meaning reformulated by Arendt after the 
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experiences of the 20th century, the right to action presupposes not a subject of pity, 
neither an abstract-individual receiver of “ontological” rights, but some-one who can act, 
in his or her own terms, within his or her specific historical community. It is, in short, 
also the right to “start a rebellion”, to actively participate in the creation, reformation or 
augmentation of political communities and cultural traditions. It means, finally, the 
political confirmation of one’s existence as a unique person entitled to pursue a 
meaningful life – and all the qualifications and experiences (…“a profession”, “a 
citizenship”, “an opinion”, “a deed by which to identify and specify himself”…)629 that 
some-one can have starting from the basic right to exist politically with others. 
 
6.2 From Powerlessness to the Illusion of Omnipotence 
Rethinking the experience of power, Arendt tried to avoid two extremes: the 
feeling of powerlessness and the illusion of omnipotence. I say illusion, for Arendt stated 
that only an exclusive god could be omnipotent. In polytheism, “even a god, no matter 
how powerful, cannot be sovereign”. In a reality constituted by the presence of others, 
“sovereignty is possible only in imagination”.630 The illusion of omnipotence or 
sovereignty can only be forced into the world generating consequences as exclusion, 
domination, alienation. For Arendt, power is “limited” by “the existence of other people”. 
Indeed, thinking of the intangibility of linguistic-symbolic human power, Arendt stated 
its “boundlessness”. But power is only boundless, creative and generative if it is shared: 
“power can be divided without decreasing it”.631 Reading this line with our historical 
background, one can say that Arendt struggled against the tendencies of helplessness and 
despair, which could lead to cynicism and distrust on power; but she also struggled against 
the mythical, hubristic fabrication of an illusionary omnipotence. Historically speaking, 
both extremes, as the stories of totalitarianism showed, were intimately related. 
Totalitarianism, with the omnipotent belief that everything is possible, started with 
deep experiences of powerlessness and self-confusion. As one of the historical conditions 
for totalitarianism, imperialism was portrayed by Kipling’s Kim, from which Arendt took 
the defining legend of men living expansionist adventures overseas. Arendt described the 
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life “through danger, fear, constant surprise, utter lack of habits, constant preparedness to 
change their identities” experienced by men who left the stability of home to explore life 
outside conventional standards and roles. In this “Great Game”,  
“Life itself seems to be left, in a fantastically intensified purity, when man has cut 
himself off from all ordinary social ties, family, regular occupation, a definite goal, 
ambitions, and the guarded place in a community to which he belongs by birth”.632  
 
Soon, Arendt explored how this self-less game, this immersion in an experience 
in which the I did not play a central role, attracted T. E. Lawrence in his military service 
in Arab lands. “Pretending to be an Arab, he could only lose his ‘English self’ and was 
fascinated by the complete secrecy of self-effacement…”. Lawrence, experiencing war 
and rebellion in Arab lands, came to lose his personality, his ego-qualities, in that 
“mysterious alliance with forces necessarily bigger than himself”. After immersing in a 
sort of purified intensity along with Arab insurgent groups, T. E. Lawrence, then 
Lawrence from Arabia, found boredom and disorientation in his way back to England. 
He “came home with an obsessive desire for anonymity and the deep conviction that 
nothing he could possibly still do with his life would ever satisfy him.” He became, 
according to Arendt, a “phantom” when the “force” and the “role” to which he had 
submitted in distant were removed from him.633 Judging by T. E. Lawrence’s example, 
Arendt declared that the “pride of Western man”, and I would add the very concept of 
man, began to dissolve when he “no longer counts as an end in himself”, and decides 
simply to ally with “the secret forces of history and necessity – of which he is but a 
function.”634 
First World War, related to imperialistic events, shaped not a generation of 
pacifists, but rather a mass of men who abominated the values of “respectable society”, 
and came to embrace “[d]estruction without mitigation, chaos and ruin” as “supreme 
values”.635 They yearned “for anonymity, for being just a number”, forming thus a group 
of men who no longer felt bounded by the interests of class, of parties, and even of 
nationality. That was a mass of men who were forced by the events outside “that specific 
class articulateness which is expressed in determined, limited, and obtainable goals”. 
They no longer fitted into family, professional, municipal, trade, traditional-party 
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structures.636 They wanted to overcome tedium by surrendering them-selves to processes 
which would made them think “in continents” and feel “in centuries”.637 Marked by the 
experience of struggle and death in war, of adventure and pillage in imperialism, without 
the old alternative of escaping “into exotic lands” and becoming “dragon-slayers among 
strange and exciting people”, the generation of the front yearned for a historical mission 
that no realpolitik, and no civil society, could offer: 
“There was no escape from the daily routine of misery, meekness, frustration, and 
resentment embellished by a fake culture of educated talk; no conformity to the costums 
of fairy-tale lands could possibly save them from the rising nausea that this combination 
continuously inspired.”638 
 
Authors such as Erich Fromm, Robert J. Lifton and Eric Hoffer, working on the 
level of psycho-history, tried to understand these men not by their individual 
psychological past (personal childhood and personal traumas), but through the interplay 
of social phenomena and ego-processes. Lifton, after studying the mechanisms of 
“totalism” in China, referred to this dialectic between powerlessness and desire for 
omnipotence, characteristic of the modern mass man: “Feeling himself unable to escape 
from forces more powerful than himself, he subordinates everything to adapting himself 
to them.”639 Fromm presented a tension formative of the modern individuation: on the one 
hand, the “growth of self-strength” is achieved by the formation of an organized 
personality, integrated by an individual mode of thinking and willing, which stands as a 
separated, conscious and reflexive whole. It is the constitution of personal potency. This 
process has its “negative” side: individuation also creates isolation and extreme forms of 
separation, estrangement between the self and surrounding worlds, which leads to a 
feeling of powerlessness and fear, Angst, or anxiety concerning the fragile structure of 
individual life and its limited possibilities. It is the weakening of personal potency. The 
experience of submission (to “forces more powerful than himself”) may provide a secure 
shelter against solitude and anxiety, but it is only an illusory security, for it demands the 
abolition of self-integrity and extinction of the sense of one’s own life.640 
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  Arendt acknowledged this relation between losing interest in “own well-being” 
and removing “all the worries and cares which make human life troublesome and 
anguished”.641 She did not, however, grounded the whole totalitarian process on a 
psychological essence, as if every individual psyche was predisposed to totalitarian 
submission. She stressed that those inner mechanisms could only be understood in their 
interaction with specific, visible social and political events. Along with the traumas of 
war, and the high-scale unemployment and economic crisis, she placed the dissolution of 
traditional parliamentary multi-party politics, and the abandonment of social-bourgeois 
values of respectability, self-interest, and also “apathy and even hostility toward public 
life”.642 Democratic-bourgeois “illusions” ended with the “explosion” of interwar 
traumas: the assumption, for instance, that politics was a necessary burden to organize 
private life and that neutral masses were one of the pillars of democratic stability. They 
ended with the formation of inarticulate masses who despised traditional politics, rejected 
established-social standards, and disregarded personal life.  
“The breakdown of the class system meant automatically the breakdown of the 
party system”.643 The decline of class membership and class identification around specific 
goals was met by a larger crisis of the political system, in which traditional parties ceased 
to appeal to “neutral supporters”, “members from the younger generation” and masses in 
general. Parties were soon transformed into radicalized movements, becoming “more and 
more psychological and ideological in their propaganda, more and more apologetic and 
nostalgic in their political approach.”644 The Weimar Republik, “a republic without proper 
instructions for use” (A. Döblin)645, was an exemplary period in a negative sense: 
hundreds of political assassinations, daily political fights on the streets, no recognition of 
political authority (small republics were proclaimed and dissolved within days). 
Established political forms and paths became highly distrusted, as society broke apart into 
disoriented individuals: 
 “The fall of protecting class walls transformed the slumbering majorities behind 
all parties into a one great unorganized, structureless mass of furious individuals who had 
nothing in common except their vague apprehension that the hopes of party members 
were doomed,…that all the powers that be were not so much evil as they were equally 
stupid and fraudulent.”646  
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Though Arendt indicated similarities between Nazi and Soviet totalitarianism, she 
stressed one important difference regarding the formation of mass societies in both 
contextes. While in Germany historical circumstances (post-war economic recession, 
social convulsion and democratic apathy) dissolved class-society into mass 
agglomeration, in Russia the conditions were “fabricated” by Stalin through measures of 
expropriation, purge, expulsion, imprisonment and killing of entire sectors of the 
population, between the late 1920s and 30s. Stalin destroyed political diversity by 
centralizing power within a party-bureaucracy; liquidated, for ideological reasons, “the 
property-owning classes, the new middle class in the cities, and the peasants in the 
country”, promoting artificial famine; forced collectivization of factories and farms, 
confiscation of grains, goods and instruments; and executed or enslaved millions of “class 
aliens”, and members of groups as the old bureaucracy, the urban middle-class, the 
kulaks, the technical professionals etc. Those who were not killed neither deported to the 
Gulag were left as atomized individuals facing the overwhelming force of the Soviet 
government.  
Arendt reminded that this process was even more outrageous since it was not 
justified by any political raison d’état, nor by any economic calculation (indeed, the 
purges and confiscation were “disastrous for the Soviet economy”). Being a “rational” 
ideologue and a cold calculator, Stalin aimed at the total domination of society. And, for 
that purpose, it was no longer possible to admit “the autonomous existence” of any 
activity, any group, any individual. The atmosphere of purges, denunciations and loyalty-
test divided the whole population in two classes of “whisperers”, to use Orlando Figes 
formulation: those who whispered to denounce and those who whispered to not be 
heard.647 The transformation of friends and relatives into “enemies” led “one to avoid all 
intimate contacts” in order not to be accused, and not to involve relatives in accusations 
of conspiracy, counterrevolutionaries activities, class sabotage and so on. Autonomous 
family and social life ceased to exist.648        
 
To understand the “total, unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable loyalty of 
the individual member” of totalitarian movements, one must pay attention to this multi-
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sided formation of the atomized, lonely individual. This multi-sided process disallows 
any monolithic interpretation of totalitarianism. We can see here the interplay of historical 
circumstances, ideological amalgamation, political decision, psychological conflict, 
economic breakdown. I opted to focus on the self-effacement, the phenomenon of 
depersonalization, as both a motor and a result of the emergence of “superfluous” men 
who would serve to execute and to suffer the totalitarian destiny. That is why Arendt 
remarked that the “man-destroying machinery” of totalitarianism can only succeed in 
lands with massive populations, suffering from rapid demographic growth and social 
dislocation. It can then implement its “negative population policy” – purges, robbery, 
deportation, concentration, annihilation etc. -, causing thus “great losses in populations”, 
as results from so-called necessary measures deriving from ideological premises.649  
However, before executing/suffering these losses, the masses were mobilized, 
from within, as active vehicles of what history ought to perform. The jump from 
powerlessness and atomization into omnipotent mobilization (following the sudden 
“appetite for political organization”650) was a sort of existential backlash: missing all 
affective links, rejecting daily personal goals and meaningful tasks, abhorring traditional 
social-political activities, the mass-man found in totalitarian movements an ultimate 
“place” in the world. Totalitarian movements created a fictional representation of  every-
body through the activation of an impersonal entity: the race, the class, the revolution etc. 
The result, as Arendt stressed, was not so much an horde of fanaticized (re-moralized) 
members prone to execute orders out of a new idealism. “Idealism”, for Arendt, “foolish 
or heroic, always springs from some individual decision and conviction and is subject to 
experience and argument”.651 It springs, in other words, from a distinct person related to 
others in a context of experience. Totalitarian loyalty and mobilization were rather 
product of a selfless ideological-system that glues in de-individualized members with no 
personal conviction and no “capacity for experience”.  
Lifton indicated that “brainwashed” consciences are not characterized by 
fanaticism and certainty, but by an encompassing sense of unreality, of a fundamental 
doubt on the substance of ideas, perceptions, and even personal sentiments.652 Arendt, in 
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the same line, noted that these depersonalized mass men were organized not by specific 
opinions, common interests, or articulated principles. Their organization derived from the 
“sheer force of numbers”, which created an “impermanence”, a malleability independent 
of specific ideas and objectives. What counted was the mobilization, the “perpetual-
motion mania”. What functioned as amalgamation were ideological “goals” involving 
human beings and the Earth as a whole, goals “emptied of all concrete content”, to be 
pursued by pure execution, with no space for reflection and discussion. 
From these stories and conclusions, one can move away from common 
perplexities raised by readers of texts as The Human Condition, in which Arendt 
supposedly sustained an outdated praise of personal excellence and heroism. Personality 
and political courage were thought by Arendt in contrast to events that shaped 
totalitarianism, with the formation of the “scum of the earth” and the mobilization of 
masses craving for power. Different from the liberal-individualistic answer to the 
collectivistic impetus of totalitarianism, Arendt worked on a more subtle revaluation of 
the person within political interactions. Defending a sort of “individual without 
individualism”653, she criticized both the apathetic self-reference of the bourgeoisie, and, 
more decisively, the in-human processes that instilled that totalitarian “virus” within a 
system that functioned by its own, almost impersonally.  
Arendt’s description of atomization and abandonment helps her reader to 
formulate a theory of personality: one which is rooted in the world, attached to a social 
texture (family, friends, professional and cultural relations). Instead of “heroes” with no 
personal ideas, no egos, and no practical accountability, merely mobilized around 
fictional realities and mystical goals, she thought of responsible citizens acting towards 
visible and concrete aims. Arendt knew that tedium and loneliness, contemporary 
phenomena of mass societies, when added to a profound sense of powerlessness, create 
politically dangerous configurations. Against the seduction of ideology and totalistic 
mobilization, she did not offer “fairy-tales”. Neither did she preach absolute re-
individualization through cynicism. She rather trusted the possibilities of rooted and 
socially based individuals in joining and enjoying the deliberative, linguistic-symbolic 
excitements of a public life, leading to world-care, not to world-destruction. In short, 
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Arendt worked on the very difficult project of transforming the mass-man, without the 
old expedients that fomented his alienation from power, into a responsible who.       
 
6.3 Layers of depersonalization 
Let us focus a little more on the perpetrators of totalitarian crimes. Now, I intend 
to interpret Arendt’s assertions that “the greatest evil perpetrated is the evil committed by 
nobodies, that is, by human beings who refuse to be persons.”654 In the Nuremberg trials, 
Hans Frank, general governor of occupied Poland, said that everything that had happened 
was “Germany’s guilt”.655 Eichmann told the judges in Jerusalem that he had been “a tool 
in the hands of stronger powers and stronger forces, and of an inexorable fate”.656 For 
Arendt, these justifications were more than strategies of defense. Adherents to totalitarian 
movements escaped from accountability long before the trials, during their affiliation to 
the movement, the party and the bureaucratic schemes that formed totalitarianism.  
However, to accept the formulation of “Nobody’s crime” does not a imply a 
simplistic version of “cog” or “wheel” theories, according to which Nazi functionaries 
and executors were nullified agents, simply behaving as small parts of a mechanical 
system. Arendt would agree with Primo Levi that “excessive simplifications” weaken 
historical testimony.657 She never simplified the terms of mass participation and popular 
support to totalitarian regimes. Blindly obedient, wholly passive subjects do not represent 
the nuanced picture on the diversified archetypes, social mechanisms, and political events 
that led mass men to behave as vehicles of the forces of Nazism. I believe, hence, that a 
complex approach to depersonalization, even when the subordinated individual decided 
and displayed some degrees of initiative, can bring further comprehension to that social 
legalization and normalization of crime in gigantic scales. 
So there is an encompassing tension in Arendt’s approach to totalitarian crimes, 
which can be summed up as follows: were they supra-human or simply human crimes? 
Arendt sustained that totalitarian crimes could not be integrated into a reasonable system 
of crimes and punishments. They exceeded personal human motives – as sadism, 
perversion, ambition, envy, rage, revenge -, and could not be understood in terms of a 
specific relation between killer and killed, between thief and robbed object/person. For 
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Arendt, that crime could be hardly punished as it could be not understood, for the victims 
were completely innocent and, moreover, nothing of their personal acts, historical records 
and individual situation were taken into consideration by those who attacked them. In 
1946, discussing Karl Jaspers’ Die Schuldfrage (translated to English as The Question of 
German Guilt), Arendt reminded that all gassed victims were innocent (completely non-
guilty [Unschuld]), so their suffering could not be comprehended as a punishment, legal 
or not, to something they had objectively done or intended to do. The “disgusting usurer” 
[wiederwärtigste Wucherer] and the “newborn child” [neuegeborene Kind] were equally 
innocents, equally de-humanized and murdered by assassins indifferent to their personal 
stories.658 
More than one century before the Nuremberg trials, Hegel systematized the idea 
of right. Just in the first part of his Philosophy of Right, the Abstract Right, he approached 
the “personality” [Persönlichkeit] as one of the pillars of his system: a person freed to 
exercise his will, to create works of its own, to engage in physical and sensible relation 
with objects, to take propriety of things (and also of one’s own body and own being), to 
enter contractual relations with other persons - all these experiences grounded a juridical 
order oriented to freedom and justice. So the basic notions of illicit, fraud and crime stood 
as specific attacks (contradictions) to these “moments” in which juridical persons gained 
their integrity and security as free members of a community of justice. Punishment, in 
this sense, could never be determined in abstract, for juridical sentences must refer to 
individual cases, to whom and what has been damaged, whom provoked harm, how he 
did it etc. Moreover, punishment does not arise from a moral or psychological sentiment, 
but it is an act within the system, a sort of restoration of the original state of order, by 
negating the original negation (the one promoted by the criminal) of what is right.659 
Crime, furthermore, within a juridical system, was primarily a harm directed against the 
concept of Persönlichkeit, against the integrity of one’s propriety, body or spirit. 
Identifiable persons, as assaulters and assaulted, were required for the system of justice 
to make sense. 
Now, totalitarian crimes extrapolated this structure of right in several ways. I 
emphasize here the destruction of personality not only in a physical sense, but in its very 
concept, in its juridical and political meaning. There was no personal – concrete-factual 
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– relation between assaulter and assaulted. Moreover, attackers did not create a law of 
“exception” (or contradiction) to the system in accordance to their particular will, an 
exception that could be punished, denied and neutralized by the system. The system itself, 
through ideological and linguistic redefinition of what was right, incorporated crime, 
expropriation, subjugation as “necessary” measures for its functioning. It, thus, collapsed 
the distinction between the justice of the system and the illegality of individual acts 
perpetrated within the system. Seen from outside, the system as a whole was criminal. 
Seen from inside, the system presented itself as total justice, necessary and evident. Here, 
the case was not that of classic tyrannies persecuting specific individuals because of their 
specific acts. It was a system that functioned on a de-individualized, de-factualized basis 
(there was no trial, orders were secret, victims had no names, bodies were destroyed etc.), 
so challenging traditional interpretations and evaluations of what constituted a crime and 
what were the reasonable ways of punishing it. In this sense, it created an “abyss” for 
human comprehension, and also for juridical comprehension, standing as crime beyond 
understanding. That “crime without a name” (Churchill) collapsed the very order of right 
and justice.660 
Arendt tried to balance her analysis between the in-humanity of the system and its 
crimes, and the “humanity” of its perpetrators. When Jaspers reprehended Arendt’s 
emphasis on the in-human form of totalitarianism, she conceded that one must be careful 
to not explain away the events by reducing them to demoniac, metaphysic, super-natural 
principles. That would make unaccountable the human beings who supported 
totalitarianism. Still, the problem that Arendt faced could be summed up as follows: that 
“monstrous” system could only be formed with the support and the coordination of 
ordinary individuals. Indeed, as Hilberg noted, “when a process cuts into every phase of 
human life, it must ultimately feed upon the resources of the entire organized 
community.”661 Every sector of German society (or, in Arendt’s terms, masses of men 
coming from all social backgrounds) was implicated in the totalitarian destruction. The 
regime not only rested on massive popular support, it rested on the coordination of all 
spheres, associations, professions and governmental agencies. In some way or another, 
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the civil structure, the army, the industry, the party shared a function on the process of 
definition of victims, expropriation, concentration, destruction.662  
The coordination of all available human forces created hence an “organism” 
which transcended normal measurements of life based on acts of individuals or 
individually-based groups.663 The shocking paradox was that this organism, and its 
inhuman crimes, could only be sustained with the participation of atomized individuals. 
These individuals, however, if analyzed individually, would hardly seem maligns, or 
specifically fanatical anti-Semites.664 In politically stable contexts, they would be ordinary 
truck drivers, traders, workers, shipmen.665 Again, reminding the difference of method 
and historical context, one could think of Freud’s effort, in dialogue with Gustave Le Bon, 
to understand this radical transformation of the individual when he joins a mass. The 
transformation is not induced by an inner motive, but by mechanisms enacted, socially, 
by the mass-reorganization. Joining the mass, the individual does not necessarily relaxes 
its moral controls, giving it away to base passions. It may also perform “moral duties” 
and other selfless acts out of this insertion into a larger mass. The point is not losing self-
controls, but losing the very sense of one-self. He may alienate the inner mechanisms of 
his self to the whole group, adapting to a sort of external super-ego, embodied in the mass 
or in the figure of an appointed leader.666 
I rather call attention to the layers of depersonalization, which helped perpetrators 
to rationalize the acts performed by them as not exactly theirs. Together, these strategies 
of depersonalization helped them to accept their roles, and mitigate their acts and their 
eventual moral conflicts. They formed what, decades later, the social psychologist Stanley 
Milgram called “agentic state”, a situation in which someone transfers his acts to an 
authority (not necessarily a human authority) outside himself.667 These steps of 
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depersonalization, of regarding oneself as disconnected from one’s capacity to choose or 
to begin something of his own, also help us to contextualize Arendt’s long struggle to 
uncouple politics from necessity. The sense of irresistibility, in that context, can be 
analyzed in two dimensions: 1) ideological/mental and 2) practical/procedural. 
Ideologically, totalitarian execution was taken as the very expression of reality’s 
development, as the unfolding of a necessary process determined by the fundamental - 
historical or natural – law of reality. Totalitarian leaders no longer behaved as 
conventional politicians trying to convince people to follow their ideas or to accept their 
proposals. Hitler put himself above the conflictive opinions characteristic of mass 
democracies, identifying his will with the will of an all-determining metaphysical entity 
(“I follow”, he once said, “the path assigned to me by Providence with the instinctive 
sureness of a sleepwalker.”).668 
So, the executor could, a priori, transfer his acts to the movement itself. The 
movement, on its part, embodied the leader’s will. The leader, finally, followed the 
commands passed by reality itself. This simplistic, circular relation could only be formed 
with this creation of a “region removed from experience”, or a reality removed from 
reality - a fictional reality, in short. To be clear: this fictional reality was taken, in the 
totalitarian context, as reality itself, as a sort of supreme reality beyond empirical 
evidences. But it was fictional nevertheless. The fictional reality was based on lies or false 
images or, at best, gross exaggerations. It held, for instance, that everything opposed to 
the movement was due to a single force – the Jewish influence/spirit, the counter-
revolutionaries etc. Indeed, Nazis not only denied factual reality, they proposed an 
inversion of it: attack on Jews was a form of defense, for, in accordance to the Nazi image 
of a Jewish conspiracy, Jews controlled capitalism and communism, and every 
government opposing to Hitler. So destroying Jews was a way of defending the “body of 
the People” [Volkskörper]. Nazis talked among themselves about the “Jewish will for 
total annihilation” [totaler Vernichtungswille der Juden].669 
To this fictional formula of attack is defense, Nazism added, in their struggle 
against Jews, an aspect of cosmic justice and natural necessity. As Jews were defined as 
“criminals by nature”, their destruction, the destruction of that “pseudo-people” 
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[Scheinvolk], would not be seen as “no loss to humanity”.670 Indeed, Jews were taken as 
a factor destabilizing the ecology of reality (T. Snyder), or simply preventing the 
development of humanity to its perfected form. So the question of cosmic justice could 
also be taken as a matter of human health, or “political hygiene” [politischen Hygiene].671 
These ideas can also be condensed by what Hilberg called the “jungle theory”, a radical 
application of what Arendt, in slightly different terms, called the “unnatural growth of the 
natural”. Grounding politics on raw nature, Nazis normalized death and struggle as 
intimate expressions of organic life (“Whoever tired of the fight went under”).672 
Paraphrasing Snyder: politics was nature, and nature was struggle.673 Arendt summed up 
this conjunction of cosmic justice and natural necessity referring to murderers who “do 
not really murder but execute a death sentence pronounced by some higher tribunal.”674 
However, Arendt also reminded that these analogies and ideas, the “content” of 
totalitarian ideologies, were not exactly new. What was new was the totalitarian 
“organization”, designed precisely to translate the “lies” and the “fiction” of the 
Weltanschauung into a “functioning reality”, building up a “society whose members act 
and react according to the rules of a fictitious world”.675 Once the fictional narrative of 
ideology is accepted as the ultimate representation of reality, the movement is called to 
unfold this reality in accordance to its “laws” – the necessary laws of cosmic justice, of 
natural survival, of protective attack, of defense of blood and honor etc. In this “region 
removed from experience”, no personal motives and no psychological inclinations are 
relevant.  
Indeed, Arendt, along with others historians and chroniclers of the genocide, 
insisted in two points regarding the majority of perpetrators: one, they did not answer to 
psychological-personal drives, so they did not have pleasure in the task; two, they did not 
act to make profit. In fact, personally, if one’s thoughts, feelings and inner conflicts were 
considered, they would indicate “benign” instincts. Let us remember the Ukrainian 
volunteers whose bodies trembled before they shot women and children into collective 
pits.676 Personally, they did not want to do that – but it was needed. Regarding the non-
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economic logic of the destruction, one could only think of the costs of the genocide 
(including the hardly calculable loss of the Jewish labor force, which was destroyed, not 
explored). The cost of destruction surpassed all the material gains. The orientation was 
synthetized by Himmler when he said to the SS that they had a “moral right vis-à-vis our 
people to annihilate [umzubringen] this people which wanted to annihilate us. But we 
have no right to take a single fur, a single watch, a single mark, a single cigarette, or 
anything whatever.”677  
From a psychological-moral point of view, eventual conflicts of conscience 
followed an inverted relation between commands and instincts. As Arendt noted, they 
resisted the temptation not to rob, not to kill. The formal relation of morality was still 
there: there was the command, and the feelings resisting command. But now the content 
of command indicated an act in open contradiction to old morality (“…they had been 
subjected to a school in which current morality was turned upside down”)678. Indeed, the 
sophistication of the destruction – it started with “task-units” (Einsatzgruppen) killing, 
individually, groups of men, women and children, and ended with the impersonal 
methods of gas trucks and chambers – served the purpose of mitigating the “moral 
conflict” and psychological disintegration of the perpetrators. “These men are finished 
[Sie sind fertig] for the rest of their lives”, von dem Bach famously said to Himmler, 
complaining against the methods of killings in which the killer had to face his victim. The 
SS deserved disciplined, not neurotic servers.679 
In this line, the exterminations camps, where no one actually killed the victims 
with their own hands, and where everything was executed in a cold, efficient manner, 
were a microcosms of the structure of depersonalization and withdraw from 
responsibility. As I mentioned, the mental pattern was established by ideological accounts 
over the necessity of the events. In “moral” terms, the individual needed to overcome, in 
a higher level, the “weakness” of Judeo-Christian morality (which forbade assassination) 
and, in a lower one, its own debased impulses, malign or benign.680 In terms of execution, 
the perpetrators had a whole structure which facilitated his escape from accountability. 
The process of destruction was, as long as possible, hidden: orders were secret, evidences 
were destroyed, extermination camps and ghettos were built outside Germany, in the 
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country side of occupied territories. Moreover, everyone who felt implicated in the mass 
crime (by supporting it, by doing something, by simply observing something) was 
dragged into its “open secret”, joining a sort of collective loyalty shared by the producers 
of that “unwritten page of History”, as Himmler phrased it. In this sense, no criticism, 
internal or external, and no social conversation on the extermination was ever brought to 
public. Pragmatic criticism on specific methods were accepted. But the totalitarian goal 
of destruction stood beyond questioning. “Don’t think about it, my dear ”, recommended 
a Nazi officer to his fiancée, who had heard rumors about the extermination going on in 
deep Poland.681 Moreover, the bureaucratic use of euphemisms – “final solution of the 
Jewish question” [Endlösung der Judenfrage], “SB – special treatment” [SB, 
Sonderbehandlung], “evacuation” [Aussiedlung] etc.682 – helped the “desk murderers”, 
through the linguistic concealment of emotions and meanings carried by direct, more 
human words, to detach themselves from the reality of those crimes. 
Arendt referred to totalitarian organizations as providing “protective walls which 
separates them [members of totalitarian movements] from the outside, normal world”.683 
This was not a simplistic separation. It was rather a “carefully graduated hierarchy of 
militancy”684, in which one level is more or less fanatical, more or less ideological, thus 
establishing pales of absorption into the totalitarian secret and its functioning. This 
gradualness, nonetheless, worked within those “protective walls”, physical and 
ideological, preventing any contact with non-totalitarian world. Within the scheme of 
bureaucratic execution, the “protective walls” were provided by the parallel and 
convergent arrangement of functions. Everybody was in charge of some specific point of 
the operation, but none, except the Führer, the Volk, Nature or History, was in charge of 
the whole operation. “I wasn’t involved in that sense…Not in the operational sense”, said 
Franz Stangl about his early role, before Treblinka, as a security officer in the Euthanasia 
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(“mercy killing”) Program. He was responsible for supporting, but not doing the 
killings.685 
Behind the smoke of omnipotence, there was, again, powerlessness. As none 
could claim what they did as their own acts, they regarded any resistance, or any 
desistence, as simply irrelevant, incapable of making any difference. Becoming part of a 
totalistic atmosphere was like being a “drop in wave” – and a drop cannot resist a wave.686 
Besides the subdivision and fragmentation of functions, there was the perception that one 
was always surrounded by someone else in the bureaucratic structure. Someone always 
had superiors “doing more than he”, and subordinates “who were ready to take their 
place”.687 The accumulation of agencies, the subdivision of groups, the multiplication of 
branches, and the constant distribution of new roles created a fluid bureaucracy, 
characterized not by a static rigidity, but by an “organized” flow. The result was, in 
Hilberg’s terms, an “autonomous” process, unstoppable from within.688 
In this sense, the common justifications of the followers-of-orders is weak and 
incomplete. They were not simply following orders. First of all, as Arendt always 
stressed, a member of the Party, an SS officer and most supporters with active roles could 
refrain from their positions without punishments. They could say that they were 
psychologically unfit to a certain job. They could ask to be removed to a different 
function. With this, they would lose prestige within the Party, but nothing more. 
Moreover, historians showed that totalitarianism was not a system of detailed top-down 
orders, as in a traditional military organization. Arendt indicated that pan and totalitarian 
movements replaced the concept of law, with its public dimension of deliberation, 
revision, publicization etc., by direct decrees. Decrees are manifestations of a single, one-
sided will – the will of the leader, speaking for the tribe. Raul Hilberg described the 
“atrophy of law” in Nazi totalitarianism in the following development: laws were replaced 
by decrees, and then by simple announcements; later, local announcements were done in 
accordance to “presumed needs”; finally, written (but not public) directives were replaced 
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by oral orders and by “basic understandings”, dismissing explicit orders or 
explanations.689  
It is very likely that Hitler never wrote a formal order to kill the Jews. He only 
expressed his desire. Arendt noted indeed that a “chain of commands” tends to stabilize 
in a certain structural order. Defined orders would limit the unrestricted malleability of 
the movement , its ever expanding characters. The “supreme law” of totalitarianism, its 
single law in fact, was the “never resisting, dynamic ‘will of the Führer”.690 And this 
“will” was, as I am stressing, an atmosphere, a totalistic atmosphere, and not necessarily 
the manifested and registered will of the man called Hitler. In this line, Kershaw stressed 
how the “little Hitlers and Himmlers”, the local commanders of the SS, took initiative 
trying to “anticipate” the will of the Führer.691 These improvisations were, retrospectively, 
always justified, as the movement was, a priori, always right. They were backed by the 
infallibility of the movement. As Hilberg noted, in the same direction of Arendt, these 
decrees, resolutions and local decisions were not seen as coercive, external sources of 
power, but as “expressions of will”.692  
Thinking of totalitarian perpetrators, Arendt celebrated the prevalence, even in 
mass societies, of the court of justice, an institution “where all justifications of a 
nonspecific, abstract nature – from the Zeitgeist down to the Oedipus Complex – break 
down, where not systems or trends or original sins are judged, but men of flesh and bone 
like you and me…”.693 Courts are places of judgment, where even attenuating 
circumstances and detailed contextualization do not remove from the judged its capacity 
to determine his own acts. Part of Arendt’s judgement, intimately related to what was 
discussed and exposed in the post-war courts, involved a re-personification of those 
depersonalized beings, who had put themselves outside the scope of freedom and 
responsibility.  
 
6.4 Depersonalization of Victims 
After the First World War, Adolf Hitler argued that Jews were the ultimate cause 
of the German defeat. At that period, Hitler started to work on his distinction between 
emotional anti-Semitism [Antisemitismus des Gefühl] and rational anti-Semitism 
																																								 																				
689 Hilberg, A Destruição...., pp. 54-55 
690 Arendt, OT, p. 477 
691 Kershaw, I. Hitler. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras. 2010, p. 497 
692 Hilberg, op. cit., 1234 
693 Arendt, ‘Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship’, Responsibility and Judgement, p. 21 
 - 201 - 
[Antisemitismus der Vernunft]. The former indicated the traditional hatred, and similar 
feelings, felt by individuals against particular Jews, as subjective explosions in violent, 
though limited, pogroms. The latter, rational anti-Semitism, derived not from rage felt 
within body-emotions. It was a “rational” principle derived from the very essence of Jews, 
and the negative role this “essence” played in historical reality. Hence, a struggle against 
the essence of Jews (their race, spirit, influence etc.) should not result from irrational 
feelings of angry individuals. It should be a “legal” and necessary one, emerging as a 
purely reactive consequence of the harmful role of the Jewish substance.  
In 1933, the German physicist Max Planck confronted Hitler’s worldview in a 
private conversation. Addressing Hitler, Planck recalled the case of Fritz Haber, a Jewish-
German scientist who, through his experiments and inventions, such as the synthesis of 
ammonia, helped German military efforts in the First War (indeed, Haber became an 
inflexible nationalist, who believed that science should serve German interests. Einstein, 
his former colleague, distanced from him). So Haber was an empirical evidence against 
Hitler’s claim – like thousands of German Jews who, in one way or another, behaved as 
extraordinary or average Germans during periods of war and peace. Hitler, however, 
replied that he had enough of those distinctions between individual Jews, and “that a Jew 
was a Jew…, and now he was going to proceed against all of them.”694 Hitler was no 
longer interested in making specific distinctions between positive and negative Jews – all 
those distinctions which had been instrumental to forms of anti-Semitism grounded on 
the possibility of a Jewish “regeneration”. All Jews, for Hitler, were the same. They 
equally shared a “criminal nature”. 
Among the enemies of Nazi totalitarianism, most categories were defined 
regardless individual acts or personal opinions. Someone was persecuted not because of 
what he or she did. Targets were defined in accordance to physical, psychological or 
ethnic qualities. They were “objectively” targeted in accordance to what they were and 
carried within. Hilberg classified three types of “enemies”: people with diseases or 
physical disabilities; people considered socially or politically dangerous; and members of 
“target-nationalities”.695 Only among the second group there was a margin of self-
determination, and a verifiable connection to individual acts. Political opponents, 
conventional criminals, work-shy individuals and some of the a-social elements were 
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defined not by “nature”, but by their specific patterns of individuation and their personal 
choices. It was not the case of the two other groups. Disabled, sick, psychologically or 
physically ill, “unfit” individuals were targeted because of the shape of their bodies and 
the constitution of their physiology. They were what Nazis called “miscarriages of hell” 
[Missgeburten der Hölle]696 – mentally-ill, tuberculous, alcoholic, crippled, handicapped 
men and women, and children, considered “unworthy of life”, and “handled” with by the 
Euthanasia Program. 
Among the target-nationalities, there was a rank determining the “objective” 
position of each group according to a racial scheme. In the higher level, along with ethnic 
German, constituting the Aryan universe, there were Scandinavian, Dutch, Flemish 
people. Going down, there were Czechs, French, Greeks, and, finally, the lower strata of 
European races, as Russians, Poles and Ukrainians, unfit to Germanization and, in 
accordance to Nature’s design, fit to be expropriated, explored and subjugated. Below 
Poles, there were Roma and Sinti, classified in general as “asocial”, and subjected to racial 
laws similar to those who affected Jews.697 In the bottom of the racial scale, outside the 
scope of humanity, as sub-humans (Untermenschen), there were Jews, “criminals by 
nature”. These groups were what Arendt called “‘objective enemies’ of History or Nature, 
of the class or the race.”698  
In this sense, totalitarian movements were machines designed to de-pluralize 
humanity, committing crimes which extrapolated the civic relations between individuals, 
and entered the realm of human relations between peoples, nationalities and social groups. 
Arendt characterized this need for “new obstacles that have to be eliminated”699 as 
intrinsic to totalitarianism, to an extent that “…as soon as one category is liquidated, war 
may be declared on another.”700 The “logic” of movement and purification requires 
external groups which cannot be “Aryanized” (or “humanized” in racial terms), deserving 
to die. That’s the only way of sustaining the perpetual “growth” of the totalitarian 
organism. In USSR, the old ruling class was purged, then kulaks became the new target, 
and, after that, specific nationalities and certain geographical groups were defined as 
opposing the flux of revolution. Jews, in special, ceased to be a cultural or national group. 
They became instead, as Arendt noted, a “principle”, a metaphysical object. Submitted to 
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fictional “objective” criteria of racialization701, Jews entered the biological politics of 
Nazis as a negative collective-organism whose function was to contaminate the racial 
ecology.  
To use Arendt’s vocabulary: the plurality of their “who” – the unending variety of 
personal stories performed by individuals as Rahel Varnhagen, Heinrich Heine, Moses 
Mendelssohn, Gerson Bleichroder, the little Mr. Cohn, the forgotten pariah and the 
assimilated parvenu, the West and the Ostjude, the religious and the secular, the captain 
Dreyfus, the prime-minister Benjamin Disraeli and the revolutionaries Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht, the “disgusting usurer” and the “newborn child” -, everyone (alive 
or dead) who formed the Jewish people was reduced into a what – a defined set of 
qualities, an abstract object with pre-determined attributes. They disappeared to the 
human world way before the actual disappearance of their bodies in extermination camps, 
as they lost their faces, names, and they capacity to constitute individual biographical 
paths. As even Jewish children were inflicted by the “criminal nature”, the people as a 
whole was marked to be confined, degraded, expropriated, and finally annihilated.  
Regarding this ideological de-humanization, the historian Claudia Koonz recalled 
the memories of a former Hitler Youth [Hitler-jugend] member, who watched the Gestapo 
taking away all the Jews of his village, including Heinz, a boy who was his friend. Instead 
of lamenting the deportation of his friend, the HJ member simply reasoned “What a 
misfortune Heinz is Jewish.”702 Arendt noted that ideology blocks one from experiences 
of life. In this case, the HJ teenager neutralized his feelings, and the affective memories 
related to the experience of friendship, for the sake of an “idea” – the idea that Jews were 
necessarily evil. He could not invalidate his ideological reasoning based on his experience 
of life, on the positive, empathetic relationship he had established with Heinz. The 
compulsion of ideology assumed a force of “reality” stronger than the reality of one’s 
personal emotions and stories. As ‘objective enemies’ were removed a priori from the 
definition of humanity, all human affections towards them (sympathy, indifference, 
admiration, curiosity, and even resentment and hatred) were replaced by the impersonal 
function ascribed to their “essence” according to a totalizing ideology.    
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One of the most important references concerning this topic, among all the sources 
and findings of my years of research, is Emil Fackenheim’s emotional lecture at the 
University of Oregon, in a 1996 seminar entitled “Ethics After the Holocaust”. 
Fackenheim proposed a specific human ritual as the “beginning of human civilization”: 
the funeral of individual human beings. Breaking with the past, pre-historical habit of 
leaving dead corpses in open field, to be eaten by animals and exhausted by putrefaction, 
men and women decided to acknowledge the humanity of those who passed away by 
making them specific memorials. Human graves paid a tribute to human individuality and 
uniqueness: “This is a person. He is or was unlike any other.” For Fackenheim, 
contrastingly, human civilization came to an end when Nazis tried to exterminate even 
Jewish ashes, for “even the Jewish ashes contaminated the world”. By using ashes to 
“trample on”, by mixing it with sand, or throwing it away into rivers, they denied Jews 
not only the right to live, but the right to die humanly.703 
This collapse of civilization, or historical tradition – for what many regarded as 
“human nature” was in fact a “nature” historically constituted around principles and 
practices which had “civilized” man, including the memorization of the dead - grounds 
Arendt’s assertion that the living-dead of the camps had undergone an experience worse 
than physical finitude: total oblivion.         
“The real horror of the concentration and extermination camps lies in the fact that 
the inmates, even if they happen to keep alive, are more effectively cut off from the world 
of the living than if they had died, because terror enforces oblivion.”704 
 
For Arendt, one of the origins of totalitarianism was the ethnical competition, and 
its reorganization in a geo-political order that, as we have seen, displaced millions of 
people. Totalitarian realization, on its turn, required a deepening on the losses of the 
individual – loss of governmental protection, loss of nationality etc. – towards a 
fundamental loss of his own existence, of his own person. Arendt called it the “deaths” 
which an individual suffered before his actual physical death. It was a process of gradual 
disappearance of Jews and other objective enemies. It was not the natural disappearance 
of bodies affected by diseases or by aging, but the politically-human disappearance of 
groups dominated, manipulated and destroyed. Arendt stressed that totalitarianism is only 
implemented when it executes its ideology into reality. In this sense, the Jewish 
metaphysical “principle/attributes” of criminality, degeneration, pollution etc., held by 
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the Nazis as axiomatic, came into being in the Lager, where Jews were mixed with 
conventional criminals, turned into a band of miserable living-corpses, demoralized, 
decaying, struggling for every inch of bread, and agonizing in in-human conditions. The 
central myth of Nazi ideology was produced.  
 This leap from ideology into reality required the camps as a central institution of 
totalitarianism – an institution designed not to explore, not to reeducate, not to punish, 
but simply to destroy human beings. The first step of destruction was the death of the 
“juridical person in man”. Objective enemies had no documents, they were not backed by 
any recognized rights, and the camp itself felt outside the “normal penal system”. That 
was the death, in other terms, of the formal personality. Without documents, without a 
name and an identity card, those men and children lost their capacity to do something, to 
act, even if acting criminally.705 The objective enemies, called “pieces” [Stücke] by the 
SS officers, “renamed” by numbers, were now lawless bodies “most suitable [group] for 
thorough experimentation in disfranchisement and destruction.”706  
The second step towards total disappearance was to kill “the moral person in 
man”.707 For Arendt, the removal of those bodies from a human community made moral 
initiative impossible. With no public space for testimony and discussion, with no 
remaining instinct of justice to appeal to, camp inmates had no meaning and no purpose 
for acts of rebellion, resistance and martyrdom. The “organized oblivion” emptied 
conscience, for there was no moral alternatives in a place where written and spoken 
words, where “Grief and remembrance”, where reflection and thinking were forbidden or 
simply destroyed. Primo Levi insisted throughout his work that only the “worst” could 
survive the camps. A survivor needed to be stripped from every moral reserve, from every 
principle or ideal, to had a minimal chance of outlasting the Lager. Those were, for 
Arendt, “conditions under which conscience ceases to be adequate and to do good 
becomes utterly impossible…”.708  
This moral annihilation was perfected by the fact that victims were forced “to 
behave like murders”, to be implicated in their own crimes, being compelled to denounce 
their compatriots, to throw them into chambers, or to trigger the buttons of machines of 
assassination, thus “blurring the line” between “the murderer and his victim”.709 This 
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complete demoralization meant the very death of death. Arendt had already indicated this 
totalitarian tendency of robbing the dignity and the meaning of death in her early article 
“Not One Kaddish710 Will Be Said”, written in 1942, even before learning about the 
implementation of killing camps. She referred to dead who “leave no written wills behind, 
hardly so much a name”.711 By intending to kill not only bodies, but a whole group – with 
its symbols, memories, rituals, traditions, and personal stories -, Nazi totalitarianism had 
distinguished itself from the evilest aggressions in history, for it denied the participation 
of victims even in historical records. While “Achilles set out for Hector’s funeral” and 
“the Church kept its heretics alive in the memory of men…”712, the Jewish death was 
planned to “seal the fact” that Jews had never existed, never appeared.  
The last step towards total disappearance was the death of man’s “unique 
identity”. It was the destruction of concrete personality. Arendt ascribed this process to 
the “tortures” designed not to kill the body, neither to extract a confession, but simply to 
annihilate someone’s presence. The transport in “cattle-cars”, the absence of minimal 
hygienic conditions, the shaved heads, the “grotesque camp clothing”, the medical 
“experiments”, all the manipulations of the body and its emotions – and the exploration 
of “its infinite possibilities of suffering” - had no purpose but equalizing all men as 
“beasts” or “ghastly marionettes”.713 Viktor Frankl recalled how the Muselmänner (in the 
camp jargon, the living-dead), marching with no soul behind their eyes, with no trace of 
visible human emotions, resigned to die soon, were already lost for life, even before the 
concretization of their deaths.714 Arendt referred to these men as examples of human 
beings transformed into a “human animal”, lacking the spontaneous responsiveness of 
vivid animals. They only “reacted”, they ceased to affirm their identity, their unique 
existence, “without protesting”715, for they were already destroyed. 
Here, Arendt linked this personal uniqueness with man’s spontaneity. No human 
response was ever possible in the camps, according to Arendt, “For to destroy 
individuality is to destroy spontaneity, man’s power to begin something new out of his 
own resources”.716 Man, removed from his own individuality and uniqueness, becomes 
finally a no-body, incapable of even suffering his own death. Life was finally de-
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constructed. A new form of being was fabricated by totalitarian masters. Nazis tried to 
master, control and destroy what depended, for Arendt, “on forces that cannot be 
controlled by the will”. Arendt stressed that uniqueness is “shaped in equal parts by 
nature, will, and destiny”, all those interactive realities and forces which were in part 
given to, in part acted upon by individuals, and whose ultimate resources (inner feelings 
and thoughts)  could be preserved even in isolation. But not in the camps, whose sole 
purpose was the destruction of every stratum of human existence. 
Jews, transformed into One Jew, collectively disappeared in the trains, where they 
were “glued to each other”, and in the “gas chambers which, if only because of their 
enormous capacity, could not be intended for individual cases but only for people in 
general”.717 Vassili Grosmann, in his report from Treblinka, recalled how people were cut 
off from “freedom, home, country, belongings, letters, pictures of beloved ones”, then 
from “mother, wife, son”, and then from documents and name; in the barracks, cut from 
the “sky, stars, wind and sun”, until the last “circle of Hell”, the gas chambers, where, 
without oxygen and with broken bones, pressed against each other, covered by a “deadly 
sweat”, they “died as if they were one single person”.718 This was not the death of the 
soldier, of the condemned criminal, of the oppressed martyr, of the conquered hostage. It 
was the disappearance of a whole people.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
‘AN EMANCIPATION OF HIS OWN’: WILL THE PARIAH APPEAR? 
 
7.1 Stories versus Ideology 
We will see soon that one of Arendt’s clearest redefinitions of the pariah relied on 
four figures, three of whom were story-tellers: Heine, Chaplin, Kafka. The fourth, Lazare, 
can be said also a teller, and a spectator, of political stories. Story-teller, along with 
political thinker, was one of the self-descriptions Arendt preferred, as she sought to 
ground her words on enacted experiences. As we have seen, the process of 
depersonalization, along with the emergence of a radical-banal evil719, depended on 
ideological reasoning. Ideology, in Arendt’s sense, neutralized feelings, destroyed 
autonomous thoughts, invalidated moral evaluations, as it operated as a purely mental, 
self-sufficient system, independent of thinking human beings. Developing a single idea 
via logical implication, ideology was completely immune to experiences, opinions, and 
judgements of a plurality of actors. It moved circularly, within a tautological whole. 
For Arendt, philosophy was definitely not ideology, but they shared disturbing 
similarities. In its canonical method, philosophy aimed to form a pre-experience (a priori) 
body of knowledge, grounded solely on mental “experiences”. Based on rational-logical 
necessity, it would dismiss the personal voice or the particular view of the philosopher, 
for the philosopher does not speak with his own voice, but from an “universal” view-
point. Philosophy aims to abstract – to extract from what is unique– general conditions 
which function as a common denominator above temporal and contextual variations. In 
its attempt to organize knowledge, philosophical classification aims at confining the real 
in unequivocal  categories. It usually dismisses lower methods as exemplifications, for 
examples, always particular, lack the generality and unlimited validity intended by 
philosophy.  
Arendt also regarded as wordless, that is, as unpolitical, the so-called social 
sciences. Based on abstract types, defined by statistical calculation of dominant qualities 
or patterns of social groups, these “sciences” are “by no means a harmless scientific 
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ideal”.720 They may inflict a double political “harm”: by turning political processes into 
predictable and knowable objects of “science”, and by extracting this scientific stability 
from qualities verifiable in social majorities. Indeed, it is properly called a social science, 
for the social, as we have seen, aims at uniformity and predictability. From a political 
point of view, though, the social and its “large numbers of people” shows an “irresistible 
inclination towards despotism”, especially the despotism of “majority rule”.721 Social 
types and dominant social trends, deduced from mathematical calculations (“quantitative 
methods”) or by the definition of the what-ness, the common attributes of individuals 
coded or labeled in the same categories, “aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his 
activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving animal.”722 Automatism, 
behaviorism, conformism are both “scientific” and “social”, for they neutralize the 
unpredictability and spontaneity inherent to human plurality.  
There is an irony at this point. Social (or human) sciences claim to deal with 
empirical reality. As opposed to philosophical speculation, theological dogmatism, 
ideological self-closure etc., social sciences would focus on the real, on what really is 
there, concrete reality. But Arendt indicated that social sciences carry within unrealistic 
premises and powerless conclusions. They depict only a small parcel of reality. Indeed, 
they reduce or even falsify reality by producing an “object” which exists only in terms of 
social abstractions and groups comparison. They have little to offer to the political, in 
Arendt’s sense, for the political is the space of concrete persons, a space where unique 
agents perform indeterminate acts. A race or a class could be a proper object to the science 
of society, but no race neither class has ever acted on history without the enactment of 
stories by actors and persons, who transcended the abstract denominator of their social 
groups. Indeed, a science of social behaviors and patterns relies not only on a-political, 
but on an anti-political world-picture, in which humans are taken as explainable objects, 
as predictable, thus, as controllable beings. Its methods can be, as they actually are, 
appropriated by techniques of domination and manipulation, based on the determination 
and anticipation of certain reactions to predefined stimulus.  
Arendt moved away from this modern obsession with objective ideas and 
scientific models, which dismissed individuality and “non-behavior”. She moved closer 
to stories of life and public experiences. In this sense, “experiences” meant for her almost 
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the opposite of “experiments”. Experiences are not produced by techniques of 
“management”. They are enacted by spontaneous (that is, non-coerced, non-controlled) 
political agents interacting with each other. They relate to contingent, possible 
actualizations of what was not necessary, so they cannot be foretold, anticipated by 
theory, ideology or models of predictability. They do not relate to the simplicity of well-
defined ideas, but to the complexity of human characters, always shaped by multiple 
emotions, by plural interests, by non-identical intentions. No analytical fragmentation, in 
Arendt’s view, would be ever capable of reducing a person to a stable object or to a single 
intention. Complete stabilization would mean the death of the individual’s vitality. 
Moreover, what is decisive in stories of life is not the dispute over cognitive 
values, not the truth or the falsehood of this or that idea, but the detailed appearance of 
someone, his spoken words, his relation to others who are also acting, speaking, deciding, 
and thinking. World War II, for instance, could be said a battle between ideas only in a 
reductive sense. Even if it was presented by Nazis as a cosmic conflict, it was in fact the 
result of “webs of relationships” consolidated by the words pronounced by Hitler, by his 
megalomaniac and also ideological decisions, by what Frenchmen did, and specially did 
not, by what Churchill, who “mobilized the English language”, said and decided to do, 
and how he persuaded his compatriots to act, and so on. Arendt affirmed that history, with 
its “follies and vanities”723, was nothing but a collection of stories.  
She also went back to the Aristotelian definition of stories and artistic plays as 
“imitations of action”.724 According to Aristotle, “drama” and “practice” were intimately 
related in Greek etymology: to act was “dran”, for Dorians, and “prattein”, for 
Athenians.725 Moreover, for Aristotle, poetry and theatrical representations would be a 
form of “delightful learning”, in which the spectator learns something, grasping its 
meaning by seeing and hearing, even if seeing and hearing “painful objects”. In this line, 
the ancient-modern gap can be illustrated by the original meaning of theory, almost the 
opposite of its modern resignification: while Greek theoria meant “looking at”, modern 
theory implies something purely “rational”, detached, and different, from “practice”. 
“Seeing” was indeed the first experience exemplified by Aristotle in his famous opening 
of Metaphysics, in which he compared man’s propensity to learn with man’s delight in 
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using his senses.726 Arendt noted this, along with her observation on the “Hebrew truth, 
which was heard”727 and the experience of telling and hearing stories as the supreme 
source of wisdom in the Jewish tradition. Not coincidentally, she quoted in the same 
passage Kant’s critique of judgment, grounded, as we saw, on sensible and imaginative 
capacities to see, feel and speak about aesthetical experiences. 
Stories, in this line, are the locus of uniqueness. They are eminently political, for 
the “personal element in man”, its daimon, “can only appear where a public space 
exists.”728 This political space of stories (“which extends far beyond what we ordinarily 
mean by political life”729) shelters personal uniqueness in two senses, one related to the 
unique way of doing, and the other to the unique way of telling what was done. While 
philosophy aims at establish compelling reasons and general truths, while ideology 
assumes to have found the “key” to reality, and while social sciences search for patterns 
of explanation, causation and certainty, story-telling moves in the imaginative space of 
wisdom and wonder, of identification and estrangement. It seeks to establish meaning, 
and also to dispute and amplify meaning. If ideology, and philosophy and social sciences 
in lower degrees, aim at offering a final depiction of reality, or a compelling reason to 
“solve” a problem, or to “conclude” a mental process, story-telling and story 
interpretation move in the sphere of what can be “spoken about”, of what is inherently 
tied to public and open forms of political, social and cultural conversations. Moreover, if 
ideological fictionalization replaces reality with frozen images, stories aim at 
reestablishing reality in its complexity, in its several dimensions and multiple angles. In 
stories, the pretension of knowing all at once is replaced by seeing, contacting, feeling, 
grasping one’s presence: Jews, kulaks, whatever group or individual is not be defined as 
objects from “the world of sheer mental effort”730: they are rather humanized as living 
persons, not identical but not radically different from other actors living the drama of life. 
If the Hitlerjugend member payed attention to his story with Heinz, he would have 
discarded the grotesque falsehood of the Nazi premise that Jews are “criminals by nature”. 
Story would have defeated ideology. 
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Standing somewhere between the mere facticity of events and the detached 
explanations of periods of long duration, stories have another political implication: they 
may change patterns of behavior. As we have discussed, Arendt left untouched the 
minimal basis of “bare facts”. “Facts are beyond agreements and consent…”.731 I 
indicated, however, that her view did not imply a belief on an independent objectivity of 
facts – for facts need to be established and interpreted in a community of shared meaning. 
As an example of her view, she mentioned the period of Jewish secularization, when Jews 
lost “their faith” on a sacred beginning and culmination of history, so “Jews lost their 
guide through the wilderness of bare facts”. Without exemplary and foundational stories, 
without interpretative or inspirational principles, there is only random pragmatism and 
even systematic confusion, “for when man is robbed of all means of interpreting events 
he is left with no sense whatsoever of reality”.732  
So the entry-point to the collection of stories forming history is already an exercise 
in political possibilities. Arendt praised the historian, and her friend, Salo W. Baron for 
having challenged traditional meta-stories of Jewish historiography – in particular, the 
emphasis on suffering. His “anti-lachrymose” view, emphasizing factors others than 
tragedy and persecution, intended “to unlock hidden and undiscovered doors of Jewish 
history” and to establish elements that “had remained unexplored or unappreciated”.733 
What was crucial, he did it relying on facts, not only on newer principles or ideas. Telling 
forgotten stories, or telling stories from different narrative angles, make us challenge that 
tendency of freezing living experiences in rigid Weltanschauungen. Moreover, a 
renovated story-telling reminds us of “hidden traditions”, suppressed memories and 
unexpected events, whose significance point to the originative plurality of human 
experiences, as human beings are not tied to necessary plots and predetermined scripts.    
 
7.2 Disclosing the pariah 
Telling pariah-stories was one of Arendt’s way of exploring and pointing to new 
possibilities. Replacing the historiographic principle of passive-objectivity with a 
combination of story-telling and story-judging, Arendt’s approach to the experiences of 
anti-Semitism, imperialism, totalitarianism ran parallel with her claim for a “new law” to 
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guarantee human dignity. As we have seen in this work, her pariah-stories were 
accompanied by several interpretations: Jewish passivity, the decision of Jews of staying 
out of history, was interpreted with the principle of interaction. It was taken a combination 
of external forces limiting the paths opened to European Jews and, on the other side, inner 
tendencies of Jewish communities, like the inability for political articulation. In general 
terms, Arendt described and criticized the emphasis, running throughout 18th and 19th 
centuries in Europe, on economic and social forms of relations between hosts and pariahs. 
From a Jewish angle, this led to models in which emancipation was mistaken as 
assimilation – conformation to society. Instead of praising assimilation as an example of 
the (“famous and infamous”) Jewish adaptability and respectability, she considered it one 
of the main factors to the destruction of Jews. It reinforced homogeneous social forms (in 
which anti-Semitism remained unchecked) and destroyed the already fragile political 
institutions of European Jews. In broad terms, after centuries, the pariah lost even his 
precarious instrumental status of tolerated, becoming simply the “scum of earth”. 
Facing the “end of humanity”, Arendt not only vindicated a “new principle”, but 
worked deeply on new understandings and new terms for dealing with “the elementary 
problems of human living-together”.734 One of her early indications of the renewed 
principles and examples that would become central to her work was her article The Jew 
as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition, first published by the magazine Jewish Social Studies in 
1944. The text is itself an example of Arendt’s proposal to regard the past, and its 
forgotten possibilities, as a “force”, not a “burden”, to inspire new modes of human 
actualization and political organization. Arendt’s resignification of the pariah was already 
an active attempt to begin anew, starting with a new look on what is normally taken as a 
frozen, static collection of necessary occurrences, the past. She refused Weber’s 
“objective”, neutral sociological description of a people outside society, outside politics, 
only inside a fragile economic relation. She searched instead for political, or pre-political, 
examples of pariahs who, in some way or another, rejected the oppressive outcast-
conditions. In this sense, Arendt referred to the “pariah as a human type – a concept of 
supreme importance for the evaluation of mankind in our day”.735 In broad terms, the 
reorganization of humanity required the appearance, the disclosure of the pariah, his 
rescue from the “holes of oblivion” where he radically disappeared.  
																																								 																				
734 Arendt, ‘What is Authority?’, p. 141 
735 Arendt, ‘The Jew as a Pariah: a Hidden Tradition’, TJW, p. 276 
 - 214 - 
This hidden tradition has a double meaning. Pariahs were hidden by “other 
peoples” who had taken the “credit” for great Jewish writers, giving in “return” more anti-
Semitism (Jews were “acclaimed father of every notorious swindler and mountebank”).736 
Kafka became a strict Czech writer, Heine a national poet of Germany, and Lazare, un-
orthodox compared to most Zionists and French socialists, simply forgotten: “Even his 
memory has faded”.737 When recalled by Europeans, they were put on lists of individuals 
who “might conceivably claim Jewish descent”, but who were no longer alive. Lists were 
actually “mass graves for the forgotten”. When recalled by Jews, they normally served 
“assimilationist propagandists” or “parochial records” trying to prove Jewish geniality. 
Their authentic uniqueness was concealed both by “other peoples” that erased their 
specific Jewish character, and by Jews who tried to normalize them as cases pro-
assimilation.   
However, their meaning, for Arendt, rested on their refusal to assimilate to “other 
peoples”, “to ape the gentiles” and “to play the parvenus”. They “did the most for the 
spiritual dignity of their people”, for they rejected at the same time parochialism and 
abstract universalism. They “were great enough to transcend the bounds of nationality 
and to weave the strands of their Jewish genius into the general texture of European 
life…”.738 They were a counter-example to assimilation, examples of what emancipation 
“really should have been – an admission of Jews as Jews to the ranks of humanity.”739 
“[F]rom Salomon Maimon in the eighteenth century to Franz Kafka in the early 
twentieth”, they existed in a “variety of forms”. Against the anti-Semitic “principle” of 
Jewish corruption, against the premises of an abstract assimilation to universalism, 
against the restricted imagination of the parvenu, the Jew as Pariah provided “an 
alternative portrayal of the Jewish people”.740 They were not imagined as an “ideal type”; 
they rather existed in “historical actuality”, as examples of who Jews had been, and who 
others Jews could have taken as example. 
The four pariah selected by Arendt were writers and artists. Since they could not 
be free as Jews, as themselves, their emancipation came by “the sheer force of 
imagination”. Since world-structures could not accommodate their condition, they 
performed a unique, extra-political experience of emancipation: “they started an 
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emancipation of their own, of their own hearts and brains”.741 They relied on words, 
thoughts, images to judge the tendencies of their contexts and refuse participation in the 
dominant social trends of their epochs. They underwent so, as pariahs, a political 
transformation, from passive members of a sociologically-described group into unique 
voices reflecting the experience of oppression, criticizing their societies from a estranged 
position. 
 
7.3 Heinrich Heine and Bernard Lazare: nationalism meets humanism 
The first pariah analyzed by Arendt was Heinrich Heine. Actually, according to 
his birth certificate, Harry Heine. He experienced formal assimilation (conversion and 
name-changing), but he regretted it, referring to the “Jew in me that can never be washed 
off”.742 Unlike assimilationists, he was not ashamed of his Judesein. Indeed, Judaism did 
not mean for him a theological system, a biological essence, nor “some extraordinary, 
mystic power”. Heine’s definition of Judaism meant the “homespun Judaism of everyday 
life”: the Jewish faces, names, sounds and images, and the Jewish food. Arendt recalled 
Heine’s singing of the “Schalet”, a Jewish stew made of meat, potato, beans and barley, 
which could have worked as a true approximation of people, for it would happen around 
the table: 
“Schalet, shining gleam from Heaven, 
Daughter of Elysium! – 
Schiller’s ode would sound like this if 
He had ever tasted schalet.”743 
 
Heine did not hesitate in embracing the warmth of Jewish circles, that atmosphere 
of closeness and human affection, which Arendt regarded as typical of pariah societies. 
The atmosphere became especially warm on Friday evenings, when the “Princess 
Sabbath” is transmuted, by magic, from a “hairy monster” [Das behaarte Ungeheuer] 
into an “enchanted princess”. The Jewish weekend, the moment of rest, family reunion 
and prayer, was for Heine a magical moment when the dog becomes a man, when the 
monster becomes a princess, when Jews are allowed to enter a dignified form of human 
existence. Despite its economic successes, Jews were social and political “dogs”, they 
suffered not necessarily a material, but certainly a spiritual humiliation six-days a week. 
But not on Friday, a day Heine described not without his typical humor: 
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“Human now, with human feelings, 
Head and heart uplifted proudly, 
Dressed in clean and festive clothing, 
He goes in his father’s mansion.”744 
 
This humored praise of Jewish tradition – better said, of Jewish things, flavors, 
experiences – contrasted to the parvenu acculturation, in his ironic advise to his “good 
wife”, who had never heard of Jewish poets: 
“I’d advise you, my beloved, 
To make up what you’ve neglected , 
And to learn the Hebrew language; 
Drop the theater and concerts, 
 
Go devote some years of study 
To this subject – you’ll be able 
To read all of them in Hebrew, 
Ibn Ezra and Gabirol”.745 
 
But the “human existence” – the Friday evening – of Jews fades away (“His name 
is Israel. A witch’s magic [Hexenspruch] / Has transformed him to a dog.”). Arendt 
located in Heine the pariah’s “attitude of denying the reality of the social order and of 
confronting it, instead, with a higher reality”.746 Heine’s higher reality, according to 
Arendt, was natural reality, assumed as a realm untouched by the injustices of that human 
artifice, a realm where all men were born equal, and whence Heine could criticize – 
indeed, mock – society, and its “slaves and tyrants” as both “unnatural”. Reflecting a 
sense of powerlessness, Heine attributed to a “magic” force that transformation of Jews 
(“dogs”) into humans. Arendt also related this mixture of rejection and powerlessness, 
this “lack of social roots”, this distrust in the possibilities of actual change within given 
societies, to “the Jewish tendency towards utopianism”.747 What, according to Arendt, 
rescued Heine from becoming an unhappy consciousness, from becoming a frustrated 
revolutionary or an ineffective publicist, was, simply, his “creativity”.  
Heine kept himself distant from doctrines and dogmas. Mocking himself for 
having embraced once more the “old superstition” (the belief in a “personal God” but 
remaining “free from any attachment to a Church”), Heine declared his willingness to 
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“make peace with God and the world” while promising to burn his own offensive poems, 
for “It is better for the verses to burn than the verse maker”. Heine knew that his positions 
would bother schools of German thought: the “high clergy of atheism” and his former 
colleagues, the Hegelians, trained to endure “the vertiginous mountain-paths of the 
dialectic”.748 He also replied to anti-Semitism not with apologies, with serious 
disputations, with theological demonstrations, but with his “fearlessness” and “divine 
impudence”749, with mockery, again, as in Disputation, when he gave voice to a rabbi 
who argued with a priest over the accusation of Deicide: 
“That it was the Jews who killed him [Christ] 
Is a hard thing to say now 
Since the corpus delicti vanished 
Three days afterward somehow.”750 
 
Arendt observed that “laughter does not kill” and “mere amusement” is 
insufficient to change a social order.751 But the poet task in not to start a rebellion, but to 
inspire it. In this sense, Heine accomplished something big. When assimilated Jews 
avoided any mention to Hebrew words (when they shaved they beards, ran away from 
their cousins recently arrived from Poznan, when they replaced the word Jude in their 
newspapers), Heine practiced “that true blending of cultures of which others merely 
talked”. Combining critique and irony, idealism and mockery, he mixed Hebrew, Yiddish 
and German words, as in his celebration of the Schlemihl (“We are descended / From 
Schlemihl ben Zuri-shaddai”752), an Yiddish word for the “unlucky”, a word that entered 
the German vocabulary through a novel of the writer Adelbert von Chamisso. Because of 
this, we learn from Heine’s mockery, “Schlemihl…got German Civic rights – I mean the 
word did.”753 Through Heine, at least Jewish words could be emancipated. 
Speaking “the language of a free man”754 ( Arendt also placed him “among the 
most uncompromising of Europe’s fighters for freedom – of which, alas, German has 
produced so few”)755, Heine built his politics with laughter as an instrument. Singing in 
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the “sleepless night of the exile”, the actual exile in France or the imaginary exile of the 
“lord of dreams”, he made fun of religious men, of Prussian censors, of French culture, 
of German “spirit” (“Oh German soul, how nobly you soar – At night when you are 
dreaming”), especially of the German aim at hegemony and organic unity, which could 
only be achieved in the “airy realm of dreams” [Luftreich des Traums], abstract 
imagination and fictitious sovereignty: 
“But in the airy realm of dreams 
Our sway is uncontested 
Here we exist unfragmented [Hier üben wir die Hegemonie] 
And rule without a murmur [Hier sind wir unzerstückelt] 
The other nations of the earth [Die andern Völker haben sich] 
Developed on terra firma. [Auf platter Erde entwickelt]”756    
 
His winter’s tale to Germany rendered him the label of anti-German, pro-French 
(the offenders did not have the trouble of reading his remarks on French culture on those 
days), and his Jewish condition made him an “unknown author” in Nazi anthologies. 
Heine, however, was not pro or contra this or that nation. He was in favor of the Schalet, 
the Shabbat dinner, the “German air” and “Rhine’s water flowing”, the German language 
(hearing it, his heart “began / To bleed away with pleasure”), in favor of the freedom to 
think and read whatever pleased him (“My head is a twittering nest of books / Good 
enough to be confiscated.”), and of “A newer song, a better song” that would announce a 
new world to be built, the “Kingdom of Heaven on earth” – Wir vollen hier auf Erden 
schon / Das Himmelreich errichten.757 And, anticipating the rage of chauvinistic 
Germans, he, who self-declared “the free Rhine’s much freer son”, announced that he 
would “respect and honor your [German] colors when they deserve it, when they are no 
longer a pointless or servile triviality”. Bringing closer nationalism (or, in his words, his 
patriotism) and humanism, Heine proclaimed that “the whole world will become 
German” if the “black-red-gold flag” was turned by Germans into “the banner of a free 
humanity”.758 That did not happen, as we know it, but Heine, the lord of dreams, proved 
that the pariah’s voice, flowing from the realm of imagination, challenging from outside 
social standards and dominant values, can bring, with its mockery and its colorful images, 
a sound, coherent, realistic (ideal-realistic) political message. 
 
																																								 																				
756 Heine, op. cit., p. 496. Heine, Ausgewählte…, p. 409 
757 Heine, The Complete…, p. 484. Heine, Ausgewählte…, p. 401 
758 Preface to Deutschland: Ein Wintermärchen (Germany: a winter’s tale). Heine, The Complete…, p. 482 
 - 219 - 
Bernard Lazare, the second pariah-form approached by Arendt, was also a 
nationalist-humanist. Indeed, we find in Lazare much of what Arendt would rework in 
her context, especially in her takeover on Jewish matters. Both shared impressive 
similarities. They refused both the abstract utopianism of world-socialists and the 
chauvinistic closure of tribal nationalists, who practiced, according to Lazare, a national-
egoism [“égoïsme des nations”]. Against assimilationists, they proudly defended the 
national character of the Jewish people. Against anti-Semites, they freed Jews from 
Jewish stereotypes, challenging prejudicial models sustained both by Jews and their 
enemies. They understood the Jewish Question in its political dimension, and demanded 
more than economic opportunities and social tolerance. They requested rights and 
platforms for action. Both defended federal structures, and a basic civic solidarity among 
peoples and individuals searching for freedom. They fundamentally praised plurality and 
diversity as the “richness of humanity”,759 and rejected dogmatism and ideology (“…et 
moi que ne suis orthodoxe en rien”)760 as obstacles to a free, uncompromised dedication 
to political affairs.      
In specific terms of Jewish politics, both belonged to the Zionist opposition. 
Lazare broke with Herzl when the latter met the Ottoman Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid for 
diplomatic conversations, after the Sultan having slaughtered thousands of Armenians. 
Zionist leaders, supposedly acting in terms of a “politique pratique (realpolitik)” betrayed 
not only the causes of others, but their own cause, their own significance as leaders of an 
oppressed, persecuted people: “this people, bleeding from its wounds, was put to the feet 
of a Sultan covered by the blood of others”.761 That kind of political articulation, “ignoring 
the means employed”, only repeated the strategies of sovereign, self-interested political 
bodies. For Lazare, Jewish emancipation implied not the configuration of a simple Jewish 
nationalism, but of a new nationalism, one that would imply not only a geographical 
migration, but a political and spiritual one. This new nationalism would require “raising 
the arm” against persecutors, and not “shaking hands” with them. In Arendt’s way, 
Lazare’s Zionism was a Zionism erected on principles of justice and freedom – for Jews 
and others. 
Indeed, this critical Zionism was, like Arendt’s, a result of Lazare’s description 
and judgement of Jewish types. As Arendt decades later, Lazare grounded his analysis 
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not on fixed, predetermined types, but on alternative models formed within Jewish 
interactions. Lazare’s contempt for the parvenu was even stronger than Arendt’s. But it 
was also “politically immanent”, for his case was not simply liking or disliking the social-
climber, but pointing to its political deficiencies. In his early article Juifs et Israélites 
(1890), Lazared depicted two, almost opposite, figures: the Jew, always searching for a 
rapid fortune and a rapid escalation in whatever position, whatever profession, and the 
Israelite, a pacified type, seeking dignified roles and producing relevant tasks. This 
simplistic distinction, still grounded on some of the prejudices of Enlightenment (as the 
negative connotation of the word Jew), almost bordering self-hatred, was nevertheless 
already relevant, for it pointed to the basic problem of un-political leaders conducing the 
destinies of Jews – the problem of a people “leaving itself to be led by undignified men” 
[“…de se lasser diriger par des indignes…”].762 
The distinction would be refined years later, in articles such as Le Nationalisme 
Juif (1898), in which the author deepened on the political problems of the parvenu and 
its project of assimilation. The fundamental problem of the parvenu was then that he 
denied the common past and the common bond of the Jewish people. He assumed it as 
dissolvable in his entering to another people or another society. He denied, in short, the 
Jewish people its existence. However, according to Lazare there is a Jewish people – “Il 
y a une nation juive”.763 Anti-semites were right in affirming the unsolvable bonds of the 
Jewish people. But they were wrong in projecting against it the essence of corruption. 
Jews are the result not of a fixed dogma, not of a racial predetermination, but of common 
stories, traditions, since nations are unified by juridical codes, by habits and by ideas, by 
a distinct name and a shared group-consciousness. Translated to Arendt’s terms, a people 
is a historical result of its works and its actions, of its words and its deeds. Away from 
seeing it as a fixed continuum, Lazare regarded the political constitution of the Jewish 
nation as requiring a “revolution among ourselves”.764 
This specific revolution would turn the “unconscious pariah” into a “conscious” 
one.765 This awareness – becoming “conscious” – is political, not philosophical: it does 
not arrive at a superior reality presented by pure thought, but it requires a confrontation 
with the apparent, public reality. There, the pariah would find the reality of its oppression 
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and exclusion, without the escapisms of assimilated (towards pure universalism) or of 
orthodox (towards pure particularism). By becoming a “conscious pariah”, he becomes 
“a rebel against” its condition – “the champion of an oppressed people”, in Arendt’s 
words, or “the soldier of human justice and fraternity”, in Lazare’s.766 He or she discovers 
the duty of the pariah according to Lazare: “it is a duty of every attacked human being to 
defend himself.”767 Arendt added to it the political imperative that Jews, when attacked 
as Jews, should defend themselves as Jews.  
The language of defense and rebellion did not imply violence, at least not in times 
when the paths for speech, initiative and persuasion are still open (violence, Arendt 
reminded, implies powerlessness, despair, impossibility to act). So, in this sense, for 
Lazare the sentence “I am a nationalist” [Je suis un nationaliste] did not mean a specific 
claim to particular goals. It simply meant “I want to be a fully free man, I want to enjoy 
the sun, I want to have the right to human dignity.”768 This national-humanism implied, 
in Lazare’s terms, an internationalism (different from world-socialism), in which nations 
would be established not by diplomatic interests and opportunities, but by a “human 
fraternity”. The suspicious of utopianism in Lazare’s message can be mitigated by his 
defense of human variety, with its prevalence of national and individual differences. 
Individual, national, political, economic, aesthetic variances were expressions of 
diversity, “la richesse humaine”.769  
Lazare’s project and vision failed in some significant ways. First, perhaps still 
grounded on a late Enlightened optimism, he predicted that Western Jews would be never 
be locked up in ghettos again, and that an “Armenian Solution” to the Jewish Question 
was unlikely.770 More fundamentally, he did not see his ideal of a Jewish nation – 
emerging from grassroots mobilization, through the politicization of masses, with the 
preference of political and moral principles over pragmatic and diplomatic considerations 
– fully realized. The dominance of the parvenu, and the illusions of assimilation, were 
kept intact until the coming of the 1930s. Arendt attributed this failure not to Lazare’s 
vision, not even to the force of the parvenu, but to the pariah’s incapacity to become 
“conscious”, to start a political struggle. The pariah, and especially the poor Jewish 
masses of the East, became a “schnorrer”, a traditional beggar of Jewish villages. That 
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is, most Jews simply accepted the standards of instrumentalism and assimilation, of 
coordination from above and orderly waited for better conditions to be handed out to 
them, not reclaimed neither made by them. Lazare did not live to see two radicals, almost 
opposite developments of this scenario: the genocide of European Jews and the creation 
of a Jewish state in the Middle East. But, as he dealt with the circumstances and the factors 
which created the Jewish “problem”, and as he offered principle-anchored judgements to 
this situation, his was a meaningful failing, as the one Arendt ascribed to K., one of the 
pariahs we will discuss in the next section: 
“But though his purpose remained unaccomplished, his life was far from being a 
complete failure.”771  
 
7.4 Chaplin and Kafka: the common man, and the little man, in a meaningless 
world 
Although Charlie Chaplin’s biographical background is a mystery, Arendt took 
him as another pariah-figure, another Jewish one, whose Jewishness – a condition that 
Chaplin himself eventually assumed, despite the lack of evidences of his real origin – 
grounded Chaplin’s artistic elaboration of the “entrancing charm of the little people”.772 
According to Arendt, Chaplin’s “own childhood had taught him two things”: a Jewish 
experience – the traditional fear of the “cop” – and a “Jewish truth” – that “the human 
ingenuity of a David can sometimes outmatch the animal strength of a Goliath”.773 
Chaplin’s pariah, his “little man”, is “virtuous” only insofar as he stands in contrast – 
even if an almost unconscious, involuntary, only improvised contrast – to an absurd order, 
whose “law” oppresses guiltless men and women, kids and girls, creating so “outlaws” 
who only want basics goods of life, like a home, a meal, a decent job. This accidental 
hero is no example of Greek virtues: he has “a thousand and one little failings”, he is 
“forever clashing with the law”, he becomes a guiltless suspect, and also an innocent 
rebel, almost unaware of the meaning of his subversive deeds. He combined, according 
to Arendt, “fear and impudence”: “fear of the law as if it were an inexorable natural 
force”, and that jumbled courage, that “ironic impudence in the face of its [law’s] 
minions”, that mocked resistance against the law-enforcers.774 
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Indeed, Chaplin reflected the “hard and real” modern world, in which innocents, 
still humanized men tried to find a way of living within societies whose authorities and 
standards became gradually senseless. In Work (1915), Chaplin is used as a horse-traction 
to a poor cart, and his sole privilege, as a horse, is to kick a policeman who blocks his 
way. Grotesque, animal-like waiters are the incarnation of authority in Immigrant (1917), 
in which Chaplin, recently arrived to the US, tries to escape the “law” of the restaurant 
where he eats with no money to pay. He had given some money away to a migrant woman 
in need. In the closing of the First War, Chaplin created peace, in Shoulder Arms (1918), 
not through force and blood, but through his typical innocent, harmless artfulness. As a 
soldier in the beginning incapable of following the rhythm of a military march (he cant’s 
keep his feet straight), he almost accidentally (not with full courage, but with a random 
luck) finds an opportunity to imprison German officers and the Kaiser himself, putting so 
an end to the war.  
Arendt indicated that, as Chaplin sharpened the critic tone of his comedy, as years 
passed by, his popularity began to decline, for masses were no longer interested in finding 
relieve in laughter. His masterpiece Modern Times (1936) came as a light, a dim light, 
when the darkness of technological control and human superfluity began to produce its 
worst outcomes. With scenes that could work as animated prologues to Arendt’s The 
Human Condition, the movie depicts a little man reduced to a little function with no time 
to scratch himself, to talk with others, to swat a fly (little tasks which are human). He 
cannot stop working in his assembly-line, for any delay impairs other workers’ 
productivity (it is a collective synchronization) and weakens the “labor force” upon which 
the industry – and the manager’s profit – depends. His time to rest is controlled by the 
manager, who is now working on a “lunch machine”, which would feed the workers 
during their work, so no break for eating would be needed. It is a proper image for 
Arendt’s concern with the fusion of the natural and the artificial, the unnatural 
combination of work and labor under conditions even more inhumane than those 
experienced by animals in the wild nature.  
Tired, with his body movements totally conditioned by the work-routine, the little 
worker has no time, no energy, no wisdom for protesting against his condition. When he 
protests, he does it accidentally, trying to give back a fallen flag, and unknowingly leading 
a mass of unemployed men. Again, he was jailed with no guilt. The rhythm of his 
mechanic oppression only changes when he finds the warmth of a girl with whom he falls 
in love. “Where do you live?”, he asked her; “No place – anywhere”. The “law” of modern 
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times imprison innocent workers, kills unemployed fathers, and chases pure orphans for 
the sake of a meaningless, absurd “order”, in which struggling for a decent job, for a 
home, a plate of food seems to be an impossible, heroic task. “What’s the use of trying?”, 
asks the girl. Chaplin’s hero – according to Arendt, “poor in wordly goods but rich in 
human experience”775 – carries a melancholic message, trying not to give in to despair.  
In that sense, without giving in, in The Great Dictator (1940), Chaplin still tried 
to recover what Arendt called “the simple wisdom philosophy of the ‘little man’”, by 
stating great and simple words as “In this world there is room for everyone”, by reminding 
that dictators, who are “machine-men with machine-minds and machine-hearts”, will 
“die”, while soldiers are “not machines, you are not cattle, you are men!”, the only men 
capable of creating a “decent world”, a world with less national barriers and more human 
solidarity. Chaplin’s ultimate appeal - “Do not despair” - was late. In Arendt’s regard, at 
that time “came the change”, and the little man ceased to be funny, ceased to accept fun 
and comedy as little remedies for life troubles and social injustices: “the little man had 
decided to be a big one”. In Arendt’s interpretation, the decline in Chaplin’s popularity 
(“This was not the idol of the thirties”) was mainly caused by the willingness of the little 
men to become a depersonalized part of a “Superman ideal”.776 Chaplin’s pariah-
evaluation was again unpopular, falling “upon unresponsive audiences”, and politically 
accurate, trying to speak to human ears over lost dimensions of their own humanity. 
 
In 1944, the same year Arendt wrote her article on the pariah, and also on subjects 
as minorities and racism, she published a “revaluation” of Franz Kafka in the magazine 
Partisan Review, for the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Kafka’s death. In the 
article, Arendt explored the tension between the deformation of the social-world and the 
estrangement felt by someone who wants to have a normal life, to do no harm. When 
social structures lack reasonable-reasons legitimizing them, when the order of reality 
seems to be built upon mysterious but necessary forces and authorities, whom no one is 
able understand or to contact, the man of “goodwill”, trying to live a normal life, becomes 
a complete stranger. This is, according to Arendt, the underlying motive of The Trial [Der 
Prozess], in which K. hires an advocate who recommends “to adapt oneself to existing 
conditions and not to criticize them”. What matter is not the truthfulness or rightfulness 
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of the social order, but to “accept it as necessary”. If the social-world remains as a 
necessary force standing beyond the quest for reasons, for meaning, for discussion of truth 
and justice, then silence or simply “lie” become “universal principles”. Lying becomes a 
necessity, a sort of “divine law”, and the trial, once the realm of justice, leads to nowhere, 
only to an unending series of deceptions and delays. 
Kafka’s experience with the bureaucracy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
according to Arendt, grounded his depiction of a world “whose senseless automatism has 
the privilege of ultimate decision”. In a context where interpretation of justice is replaced 
by regulations and mechanic procedures, instituted in anonymous routine, “a man caught 
in the bureaucratic machinery is already condemned”.777  Man, applying or obeying what 
seems to be necessary resolutions coming from nowhere, becomes, in Arendt’s words, “a 
functionary of necessity”.778 By adjusting to an unstoppable system, working as a 
“machine”,  
“man becomes an agent of the natural law of ruin, thereby degrading himself into 
the natural tool of destruction, which may be accelerated through the perverted use of 
human capacities.”779 
 
Here Arendt anticipated her analogy between necessity and nature, with the 
emphasis on the declining tendency of natural processes – the “ruin” of the natural. 
Naturalization of social processes is related, for Arendt, to social decay, to world’s 
destruction, as human beings use their “perverted capacities” to accelerate a assumedly 
blind, irresistible functioning. In this line, Arendt rejected psychological and religious 
interpretations of Kafka (suggested, for instance, by her friend Walter Benjamin ), for the 
sake of a social-political evaluation of Kafka’s strange, absurd stories. Kafka’s “hero” has 
no name, his characters “lack…detailed characteristics”, they are nobodies, only 
identified by a “role” or a “job”, which are nevertheless “indefinite”, providing to them 
no specific place in the world, no substantial existence. In this depersonalized society, 
freed from human characteristics as names, individual qualities, spontaneous acts and 
vivid emotions, “characters” aim “at some kind of superhuman perfection”, living “in 
complete identification with their jobs”.780 In depicting the main aspects of a completely 
depersonalized society, dragged into an absurd world where the absurd is done and 
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supported by human capacities, Kafka chronicled a collapsing world, even anticipating 
the darkness that came into being only a decade after his death, when victims would not 
be able to escape from the haunting-dogs of necessity: 
“The dogs are still playing in the yard, but the quarry will not escape them, never 
mind how fast it is running through the forest already.”781 
 
 In Arendt’s view, Kafka broke with the “realism” of traditional novel, which was 
based on “acceptance of society as such” and “submission to life as it happens”.782 Kafka’s 
work of art fitted the contemporary world, where “real event, real destinies, have long 
surpassed the wildest imagination of novelists”.783 He inaugurated a “documentary 
novel”, in which artistic imagination seeks to portray the structure of reality, with an 
accentuation of its most grotesque aspects. But this does not imply a “realism”, as if 
reality is contained into a predictable and limited object. Kafka’s approach meant indeed 
rejection of reality, as “he was not fond of the world as it was given to him”, and thought 
that no escape – not even into nature, as Heine imagined – could ever match the 
fundamental need to alter social-political reality. Kafka’s “documentary”, hence, is a 
novel about action, indeed, about the permanent attempt to act against the tendencies of 
a dehumanized and functionalized society. K.’s cry “I want my rights” is heard as a song 
of non-acceptance, of denunciation against the meaninglessness of social-reality. 
K.’s cry is nowhere louder than in his attempt to achieve a normal existence in 
The Castle [Das Schloss], “the one novel in which Kafka discusses the Jewish 
problem”784, according to Arendt. Lacking visible attributes, a name, a place to return and 
a place to go, “the hero is plainly a Jew”, in Arendt’s words, for “he is involved in 
situations and perplexities distinctive of Jewish life”.785 First of all, he is a rootless pariah: 
“I shall tell you something of what is keeping me here: the sacrifice I made to get 
away from home, the long hard journey, the legitimate hopes I had as a result of being 
taken on here, my total lack of assets, the impossibility of my now finding another suitable 
job back home…”786 
 
Beyond his almost anonymous designation (K.), the hero is only identifiable for 
reclaiming a job which had been promised to him, the job of land surveyor. But he cannot 
confirm his job – hence, his existence -, for he has no access to the authorities of the 
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Castle (which stands upon a distant hill), neither to any representative of the constituted 
power. His attempts to speak to someone in the castle are regarded by the villagers as 
impossible, for the authority “doesn’t even speak to people from the village, never has 
done, not even to someone from the village”. K.’s insistence in confirming his job, his 
permit to stay, and his normal existence within the boundaries of the village is defined as 
“awkward and childish” by a landlady who never met someone willing to change the way 
things are: 
“I’m not denying it’s possible, sometimes, to achieve something even completely 
contrary to regulations and in defiance of tradition, I’ve not experienced anything of the 
kind myself, though there are said to be instances of it happening, that’s as may be, but it 
certainly doesn’t happen the way you’re going about it, by constantly saying No, no, and 
taking anyone’s word for anything, ignoring even the best-intentioned advice.”787 
 
Almost every topic of Arendt’s elaboration of the Jewish question is transformed 
into art by Kafka here. The “hero”, coming from a long journey and a distant place, only 
wants to survive with dignity in a new territory. He takes authority and justice as serious 
institutions, but he can only receive from them empty promises, invalid documents, 
finding no way of directly appealing to responsible incarnations of authority. As justice 
is unachievable, as no pariah can “enter” the law, what is left is simply the illusion of 
justice, that is, bureaucracy (“Nowhere before had K. seen officialdom and life as 
interwoven as they were here”788), which only deals with “remote, invisible matters”, 
while “K. was fighting for something of the most lively proximity, namely himself”.789 
The people, the villagers, are hostile towards him, seeing his request for “the essentials 
of life” as a strange attitude790. The villagers also lack access to power, but they are 
nevertheless satisfied with the current order, and prone to justify and guard it (“Only a 
complete outsider could ask your question. Are there control authorities? There are 
nothing but control authorities”791). Instead of justice, the only thing that K. may expect, 
according to the people, is the favor of being temporarily tolerated. Social reality and 
social actors, fluctuating around impermanent roles, within an incomprehensible order 
where no one occupies a permanent space, expels the pariah, as he cannot be absorbed, 
that is, assimilated by the people, and not even rightly protected by the Castle. He stands 
alone: 
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“You’re not from the castle, you’re not from the village, you’re nothing. 
Unfortunately there’s one thing you are, though, namely a stranger, an outsider, someone 
who’s constant source of trouble…”792 
 
The trouble comes because he is willing to confront the absurd social-order with 
common sense affirmations such as: ‘I’ve not made this endless journey to be sent back 
again now’. Arendt, who lamented the lack of Jewish action but also comprehended the 
overwhelming obstacles to it, could only appreciate the rebellion started by the pariah’s 
strange words: ‘I want no favors from the castle, I want my right’.793 An order which 
denies a peaceful pariah his entrance to justice (not supreme justice, but the justice of a 
documented existence, a regular job and a place to rest) can only be seen as mysterious. 
Jews claimed for nothing more than a normal existence, for what was “natural”, “normal” 
or basic of life. At the end, they were engulfed by a process they could not understand, 
neither resist, a process with semblances of justice and authority, which only fostered 
injustice, destruction and a seemingly necessary ruin. In Before the Law [Vor dem 
Gesetz], Kafka revisited the impossible attempt to act and to achieve justice, depicting a 
common man from the country who waits his entire life in front of the building of law. 
The building is guarded by a mysterious, “powerful”, richly dressed gatekeeper, who 
repels the common man with vain promises (“It is possible…but not now”) and enigmatic 
threats (“If it tempts you so much, try it in spite of my prohibition. But take note: I am 
powerful. And I am only the most lowly gatekeeper.”). The common man did not expect 
that situation, for “the law should always be accessible for everyone”.794 But he 
nevertheless decided to respect authority, and wait for “a permission to go inside”. He 
waited his entire life before the law, until the gatekeeper granted him only the “right” to 
ask something – why no one else tried to enter the gate during all those years, since 
“everyone strives after the law”? “Here”, the gatekeeper replies, “no one else can gain 
entry, since this entrance was assigned only to you. I’m going now to close it.” 
 
With an enigmatic note lamenting inaction (“this entrance was assigned only to 
you”), Kafka presented to his reader the paradoxes of action and change in contexts 
which, inspired in Arendt, one could call of crisis of authority and end of justice. How 
can one expect the permission of an inaccessible authority? How long should one wait 
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for participation in power? When, in which conditions, will someone feel impelled to take 
the destiny into his hands, to make justice himself, to decide that he is entitled to rights, 
regardless permissions and favors, regardless what designated authority dictates? One of 
the striking characteristic of Jewish inaction was its absolute respect to constituted order, 
its belief in the stabilization of the world around acceptable levels of normalcy. Kafka’s 
fundamental question, then, was how “normal” is to behave normally, respectfully, 
orderly before an excluding, oppressive order? Moreover, how should one aim at 
integration and assimilation to a village that is hostile to oneself?  
For Arendt, Kafka was guided by “the perception of this truth”: “Men’s lives must 
be normal, not exceptional”. Also according to Arendt, this truth was responsible for 
making Kafka a Zionist.795 The abnormal position of Jews as pariahs in other societies, as 
K.s trying desperately to find a regular job and a residence permit, would be abolished if 
Jews were transformed into a “people like other peoples”. Arendt noted that Kafka “could 
scarcely have wished to become a nationalist”. As a major European poet, he wanted to 
be a “human being”, not a member of ethnic society. But “It was not his fault that this 
society had ceased to be human…”.796 Zionism was a logical solution in a world where 
normal existence could only take place in national communities.  
Kafka, indeed, accepted the fact of his Jewishness, and of the Jewish condition, 
without paying too much attention to the deeper meanings of Judaism. Departing from 
his “sense of nothingness”797, he complained against his father’s attempt of making him 
to “cling” to the “nothing of Judaism” both seemed to share.798 Years before, he referred 
to the “dark complexity of Judaism”, recalling the “boredom and the pointlessness of the 
hours in the synagogue”.799 As Jews, however, existed historically regardless the 
complexity or simplicity of its religious system, Kafka saw in Zionism a possible platform 
for justice. He did so without any enthusiasm, as one can read his account to his fiancée 
of his attendance to the Zionist Congress in 1913: 
“I went to the Zionist Congress this morning. I have no real contact. I feel it in 
certain respects, also for the entire concept, but not for the essential part.”800 
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797 Kafka, I am a memory…, , p. 10 
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799 Ibid., p. 147 
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To Greta Bloch, he referred to his “non-Zionist (I admire Zionism and am 
nauseated by it), nonpracticing Judaism”801, and two years later he called Felice Bauer “to 
come to terms with Zionism”.802 He did not seem to celebrate Judaism, as Heine did, 
neither did he embrace an active Zionism, as Lazare, but he nevertheless accepted his 
Judesein and the Jewish condition of masses waiting for justice to come from an unjust 
system. He was another non-dogmatic pariah, who refused the binary logic of simplistic 
identifications, when he commented attempts of classification of his prose:  
“And incidentally, won’t you tell me what I really am: in the last Neue Rundschau, 
Metamorphosis is mentioned and rejected on sensible grounds, and then says the writer: 
‘There is something fundamentally German about K’s narrative art.’ In Max’s [Brod] 
article on the other hand: ‘K’s stories are among the most typically Jewish documents of 
our time.’ 
A difficult case. Am I a circus rider on 2 horses? Alas, I am no rider, but lie 
prostrate on the ground”.803    
    
 Much has been written about Kafka’s complex character, about the experience of 
“his exile”, on “the most forgotten alien land”, “one’s own body”.804 If we follow Arendt’s 
perspective on this pariah, Kafka’s complex subjectivity is not solely the result of an 
inner-psyche, of a complicated relation with his father. Aiming at a “normal existence” 
in an abnormal, corrupted social-world aggravated Kafka’s “sense of nothingness”, of 
dislocation and estrangement. He could not feel at home in a world where it was necessary 
to engage in meaningless jobs, necessary to conform to a “senseless automatism” of 
bureaucracy and absent authority, to adapt and to constantly wait for an unresponsive 
social order, but where it seemed not necessary, where it was indeed impossible, almost 
absurd, to claim for a dignified existence, within a framework of justice and freedom, to 
his pariah people. Kafka’s ideal of hero, a hero trying to survive in this absurd village, 
could only be “exhausted” like a “gladiator”, whose job had been cleaning a corner of his 
office.805      
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FINAL REMARKS 
 
Instead of summing up all the topics this work has developed, in this final section 
I will explore some of its findings, taking the pariah, and its related themes, as a “human 
type” important, as Arendt put it, for the revaluation of mankind “in our days”, meaning 
not only 1944, but also our present days. Is the pariah an example to our epoch? My 
general answer is yes, for, as I have argued, we are still living in Hannah Arendt’s world. 
Most of the problems approached by her are still around us, though in different 
circumstances, in some aspects more stable, in others more threatening. What makes her 
thought so interesting to be actualized a is that our circumstances are also new, resulting 
from the reinforcement, but also the decline, of tendencies she has envisioned, with new 
developments she could not foretell.  
I will divide my final remarks into three cases, which will be dealt not in a 
conclusive way, but in an exploratory one: the case of multiculturalism; the case of 
nationalism; and the case of mass societies: 
 
The case of multiculturalism 
In this work, I tried to avoid, as long as possible, references to authors abd 
concepts from cultural studies. The reason is that it is a field on its own. Moreover, it is a 
field whose terms are far from being consensual and whose claims are diffuse. To being 
with, culture itself lacks a clear definition. Is culture related only to ethnic and religious 
ideas and practices, or nationality, class-association, gender-identification, as any group-
formation can be said generative of cultures? In this line, what are exactly the demands 
of culture: end of specific modes of political oppression, preservation of differentiated 
cultural symbols, reversal of social inequalities?806 A Catalan struggling for 
independence, a LGBT demanding social recognition and a Rohingya applying for 
asylum are equally fighting in the field of culture?  
Hannah Arendt offered no manual to approach these questions. She dealt with 
issues taken nowadays as cultural ones, but in a very specific context: a non-democratic 
one, in which a particular story unfolded a novel form of political domination. Can 
Arendt’s ideas and lessons, in this line, be simply transported into democratic contexts, 
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in which diversity seems to be a principle much more accepted than it was in the earlies 
1900s? That’s a more difficult question. To try an actualization of Arendt’s terms, we can 
restrain this discussion by focusing it on the issue of refugees and displaced persons, on 
which she has written very clearly. According to an estimation of 2016, more than 65 
millions people live currently as displaced persons in the earth, as groups and individuals 
forced away from their homes by political crisis and conflict. Among these, 22,5 millions 
are refugees (persons fleeing armed conflicts and persecution), and around 10 millions 
are stateless, that is, individuals who are not recognized as citizens by any state, thus 
lacking access to rights, juridical protection, state-backed institutions of health, education, 
security etc. In Arendt’s sense, they lack a community where they can appear as persons. 
This situation is mostly created by political problems, not natural ones, as ethnic conflicts 
in Africa and religious and civil wars in the Middle East and Arabia. They are not 
incidental problems, hardly explainable by evil intentions of this or that governor. They 
are rather structural problems, generated by specific institutions and forms of 
“organization”.807 
The existence of these millions of displaced proves one of Arendt’s point: that 
plurality is a fact, regardless the acceptance and accommodation of this fact by prevalent 
political frameworks. These millions are existing bodies, living under in-humane, or not 
fully political, conditions. So the argument for refugees is not primarily a moral one – a 
matter of compassion, an ought to be forced as a perfective duty. Since humanity has now 
become a fact, a global community whose interactions are experienced and felt 
everywhere by large populations, the case of displaced persons is a political issue in 
Arendt’s sense. It concerns living experiences, it demands judgment, action and 
commitment, it is open to contingent difficulties and decisions, and it is, on grounding 
terms, an issue concerning human beings striving for a stable place on earth. It is a matter 
of sharing the earth and human-political frameworks with individuals who are already 
among us. Here what is required is something much more basic than the claim for 
“recognition” of cultures or groups within a polity of rights. We deal rather with groups 
with no voices, no faces, no rights whatsoever, in the search for a minimal political 
stabilization. 
From the perspective of cultural struggles, Arendt’s approach can be said 
insufficient, for it defends “only” equal rights, “only” granting of citizenship for one to 
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share a community of action. Although she defined plurality as the condition of politics, 
she did not work on specific “group-differentiated rights” (Kymlica)808 in terms of a 
positive political discrimination intended to preserve, to foster or to counter social and 
cultural practices. As we have seen, plurality pervades both the political and the social, 
being a condition that is more given than created by human artifice. Plurality plays a 
definitive role in the political, for human beings can only be citizens as unique 
individuals, formed by different historical, social and familiar contexts. But politics, in 
Arendt’s terms, is the space where plurality comes together to mediate their differences, 
to exchange views, to mobilize around public issues, and to build and re-build their 
common world. Self-reference and absolute-difference are properly displayed in private 
and social spaces, where affinity and similarity, where “like attracts like”, promotes 
“natural” and social forms of discrimination. 
Defending a Jewish politics, Arendt never thought of self-referent, folkloric 
groups oriented only to preserve their culture. She envisioned a platform whence Jews 
could act with others, struggling against their political persecution. The right to have 
rights, translated to the Jewish problem, implied the politicization of a before insular, 
public-shy community, which had suffered political attacks because of their lack of rights, 
their inability to judge and reluctance to act. It never meant an attempt of ending social 
or historical anti-Semitism, or, positively, promoting universal compassion towards Jews. 
It meant granting Jews a political locus and a political voice to defend themselves and to 
exist among a plural humanity. It meant, in other words, entering political history, not 
creating an utopian harmony. Arendt’s view can be seen as insufficient regarding political 
struggles of groups that already have rights, existing in democratic contexts, and using 
these rights to reclaim more “differentiated rights”. But, from the perspective of displaced 
persons, Arendt’s right to have rights, her defense of politicization, of insertion into 
political conditions, makes all the difference for masses who are living as the “scum of 
the earth”, in shelters, camps and state borders. Granting rights and citizenship, as we 
discussed, means granting humanity to them. It also means granting them the capacity to 
begin, to explore the possibilities of an active life. Seeing refugees and stateless as 
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potential agents is different from seeing them as objects to be protected or simply 
tolerated.809  
Now, I remember one discussion, last year, in Fred Dewey’s working group in 
Berlin, when one member – a writer originally from north Scandinavia – accused Arendt 
of displaying an Eurocentric approach. Could Arendt defend plurality and be Eurocentric 
at the same time? Is there an Eurocentric bias on what she said and wrote? Moreover, are 
authoritarian, anti-political and a-political forms of organization – let us say a theocracy 
in Middle East, a monarchy in Africa, a dictatorship in Asia – authentic expressions of 
human plurality? Or did Arendt think of an “Europeanized” plurality, based on “Western” 
forms of organization, such as democracy, citizenship and civil liberties? A first answer 
is yes, Arendt’s perspective is European. But this answer requires a series of 
qualifications, for Arendt never worked on an anthropological project of comparison 
between civilizations.  
Her project can be said Eurocentric, meaning that the center of her approach was 
Europe (or Western tradition). Instead of a clash of civilizations (grandiose terms she 
would certainly avoid), she was preoccupied with the self-induced collapse of European 
civilization. She even observed ironically that Europe produced a form of persecution and 
destruction in which one could find “no longer any ‘uncivilized’ spot on earth” to 
escape.810 Moreover, for her, Europe (Western tradition) did not mean a reified entity, an 
object with all positive or all negative predicates. It was a collection of concepts, 
experiences, stories and actors, which could be said formative of several traditions within 
a larger tradition. So, relying on Greek democracy, north-American revolution, German 
and French writers and artists, Arendt was certainly European. But she was a critical and 
conscious one: she was an European pariah. Relying on her experience as a German-
Jewish woman, she recovered European experiences and principles – the polis, the 
division of power, the Persönlichkeit – to criticize authoritarian and destructive trends 
created by Europe itself: nationalism, imperialism, anti-Semitism, totalitarianism. By 
being grounded on European experiences and ideas, she was not fixed in a static position, 
as one is conditioned, but not asphyxiated by one’s context. 
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So, when Arendt judged other “cultures” – she said, for instance, that in “the lands 
of traditional Oriental despotism, in India and China…” there has been a “contempt for 
the value of human life”811, and that African tribes “behaved like part of nature”812-, she 
did not opine out of anthropologic ignorance. She was being “politically immanent”. 
European totalitarianism was even more shocking because it destroyed the principle of 
personality, which seemed consolidated in Western tradition as in no other geopolitical 
context. Saying that indigenous tribes were “natural”, she did not disdain them as 
backwards (a bias that would imply an identification of Europe with progress). She simply 
judged that they had no political organization, no freely chosen and freely controlled 
framework to act upon. Hence, her judgment spring from the view point of political action 
and freedom. One could even say that there are civilizations which are more natural, more 
exotic, more spiritual, healthier, and happier than Europe. Arendt, however, thought in 
terms of freedom and action, in that interplay between creating a human world and acting 
upon it, between creating stability and promoting change. 
I remember the Scandinavian poet saying that his native region was organized by 
families who maintained an intimate, ritualistic relation with their natural landscape. Life 
was oriented to subsistence and preservation of tradition. It is a beautiful form of life, but 
hardly a politically free and active one – for it shapes a community of repetition, not of 
action. It is assumed as a necessary and self-evident form of organization, perhaps with 
little space for inner differentiation. With Arendt, one could say that a historicized 
humanity is a collection of experiences, institutions and examples, which can serve to 
inspire or to repulse political actors regardless their geographical location. To criticize 
and reclaim certain principles, transforming so human communities in spaces not of 
necessity, but of freedom, is a political attitude in itself, an attitude which renders human 
being as agents in their contexts. If politics really started in ancient Greece (way before 
the establishment of the modern concept of Europe), its incorporation by different 
geographic and temporal contexts shows us that human beings are not imprisoned in 
cultural walls: they are capable of judging and beginning new experiences of coexistence.  
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The case of nationalism 
This is not to say that there is no tension in Arendt’s grounding-condition of 
plurality. This tension is felt in her approach to the question of nationalism. Arendt is 
normally (and rightly) considered a strong critic of nationalism. As we have seen, 
nationalism generated political and spatial exclusion. It subordinated justice and freedom 
to the so-called interests of homogeneous nationalities, leaving groups of individuals and 
minority-nations with no political voice and, sometimes, with no place in the world. As a 
result from nationalist competitions, ethnic groups monopolized the state for their own 
ends, destroying spaces of universal citizenship and plural deliberation, fostering so an 
atmosphere of ethnic suspicion and hatred inside and outside borders. 
However, as we saw, totalitarianism – and the end of humanity – coincided with 
the decline of the Nation-State order. Racial imperialism is different, in some aspects 
deeply different, from nationalism. In this line, Margaret Canovan even asked: “is there 
an Arendtian case for the nation-state?” Canovan presents not only one, but three cases. 
First of all, she reminds that Arendt estimated the role of the nation-state as a “fortress”, 
as an entity spatially and institutionally limited. To that she opposed the “motion-mania” 
of imperial and totalitarian regimes (Arendt, for instance, argued that Mao’s China did 
not seem to walk a full-totalitarian path, for it was still bounded by “national interest”813). 
Secondly, the feelings and ideas promoted by nationhood can mobilize popular power, 
providing energy for sustaining political institutions. The role of nationhood as a 
“mediator between the personal and the political”814 would be crucial for fostering the 
sense of “We”. Last, Arendt’s defense of human rights was concomitant to her suspicion 
of an international state. Canovan argues that nation-states are platforms for stability and 
protection of humanitarian institutions and agents, in a sort of positive embodiment of the 
paradox human rights versus national rights. Nation-states are not necessarily indifferent 
to human rights. In some cases, they rather appear as proponents and defenders of ideas 
and institutions of international justice. 
Canovan’s takeover, especially in the last case, is stimulating, for it points to what 
I called the tension in Arendt’s approach to the phenomenon of nationalism. Canovan 
rightly observes that Arendt was not simply “in support of universalist 
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cosmopolitanism”.815 But I believe that Canovan’s emphasis is weakened by the very 
formula she uses in her question, the nation-state. Two of the positive aspects presented 
by Canovan – institutional-geographic limitation and human rights protection – are 
guaranteed, in Arendt’s terms, more by the state than by the nation. Multi-national states 
and other polities lacking a strong sense of nationhood can and, I add, normally do limit 
expansionistic adventures and protect issues of justice and right. The second case, that of 
mobilization of political feelings, is more difficult. It relates to a problem for which 
Arendt had no simple solution: how to politicize people without relying on mythical, 
fictional identifications and other signs and images that imply immediate, total 
communion. Arendt worked on distinctions such as tribal and traditional, or inner-
oriented and external forms of nationalism, the latter related to historical, state-limited 
nations grounded on objective memories. These people did not need fictional factors of 
identification to imagine themselves as a nation. Later, Arendt even distinguished 
between legend and ideology, the former being related, even if in a ludic and imaginative 
way, to factual experiences of foundation.816   
But the core of the issue is that Arendt rejected nationalism (as Canovan herself 
acknowledged, her “cases” did not mean an “endorsement” of nationalism)817, while 
keeping a reluctant approach to the phenomenon of the nation-state. This reluctance can 
be found in her approach to Zionism. In my view, Arendt was a melancholic Zionist, to 
borrow Benhabib’s expression.818 This position does not derive from personal mood, 
neither from an exaggerated negativity (self-hatred) or enthusiastic support (self-love) to 
the Jewish politicization represented by Zionism. As I will try to show, her approach to 
Zionism evolves consistently – as her approach to the issue of nationalities -, in 
accordance to the immanence of her political categories. In my reading, this is another 
evidence of Arendt’s coherent (though not systematic) development from historical and 
political commentaries of the 1930s and 40s to the consolidation of her political thought, 
worked on the 50s and 60s. 
As I presented in this work, Arendt’s critique of assimilation, her early 
politicization as a Jew, and a large extent of her political insights and lessons resulted 
from her affiliation with German Zionists, in the late 20s and early 30s. But, before 
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moving on, let us ask the question: what was Zionism? In short, Zionism was an 
intellectual and practical current, born within European Jewish communities, to address 
the pressing issues of the Jewish question. Many Jews answered to the political and social 
dilemmas presented by modernity by choosing specific, late-modern shapes for their 
identities: some assimilated, some felt back into orthodoxy, others became 
revolutionaries. Zionism was a secular-political alternative for Jews who wanted to 
become active members – to enter politics, as Arendt would say – in their communities 
or in communities to be created. Importantly, they wanted to do this as Jews.  
In this sense, Zionism was itself an example of how a certain tradition can be re-
appropriated, or re-enacted; how, in this case, Jewish tradition could break up with its 
past passivity to foster a new form of organization. (Referring to diasporic Jews, Leo 
Pinsker mentioned “This ghostlike apparition of a people without unity or organization, 
without land or other bond of union, no longer alive, and yet moving about among the 
living.”)819 Zionism intended to foment a specific awareness, and commitment of Jews as 
active Jews. Gradually, it defined its immediate practical goals (organization of youth 
movements, revival of the Hebrew language, expeditions to potential regions of 
immigration) along with theoretical discussions on its ultimate purposes – the creation of 
a party, a movement, a state? So, in broad terms, Zionism established a tradition of itself, 
within which several parties and groups, according to their political leanings, their 
regional origins, their views etc., subdivided in different camps: right, left, labor, 
revisionist, secular, religious, agricultural, urban, Western, Eastern etc. Arendt was a 
German Zionist, and German Zionists were, as Amos Elon put it, notable more for their 
cultural and philosophical self-awareness as Jews than for their actual willingness to 
move to Palestine and build a new home there.820 
But the fact that Arendt never really considered migrating to Palestine did not 
prevent her of going there, keeping informed about there, and constantly writing about 
events of that region. It did not prevent her of understanding the passions and ideas 
moving Zionists, neither of celebrating part of their achievements. To begin with, relying 
on the perplexities of the Rights of Man, Arendt wrote that Zionists willing to migrate 
from Europe to Middle East were not moved by fanaticism, but by “pragmatism”. After 
being destroyed as European “cosmopolitans”, after having experienced humiliations and 
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violence in the hands not only of Germans but of most European peoples, Jews could only 
conclude that their human rights, their human status, depended on the constitution of their 
own “natural” polity.821  
Moreover, Arendt celebrated the basic will to act of Zionists, to take the destiny 
in their hands and do something. They differed from traditional Diasporic Jews, who 
normally relied on a distant past and wished a Messianic future. They were also different 
from assimilationists, who believed in social integration, in the training of Jews to become 
productive or extraordinary members (the “salt of the earth”) in their present societies. 
They also distinguished from “internationalist revolutionaries”, who “transferred their 
hopes to the progressive forces of history which would solve the Jewish Question 
automatically”.822 Finally, they differed, of course, from orthodox, with their religious 
quietism and inwardness. Compared to utopian, messianic and assimilationist tendencies, 
Zionism even offered at some point, in Arendt’s view, a “sound nationalism” and a 
“sound realism”.823  
Zionist’s “furious will to act at any price” was mostly infused by a new type of 
Jew, an intellectual who, despite having financial stability, felt dislocated from gentile 
and Jewish-diasporic societies, longing for a radical redesign of his life. His “personal 
problems could be solved only by a reorientation of the Jewish people as a whole”.824 
These intellectuals, journalists and writers like Herzl and Pinsker, were “crackpots”, 
trying unfamiliar paths to questions unsolved by established political means. They finally 
understood the Jewish question as a political one, demanding action and initiative, open 
involvement, publication of pamphlets, realization of assemblies and gatherings, 
requiring courage and boldness to start something. They attempted to change the Jewish 
condition “by direct political action”.825 Arendt could not leave unnoticed this Jewish 
disposition to respond to human events and begin a new path.  
Moreover, if one recalls abbe Maury’s discussion with Robespierre, centuries 
before, when the French monk accused Jews of being essentially tied to certain roles and 
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activities (“Will you make them soldiers? Will you make them artisans?”)826, the Zionist 
enterprise in Palestine was an dignifying answer, for Jews proved themselves free from 
deterministic and biological stereotypes held by European anti-Semites. In the yishuv, the 
pre-state community, Jews became peasants and laborers, they built farms, bridges, roads, 
cities and small villages, embracing every sort of social and economic role. They were 
bankers and truck drivers, journalists and cooks. That enterprise, which Arendt referred 
in 1948 as “the great hope and the great pride of Jews all over the world”827, was an 
example of a group of people building a world, a human artifice, out of their collective 
initiative and their personal resolve.  
It could also be seen as an experience in the right to have rights: the basic right of 
being reincorporated to a part of the Earth where one can labor, work, and act. Jews 
labored the soil, worked on infrastructure, memorized an old culture but also created a 
new one, and established new institutions. In fact, Arendt praised one of these new 
institutions, the kibbutz, as “one of the most promising of all social experiments made in 
the twentieth century”.828 Those agrarian, collective communities, remaining outside the 
influence of daily politics and “the more noxious ideologies of our times”, could 
experiment and create a “new form of ownership, a new way of family and child 
education”. Trying to begin something on their own terms, focusing on practical matters 
in a creative way, they realized “new laws and new behavior patterns, establishing new 
customs and new values, and translating and integrating them in new institutions”.829 The 
kibbutz model was a “hope” for those Jews and non-Jews “who have not and never will 
make their peace with present-day society and its standards”.830 The practical and 
symbolic importance of the kibbutz to the consolidation of Israeli identity was an ultimate 
proof of a Jewish capacity to being anew, to explore unseen possibilities.   
Arendt’s enthusiasm was, of course, due to the fact that her people, at that time 
still living the consequences of displacement and annihilation in Europe, could start a 
pariah’s world-building in another part of the Earth. Zionism had enacted a 
“revolution…directed not only against a system, but against a destiny”, in Ben-Gurion’s 
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words831 (although Arendt disliked him, his sentence is very much in tone with her 
essential comprehension of Zionism). That experience also provided a larger example to 
Arendt’s political theory, in which the historical and the conceptual were intimately 
related in an experience of displacement and replacement, of movement from passivity to 
“direct action” and world-involvement. But political events always bring up some 
“plagues”, as they are not pure products of an infallible intellect. In the case of the Jewish 
experience in Palestine, and the soon consolidation of the State of Israel, these were, 
according to Arendt, problems of structure and also of contingency.  
Despite praising Herlz’s resolution to act, and also his open defiance of parvenus 
and assimilated, who thought in economic and social categories, and not in political terms, 
Arendt was very critical of some tenets of his worldview. First of all, Arendt said that 
Herzl understood some political mechanisms of anti-Semitism, but he then derived from 
it fixed premises, as he believed in reality as having an “unchangeable structure, always 
identical with itself”.832 This fixed reality was, in his eyes, the reality of stable nation-
states living side by side and taking care of their own interests. The aim of Zionism would 
be, thus, “finding a place within the unchanging structure of this reality”, and so creating 
a polity that “would be able to develop their own isolated organism”.833 This thesis of 
separatism was related to the role of anti-Semitism, as a negative force, in Herzl’s 
worldview. His thoughts were reified in a soft-ideology which assumed anti-Semitism as 
an “eternal” force of history, which would be nevertheless solved with the creation of a 
Jewish state. As Herzl interpretation was based on pre-racial, merely national forms of 
anti-Semitism (typical of the 19th century), he “logically” concluded that anti-Semitism 
only endured because Jews lived as foreigners in other’s states. Anti-Semites simply 
wanted Jews to go somewhere else. That was true regarding “traditional” anti-Semitism 
(most Polish anti-Semites, for instance, were in favor of a Jewish state)834, but not of the 
“new sect of racists whose loyalties and hatreds did not stop at national borders.”835 
So Arendt held that Herlz’s Zionism was isolationist and utopian. From relying 
on fixed premises and fixed ends, he disconnected from living realities and possible goals, 
thus assuming that a Jewish state would create a state of harmony, for Jews and anti-
Semites. More profoundly, the future-optimism was grounded on a present-pessimism, or 
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simply fear, as Herzl’s history was basically reduced to this tension between Jews and 
anti-Semites. This pessimism hid a basic powerlessness, camouflaged by the aspiration 
to sovereignty: if Jews were surrounded by anti-Semites, they could trust nobody and 
enter no alliance with others. These premises were soon to create an illusionary sense of 
power grounded on fear and distrust. Arendt conceded that this reactive position was 
understandable, especially regarding the “fantastic injustice”836 which Jews had suffered 
in Europe. But here the interaction between comprehension and judgement appears again: 
she could comprehend a psychological and political pattern of behavior after the 
catastrophe (retraction, distrust, fear, and the will to live only among Jews), while judging 
it as politically problematic. 
The consequence of Herlz’s view was that Zionism could only be realized in the 
form of a nation-state, a Jewish state. For Arendt, this demand, at Herzl’s time (19th 
century), “seemed neither doctrinaire nor utopian”. Indeed, for the epoch, national self-
determination was “almost self-evident justice.”837 But this was not the case of the 1940s, 
a decisive period for Zionism, and a period, according to Arendt, “when the whole 
concept of national sovereignty had become a mockery”.838 Arendt, as a Zionist (“of 
sorts”)839, criticized a view that would become dominant among the Zionist movement 
and the Jewish masses, the Herzlian one. She belonged to defeated, marginal groups 
within the movement: she came from the German Zionists, who suffered an “irreparable 
loss of prestige” after Hitler, and allied with groups which proposed bi-national and 
federal models to shelter the Jewish home (not the Jewish state) in Palestine. Arendt 
favored Zionist parties as the Ihud [Unity], organized by figures as Judah L. Magnes, 
Ernst Simon, Henrietta Szold, Martin Buber, and she also supported the role of “loyal 
opposition” played by anti-nationalistic, Zionist-Socialist groups as Hashomer Haza’ir 
and Ahdut Avodah. The Ihud, for instance, advocated the foundation of a bi-national state 
with political spaces equally shared by Jews and Arabs. 
These groups and these views, mostly during the period when the news on the 
Final Solution spread around the world, were gradually supplanted by what Arendt called 
the “growing unanimity”840 achieved by Herlz’s Zionism. Politically, the consolidation of 
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unanimity came in the Biltmore Conference, in 1942, in New York, when the proponents 
of a Jewish state (“Commonwealth” was the actual term) defeated the proponents of bi-
national and federal options. Arendt, familiar with the traditional plurality of opinions 
within Jewish circles, lamented that “Jewish businessmen”, normally indifferent to 
politics, “Jewish philanthropists”, initially reluctant in helping to build a community in 
Palestine, “the readers of the Yiddish press”, who had been looking to the USA as the 
“promised land”, and several groups within worldwide Jewish communities united “in 
the firm conviction that a Jewish state is needed”.841 This was an unacceptable turnover 
for Arendt, as “unanimity of opinion” destroys the “fact that we are different by nature 
and by conviction”. This closure within mass-unanimity, in Arendt’s eyes, related to the 
separatism implicated by Herzl’s Zionism. Although she distrusted an abstract universal 
revolution, Arendt always thought of Jewish emancipation as requiring an articulation 
with other groups and nationalities struggling for justice or freedom. She followed, again, 
Lazare, who had broken up with Herzl, when the latter met the Turkish Sultan for political 
negotiations, despite the news of Turkish violence against Armenians.  
Being self-oriented, nationalism is not necessarily aggressive, but it is essentially 
indifferent to others. It rests on the illusion of sovereignty: that one’s existence is 
“unrelated to all other events and trends”.842 Arendt criticized the Zionist establishment 
for acting exactly like old fashioned nation-states, guided by the classic reason d’etat 
principle. In this sense, the Jewish state assimilated to the old nation-state order, 
struggling for the normalization of a once pariah-cosmopolitan people, which carried a 
specific message of justice.843 This radical pragmatism, in Arendt’s view, turned to be 
“unrealistic”, for it disregarded the “only permanent reality”, a reality beyond ideologies 
and specific political decisions: “the presence of Arabs in Palestine”.844 Instead, Zionists 
searched the support of “super-powers” like England, the USA, the USSR, while 
gradually seeing Arabs as essentially political rivals and ethnic enemies, thus giving up 
in principle any form of cooperation. For Arendt, again, it was understandable that, 
coming from past oppression, Jews (in the aftermath of genocide) and Arabs (after 
imperialism) developed a tendency “to shut themselves off from the rest of the world and 
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develop nationalist superiority complexes of their own.”845 But, politically speaking, this 
tendency was wrong, for it disregarded the very fact that Jews and Arabs existed 
simultaneously in that land. In this sense, an “Arab-Jewish cooperation” was “not an 
idealistic daydream but a sober statement” of the fact that Jewish and Arab aspirations 
were entangled, that the option of sovereignty was illusionary and “suicidal”, and that any 
military victory would create a self-destructive status quo for both parts.  
Moreover, a cooperation would “show the world that there are no differences 
between two peoples that cannot be bridged”.846 Arendt refused the idea that there is an 
essential animosity between Arabs and Israelis. She relied on the principle of 
indetermination (natality) of human interactions: there is no natural law forcing up 
conflict between the two people. Indeed, Arendt still believed, in the 1940s, that, despite 
the tendency of the Jewish community in Palestine becoming a “small warrior tribe”, a 
modern Sparta, and despite Arab nationalism assuming an “increasingly fascist 
coloration”, a political elite in both sides, acting with responsibility, with no desperation 
and no fanaticism, could still work on more cooperative political configurations.847 So 
Arendt defended as “axiomatic criteria” to judge the situation in Palestine the following: 
the establishment of a Jewish “homeland”, instead of the “pseudo-sovereignty of a Jewish 
state”; “a solid basis of Jewish-Arab cooperation”; “elimination of all terrorist groups”; 
immigration of Jewish displaced persons to Palestine; “local self-government and mixed 
Jewish-Arab municipal and rural councils”.848 
One could easily argue, especially with today’s eyes, that Arendt’s proposal was 
too optimistic, hardly achievable. How would a people coming from the experience of 
total failure of integration and assimilation trust the possibilities of a new pluralistic 
adventure? As Arendt herself recognized, sovereignty and self-orientation seemed more 
“logical” and “natural”. Moreover, why would one trust the possibilities of a federated or 
bi-national system in lands marked by experiences of imperialism, subjugation and ethnic 
animosity, with no democratic tradition whatsoever? These are questions which Arendt 
did not ignore. They also resemble the kind of reasoning that proposed “no way out” to 
European Jews faced by the assumed necessity of accommodation and assimilation. 
Arendt always considered alternative configurations. Her ideal realism worked against 
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tendencies which she assumed as politically destructive (as undermining conditions for 
plurality and political coexistence). So, against the suspicion of being “utopian”, Arendt 
defended only a “tentative effort” of cooperation. She observed, ironically, that it was “no 
time for final solutions”. Since “politics seldom offers ideal or eternal solutions”, she 
defended an experiment in co-participation: in that context, specifically, a trusteeship, 
backed by the US, Great Britain and the United Nations, supporting a “federated 
structure” with “Jewish-Arab community councils”, working on “the lowest and most 
promising level of proximity and neighborliness”. The aim was “pacification and nothing 
more”.849 
In 1948, Arendt judged that it was “still not too late”. Today the situation is quite 
different. Some of the tendencies indicated by Arendt aggravated: Israel is “surrounded 
by an entirely hostile Arab population”, “physical self-defense” and “military strategy” 
are priorities over “social experiments” and the free development of culture and political 
thought. Palestinian Arabs are even more alienated from the exercise of political power, 
and Palestinian leaders have institutionally embraced terrorism as legitimate politics. 
Both sides see each other, increasingly, through de-humanized, ideological 
representations. Conflict seems to be rooted in necessary causes. However, as Arendt 
reminded, no political process is doomed to be fatal. There are indeed, hidden or apparent, 
counter-tendencies, explored and still unexplored possibilities, to create political 
approximation rather than exclusion. As Canovan argued, a sovereign state is not 
necessarily unjust. The State of Israel, in its actual shape, despite being a nation-state, is 
also a democracy with Arab parties, civil liberties, and levels of economic prosperity 
reaching its Jewish and non-Jewish citizens.  
Fundamentally, however, Israel can hardly escape the logic of majority-minority, 
and the feeling of non-Jewish groups (and also some excluded Jewish groups) of living 
almost as second class citizens, under differentiated duties and rights, due to a confusion 
between citizenship and ethnic affiliation. The very formula Jewish democracy, or Jewish 
state, contains the inner contradictions, and the competing tendencies within Israeli 
politics and soceity: on the one hand, the inclusive, egalitarian, democratic Israel, the 
Israel of LGBT rights, of the Supreme Court, of pro-peace groups, of cross Jewish and 
Arab civil-social interaction, the Israel of cultural and political pluralism; and on the 
other, the chauvinistic, self-centered Israel, moved by the principles of fear and self-
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defense, and ruled by religious and nationalistic forces grounded on ethnic exclusivity. A 
status quo based purely on self-defense and occupation of hostile neighborhoods would 
be called by Arendt as political unsustainable, regardless the illusion of inner peace 
among Israelis. This is the peace of citizens who can live in relative security and 
prosperity in their streets, but need to conceal their Israelis identities when travelling 
abroad, for they cannot appear as Israelis to the world. 
A former European pariah-people built so a sort of “pariah-state”, as Feldman 
observed,850 which did not solve the problem of anti-Semitism. It did not find so far a 
stable place within the “family of nations”. Assuming the concept of nationhood, the 
pariah-people generated its own pariahs. These consequences were not due to an essential 
Jewish malignity or stupidity, greed or selfishness. They resulted from the choice of 
problematic political frameworks and concepts. Some basic psychological and social 
reactions, both from Jews and Arabs, entered in a process of mutual determination with 
other-alienating institutions and mentalities. But this process, again, though rigidly rooted 
in ideological views, and in memories of terror and pain, is neither necessary or 
irreversible: differences are not biologically fixed, and the very experiences of promising 
and forgiving, defined by Arendt as essentially political, can enact new political 
tendencies in the region.851 
A few years before Arendt’s commentaries on Palestine, Joseph Roth, who also 
opposed the ideology of nationalism, wrote the following lines, concerning the wandering 
of Jews for a new political home: 
“In seeking a ‘homeland’ of their own, they are rebelling against their deeper 
nature. They are no nation, they are a kind of supranation, perhaps the anticipation of 
some future form of nation.”852 
 
Arendt did not give up of thinking of Jews, and other pariahs, as a sort of political 
and social vanguard, carrying principles and examples for this “anticipation of some 
future form of nation”. Her reluctance concerning nationalism can be explained through 
the stories of these pariahs. It also explains her melancholic takeover on the Jewish 
politicization. As Beiner rightly summed up, she “wanted Jewish politics but not Jewish 
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nationalism”.853 This position resulted not from any insensibility, neither from an abstract 
utopianism, but from the political stories of the 20th century. As we can apprehend from 
her analysis of Zionism, she did not think in terms of an abstract cosmopolitanism,854 as 
if every city and town should be Berlin, London or Toronto, and as if every Jew should 
migrate to multi-national states as the US or Switzerland. Looking closely to contingent, 
mutable realities, she was open to diversified manifestations of human plurality, while 
grounding her thoughts on facts as the existence of others and the inexistence of emptied 
spaces on earth. 
In this line, Arendt was not against nations. Indeed, important questions of her 
thought evolved from the factual existence of historical and cultural nations. She was 
against nationalism as a self-referent system of ideas and attitudes. If grounded on the 
illusion of sovereignty, nationalism becomes necessarily unrealistic and worldless, for it 
separates itself from the interactions of a globalized humanity. Arendt never demanded 
an immediate identification of nations and groups (that would deny the very fact of 
plurality), but she politically expected that groups and nations, if they wanted to ground 
their actions in the reality of plurality, would acknowledge that they must live with others, 
because they do share the earth with others. The political fallacy of insular communities 
derives from their sense of remoteness and separateness, as if they were independent from 
larger political structures. Similarly, nationalism based on homogeneous (unanimous) 
images and ideas of itself is per force exclusionary, working against the fact of plurality. 
They tend to create unstable orders, for they produce internal and external pariahs, people 
with no political presence.  
Regarding the argument that nationalism provides a basis of energy and emotions 
to sustain institutions, it can be said that, depending on the shape of that nationalism, these 
energies can end up undermining democratic institutions, by conquering them to specific 
nationalistic feelings and purposes. To this point, the distinction between demos, “the 
nation as a self-governing democratic body of citizens who may or may not be ethnically 
homogeneous”, and the ethnos, “the nation as an entity that is ethnically, linguistically, 
or religiously homogeneous”, is instructive.855 This is not simply a matter of random 
choice between empirical alternatives. Arendt noted that the more a community imagines 
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itself in natural, ethnical terms, the less it requires political processes as public 
deliberation and mediation of differences; inversely, in a demos related by world-
institutions (and not identified by “nature”), political experiences, as the ongoing 
participation through argumentation and group-formation, through judging and acting, 
foment the constitution of a people. 
Thinking of our days, the present backlash of nationalism – the electoral 
manipulation of a nostalgic nationalism in the US, the growth of nationally-centered 
parties in Eastern Europe, the movement towards British isolation, both phenomena 
undermining a federated Europe, and the reuse of arguments of national sovereignty 
everywhere, with a decisive political threat to global matters such as the crisis of displaced 
persons and the ecological emergence, which cannot be solved in the framework of 
national interests – is not necessarily a counter proof to Arendt’s position. Firstly, because 
there was in Arendt some margin of acceptance and understanding of the role of national-
identities in a pluralistic world. The problem starts when these nationalities regard the 
world as beginning and ending within their particular borders. In these cases, when 
nationalism puts itself above the political frameworks in which people can cooperate with 
each other, Arendt’s case becomes even more relevant, for she used to work against what 
was seen as inescapable trends.  
 
The case of mass societies 
In a lecture at the University of Berkeley, in 1955, Arendt referred to politics 
through the metaphor of an “oases” which stand in contrast to the “desert-world” and 
“desert life” created by modern conditions.856 Oases, as spaces of colorful vitality 
disrupting the undifferentiated landscape of desert, are capable of arising “passion” and 
“action”. Indeed, the oases only exist because there is a political passion, courage, lying 
“at the root of action, of becoming an active being”.857 In contrast, “adaptation” and 
“escapism” are behaviors that establish the desert as a necessary landscape, the only 
possible home for human beings. Arendt related this preparation for desert-life with 
modern psychology, with its focus on the inner individual – with the desert inside – and 
the elaboration of internal mechanisms to conform to social reality. This desert-world, 
according to Arendt, “menaces us not only with no-thingness but also with no-
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bodyness”.858 The problem is not only nihilism, the belief in nothing, but the passivity of 
no-bodies in sustaining a meaningless and dehumanized world. 
For Arendt, desert-life does not mean tedium. The conditions of desert may create 
“sandstorms”, of which totalitarian movements were only the most radical expression of 
the arid social forms promoted by modern mass societies. The pariah, as we saw, cannot 
adapt to the desert. In the stories of European Jews, we saw that there were larger efforts 
of assimilation to excluding and oppressive societies, instead of attempts to create small 
oases of citizenship and dignity. The effort of assimilation ended up contributing to form 
a huge sandstorm in the 20th century. Arendt’s quest for the political activation of the 
pariah ran parallel with her concern with the sandstorms, the destructions and ruins, that 
may be caused by the “perverted capacities” of depersonalized individuals engulfed in 
pathological societies. 
Here, if one looks closer to the conditions of the desert-world of mass societies, 
the meaning of the pariah and the meaning of politics come together. In Society and 
Culture, Arendt listed the following attributes (or lack of it) of the mass man: 
“his loneliness…regardless of his adaptability; his excitability and lack of 
standards; his capacity for consumption, accompanied by inability to judge or even to 
distinguish; above all, his egocentricity and that fateful alienation from the world…”859 
 
Under the agitation of modern societies, with its endless interactions of social 
media and the overwhelming flux of isolated bits of information, runs the deeper currents 
of confusion and hysteria. The rejection of authority and tradition created a desert which 
nevertheless promotes the storm of socially-exchanged prejudices, slogans, images which 
claim truth in a skeptical universe. Social interactions and social shares, mostly related to 
subjective affinities and temporary impressions, are easily consumed and exhausted, only 
reinforcing the loneliness of crowds. The sense of impermanence and mutability, 
politically verified by the rapid fluctuations of the “public opinion”, are socially 
complemented by functional relations determined by momentary “values”. This, as 
Arendt noted, does not lead necessarily to political inertia. There may appear a 
simulacrum of political participation through the public invasion of ideology-based and 
image-made statements. The modern “confirmation bias”, the tendency to seek for 
additional information, interpretation, ideas that confirm one’s initial belief, retro-
alimented by internet algorithms, is only one actualization of Arendt’s diagnosis of the 
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modern withdraw from the world to the subjective-mind.860 In this context, daily politics 
became a sort of civil war between particular groups, a dispute for space among self-
oriented associations, to be fought with the new weapons of mass communications.  
Mass men are being dragged into politics without leaving their “shields from 
experience”, still closed in “pseudotheories” and worldviews, or at least still relying on 
fixed prejudices. Arendt noted that prejudices are necessary, for no man can “form an 
original judgment about everything”.861 Prejudices – statements passed by without 
reexamination and further study – were regarded by Arendt as “natural” in the social 
realm, with its inherent habit of discrimination in terms of affinities and its assumption of 
“values” and “standards” which are immune to judgement and critical thinking. But this 
is the social. One of the “task of the political”, for Arendt, is “to shed light upon and 
dispel prejudices”, and “to train people to be unprejudiced”.862 We’ve seen how Jews and 
other pariahs were blocked from politics by prejudices, images and ideologies that 
falsified their experiences and “ossified” them into dehumanized objects. They could not 
act, and they could not be truly judged and appreciated because of the images made of 
them. In this line, Arendt noted that prejudices, if they enter the realm of politics, become 
dangerous, because they “make both judgment and genuine experience of the present 
impossible”.863 The political significance of the pariah, in this regard, is to break up the 
“shields” of prejudices and images with new forms of human interactions.  
With an emancipation on his own terms, the pariah defies conventional standards 
and dominant prejudices with his voice and his presence, that is, with his original 
judgements and originative deeds. We deal here not only with a new idea that is brought 
to the public, but with a new face, who adds his view into the political texture. In this line, 
Jerome Kohn even noted that “being a judge and a conscious pariah…are virtually 
synonymous”.864 Let us consider the context which Arendt regarded, that of the collapse 
of tradition and the desert of depersonalized, automatized societies. The pariah does not 
come as an authority from above, grounding his acts and words on ultimate criteria for 
truth or goodness. He comes from outside, from experiencing oppression and dislocation, 
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thus regarding a corner of experience which remains ignored by the larger society. Or, in 
“his becoming an active being”, he may put himself, willingly, outside society, outside 
social standards, values and prejudices, becoming a sort of voluntary pariah, who is more 
concerned with presenting an original judgement than with adjusting to a certain role or 
function of the prevalent society. 
Along with Arendt’s critique of modern mass societies, came her evaluation of 
mass democracies, with its favored form of organization, that of government and 
representation via the party-system. Arendt reminded that modern democracies relied on 
the authoritarian tendency to administer people and human affairs as if they were things 
to be managed in accordance to objective and irrefutable needs of society. In this context, 
modern parties tend to become autocratic structures, claiming infallibility, presenting 
policies and programs assumed as necessaries, to be executed by society and for society. 
The only thing that the citizen can expect, in this system, is to achieve “a certain control” 
over the execution of party-programs and government-policies, or to be “represented” in 
the process. For Arendt, it was clear that no one can be represented: only social interests 
and social moods could be barely “ascertained objectively”, and said to be represented in 
an abstract level. Mass democracy, then, becomes a clash of interests – normally private 
interests translated into the interests of “group of voters”, which tend to force their 
“interests” over other groups’ preferences. Arendt compared these political relations with 
those of “blackmailing”, “forcing obedience”, of ruling in accordance to “at least 
supposedly, in the interest of the many”.865 Mass democracy, in this context, tends to 
create passive relations, depoliticizing its citizens, which are regarded as objects with 
interests to be administered or desires to be attended. In this scenario, political leaders do 
not lead, but follow what is “objectively” defined by polls or experts as the preferences 
of the masses. 
Even modern revolutions could not break with this attempt to represent and to 
govern others. The “fear of the new”, for instance, was for Arendt one element in the 
actuation of the “professional revolutionaries”, like Marx and Lenin, who regarded the 
revolution as a process to be controlled, and power as a reality to be created by force – 
using so the old categories of absolute command. In this line, the “name ‘Soviet Union’” 
became a “lie”, for the soviet system, the experience of councils – of workers, artists, 
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peasants, students – was brought into “impotence” by the one-party dictatorship.866 In 
Arendt’s view, the party-system and the one-party-dictatorship were equally 
inappropriate to deal with modern political problems, such as public alienation, decline 
of authority, social automatism, and individual withdraw from responsibility. In a sense, 
they reinforced these problems.867 So, for Arendt, adequate to the “federal principle, the 
principle of league and alliance among separate units”868 was the experience of the 
“councils”, the local assemblies of political participation and deliberation, typical of 
revolutionary moments as the commissions in Paris in 1848, the soviets of 1917, the 
Rätesystem created after the First War in German cities, the councils of the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956, and other locally-enacted gatherings of citizens.  
What was truly political in the council experience, according to Arendt, was not 
its capacity to solve problems neither to execute resolutions. There, “people who 
belonged to no party”, who “crossed all party lines” could come together “to act and to 
form opinion”.869 Flesh and bone citizens could enter power, experiencing action and 
forming their own judgements and opinions through public debate and deliberation. This 
no party-system, democratic or authoritarian, could do: represent one’s opinion, one’s 
own deeds and words in a public venture. In a framework like that of councils, one 
becomes a “participator”, not a “represented”. He counts as someone who is more than a 
vote, a statistic in a social trend, a member of a class of interest. Arendt took the opposite 
path of contemporary political theorists who assume that political institutions must be 
larger and larger in order to absorb millions and billions of human beings. For Arendt, 
expert decision, mass representation, diplomatic negotiations share the tendency of 
washing away citizens from spheres of power.  
Arendt refused to comply with the necessity of modern patterns, and their 
capacities to foment “sandstorms”. She recalled the elemental insight that freedom “has 
always been spatially limited”. Border of territories, walls of cities, and even international 
treaties establish spatial and institutional limits that create the “space of appearance” 
which Arendt understood also in literal terms: a space to be, to exist, to move and to speak 
among others. As most of our actual political institutions seem to be unable to solve the 
problems created within their own framework – why would, for instance, the party-
																																								 																				
866 Ibid., p. 250 
867 For a critique of the politically noxious role of parties, see: Weil, S. On the Abolition of All Political 
Parties. New York: New York Review Books, 2013 
868 Arendt, op. cit., p. 259 
869 Ibid., p. 255, 259 
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system, created in the context of class-societies, be adequate to a society lacking class-
structure? -, new political “oases” can only be established from outside the political status 
quo. Not every dissent, not every independent citizen can be said a pariah, but certainly 
pariahs – political, not only social pariahs – can start small revolutions with their 
participation in public affairs through alternative channels and renovated power-
experiences. As Arendt recalled, this requires the “courage”, the voluntary resolution to 
act and to take care of public matters, to be “self-selected” among those who are 
politically responsible. The pariah, with its capacity for independent rebellion and 
original judgement, is an example to recover a republican spirit in times when the 
common matter is mostly corrupted by the political establishment itself. By challenging 
mass societies, pariahs per force challenge the political structures created for its social 
functioning. 
** 
In this work, I have chosen an interpretative and explanatory approach to Hannah 
Arendt’s topics, and to related ones, preferring a positive dialogue with her terms, texts 
and examples. I did not try to problematize every concept or insight of Arendt, for she 
never aimed at building the vision of an universe with no “holes”, as Heine put it, or a 
scientific body analytically formed by logical units. Some of the perplexities in her 
thought are too obvious to be mentioned, especially if we remain aware that she sought 
“unfamiliar definitions to familiar words”. She did not take, for instance, representative 
democracy for granted; she avoided the correspondence between power and violence; she 
tried to think beyond the limits of the modern state; refused grounding political debates 
on an economical struggle between capitalism and communism. Arendt is of no help for 
a political scientist seeking tips on how to win an election, neither to a politician willing 
to mobilize the masses at any cost. She avoided the pseudo-scientific language of “human 
sciences” working, on the image of modern engineering, to “solve” problems objectively. 
By rejecting the dominant political notions and slogans of our epoch, she risked being 
called, as she was indeed, a nostalgic, outdated and utopian thinker. 
So the pariah can find himself as a melancholic figure, sometimes misunderstood 
by masses, perhaps too idiosyncratic to influence the game of politics, and certainly 
ineffective to produce certain social results. But that was ok for Arendt. She insisted that 
political speech, even political theoretical speech, was oriented to persuasion, to the 
possibility of a general “voice”, in Kant’s terms, not to an absolutely universal rule. In 
thinking of “oases” and “islands”, she knew that most part of human lives are spent in the 
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desert of necessities, in the oceans of needs, in the darkness of private emotions and 
feelings. Rejecting trends, unanimous opinions, and social moods was not a problem for 
Arendt – it was rather a political attitude in an age of thoughtless masses. Freedom is a 
possibility.  
Contrary to the opinion that Arendt’s political thought was useful only to 
totalitarian or proto-totalitarian situations870, some observations must be made. Even if 
the reality of the Lager and mass executions seems to be historically distant, totalitarian 
or quasi-totalitarian methods are still around us. Those who simply assume that there is 
no alternative to the terms and solutions held by the political status quo are deaf and blind 
to the most evident realities presented by public events everywhere: the crisis of party-
representation; the backlash of mass hysteria and mass irritation disguised with national, 
racial, chauvinist slogans; the growth of ideology-based movements and groups replacing 
persuasion and open-mindedness with terror and indoctrination; the naturalization of 
corruption as an abstract crime inherent to a social epoch, whose distinctions between 
private and public are ultimately dissolved; the danger of nuclear solutions to problems 
created by the diplomatic inability in tackling and mitigating political tensions; the reality 
of refugees, displaced and stateless persons, who become living-bodies with no faces, 
with no place in the world; the ever-growing crisis of natural environments, resulting 
from an uncontrolled invasion of the natural by the artificial, a sort of “virus” reproduced 
by actual patterns of production and consumption. It was no accident that The Origins of 
Totalitarianism became a bestseller after Donald Trump’s election. Arendt’s corpus is a 
substantial piece of political thinking, profoundly relevant for our days.     
With the eyes in the catastrophes of the 20th century, Arendt did not use the terms 
“ruins”, “hell”, “desert” in a strictly allegorical sense. In the 21st century, politics may 
become not only the realm where we define what life means, but if it means anything at 
all. I assume that the different, though related, meanings of the pariah as it was presented 
by Hannah Arendt – from the social outcast to the “scum of the earth”, from the rightless 
to the one who starts his own emancipation – are tied to the criteria offered by her for 
evaluating our political situation: are we, politically speaking, including more people? 
Are we creating world-institutions adequate to plurality? Are we enabling more people 
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que possa seriamente convidar os homens a abandonar sua preocupação com a segurança e o bem-estar”). 
Lebrun, G. Kant e o Fim da Metafísica, São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002, p. 57  
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and more groups to act? Are we making more room for symbolical, political, artistic “new 
beginnings”? Choosing the entry point of action and history, that is, describing and 
judging how the pariah appeared and disappeared in historical interactions, Arendt 
avoided a cold philosophical discussion on the logical – or illogical – relation between, 
let us say, identity and difference. Placing the pariah as an example for humanity, she 
definitely demonstrated, in historical and political interpretative terms, how world 
commonality can only make political sense, can only be integrative, real, experiential, 
and more stable, when it bridges the spaces between different, unique individuals, 
associations, groups, nations.  
Arendt’s friend and former student Leon Botstein, giving voice to many of her 
interpreters, indicated that she “never overcame the conflict between her idealized notions 
of common citizenship, natality, and solidarity, and her idea of an uncommon 
individuality.”871 As I tried to present in this work, she not only overcame this “conflict”, 
she made it a relation central to her thought. There is no conflict between the political 
interactions intended to bring together people who are unique and singular. Arendt’s 
project was mostly devoted to inspire and to realize human realities that, by not sacrificing 
what Lazare called the richness of humanity, its diversity, can establish better institutions 
and forms of relations for the permanent question of “human living together”.     
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p. 174 
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